

and C. Mockler; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BOLAND:

H.R. 13374. A bill for the relief of Sfc. Patrick Marratto, U.S. Army (retired); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BRADEMAS:

H.R. 13375. A bill for the relief of Christopher John Kyriazis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GATHINGS:

H.R. 13376. A bill for the relief of Fong Shu Shee, Fong Toy Hing, Fong Ng Shee, Fong Mee Yew, and Fong Buck Hoi; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PELLY:

H.R. 13377. A bill for the relief of Zacarias Quitoriano Montero; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13378. A bill for the relief of Expedito Soriano Angco; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13379. A bill for the relief of Demetrio Tabalon Morales; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. POLANCO-ABREU:

H.R. 13380. A bill for the relief of Dr. Arturo Brito Santos; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13381. A bill for the relief of Dr. Victor Luis Bienes Jimenez; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13382. A bill for the relief of Dr. Orlando De Varona De Zayas; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13383. A bill for the relief of Marcelino Suarez Pedemonte; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13384. A bill for the relief of Dr. Angel Rafael Marino Varona; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13385. A bill for the relief of Dr. Nis Juarez Fernandez; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13386. A bill for the relief of Dr. Mario A. Garcia Gamboa; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WALKER:

H.R. 13387. A bill for the relief of Dr. Julio Epifanio Morera; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

170. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Henry Stoner, Avon Park, Fla., relative to NASA appropriations; to the Committee on Appropriations.

171. Also, petition of the city of Brentwood, Calif., relative to tax sharing; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

172. Also, petition of city of Oroville, Calif., relative to tax sharing; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

173. Also, petition of city of Brea, Calif., relative to Government tax sharing; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

SENATE

MONDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1967

The Senate met at 10:30 a.m., and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

O Thou God of love and hope, through all the length of changing years Thy goodness falleth never.

In a day so full of fear and threat, save

CXIII—1777—Part 21

us from any panic of spirit, because our inner strength is drawn from deep wells.

With the light of Thy wisdom and strength of Thy grace, enable those who in these baffling times have been entrusted with the stewardship of the national concern, to be true servants of Thine in the welfare of Thy kingdom's cause.

Help us to remember that we are Thy children and belong to Thee, who hast set a restlessness in our hearts, and made us all seekers after that which we can never fully find.

Deliver us from all malice and contempt lest we hurt others and sour our own souls.

Hear Thou our prayer as out of the depths we cry, asking for wisdom and strength as we bow at the altar stairs which slope through darkness up to Thee.

We ask it in the dear Redeemer's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, October 6, 1967, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LIMITATION OF STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the remarks by the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] there be a time limitation of 3 minutes on statements with relation to routine morning business.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION TODAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees, except the Committee on Finance, be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield without losing the floor?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be not charged to the time allotted to the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT].

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Spong in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

VIETNAM

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, for the past several weeks, several Senators from both parties have commented, in major speeches, on the prosecution of the war in Vietnam. Some of their speeches represented a distinct change of opinion and contained rather severe criticism of the conduct of the war.

Since I am frequently asked what this means for the Republican Party and what my own personal opinion is, I wish today clearly to define my personal stand.

I do not believe that the individual view of any of us who are members of the Republican Party can validly be interpreted as an expression of party position any more than the variant views within the President's own ranks represent Democratic policy. I wish the Republican Party were solidly united on the issue of Vietnam, but I do not think it vitally significant that it is not. There is room for honest dissent and full respect for the opinions of others.

I say this because I want it clearly understood at the outset of my remarks that I am not trying to start an argument with or to denigrate the views of other members of my party. Nor am I attempting, at this time, to predict what the Republican Party, assembled at its national convention in Miami next year, will decide in presenting its foreign policy positions on Vietnam and Asia generally; nor, for that matter, what the Democratic Party, assembled at its national convention in Chicago next year, may decide with regard to its foreign policy positions.

I can say only where this Senator stands.

I wish first to speak in behalf of the Office of the President of the United States because its present occupant has, on the subject of Vietnam, been the target of a torrent of criticism—some of it proper, and some of it, in my view, beneath the dignity of his office.

My deepest concern, as I look at the position of my country in world affairs, is with the integrity and prestige of the Presidency. I believe it is imperative that we do not undermine the stature of the President as Commander in Chief and as the Nation's chief diplomat.

As a legislator, I, of course, would not downgrade the role of Congress in the formulation of our foreign policy. As a Senator, I share the jealousy of all my colleagues in the Senate's right to advise and consent. The President is, however, as John Marshall said in 1799, "the sole organ of the Nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." In the eyes of the world from beyond our borders, it is the President who is the focal point when America is the subject of attention. Loyal American support of Presidential action in resisting aggression must not be misunderstood or underestimated by friend or foe. Our resolution in support of our policies, if received with skepticism abroad, can

only make more difficult our political and military commitments. I realize that on several occasions the President has been charged with lack of candor with respect to the war in Vietnam, leading to much debate over a credibility gap. Seeking neither to excuse nor exculpate the President from his responsibility here, I can understand why those charged with the formulation and conduct of our national security policies might become overzealous in their efforts to withhold from our adversaries what they regard as vital information. The present administration has at times seemed obsessed with secrecy, even in solely domestic matters. This can be remedied by greater candor with the American people within the legitimate bounds of national security.

Meanwhile, I reiterate my own trust and confidence in the President in his prosecution of our basic strategy in Vietnam, because I know that he is not deliberately trying to deceive the American people on such a serious matter.

I respect the President for the majesty of his office. I use the word "majesty" not because I am a monarchist nor because I think the present occupant of the Presidency is regal. I use it only to convey some sense of the aura that surrounds the office of the Presidency.

It is, in this spirit, that Clinton Rositer wrote:

The Presidency . . . unites power, drama, and prestige as does no other office in the world. Its incumbent sits, wherever he sits, at the head of the table.

I would also like to quote McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, from an article which I inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on May 17. He was speaking of guidelines for debate on Vietnam. He said:

We can have only one President at a time. If you accept this rule, it applies to questions of diplomatic negotiation, of command decision and of national political leadership. It confers no immunity from criticism and no requirement of support. Yet it does set the President apart—in our interest, not his own.

When we undermine the stature of the Presidency and derogate from the prestige of its occupant, we do a disservice to ourselves, our political parties, and our Nation.

Turning now to my position on Vietnam, I support the basic policy of the U.S. Government with respect to Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Our Government has repeatedly and, in my opinion, convincingly declared that we seek no permanent military bases nor any other territory on the Asian mainland—nor, for that matter anywhere in the world. Nor do we seek subservient allies on that continent—nor, for that matter, any other continent—nor to impose our way of life on any of its peoples.

Our objective in Southeast Asia, as in every other region of the world, is peace. We believe that the absence of armed hostilities or of the threat of force will enable the emerging independent countries of this region to develop their nationhood in such ways and with such institutions as are appropriate to the historical traditions and present needs of their people.

The indispensable prerequisite is peace. Regrettably, there is no peace today in Vietnam, or, for that matter, in neighboring Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, either. This tragic situation is not the result of American policies or actions. Rather, it is the consequence of a conscious decision, made many years ago by the Communist Governments of North Vietnam and China, to extend dominion over these countries by force and violence, in flagrant contravention of widely accepted principles which are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and in callous disregard of the desires of the people of these countries to be left alone in peace.

What North Vietnam is doing, and has been doing at least for the past decade, is to engage in sharp aggression. It may not be as clearcut as the attack of December 7, 1941, on Pearl Harbor. It may be cloaked under the euphemistic term "war of national liberation," but it is aggression, nevertheless.

I must support our policy with respect to Vietnam and the basic military and diplomatic strategy designed to achieve its objectives. I know of no better alternative. The origins of the American commitment in Vietnam and the size and intensity of the commitment may be debatable by some, but the fact is that we are quite definitely committed. The presence there of over half a million young Americans is evidence enough of that commitment. The question is not what we should have done, but what we must do.

My views have undergone no change. I believe we must pursue any honorable means to bring the aggressor to the conference table and I welcome any move, anywhere, any time to bring this terrible war to an end. Our objectives, and the nature of our commitments in Southeast Asia are peace, an independent South Vietnam free to decide its own destiny, and an honorable withdrawal of U.S. forces as soon thereafter as possible.

We have another commitment of a different kind, and that is to the American servicemen who are daily risking their lives in this beleaguered land more than 10,000 miles from home. We cannot falter in our support of those men.

We must use such force as may be required effectively to protect our men and to achieve our committed objectives. I believe the President and his advisers, armed with the knowledge available to them and burdened with the responsibilities, are presently pursuing the only course currently open to us.

While I feel there has been some change of attitude in my constituency away from approval of the conduct of the war, I have nevertheless had no advice or information which puts me in possession of a better course of action. I have talked to a number of members of the armed forces who served in Vietnam and they do not appear to me to share the sentiments of those people at home who would favor withdrawal into enclaves. Nor has any soldier yet spoken to me or written to me asking that we stop activity against the enemy which restricts that enemy's ability to kill American soldiers.

I add that we have recently completed

a battle under the classic enclave theory at Conthien, with dreadful casualties on both sides; and if ever there was a demonstration of the illogicality of the enclave theory generally, it has been in the effective, to all intents and purposes, necessity for fighting out of an enclave at Conthien.

I am for constant, zealous, continuing negotiation and for cessation of hostilities as soon as reasonably possible; but I want some indication of good faith from the other side before we let down our guard and stand by while the enemy sends in more arms and ammunition with which to kill more American boys.

I know that there is frustration and dissatisfaction in all parts of the country over this war issue. Polls and surveys indicate increasing disapproval of present action. I do not think that this is valid justification for attacks upon the President, especially in the light of the absence of alternative courses of action based on anything more substantial than a desire to get it over with and the hope that the other side will behave like good fellows.

I am certain that the majority of the American people, despite their confusion and impatience, support American objectives and will continue to insist on maximum support for U.S. forces, especially if the administration repeatedly and candidly articulates its policy in terms which every citizen can understand.

The war in Vietnam is not, and must not become, a political issue. It would be unwise to seek political gain from involvement of American servicemen in this far-off land. It would be wrong for the loyal opposition so to misconceive its role as to become a peace-at-any-price party. I, for one, would find it impossible to explain such a party position to members of the Armed Forces who have been sent to Vietnam partly as a result of my vote. Nor would I be easy in my own conscience in supporting a peace-at-any-price position. For each Member of Congress is charged with responsibility in this matter.

Congress has helped define our policy toward Vietnam. Congress has endorsed it on a series of votes running from the Senate's approval of the SEATO pact in 1955, through the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, and up to the recently enacted defense appropriation bill. When the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was being debated, I asked Senator FULBRIGHT, its floor manager, for confirmation of his earlier assertion that the resolution did not limit the right of the President to repel any attack or further aggression within the areas described by the resolution. Senator FULBRIGHT's answer was quick and affirmative.

None of us could foresee then that the United States would be faced at the turn of that year with the imminent collapse of the South Vietnamese because of vastly intensified North Vietnamese infiltration. This action forced us to intensify our effort to defend South Vietnam. Like it or not, we did walk smack into a national commitment. I therefore, do not agree with those who would now have the President and Congress back away from their responsibilities.

I do not believe that I misconceive the

role of the loyal opposition. There are legitimate areas where that opposition should argue such considerations as who is to be included in negotiations for peace, and candidly discuss with the American people the pros and cons of the use of more or less military force, and other such matters of legitimate concern. On the most fundamental issues of the war, however, I must support the Commander in Chief. There can be, for me, no other consideration.

I personally, do not enjoy defending Lyndon Johnson. I am a partisan and I know the vulnerabilities of the other party. As a member of the opposition in 1968, I will vigorously support my party's candidate and will criticize the Democratic administration in every area where I feel criticism is deserved—and the list is long. I will do everything in my power to make sure that this country has a new Commander in Chief.

Wherever proper, I will be a partisan advocate for my party's stance within the competitive framework or our two-party system. But I will not play Parcheesi with the war.

Above all, I shall continue to plead for trust in the President out of the deep conviction that the maintenance of trust and confidence is essential to the integrity of the office, at home and abroad.

In short, I continue to support the President in his conduct of the war. If I knew a better way to end the war, I would recommend it. If a better alternative comes along, we would all welcome it. Until better solutions are offered, if they are, I am not going to add to the burdens of the Presidency in this frustrating unpopular war.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the able Senator yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I am very happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from California.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, my friend, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, has made a stimulating and effective contribution to the debate on American policy in Southeast Asia. I find myself in a wide measure of agreement with much of what he has said, and I congratulate him.

The truth is that America's defensive and deterrent power has had a marked effect on Communist North Vietnam and, consequently, on the course of this conflict.

The other day when I made some comments on this general subject, I quoted some of the leaders of free countries in Southeast Asia and beyond, each expressing his profound concern over the implications of any precipitate change in our Asian policy. This is the view, I believe, my friend, the able Senator from Pennsylvania has expressed today. I simply want the Record to show my very high esteem for the Senator, and my congratulations for his comments.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, yesterday the Washington Post published a lead editorial entitled "Which Defense Minister," in which the editorial went on to say:

On the same day that Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister of North Vietnam, was quoted in Hong Kong dispatches as say-

ing the war would be protracted. Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Defense Minister, told the United Nations in New York he was confident that a halt in U.S. bombing would lead to peace.

Another comment in the editorial was:

We will be well advised to make no plans for peace and no plans for war on either the hopes of Swaran Singh or the warnings of General Giap.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial to which I have referred printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, one of the points which the able Senator from Pennsylvania makes is that those who seek to advocate a change in our policy must carefully weigh the effectiveness of our military effort up to the present moment. There is a grave hazard of throwing away what has already been gained. If America were to change its course and, if the new direction were to be proved wrong, the advocates of the new policy would be forced to give way to their opposition, and whatever alternatives they have in mind. In the meantime we might all wish to be back where we started. But, by then, it might be far too late.

In sum, I think I may truthfully say that I am in widespread agreement with my friend, the able Senator from Pennsylvania, as he exercises, as many of the rest of us have, a constitutional right of free speech, recognizing, nevertheless, that this country is in danger and that there is only one national leader in time of crisis, the individual who holds that responsibility under our Constitution.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1967]

WHICH DEFENSE MINISTER

On the same day that Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister of North Vietnam, was quoted in Hong Kong dispatches as saying the war would be protracted, Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Defense Minister, told the United Nations in New York he was confident that a halt in U.S. bombing would lead to peace.

That presents the government and the people of the United States with a choice. They can believe either one they wish to believe. Since it is Giap and not Singh who is in command of the North Vietnamese armed forces there is a certain practical consideration that invests Giap with the higher degree of credibility. Sardar Swaran Singh tenders a conjecture founded upon unnamed sources obtained in unspecified places and uttered at times not disclosed.

If the Swaran Singh forecast suffers the debility of anonymous speculation, however, the Giap summons to a longer war and ultimate victory is also a little mortgaged by the conventions of diplomatic necessity. Whatever the North Vietnamese intend to do, they certainly will indicate an intention to fight on forever until five minutes before negotiations.

So neither defense minister really proffers any very dependable basis on which to make a forecast or on which to found a policy. We will be well advised to make no plans for peace and no plans for war on either the hopes of Swaran Singh or the warnings of General Giap.

Many would like to respond to the hopeful conjectures of Swaran Singh by suspend-

ing the bombing; and others would like to respond to the bellicosity of Vo Nguyen Giap with increased bombing. There is a longing in the country for a change in our predicament in South Vietnam. It probably would be politically rewarding to respond to it with a dramatic suspension of the war or a dramatic escalation of it. But our course should not be set by every rumor from abroad or every clamor from at home. It must be set by the necessities of a war that is waged for limited ends by limited means. In such a war, the impulse to escalate hostilities is bound to alternate with the impulse to suspend them.

The hope of the country lies in the government having the wisdom to appraise all such conflicting counsels by looking beyond immediate to ultimate objectives. Those who wish to suspend military operations must be required to offer something better than mere conjecture as to what will happen after the suspension of bombing. The failure of such a suspension to elicit any satisfactory response from North Vietnam would produce a very dangerous situation. It could have direct and tragic consequences to combat troops in Vietnam. And it could produce in this country, after an interval of frustration and rising anger a demand for a resumption of hostilities at a level of intensity unprecedented in this conflict.

Those who counsel immediate escalation of the war also must be required to offer something better than mere conjecture as to what will follow the resort to their proposals for a wider war.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I am immensely grateful to my distinguished friend, the senior Senator from California. He and I, along with most of the Members of the Senate, have served in uniform at one time or another. We did not spend much time in an awareness of the political faith of the Commander in Chief. We were mostly concerned that the Commander in Chief would know what to do to help us to get out of the darn thing.

We were also primarily concerned that the Commander in Chief would be able to do this without incurring too much difficulty either outside or inside of the country.

Having been suffused with that feeling in a couple of wars, I am trying to reflect what I believe is the feeling of a great many of the veterans of Vietnam. I am trying to do it as tactfully as I can because I want to be neither enthusiastically embraced from one side by bear hugs nor criticized from another by those with whom I am in disagreement.

After 25 years of service in the Congress of the United States, I recognize the honor and the obligation of each Member to speak out. As I speak out, I am filled with affection for all of my brothers who may at times feel it necessary to disagree with me.

On the 9th of November I shall have dinner with Foreign Secretary George Brown of Great Britain. After talking with people of that country and of our country, my understanding is that, notwithstanding what we hear in party conventions or read in the papers, most of the people I meet are saying, "Get on with it. Get the war over. But do not listen to the people who would have you do something which either would be dishonorable to the United States or would diminish the effectiveness of your commitment."

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I express my thanks to the Senator from Pennsylvania for the service he has rendered, not only to his party but also to the country.

I ask the Senator if there would not be the danger, if the Republican Party were to become the peace-at-any-price party, that this action might be construed by Hanoi as an encouragement to keep their military effort against us in Vietnam on as high a level as possible with the hope that if they might be able to hold out until November of next year, the Republicans could offer them a thinly veiled surrender or some sort of face-saving accommodation that would allow them to achieve their objectives there anyway.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Texas has made a perfectly valid point. I hope that in neither party would any group or faction arise to assume leadership who would be identified as a peace-at-any-price faction, a group which would attempt to make the question of peace or war a national issue in this oncoming political campaign. Goodness knows, enough things are going to be said. We will indulge in a great deal of philippic and partisan oratory.

I am trying, while we are still cool, to nail down the point that the Presidency, especially in its role of Commander in Chief, is so respected that Hanoi will never be able to say of either political party that it has anything to gain by waiting until after our national elections in November 1968.

I do not want our elections in any remote sense to give the slightest idea of that or to infer that to the people in Hanoi who are conducting this dreadful series of aggressions against relatively defenseless people who only want to be left in peace and free.

I may add that I was in Iceland during the occupation; and, with the tail-wagging friendliness of the typical American in his first attempt to visit a country in a military capacity, I talked to some very literate Icelanders. I asked, "Aren't you glad the Germans didn't get here to occupy this country?" They said, "Yes. We want to keep them out."

Then I asked them, "What do you think of the Americans?" They said, "We wish you would go home, too."

This has been my experience in Japan, in Iceland, and in many places in between. There is not a people in the world who do not wish that other people would stay out of their country.

But we were asked in. And we are there. It is my judgment that we must do what is necessary effectively to maintain that commitment. This is all I am arguing. It is also my judgment that, in the course of our differing opinions—which I respect—we should always, and with great respect, bear in mind the symbolic significance of the Presidency in the eyes of the world beyond our boundaries.

Mr. TOWER. I believe that the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in

his remarks this morning, has restated what should be the national objective—that is, that we are not in this business for our own territorial aggrandizement. We are trying to help create a climate in which self-determination is possible for these people, in which they not only can aspire to it but also have some hope of realizing it.

I wonder whether the Senator does not feel that, if around Communist China there are a number of Asian states in which there is an expanding social, economic, and political progress, ultimately there will exist in that area a climate hostile to the fomentation of so-called wars of national liberation.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes; I believe it exists. And while I have heard Senators say—I had such a debate recently—that an enormous body of public opinion in the world tells us that Ho Chi Minh is ready to talk, on the contrary, I am aware that Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand and the leaders of the Philippines, of Japan, and other countries in Asia—nearly all of them, with the exception of one large country in that area—tell us publicly that we are doing what we have to do.

So, I do not believe the body of opinion is as great or as overwhelming as it sometimes is represented to be. Whether they are right or wrong, our task is to decide whether we are right or wrong.

I have joined in proposals designed to facilitate the end of the war. I joined last May with the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. PERCY] and the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] in a nine-point statement of principles on Vietnam proposing Asian initiatives and similar suggestions.

I know we all are anxious to do anything which will further an honorable negotiated settlement of the war. But for the purpose of this occasion, I have tried not to offer alternatives or to debate the issues of how we might do this or that in order to get out, but simply to urge that we remember that while the loyal opposition can be a raging torrent, it should rage within well-defined banks. I hope that we have good flowing and strong currents and that they will lead us somewhere to the sea. But I do not want us to overflow our banks.

Mr. TOWER. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania. I believe if we should be irresponsible in making a political battle of aspects of this war, the American public would find us out. I believe that the stance the Senator from Pennsylvania has taken has given the responsible opposition a good image. The Senator from Pennsylvania has done a great service to his party in this connection, and I believe he has done a great service to his country, in pointing out the necessity of avoiding any sort of political activity that would undermine the President of the United States in his capacity as Commander in Chief and chief diplomat of the United States.

Mr. SCOTT. I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Illinois.

Mr. PERCY. I, also, commend the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania for his comments this morning and for the spirit of those comments. I have enjoyed working with him for many years in Republican policy matters. I recall his distinguished service to the Republican platform committee, of which I was chairman in 1960, when he served as general counsel to the platform committee. I found him a source of inspiration and enlightened reason, and at times that year we engaged in some heated debates expressing differences of opinion among Republicans on both foreign and domestic affairs.

Mr. SCOTT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. PERCY. But we came out of it with what we considered to be a highly responsible statement on which we all united.

The distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] was a part of that platform formation. We held differences of opinion on certain critical key issues. I believe the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania will recall that the distinguished Senator from Texas moved the unanimous adoption of that platform, and we thus decided to unite around a body of statements with which none of us agreed totally, but which we felt embraced, in overall perspective, a responsible position for the Republican Party to take in 1960 on many issues facing the Nation.

It is for this reason that I am confident we will find a responsible position that we can take in the very critical issue in Vietnam. As I have listened to the comments of my colleagues on this side of the aisle—for all of whom I have the highest regard and respect—I know that there has not been the slightest political motivation on their part in raising the honest differences of opinion that they have, on a matter that involves the future well-being of this Nation and of the free world.

It is for this reason that three Republican Senators decided to sit down together last May to see whether we could agree upon a common program or principle on Vietnam. I have just taken from my files the statements on Vietnam made by Senator JAVITS, Senator SCOTT, and myself on May 2, 1967, which were prepared for distribution to the Republican policy committee, to see whether or not at this time, many months later, with the millions of words and the many events that have transpired in the meantime, we do not accept these as cardinal principles to which we would hold today just as firmly as we did last May 2.

Senators JAVITS, SCOTT, and PERCY agreed at that time as follows:

1. We accept and support the U.S. commitment to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of South Vietnam so that the South Vietnamese may freely determine their own destiny.

2. We express our pride in the valor and spirit of our men in arms who fight this battle in Vietnam for all of us.

3. We urge the Administration to persevere in greater efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the war. We should not allow battlefield successes to divert us from the pursuit of such a settlement.

4. We support the stated goal of avoiding a widening of the war and we caution the Administration against initiating actions

that are likely to lead to the introduction of Communist Chinese armed forces into Vietnam.

5. Since the war in Vietnam cannot be won by force alone, we urge greater efforts by the Administration to assist the South Vietnamese towards social, economic and political reform and development with special emphasis on the establishment of a government in Saigon with popular support as a result of the forthcoming elections. We point out, however, that this "other war" is primarily the responsibility of the South Vietnamese themselves, and we caution the Administration against any tendency to make it an "American" effort.

6. Debate of the issues on their merits is essential to a free society. We deplore criticism and acts which are irresponsible as much as we deplore attempts to equate responsible criticism with disloyalty.

7. We look with favor upon developing regional cooperation among Asian countries in the hope that through their cooperative efforts at self-help they will become much more self-sufficient economically, politically and militarily.

8. We note a sizable credibility gap between the Administration and the American people, and we call for candor on the part of the Administration in its public expressions and explanations of U.S. policy and actions in Vietnam.

9. We must emphasize and encourage Asian initiatives in finding a solution to the war. In this connection, we must encourage and seek Asian support also in non-military areas to help the people of South Vietnam and to put other nations more squarely with us in reaching the objective of a free South Vietnam.

I wish to say to the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania that I found these nine points to be exceedingly important principles that helped me anchor down positions I have taken in the intervening months. I do not believe I have taken any position at any time inconsistent with those nine points, which I reaffirm just as strongly today as I did at the time we agreed upon them.

Mr. President, I express my gratitude and commendation to the Senator from Pennsylvania for working with me and the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], which demonstrates that we can have areas of agreement where we can take responsible positions and hold to those positions in an effort to have as united an approach to a complex problem as we can. I have not seen the slightest evidence at any time with respect to any of my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle or, for that matter, on the Democratic side either, to in any way use the war for political motives and purposes. What we say is said from deep conviction and belief and out of love for country and dedication to our constitutional duties and responsibilities.

I thank my friend and esteemed colleague, the Senator from Pennsylvania, for his responsible comments this morning, so characteristic of him.

Mr. SCOTT. I am most grateful to the distinguished Senator from Illinois for his comments.

I agree that he and I and all of us are trying to make the same points here. I think the nine points that he, the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] and I agreed on in May have worn very well. I stated earlier that I had not changed my opinion. I think that the Senator from Illinois and I are in the position that we

have been indeed consistent. Since we made those observations there have been elections in Vietnam which indicate that the democratic process is working there as well as possible under most adverse conditions in time of war—especially given Vietnam's lack of a democratic political tradition—and surely better than some had conceived. We have recently received greater cooperation from other Asian countries in Vietnam. The Government of Thailand has contributed military and other assistance. So I think that the principles enunciated in our statement of May 2 are wearing well.

I echo what the Senator said. At no point do I so interpret any responsible comments or criticisms of the conduct of the war, or any honestly expressed difference of views because I think it is essential that we have that which we do have, the opportunity to vent opinions here, in the hope that those areas of dissent will be helpful to the President in his burdensome responsibility of conducting our foreign relations, and where our area in the Senate is one of advise and consent.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I am sorry that I was not here for the delivery of the Senator's speech. I think it is a most important speech. I welcome him to the ranks of those who have been and are being heard on the floor of the Senate on this matter. It seems to me there is nothing more important in the world than our conduct of our relations and our policy in Southeast Asia at the moment.

I am sure that in some quarters the fact that the Senator has taken the floor and made the remarks he has made will be regarded as further evidence of division among the Republicans, especially among the liberal Republicans; and possibly someone will point to the fact that now we have a former national committee chairman who is a dove, and he is balanced by the emergence of a former national Republican chairman who is a hawk.

Mr. SCOTT. Actually, I am not a hawk. I just do not want to be a pigeon.

Mr. CASE. This is the point I wish to comment on, if the Senator has a little time remaining, to develop an approach of reality as opposed to romanticism, and getting solutions, as opposed to dividing the country and the party.

The reason I welcome the Senator's speech, and I wish he were going to be around for the next couple of weeks so that I could continue the dialog with him, is that his is a most important voice and it has been during all of the period of his public service in probing to get at the facts of the situation, whatever the matter at issue may be. This is my interest.

I think the Senator has made note of a very useful point in stating that the main question is not how we got into this thing. We are there and our choices are limited.

Of course—and I do not think this can be said too often, but it can be misunderstood—we support our forces and the military as long as we have them there. They receive our full support whatever one's views may be about the wis-

dom or nonwisdom of the fighting. Therefore, that we must support our troops is no argument for one position or another about the war. I think it is well to lay that aside, as the Senator has done by implication, if not directly.

The point I wish to make is this. I, too, agree that the question is not whether we should have gotten in or not; it is not whether President Johnson is the big villain here or whether it is some predecessor in that regard. I think he had fewer options when he took office than perhaps any of his predecessors with respect to Vietnam, and I have said so.

Mr. President, the question is what we are doing there and should be doing; what is possible and what is not possible to accomplish in Vietnam; and are we going about it in the soundest way.

Because the Senator is so much in touch with all developments in the political world, especially, he is very conscious and knowledgeable about the Ripon Society. The Ripon Society is a group of people, I think largely Republican, but more independent than anything else, from the intellectual community in New England, with membership spreading over the country. The Ripon Society has recently issued a research paper in connection with Vietnam.

I would like, if I may, and if the Senator will indulge me, to ask that that paper and its accompanying analysis be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of the discussion today, because it will be helpful in the consideration of this matter.

Mr. SCOTT. The Ripon research paper is an excellent and thoughtful proposal.

Mr. CASE. I have made reference to the Ripon Society paper because I hope to make that the basis of a good many discussions about what goes on in Vietnam.

The real question is, Are we using the best tactics in Vietnam? Are we rightly or wrongly trying to help this present government establish itself as a highly centralized government in Saigon? Are we or are we not requiring our influence to be placed on the side of that government which has the best chance to win the allegiance of the people of Vietnam? These are questions that my friend from Texas and I will agree are important. None of us will basically disagree about military matters. All of us would say, as I say, that the military people are the ones to decide how that should happen.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. I wish to say to the Senator from New Jersey that I believe in democratic institutions and I believe every country should have them. Our objective must be to help create a climate in which democratic institutions can develop and they can establish self-government. This is my objective and I think it is the only justification for our being there.

Mr. CASE. I appreciate the comment of the Senator. It is in line with my thinking. We may have disagreements, for example, about whether bombing in a certain area is wise or not wise, productive or not productive, but those are matters apart from the broad policy we

are all trying to pursue here, although the matter has been clouded by the tendency of everybody to cast us either in the camp of the doves or hawks, to either get out or destroy everything. If there is anybody in the Senate who belongs in either of those categories, I have yet to discover who it would be. That kind of categorizing only clouds and makes more difficult the solution of our problems over there.

We do have tough problems when we are dealing with a society as old as this one is, and as unlike our society as this one is. It is almost impossible for us to understand it. We are going to have great difficulties. The only justification, it seems to me, for a discussion of this sort is not that Senators may run the war, because Senators are not competent to run a war in the military sense, but Senators are supposed to be men of some intelligence and men possessed, above all, of the belief and governed by the principle that the facts are what count.

It seems to me very desirable, since the Senator's speech had been publicized—not by him but by the new media—as a “hawkish” speech, that we get as much of the characterization out of the thing and as much of the hard facts into it as we can.

I close by saying that for myself I shall continue to try to find out what the facts are and how we are actually doing. The Evans-Novak column the other day discussed a little phase of this thing—that is, the difference between statistics in their quantity and in their quality as regards Vietnam, and the accomplishments of the pacification program.

Well, this is another phase of the matter. It is very difficult for us in the Senate to get the kind of facts we must have in order to judge and guide policy and determine the success of the conduct of that policy; but I have a feeling that this debate must continue until all the facts are laid bare as to the success we are having in South Vietnam, or the lack of it, not just on the military side—although that is important, too, of course—but in the way of helping the South Vietnamese to establish a nation. That is the whole of the question.

I have some question as to the so-called pacification program. It is not something we can say is good and we must support it. I think there are many questions about whether, for instance, pacification as now conceived amounts to much more than a gigantic welfare program and attempting to buy support by tossing in a lot of money. I shall support those efforts to help South Vietnam in the hamlets, villages, sections, and different regions of the country to help themselves develop under a local autonomous system.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. I would certainly agree that the wrong approach would be the welfare approach, where we simply go in and give them bags of rice or build a school for them. That is not the approach we are taking. I think we are taking essentially the right one, although progress has not worked out as much as we thought. Nonetheless, I think the orientation is right, to the extent the mili-

tary is involved, because the whole idea is one of self-help. In other words, to help them acquire the materials and then let them build the school, to show them how to get the maximum utilization out of their land and then let them take care of it. A good example is the Marine lance corporal, from the 4-H Club in Illinois who showed them how to get the most out of their pig farms.

That is an important thing we are doing there. It contributes to developing a viable and progressive economy in that country. Progress is slow, of course, but we are making it and I think that this is the way the program should be oriented.

I should like to say this: Our military men are making every effort to see that the pacification program succeeds not just from the standpoint of a self-help program, and for economic development, but also from the standpoint of developing native leadership.

As the Senator from New Jersey knows, France not only did not encourage the development of native leadership but she actively discouraged it. Of course, before these people can handle free institutions, they must be educated to it. They have to have not only the quality of leadership, the capacity for leadership, but also the capacity to understand the responsibilities of leadership.

I pay tribute to our servicemen in Vietnam, and to the AID personnel team out there, which I think is the best we have anywhere in the world, in trying to orient the program in this direction.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I shall not trespass further upon the time of the Senate, but I do think colloquy of this sort should be indulged in more, if I properly sense the mood of the Senate, and I know my own intentions are to try to make contributions as much as I can. But I want to say this, that any suggestions—and I have said it before—that a discussion of the wisdom of what we are doing, the facts of our operations and our success or nonsuccess, the way in which this whole matter is being conducted, in frankness and openness on the Senate floor, or anywhere else, are harmful to our success and can produce only aid and comfort to the enemy, is something which I repudiate down the line.

The only way we can be sure we are doing the right thing is constantly to examine it, not with any suggestion that we are going to cut and run, or pull out, but it is a question of being on the right track.

I think that much of the romantic idea that we could, by our massive efforts, quickly change the whole character of South Vietnam and Southeast Asia and win this thing, has been wrong and that we are coming quite soberly to a much wiser view in government, I hope, and I certainly think in the country.

Mr. SCOTT. I thank the Senator. I am not arguing for indiscriminate or indiscriminating support of our course of conduct in Vietnam, nor am I making any point in derogation of any Senator whose position may differ from mine. I think we are learning from the various pro-

posals offered in this Chamber. I do not believe that we should be set against one another by easy labels or quick and inappropriate definitions.

I would prefer that it be understood we derogate neither from the responsibility of Senators to advise and consent nor from the responsibility of the President to conduct the war.

Mr. President, much of the controversy over our conduct of the war in Vietnam stems, in my opinion, from fundamental disagreements over the historical background to the present hostilities.

Those who believe that the war is a civil war and a popular rebellion would profit, I believe, from studying the comments of Canada's distinguished Foreign Minister, the Honorable Paul Martin, which are contained in a comprehensive review of the Vietnam situation and of Canada's role therein which Foreign Secretary Martin presented on June 10, 1965, to the Standing Committee on External Affairs of Canada's House of Commons.

I ask unanimous consent that excerpts of Foreign Secretary Martin's statement be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, it is noteworthy that Canada, as a noncombatant, has no special ax to grind in the war in Vietnam, but, as a member of the international body charged with the enforcement of the 1954 Geneva accords, she is in a position to give informed and objective assessments of events in Vietnam.

EXHIBIT 1

To solve a problem it is first necessary to understand it. I would like to speak about the nature of the problem in Viet Nam as we see it. No one is happy about the situation in Viet Nam. We all realize the dangerous implications if there were to be an extension of the conflict or a wider participation in it. It involves three of the most powerful nations in the world, including the most powerful nation in Asia and the most populated nation in the world. There is no doubt about the stakes in this situation. However, we have to look at all aspects of the problem in order to be able to fully understand it and to fully respond to it.

I hope it is clear that the position of the Canadian government as a non-combatant, as a member of the Commission, is to do whatever it can to try to bring about pacification. We have had a long experience in Indo-China. We have been on the Supervisory Commission with India and Poland for 11 years. This has given us an opportunity of objective assessment; it has given us a responsibility which we have to discharge in accordance with our international commitments.

To state that what is happening in Viet Nam is “an internal rebellion plain and simple” is clearly at variance with established facts which indicate beyond a shadow of a doubt that the essential element has been North Vietnamese interference, limited at first, but growing steadily in scope and intensity.

In the midst of the lack of experience in self-government in South Viet Nam, following the Geneva settlement of 1954, the Communists were able to build the subversive movement now known as the Viet Cong and it was able to flourish only because of the material support and political direction it received from outside.

When I came in here this morning I

thought carefully whether, in this committee, I should go further. I have gone thus far; but this is the best opportunity we, as a government, have yet had to put before a proper body of our parliament the facts involved in our stewardship as a member of that Commission. While I appreciate the risk involved in this aspect of my presentation, I feel there is a duty to put the following facts before this committee and I propose to do so.

Some people contest the claim that North Viet Nam has been deeply involved in or indeed has instigated the war in the South. They say there is no evidence to show any involvement on the part of North Viet Nam and that thus the claim of the United States of America and indeed other countries, like Australia and New Zealand, which now are involved, that they are helping South Viet Nam resist outside aggression, falls to the ground. This argument, I believe, is inadequate in its basis and is dangerous in its impact.

The evidence has not always been adequately presented. Here, of course, security factors are involved; but the evidence does exist, I assure you, and in quantity. Those who argue that North Viet Nam never has been interfering in the affairs of South Viet Nam are ignoring, for example, the conclusion on this question of the International Commission in its special report of June 2, 1962. In this report India and Canada agreed there was evidence to warrant the conclusion that North Viet Nam had, in violation of its obligations under the Cease Fire Agreement of 1954 encouraged, sponsored and supplied activities aimed at the overthrow of the authorities in the South. That special report of 1962 also said other things about the situation in Viet Nam. I want to say more about that later on. For the moment I simply wish to point out there has been an impartial international judgment on this matter and that that judgment is against North Viet Nam. That judgment was pronounced by members of the International Supervisory Commission, by majority composed of India and Canada, and other member of the Commission, of course, being Poland. However, this problem did not come to an end in 1962 with this report; on the contrary it has continued to exist and in fact its scope has increased seriously, and so has the evidence for this claim.

I tabled the special report in the House in March. It is available to the members of the committee and I think it is indispensable reading in order to fully understand the situation in this very complicated and regrettably dangerous matter.

Now to understand the situation confronting us in Viet Nam, I think we must uncover some of the vast complicated history of that little country. It is precisely because so many of these complexities seem to be lost sight of, or disregarded, in assessing the problem that I wish to point out now some of the relevant factors as I see them.

By the end of the Indo-China war in 1954, during and prior to which France had unsuccessfully tried a variety of constitutional arrangements for Viet Nam, two governments had been established in Viet Nam, both of which participated in the Geneva Conference, and both of which claimed to speak for the people of Viet Nam.

On the one hand, there was the regime of Ho Chi Minh which had begun as an anti-colonial resistance movement—the Viet Minh—under Communist leadership. This leadership quickly established its control over all elements in the movement. Although it was active during the resistance to the Japanese invasion, the Viet Minh cannot, in point of historical fact, be given credit for driving the Japanese out of Viet Nam in 1945. The Viet Minh had been formed in May, 1941, when the Indochinese Communist Party, having decided on a National Front policy, made approaches to various non-Communist

groupings. During the war, the Viet Minh aided the allies by providing some intelligence information, distributing propaganda, and organizing the odd attack against the Japanese. At the same time, however, the Indochinese Communist Party consolidated its control over the National Front, eliminating or out-manoeuvring the plethora of disorganized non-Communist nationalist groups. In March, 1945, the Japanese, fearing an allied landing, wiped away the facade of Vichy-French administration. The French army was interned (and remained so until the allies landed to disarm the Japanese), and the French administrators were arrested.

Thus, when Japan suddenly collapsed in August, 1945, catching the allies unprepared for the political consequences which were to follow in all of southeast Asia, a vacuum was created in Viet Nam which the Viet Minh rapidly sought to fill. Two days after the Japanese capitulation, the Viet Minh appeared in Hanoi. Refraining from any attacks on the Japanese, the Communist-led movement concentrated on driving other nationalist movements from the streets of the city. Encountering no resistance from the disorganized non-Communists, from the now uninterested Japanese or from the still imprisoned French, Ho Chi Minh formed a provisional government on August 29, in which the Indochinese Communist party or the Viet Minh held all key posts.

This is, of course, a very condensed view of the vastly complicated period of history in Viet Nam associated with the collapse of Japanese rule. I have for lack of time omitted reference to the role of the Chinese in this period, the re-entry of the French and their unsuccessful attempts to work out an accommodation with the Ho Chi Minh regime. I have mentioned the role of the Viet Minh vis-a-vis the Japanese because this matter was referred to in the House recently and because I wished to point out the movement's origins and the fact that it first came to prominence through the creation of a power vacuum, not through an anti-colonial war. That came later.

Of course, any member of the House of Commons has the duty to put on the record the facts as he sees them. It is equally the duty of those of us who, in the government, have information to give it and that is what I am now doing here. There was no adequate opportunity to do it in the debate in the House.

But to return to the two Viet Nams at Geneva in 1954. The second Vietnamese voice was that of the Southern regime based on Saigon—the State of Viet Nam as it was called at the time, to which the French had granted full independence at the beginning of the conference. The Southern government, while no less anti-colonial than the Northern, was at the same time anti-Communist not only for ideological reasons but also out of the fear that a Communist Viet Nam might become little more than a protectorate of China, a fate which the Vietnamese have always feared and rejected, as a small nation living close to a larger and more powerful one. Once again, however, it is important to get the historical facts accurate if the problem is to be understood. Although the presence of big powers has been a factor of considerable importance throughout Vietnamese history, it would be an error to see that history as one long struggle against foreign aggression. The Chinese were driven out of Vietnam in 939 A.D. China continued to exert pressure on Viet Nam but Vietnamese independence was maintained until 1407 when Chinese rule was restored; this period lasted for only twenty years and in 1427 Vietnamese independence was reasserted. The Viet Nam of the time however was not of the same territorial dimensions as today and the period following the last defeat of Chinese rule is characterized by the extension of Vietnamese rule southwards, and

by contending Vietnamese dynasties. National unity became established only in 1802, but this unity was forged in feudal, dynastic warfare, not in anti-imperialist struggles in the usual sense of the phrase. Although the French had begun to show a colonial interest in the Indo-China area somewhat earlier, it was not until the 1880's that France succeeded in establishing her rule throughout Viet Nam. It is therefore not really accurate to refer to a brief period of freedom enjoyed by the Vietnamese people in the latter half of the nineteenth century when the Chinese Empire was receding and before the French arrived.

I have given some account of these historical factors—and the summary is by no means complete and could not be in the time available—partly because I wished to have the record straight on certain points and partly because I believe it is essential to understand that the division of Viet Nam is not something created by the West in its own interests, but is something which represents the polarization of Vietnamese political forces into Communist and non-Communist sectors.

It is essential, moreover, to understand who was represented at Geneva in 1954 and who agreed to what before passing judgment on what has happened since then.

The settlement reached in Geneva in 1954 comprised two main elements—a Cease-Fire Agreement, signed by the French High Command of the day and the Peoples Army of Viet Nam (the Viet Minh), and a Final Declaration. The former document is a military agreement providing for regroupment of forces and spelling out other provisions looking to a separation of combatants and a freezing of their military activities and capabilities. The Final Declaration, on the other hand, was essentially a political document. It is there that we find references to the fact that the 17th parallel is not to be regarded as a permanent dividing line, and to the prospect of nationwide elections in 1956.

I will just make a parenthesis here. You will recall that about a week ago the Chinese Peoples Republic announced that this dividing line need no longer be recognized. I expressed some doubt that there would be public support given to this position of the Chinese Peoples Republic willingly or quickly by the government of North Viet Nam.

It is certainly clear that those who drafted and signed these documents anticipated that a permanent settlement would probably amount to the Viet Minh establishing its control over the whole territory of Viet Nam.

The important part of this analysis, however, is the phrase "those who drafted and signed" the Geneva documents. Realizing only too well what the objectives of the Viet Minh leaders would be, the South Vietnamese leaders rejected the terms of the Geneva settlement, before these documents were signed, on the grounds that the division of Viet Nam was inimical to the interests of the Vietnamese people because under these terms half of Viet Nam was turned over to Communist control. The stand of the Saigon government—and it must be remembered that it was a newly independent political entity trying to resist the attempt of larger powers to impose their terms of settlement on it—was spelled out in a separate declaration issued by Mr. Tran Van Do, who has most recently re-emerged on the Vietnamese political scene, where he is now Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of South Viet Nam. It might be useful if this declaration could be made available to members of the Committee because it clearly indicates that the government of South Viet Nam did not support the Geneva settlement and, it must also be remembered, neither did the United States.

The rejection of the political portion of the Geneva settlement by the South Vietnamese government and the reason for it is often lost sight of by those who criticize the

Salmon government as a creation of the Americans and as a political entity which is alleged to continue in existence in violation of the Geneva settlement.

Having rejected the terms of the Geneva settlement before it was signed, and having explicitly reserved its right to safeguard its own interests, it cannot—as was argued the other day in the House of Commons—be convincingly accused of violating international obligations. To argue otherwise would be tantamount to saying that the great powers should be able to impose their will on a small and weak state. In fact, there is evidence that the division of Viet Nam was a bargain struck at Geneva between the French and the Chinese, the two traditional "imperialist powers" in Viet Nam. This division was accepted by the North Vietnamese because they thought it would be temporary and that they would subsequently get what they wanted—the whole of Viet Nam—by the kind of elections which were imprecisely referred to in paragraph 7 of the Final Declaration.

The South Vietnamese believed that such elections would amount only to a facade for a Communist takeover, and rejected the whole idea from the beginning.

I remember discussing with President Diem the question whether we should continue to maintain the Commission in Indo-China or whether the time had come for the holding of elections, as was envisaged in the Geneva settlement. He reminded me then, of course, that South Viet Nam was not a party to the settlement, and also that there was need for the Commission to maintain its presence until such time as a truly objective election could take place. I am not trying to suggest that this was a correct position for him to take, but I do give it as part of the impressions that I have in my mind, naturally, as I try to assess this situation.

While reaffirming their belief in the territorial integrity of Viet Nam, the South Vietnamese maintained that nationwide elections looking to the reunification of Viet Nam would be meaningful only if they were absolutely free, and with a Communist regime installed in Hanoi this condition seemed unlikely to be fulfilled in that half of the country. I myself found this confirmed when I spent three days visiting the million refugees just outside of Saigon. They had come from the North. They were mainly Christian refugees who had fled just as others in Europe have fled, from what they thought was the dangerous encroachment of a Communist power.

It is well for us when we are considering this situation to think that there are many parallels to what is happening in Asia today and what happened in Europe that brought about the creation by us of a defensive organization known as NATO to provide for our security. The absence of this kind of arrangement, and an effective kind of arrangement, in Asia today is one of the gaps, and it is one of the reasons perhaps why this situation exists at present.

This stand was consistently maintained by the government of South Viet Nam. The election envisaged in 1956 in the settlement (which had not been signed by the South) did not take place. There were, however, elections within South Viet Nam itself, on a South Vietnamese basis rather than on a nationwide basis.

As the French withdrew from Indo-China in the years immediately following the Geneva settlement, it became clear that the government in Saigon had no intention of passively accepting the absorption which Hanoi had planned for it. There were few observers at the time who expected a life span for the Saigon government of more than a few years. Where Hanoi had inherited the traditions of a victorious struggle against colonialism, Saigon inherited a legacy of collapse and defeat. Since Hanoi had been the administrative centre for the French admin-

istration in Indo-China, Saigon found itself with little political experience and without even the physical facilities for an effective administration. But South Viet Nam not only survived, it began to make tangible social and economic progress, partly with outside help but mainly through the determination of the South Vietnamese population itself. This population had by this time been swollen by the million refugees I mentioned a moment ago who chose not to live under the Communist regime in the North. The fact that this mass migration took place—often under the greatest hardship and in the face of active opposition from the Communist authorities—is reflection enough on the contention that the Viet Minh had the wholehearted support of the Vietnamese people. No one who could have seen the plight of these refugees could have believed that there is as much credence as some people give at the present time to a distinction between the ideological motive of the Communist in Asia and the Communist in Europe. Realizing that the administration in the South was not going to collapse or allow itself to disappear as anticipated as a result of manipulated elections, and indeed that it showed signs of economic progress beyond anything that had come about in the North, the Hanoi regime decided that a more active and aggressive policy was required in order to establish the control of the whole country; this had been denied by South Viet Nam's refusal to implement terms which the North had agreed to at Geneva but which had—I repeat—been then rejected by the South.

One of the basic stipulations of this Cease-Fire Agreement was that there should be a total regroupment of forces, with the French withdrawing into South Viet Nam and Ho Chi Minh's armies into the North. Unfortunately, the North carried out its obligations only partially, leaving behind—this is based on evidence dealt with by a Committee of an International Commission of which Canada is a member—secret caches of armaments and military personnel who shed their military identification and melted inconspicuously into the countryside, ready to organize political action or to resume hostilities if necessary. The fact that the Northern regime intended to interfere in the South was first made public, although very few people have paid attention to this, in a statement of the Vietnamese Workers Party in July of 1954, just at the end of the Geneva Conference.

In part this statement asserted, and I quote:

"Naturally, at a time when our troops and our administrative authority are being withdrawn towards the North, the Party members and co-patriots in Nam Bo—that is South Viet Nam—will continue to remain in the zones on the other side. The war-mongering elements seek to sabotage the Armistice and re-establish a state of war. Our compatriots and our members must continue to wage a hard struggle.

The Party must struggle; its duties must remain with the people educating them, unmasking all activities of war-mongers, maintaining the influence of the Party and the government with the people, and winning the respect of the mass for President Ho Chi Minh."

Translated from the usual Communist terminology, this statement clearly means one thing. It means that Northern agents would be left in the South to disrupt the government there. This residue of men and arms provided the basis for the beginnings of a Hanoi-directed aggression in the South.

As a partial take-over was seen to be improbable, innocent villagers were terrorized into providing shelter and food for the guerrillas and into helping them to finance their operations. The first target was usually the village administration officer whose murder could be seen as an effective challenge to the government's authority and a demon-

stration of what happens to those who refuse to co-operate.

In speaking of instability in Viet Nam, in arguing that the Viet Cong have been supported by the peasants, these basic facts must be kept in mind; the Viet Cong has deliberately literally murdered hundreds of trained and responsible administrators. In these circumstances it must be admitted that the phenomenon of instability must be judged cautiously. Similarly, peasant support for guerrillas, which is won by murder and intimidation, is not the same as support which is spontaneously given in the exercise of free choice as we know it.

Now, the suggestion has been made that the government of South Viet Nam has never been able to hold anything but the cities because it has not enjoyed the support of the people. This was argued in the House of Commons, and this is believed throughout this country, as I see in my correspondence. Control of the countryside in South Viet Nam has always been a problem for the central authorities, as might be expected in an underdeveloped country where geographical obstacles are great and communication facilities are limited.

Even the Communists with their police-state apparatus have had to face revolts in the North, and fairly recently. Large areas of the South Vietnamese countryside regularly pass from government to Viet Cong control and back again depending on the local military conditions. Most observers of the Vietnamese scene claim that the peasants want nothing more than to be left alone. However, when they are subjected to techniques of blackmail, assassination and torture by marauding Viet Cong bands, as the Prime Minister of New Zealand pointed out recently in a statement on Viet Nam, it would be an extraordinary act of local defiance to withhold co-operation. Co-operation given in this manner however is vastly different from the sort of popular support which critics of the Southern position in Viet Nam seem to assume the Viet Cong enjoy.

Gradually, in the years after 1956, the scope of these terrorist activities increased to the point where the South Vietnamese government, with the limited resources at its disposal, was unable to cope with the problem of guaranteeing the security of its people against this kind of subversion. In these circumstances the South Vietnamese government did what any government confronted with these problems would do: It appealed for help in the exercise of the legitimate right of self-defence. This is permitted under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. To this appeal the United States responded affirmatively, at the same time making it clear that when the need for military help ended, it would be terminated.

These then, are the basic elements in the historical evolution of the dangerous situation confronting the world today in Viet Nam. Steadily increasing interference by North Viet Nam in the affairs of the South has led to the steady increase of the United States presence. It is imperative that the two should be seen together if our analysis of the problem—let alone our prescription for its remedy—is to have any meaning. These developments have been a source of direct concern to the Canadian government right from the beginning. As a member of the International Commission in Viet Nam we have a firsthand and independent experience of the failure, on all sides, to live up to the terms of the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement which it is the Commission's task to supervise but not to implement. I repeat, that if all sides were to live up to the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement of 1954, we could have peace in that area. There are instruments provided in the Agreement for dealing with grievances. However, if there is no disposition to live up to an agreement, a country like ours has no power, certainly by itself; to enforce it. And

so, we must observe and report the situation—in terms of violations of the agreement—as we see it. I think that to the best of our ability under the successive Canadian governments we have done so and we will continue to do so in the hope that the objective and impartial discharge of our responsibilities in the face of facts available to us may go some distance towards focusing international attention onto all the disturbing factors in the situation and persuading all those involved to face up to their own responsibilities for the generation of this tension and conversely for its relaxation.

In the Commission's special report of June 2, 1962, an Indian-Canadian majority presented a balanced assessment of what had been happening in Viet Nam where violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement by both sides were producing a dangerously unstable situation. Since that report was published, the situation has deteriorated even further, as we feared it would in the absence of corrective measures applicable to all violations of the Agreement. The intensification of activities in violation of the Agreement led to the Commission's special message, dated February 13 of this year which, together with the 1962 Report I tabled on March 8. It gives, as Prime Minister Wilson has said, a balanced picture. I would point out that of those countries with whom we are associated in the NATO alliance, no one country has publicly taken a position basically different from the position taken by the government of Canada. This is not without its significance. Since there has been some misunderstanding of the minority report of February 13 presented by Canada, I want to add a few comments by way of clarifying our position.

The Canadian minority statement represents our assessment of the facts available to the Commission in Viet Nam. It was submitted for reasons arising out of our conviction, based on more than ten years of experience, that to report on only one aspect of the situation in Viet Nam, to deal publicly with only one set of violations of the Agreement, is seriously to distort the assessment of the situation.

It has been argued that the Canadian statement condones the policies of South Viet Nam and United States authorities in bombing North Vietnamese installations. I do not know how anyone could possibly come to that conclusion. The sole purpose of the Canadian statement was to augment the presentation of facts in the Indian-Polish report with other and equally significant material including a direct reference to the South Vietnamese authorities' explanation of the events in question.

Our Commission colleagues had been unwilling in the opinion of the Canadian minority report to take these relevant facts into account; this made it necessary for us to do so in order to restore the sense of balance on which the 1962 report was based, but which the majority report in the 1965 message lacked.

If we had signed the Indian-Polish documents—and we did not disagree with the facts which it reports—without augmenting it, we might have run the risk of having the Commission convey the impression that the situation described in the 1962 report had changed; that the only violations of the Geneva Agreement since 1962 had been the air strikes against North Viet Nam, and that therefore responsibility rested on South Viet Nam and the United States for the danger of wider hostilities.

Well, in our statement I think we have indicated that this would clearly present a false impression. There is no change in the nature of the situation but rather there has been an intensification of the same factors as were noted in the 1962 report.

This leads me to make a few brief comments on the contents of the Canadian statement and the materials on which it was

based. The first half of the statement relates to the conclusions of the comprehensive legal study prepared and re-edited within the Commission. I discussed this at some length in the House of Commons on March 8 and I explained the nature of this legal submission. What I said then may be perhaps read with what I am saying today.

The second section of the Canadian statement, in referring to recent allegations of Northern aggression, did not purport to be Commission conclusions. Rather, this section was intended to demonstrate that the Commission had, since its special report of 1962, continued to receive serious allegations, the gravity of which was indicated by references to the substance of the complaints, of Northern aggression in the South. The Commission has not given these matters the attention they deserve, it has not established to the best of its ability whether the complaints are supported by sufficient evidence to warrant the Commission drawing firm conclusions comparable to those concerning the earlier cases in the special report.

To ignore these problems by failing to report that they are and indeed have been before the Commission for some time would be to create a seriously distorted image of the full range of violations of the Geneva Agreements of which the Commission has had knowledge.

I am sure that members of the committee will agree that this would be an intolerable deviation from the impartial and objective approach which I am satisfied beyond any doubt Canadian representatives both civilian and military on the Commission have sought to follow since we accepted this responsibility in 1954.

Far from justifying or condoning the policies followed by one or the other of the parties, or both, we have attempted—and when I say we, I mean the Canadian members of the Commission, some former officers are here today sitting against this wall, who spent many difficult months under trying circumstances in Indo China—to take cognizance of all the relevant facts and to impart a sense of balance to the picture presented to the international community at large by the Commission.

Now I believe that if we are to understand what is at stake in Viet Nam, we must realize that this is no local rebellion arising mainly out of agrarian discontent with an unpopular government, although undoubtedly it contains some of these elements, and in sufficient degree to lend an air of credibility to the argument of those who would so convince us.

It is not uncommon to hear claims made that the Liberation Front—the political organization of the Viet Cong—and its leadership are drawn from a broad and representative stream of South Vietnamese dissenting opinion, not all of it Communist or even pro-Communist.

For example, it is sometimes asserted that the leader of the Liberation Front is not a Communist. As far as I can judge, this is largely a matter of speculation, and I have material on which to judge, because he is a shadowy figure seldom seen except by Communist journalists such as Wilfrid Burchett. For a political figure who is reported to control the greater part of the country and to command the allegiance of many people, he, no less than his organization, are shadowy presences indeed. As a movement, the Liberation Front has no acknowledged headquarters. Indeed I doubt whether many people even today know the leader's name. That his opposition to Diem was responsible for his leaving Saigon is indisputable, just as it is in the case of prominent figures in the present South Vietnamese administration headed by Dr. Quat, who was likewise an opponent of Diem but whose opposition did not take the form of joining the Viet Cong.

Similarly, it was recently asserted that

Hanoi had no more control over the Viet Cong than Stalin had over Mao Tse-Tung. Now, this is a categorical statement made about a relationship, the nature of which deliberately is kept hidden. However, available evidence suggests that precisely the reverse conditions obtain. In this connection the comments of the Viet Nam Commission's legal committee, as quoted in our minority statement of February 13, are of direct relevance.

Now, I have gone into the background of some of our experiences on the Commission in this detail because I thought it important for the committee to understand why in a matter of this grave situation simple solutions will not do, attractive though they may appear.

I would not want anyone to think that in the last portion of my presentation I have sought to give the impression that our approach to this problem was that of a blind protagonist; it is not that at all. We have a responsibility on the Commission, and I have a responsibility on behalf of the government, to accept the submissions of that Commission or to reject them, and I have seen no reason for taking the latter course. Therefore, I felt it was my duty to at least take this opportunity, the first in some time, to put on the record our assessment of some of the factors; but I would not want this assessment in any way to becloud what I said at the beginning.

We appreciate the dangers involved in this situation. We recognize that it would be tragic if this situation in Viet Nam were to expand, if it were to involve more vigorous participation by other countries. I have no reason to believe that there is any evidence that this will be the case, but in this day when war should no longer be an instrument of national policy it is difficult for a country like Canada, subscribing as it does to the United Nations Charter, to see this kind of conflict being pursued. We have to bear in mind the consequence of capitulation or of defeat for either side. We must bear in mind the advantages of proper accommodation, perhaps through negotiations, without any preconditions, so that we might reach a stage of settlement in an area of Asia which vitally affects strategically not only the mainland but some other countries with whom we have closest Commonwealth association. I repeat, we are doing everything we can do. I asked myself this morning is there anything more that we, as a nation, can do, having in mind our responsibilities and our over-all obligations and interests, to try and bring about a cease-fire. I can only say I do not know of anything more that we can do. But, I do know we are not going to stop doing what we are doing.

I regret that the United Nations is not capable of intervening in this situation. This is not because of any act of ours, but there is a constitutional and financial crisis which has crippled its effectiveness in this kind of a situation. The Prime Minister has suggested that if a conference took place and conclusions are reached about an independent or neutral Viet Nam, in order to give substance to that conference arrangements must be made to provide guarantees for the observance of the commitments reached.

We have the experience of violations of the 1954 Agreement almost right away, infiltrations beginning from the North, with all the consequences that confront the world today. In view of the mistakes in Asia it would not be realistic for the west and for the nations of Asia, to assume that a final settlement can be reached in the absence of some kind of sanction, some kind of guarantee. The Prime Minister suggested that the United Nations normally would be the body to whom would be assigned this responsibility, but for the reasons I have mentioned this is not practical and there would thereby repose on the international community a

responsibility to provide that kind of guarantee. This, I think, is a minimum requirement. But, it will not be easy because this kind of a presence depends in the final analysis upon the acceptance of all the parties concerned, and without their consent such an arrangement is just not practical even though it is undoubtedly desirable.

Then, I would like to say we have given consideration to the suggestion of the President of India, Mr. Radhakrishnan. His proposal for an Asian-African force or presence differs from our Prime Minister's in the fact that while we were thinking of a presence after a conference as a means of guaranteeing the terms of settlement, the President of India was thinking in terms of a presence that would intervene before any conclusions or any settlement was reached.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I yield.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I wish to compliment the able Senator from Pennsylvania on his well-reasoned and thoughtful speech.

In his speech, he has very appropriately taken a phrase out of a statement made by the great Theodore Roosevelt, who said:

The things that will destroy America are prosperity at any price, peace at any price, safety first instead of duty first, the love of soft living, and the get-rich-quick theory of life.

No one will misunderstand the able Senator or doubt his loyalty to his own party, either now or in 1968.

It should be an inspiration to men and women of both parties to see that the Senator places his country above his party. This is as it should be.

We live in a time when members of both parties should rally behind the Commander in Chief, regardless of the political affiliation of that Commander in Chief; because, above all and beyond all, the long-term security interests of the United States are at stake in Vietnam. Those interests outweigh by far the interests of any political party or group.

Unity in America, as much as or more than anything else, will speed the day when the fighting will cease and American boys can be brought home.

Mr. SCOTT. I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I believe it was Gen. Robert E. Lee who, if I may paraphrase him, said, "There is a true glory and a true honor—the glory of integrity of purpose, and the honor of duty done." This is what all of us seek to live up to as an ideal.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a request?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to

the Senator from New Jersey without losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, a few moments ago I asked consent to have printed in the RECORD a research paper by the Ripon Society. I found that, under the request of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD], this had already been done on October 4. So I withdraw that request, and ask only that the summary which the Ripon Society made and released at the same time be printed.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RIPON STUDY OUTLINES REPUBLICAN ALTERNATIVE ON VIETNAM—RIPON SOCIETY PROPOSES CONFEDERAL STRATEGY TO REDIRECT VIETNAMESE WAR, CALLS JOHNSON POLICY A "FIASCO" AND A "FICTION"

(NOTE.—The Ripon Society will hold a conference with the press to discuss its Vietnam paper on Tuesday, October 3rd at 10:30 am in the President's Room of the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. Mr. Lee W. Huebner, President of the Society, and Messrs. J. Lee Auspitz and Christopher W. Beal, co-authors of the Vietnam Statement, will represent the Society at the conference.)

(The Ripon Society is a Republican research and policy organization composed of young members of the business, professional, and academic communities. The Society has chapters in Los Angeles, New York, New Haven, and Boston. Its national headquarters are located in Cambridge, Massachusetts.)

The Ripon Society published today a Vietnam proposal which, it suggested, could become the long sought responsible Republican alternative to President Johnson's war policies.

The current issue of the Ripon forum, circulated to all Republican Senators, Congressmen, Governors, National Committeemen and Presidential hopefuls, presents a comprehensive study which concludes that the United States:

Adopt a decentralized "confederal" strategy in Vietnam.

Redress the imbalances between our war making and our peace making bureaucracies. Implement reforms to restore Congress to a proper role in foreign policy making.

The Society stated that the Republican party, if it presents a responsible alternative on Vietnam, can and should be returned to power in 1968.

The 30,000-word Ripon document outlines a Republican alternative on Vietnam that it claims will deal with the dangers of America's present course. The Society listed the dangers as: wasting American men and resources; turning South Vietnam into "a nation of thieves and beggars;" drifting towards war with China and the Soviet Union.

The Ripon Society calls its approach "a confederal strategy" to contrast it with the Johnson Administration's attempts to set up a centralized government in Saigon. This "fiction" of centralized democracy, it says, is doomed to failure because of the strong local, ethnic and religious differences in South Vietnam. The Ripon study shows that non-Communist forces are fragmented into many jealous groups that cannot be ruled from Saigon.

It enumerates these groups as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, mountain tribesmen, Coastal Buddhists, ethnic Cambodians, ethnic Chams, and Catholics (who are themselves divided by geographical origin). In a series of statistical tables it shows that the Saigon government does not have full control even of these rock-bottom non-Communist forces and the 1.8 million refugees generated in the last two years of fighting.

THREE PHASES

The Forum study shows that the loyalty of these groups could be assured by conceding political powers to local leaders instead of the Saigon-appointed administrators who now hold sway. These leaders, it says, "hate the mandarins and army of Saigon just as much as they hate the Communists."

In its first phase, Ripon's confederal strategy would offer guarantees of local autonomy to non-Communist groups who maintain internal order and report infiltrators. Sample measures include provincial and district elections, direct access to U.S. aid, use of ethnic languages in primary schools, local administration of land reform, local taxing powers, local control of police and militia. Such arrangements, the Ripon study shows, have already been promised in many areas and could be turned into formal agreements almost overnight.

In its second phase, a confederal strategy offers the same framework to villages where Viet Cong and non-Communist leadership exists. This, Ripon concludes, would divide the loyalty of many Viet Cong cadres from the Communist hierarchy.

Ripon summarizes a number of scholarly and semi-official studies showing that many cadres are more concerned with their village role than with the ultimate Communist aim of winning the entire country. A framework enabling non-ideological cadres to keep their functions as village organizers in return for a cessation of anti-government activities would cripple the Viet Cong effort elsewhere in the country, it claims. Ripon concludes: "A confederal strategy would promote factionalism in the Viet Cong and unity among non-Communists; the present policy does the reverse."

In its third phase, confederal bargaining would be extended to hard-core Viet Cong areas. It would offer Viet Cong leaders control of their enclaves in the countryside as part of a national settlement. The Ripon study sees no hope for meaningful negotiations with the Viet Cong during the coming year because of U.S. elections and the lack of unity among non-Communist forces in South Vietnam. It calls instead for "piecemeal" and "local" negotiations to provide a basis for ultimate national negotiation.

MILITARY MEASURES COORDINATED WITH POLITICAL AIMS

Ripon charges that present military policies are wasting American lives because they are not coordinated with realistic political goals. It says that military planners have not come to grips with the true nature of the war. "Unlike World War II and unlike the Korean engagement, Vietnam is largely a counter-insurgency war." Most of the enemy is already within South Vietnam it says. "Even if North Vietnam were bombed to rubble," Ripon asserts, "the war in the South will continue." It estimates that to root out Viet Cong cadres will require two million allied troops; American troops have not yet ventured south of the Mekong River, it says. If they do, the manpower requirements will skyrocket.

Ripon asserts that present bombing policies also risk the loss of more American lives. It makes these points:

Heavy "interdictory" bombing South of the 18.5 parallel has failed to stop the North Vietnamese from paving a road, storing large quantities of supplies, and installing missiles in the A-Shau valley within South Vietnam. There is a real danger of invasion of the northern provinces of South Vietnam, and the military emphasis on bombing leaves us unprepared for this. Military spokesmen have not mentioned this failure to the public.

Present punitive bombing of the Chinese railway into North Vietnam will ultimately bring the Chinese into the war. The railway line is not merely a supply line to Hanoi; it is also the only link between China's Yun-

nan Province and the rest of China. A measure of its importance to China is that the Chinese had 40,000 paramilitary technicians working on it before the most recent bombings. Ripon charges that some within the administration don't care about Chinese intervention, since they are anxious to preempt China's nuclear capacity.

Heavy bombing of Haiphong will lead to a confrontation with the Russians who are committed to preserving the integrity of shipping to North Vietnam.

All present policies, Ripon concludes, lead to a widening of the war "on the installment plan." Even present patterns of refugee generation threaten the creation of an additional 4.5 million refugees in South Vietnam during the next three years. These refugees will have to be supported by American funds.

Ripon charges that Vietnam is not worth sending millions of American troops to the Asian mainland to continue unrealistic policies. It calls for a "hard decision" between countering invasion and countering insurgency. Since the insurgency problem would require millions of men, Ripon opts for using present troops to defend areas which demonstrate allegiance to Saigon in a confederal framework. It calls for heavy de-emphasis on bombing north of the 18.5 parallel. "The upper limit of the American commitment has already been exceeded. . . . An honorable approach can be found that will reduce American troop commitments in the long run."

"A confederal strategy," it says, "is designed to reduce the American commitment in installments much as the present policy is destined to escalate it by installments."

INABILITY TO WAGE PEACE

In the final section of its study Ripon reviews the long-range problems that have allowed our "misconceived policies" to go unchecked. The first of these is "an administrative imbalance between our ability to take military risks and our ability to take political risks." The FORUM study charges that reforms in the Defense Department have given military planners a bureaucratic advantage over the cluster of civilian agencies charged with economic and political elements of foreign policy. As a result, "blind bureaucratic momentum" shifts policies in favor of solutions recommended by the Defense Department. This explains why "American policy can drift towards military solutions where political ones will suffice; American youth can die because its elders lack decisive civilian leadership."

"It is meaningless for officials to talk of America's desire for peace and for a 'political solution', so long as administrative means to implement these hopes are not known to exist," the study says. It charges that there has been no public indication of contingency plans for a realistic settlement in Vietnam.

CONGRESSIONAL WEAKNESS

The Ripon study also shows that Congress has been unprepared to check the Executive Branch on Vietnam. "Congress has had neither the staff nor the machinery to assert its prerogatives in the making of Vietnam policy. Its right to be consulted has been compromised into a right to ratify. . . . Congress' right to know has been reduced to the right to be briefed."

The Ripon study says that President Johnson has tended to exploit Congress' weaknesses by a style of "secrecy and silence." It accuses him of relying on a "contrived atmosphere of crisis" and of blizzarding Congress with questions, "the answers to which are predetermined by carefully controlled briefing."

REPUBLICAN RESPONSIBILITY

Because of the weakness of Congress and failure of the President to reform and coordinate civilian policy-making agencies,

Ripon charges that Vietnam policy is made by a "self-entrenching bureaucratic coalition that cannot be reformed from within." It calls for partisan action by the Republican Party to correct the "fiasco" of American policy in Vietnam.

Republicans, the Ripon study says, can grasp the realities of local politics in South Vietnam and need for checks and balances in Washington. It charges that "the best men and the best minds are not making this country's foreign policy."

"In 1952," it concludes, "the Republican Party demonstrated its ability to extricate the United States from a war on the Asian mainland. 'The issue now is whether the American people think our present course in Vietnam is worth more deception, more resources, more lives. If they do not, there is an alternative.'"

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the order of Friday, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], for a period not to exceed 1 hour.

THE ABM DECISION—A \$5 BILLION INVESTMENT IN AN INEFFECTIVE SYSTEM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, today I desire to address the Senate on the decision of the administration to deploy a so-called thin anti-ballistic-missile defense at a cost of \$5 billion.

I submit that from the evidence it is clear that this vastly expensive new weapons system essentially contributes nothing to this country's security. I urge the administration to reconsider its decision, which I believe to be wrong on three counts—militarily, economically, and diplomatically.

The best arguments against ABM deployment have been made by Secretary McNamara himself. The Secretary pointed out in his San Francisco speech that there is no ABM system which can be built—no matter how much we spend on it—which would not be, and I quote the Secretary's own words, "ineffective against a sophisticated Soviet offense." Even if we were to spend \$40 billion or more on a so-called massive system, the resulting increase in our security against a Russian attack would be zero, according to the Secretary of Defense. The result would be a waste of a great deal of money at a time when the war in Vietnam is costing us \$2½ billion a month, when the President is asking for new taxes to offset a growing budget deficit, and our crucial domestic programs are being reduced to support the increases in the military budget. What would we get for our money? A very expensive flying "erector set" which the Russians could easily and cheaply overpower by increasing their offensive missile striking force.

The argument that the so-called thin system is justified by the approaching threat of Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles simply does not hold up. We have the capacity to devastate China many times over if her leaders should be so foolish as to initiate a nuclear exchange with us, and the Chinese know that. That fact is at the heart of the deterrence policy which has guided American military strategy since the beginning of the nu-

clear age. Our strategy has been to deter a first strike against ourselves by making it plain to any would-be aggressor that our second strike against him would be utterly and horribly devastating. Is there anyone who seriously believes that the Chinese Government would not be effectively deterred by that prospect?

I discussed this subject informally the other day with the President's scientific adviser, Dr. Hornig. After he said he agreed thoroughly that there was no point in building an antiballistic missile system against a possible Soviet threat—in other words, he agreed with Secretary McNamara—I said to him, "Well, if it would not be any good against the Russians, why do we need it against the Chinese?" "Well," he said, "the only basis is that maybe the Chinese are more irrational than the Russians, and, of course," he said, "that is not a scientific problem; that is a question of political judgment."

I think it is perfectly clear that practically everybody except the military-industrial complex, which would profit from the building of this system, is of the view that to build the system against the Chinese, realizing it is no good against Russia, just does not make any sense at all. I think there is no one who seriously believes that the Chinese Government could be effectively deterred by an anti-ballistic-missile system.

The second flaw in the argument is the assumption that a thin ABM system would be effective against the Chinese for any appreciable period of time. Even if it is conceded that a thin defense system would be effective against a Chinese offensive missile system which was still in its primitive stage, it is obvious that once the Chinese develop their rocket force beyond the primitive stage our ABM system will not be effective. If the Chinese get their rocket assembly lines going, and develop multiple warheads and penetration aids, they will be able to overwhelm our outmoded ABM system just as the Russians could overwhelm it today.

How long would that take? Secretary McNamara pointed out that the Chinese are devoting very substantial resources to the development of both nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems. Every time our experts have tried to predict the next advance in Chinese weapons development they have been wrong—the Chinese have moved faster than we expected. No one can say how long the period will be between the time the Chinese deploy their first primitive system capable of threatening the United States, and the time they have developed a larger and more sophisticated system capable of overwhelming first our thin, \$5 billion ABM system, and ultimately even a massive \$40-plus billion system.

The third fallacy in the logic is the assumption that even during the so-called "safe period" in Chinese nuclear development, we would be genuinely safe from a Chinese nuclear attack behind an ABM defense. There are many ways of launching a nuclear attack that an ABM is helpless to deter. A Chinese submarine could perhaps deliver a low trajectory rocket which would sneak through our radar screen, just as the Israeli Air Force

sneaked through the Egyptian radar defenses. The Chinese could detonate a nuclear bomb underwater near our west coast—again from a submarine, or even from a trading vessel—where the prevailing winds would sweep the cloud of deadly radioactivity ashore. Or, James Bondish as it sounds, miniature bombs could be hand-carried into our cities in suitcases and detonated. If the Chinese are foolish enough to risk the total devastation of their country by launching a rocket strike against us, what is keeping them from attacking us in any of these ways? The answer is obvious—deterrence, effective deterrence of all forms of nuclear assault.

The inevitable conclusion is that the proposed thin \$5 billion system simply will not do the job which its proponents say it will do. That, of course, is bad enough—squandering \$5 billion of the taxpayers' money on a useless system is no light matter. But the problem is worse than this. For there is, as Secretary McNamara said, a "mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry." That mad momentum, generated in part by the decision to go ahead with the deployment of a thin system, is already gathering force, as the Secretary foresaw, and as indeed I warned him in a letter I wrote to him on June 15, 1967, in which I said:

As a practicing politician, I would like to comment on this proposition that the United States should build and deploy a "light" ABM defense. In my own view, I see no way of holding back pressure for a full or "heavy" ABM defense once a "light" system has been installed.

There is plentiful evidence that the curtain has already gone up on this new tragedy. We are only now in act I, with the squandering of \$5 billion, the equivalent of 1 million jobs under the emergency employment program which I sponsored and which was approved by the full Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. How long will it be before we see \$40 or \$50 or \$60 billion go down the drain in an orgy of misguided spending?

The most painful costs, however, cannot be counted in dollars. They are the diplomatic costs—the resulting increase in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union which this new escalation of the arms race is bound to provoke. As Victor Zorza pointed out not long ago in the Washington Post, the most likely effect of our decision to begin ABM deployment will be the strengthening of the hard-liners in the Kremlin in their continuing see-saw battle with the more peace-oriented elements in the Soviet leadership.

This decision will not spur the Russians to come to agreement on limiting defensive and offensive missiles. It is far more likely to jeopardize the pending talks and crush the hopes for an arms control agreement which were generated by the Glassboro conference.

The only gainers from our action will be the members of the political, military-industrial complex on both sides—in the Soviet Union, and in this country. The Russian generals, their allies in the Communist Party, and the men who direct the Soviet defense industry will gain

status and prestige at the expense of their colleagues. Their counterparts in the United States will have something more tangible to show—fantastic profits for the contractors, and new stars on the shoulders and stripes on the sleeves of the military men who will be in charge of the program.

The story is in the stock market reports for anyone who is interested to see. Where is the ABM money going to go? Raytheon, up 4½ to 91½ on Monday, September 18, the day of the McNamara speech. Aerojet General, up 4% to 33¼ on the same day. Strong rising trends have been just as visible in other major ABM contractors—Thiokol, Martin Marietta, and Sperry Rand. The vast new defense pork lunch-wagon—maybe the biggest ever—has begun to roll, and the investors on the stock market know it.

Who are the losers? All of us, everyone, and particularly those who will be hardest hit by the fact that money that should be going into the effort to rebuild our cities and heal the wounds in our society—or possibly, if you take a more conservative point of view, to provide the funds which will make a tax increase unnecessary; or, indeed, to provide the funds which, in the long run, might make further tax decreases possible—is being drained off to build Armageddon instead. Americans who will be deprived of a chance to get an adequate education, necessary health care, a decent place to live, a chance for a job—for lack of funds, they will be the biggest losers.

Those higher up the income ladder will be losers because of the increased taxes which they will have to pay, or through the failure to receive the tax decrease to which they might otherwise be entitled. But the real, ultimate losers are every man, woman, and child on this planet whose lives are menaced by the threat of nuclear war, and whose only hope for genuine security lies in the amelioration of tensions between the great nuclear powers and the negotiation of effective agreements to halt the madness of the arms race and turn mankind toward the path to peace.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to my friend from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I have very little to add to what the Senator from Pennsylvania has said, other than to tell him how much I appreciate not only the courage, but beyond that, the commonsense, that he demonstrates here today; because he has taken on one of the most wasteful and, in my judgment, most dangerous proposals that have been suggested in a long time. I quite agree with him when he says that, far from adding to our security and to the chances for stability between the great powers, the introduction of the so-called ABM system really adds another dangerous new dimension that threatens both our security and the peace of the world.

One of the things that has puzzled me most about this whole discussion associated with the ABM is the seeming paradox between the devastating case that the Secretary of Defense has built against just such a system over the last

few years, having added to it as recently as January 25 of this year in his statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on defense appropriations, and the rather strange endorsement of such a proposal the Secretary made in his speech at San Francisco.

I believe if one looks at that speech carefully, 90 percent of it is a devastating, and, I think, unanswerable argument against the ABM system.

Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will yield briefly, I thoroughly agree with him. My heart bleeds for Secretary McNamara, who, as I think anybody who intelligently reads his speech must see, is doing what he is told to do, despite the fact that his convictions are otherwise.

The argument that we are building this ABM system against an anticipated Chinese attack is completely lacking in conviction, as far as Secretary McNamara's feelings come through his actual words.

Mr. McGOVERN. Would the Senator agree that the senior editor of *Newsweek* magazine, Mr. Edwin Diamond, describes well, in the October 2, 1967, issue of that magazine, what has happened in explaining this paradoxical situation with reference to our Secretary of Defense? He also refers to a column by Mr. James Reston of the *New York Times*.

Mr. President, I would like to read a couple of paragraphs if the Senator would yield further.

Mr. CLARK. I would be happy to have the article made part of the RECORD.

Mr. McGOVERN. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the editorial entitled, "The Grand Illusion," to which I have referred.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE GRAND ILLUSION (By Edwin Diamond)

Secretary McNamara's decision to go ahead with an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system is based on a set of brilliantly reasoned, highly sophisticated, and strongly persuasive arguments. But the decision is wrong, and the consequences of this error will burden every American for years to come.

Instead of strengthening the national security, the ABM decision may well undermine it, for it upsets the present delicate balance of nuclear terror based on the twin implicit assumptions of a strong (four-to-one) but not overwhelming U.S. offensive missile superiority and a modest Soviet defensive advantage. Worse, the ABM move signals another dangerous upward spiral in the nuclear-arms race which may lead to a renewed drive by both the U.S. and Soviet Union to add new offensive weapons to the overkill arsenals each already possesses. Roswell L. Gilpatric, McNamara's own former Deputy Defense Secretary, fears the ABM means a U.S. global strategy based more on conflict than accommodation. The go-ahead, he said, "is certainly a move in the wrong direction."

Let's put these abstractions in concrete terms—and concrete is exactly where we are now heading. At the very least, this new nuclear escalation means the expenditure of untold billions in exchange for a wholly illusory security blanket. Whether the U.S. spends \$4 to \$5 billion for the "thin" ABM system to guard its Minuteman strike force, or \$40 billion for the "thickening" of the blanket to protect major American cities, or \$400 billion to protect smaller cities, the end

result will be the same: all of us will still be 30 minutes away from nuclear annihilation.

MOLE SOCIETY

Indeed, with the ABM escalation, the possibility of this supposedly "unthinkable" missile Armageddon is greater, not smaller. All of us have now been propelled by the logic of nuclear events that McNamara grasps so well toward the next era of the atomic age—the mole society where the cities and civilians of the 1980s may have to burrow underground to join the concrete Minuteman silos sunk in the 1960s and the subterranean ABM control centers built in the 1970s.

Unlikely, you will say; right out of some science-fiction paperback. But who would have believed, ten years ago, at the time of Sputnik 1 and the "missile gap," that the U.S. within five years would possess the nuclear missiles to destroy the Soviet society and population five times over?

What evidence have I that McNamara—one of the most brilliant and dedicated minds in the nation—is wrong about the ABM? What proof is there that the U.S. has embarked on a dangerous new course? The evidence is abundant. Precisely because McNamara has such a firm grasp of the complexities of the age, he himself has supplied some of the best arguments against the ABM and a new arms race. In fact, if an analyst were to overlay McNamara's speech with one of the cryptologist's sheets that cover some paragraphs while revealing others, the case for the present stabilized strategic situation would become compelling.

ACTION-REACTION

First of all, as McNamara makes clear, the U.S. now has "a numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate and effective warheads [that] is both greater than we had originally planned, and is in fact more than we require." This, to use the blunt term, is what overkill means. And overkill, to be blunt again, is the legacy of politically motivated "missile-gap" cries of the late 1950s. The panic button was pushed in the U.S. and a real missile gap did eventually materialize. But as McNamara points out in his speech, this gap favors the U.S. At present the U.S. has 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons in readiness against 700 for the U.S.S.R. The Russian response to this U.S. superiority has been to concede an offensive disparity. In effect the Soviet Union acknowledged that the richness and ingenuity of American technology could not be matched. But it began an ABM system—the Russian military has been traditionally defense minded—as part of what McNamara calls the "action-reaction" of the arms race.

McNamara has been conspicuously unworried by this deployment. As he explains it, the offense always has an advantage over the defense and any ABM system "can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending over more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them."

The logic of the situation calls for one of the superpowers to forego the next turn in the vicious cycle of action-reaction. A Soviet McNamara—they have their sophisticated strategists and their war gamesmen, too—might argue that the Soviet ABM deployment represented a limited and measured response to U.S. superiority, a move intended to assure Russian second-strike capability and thus make the Soviet deterrent credible. Why not leave the arms race in this trade-off situation? Why upset the fearfully delicate balance of terror with a U.S. ABM system?

McNamara's answer last week was: because of the looming Chinese nuclear-missile threat of the 1970s. The proposed U.S. ABM system, in McNamara's words, is "Chinese-oriented," designed to deter Chairman Mao or his suc-

cessors from an attack on the U.S. It is at this point that McNamara's computer logic breaks down.

MAD ADVENTURE

First, if Peking is suicidally mad enough to mount an attack on a country possessing 200 times more nuclear power than it has, then no amount of objective reality in the form of an American ABM barrier can dissuade the Chinese from their insanity. If the Chinese are bent on nuclear genocide, they could smuggle an atomic bomb into San Francisco harbor aboard a freighter and detonate it. No ABM system can protect against such mad adventures.

Second, the Soviet Union can also argue that its ABM is "Chinese-oriented," and merely a matter of insurance against an irrational attack by a country that shares an uneasy border with Russia and is violently hostile to it. After all, the same madness that might lead the Chinese to attack the U.S. might also push Mao over the brink with the Russians. Would we believe the Russians if they said, "It's the Chinese we are worried about—ignore our ABM"? Yet we expect them to believe our ABM is China-oriented.

The truth is the ABM decision was dictated not by strategy but by politics. Computer logic breaks down because men aren't computers; they are imperfect beings shaped by history and emotion as well as reason. There are really two McNamaras. One McNamara coolly attempts to manage the arms race by force of argument and intellect. He even on occasion does the Russians' thinking for them, patiently elucidating the nuclear strategic options available and their consequences in speeches and in briefings held for the press, but aimed at Moscow. The second McNamara is an American, a patriot and a member of the Johnson Administration (just as his opposite in the Kremlin is a Russian, a patriot, and a member of the Communist Party).

It is well known in Washington that Secretary McNamara for months has opposed deployment of the ABM system despite the urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Democratic hawks and of Republicans sensing a hot campaign issue for 1968. As James Reston suggested last week, the ABM system launched by McNamara is not aimed at blocking the Chinese or even the Russians, but the Republicans. By acceding now to the clamor, McNamara has blunted the GOP charge that he is "indifferent" to the defense of the American people.

GOOD GUYS

Yet, isn't the U.S. asking—a bit illogically—the Soviet McNamara to be indifferent to the defense of his people? More fundamentally, isn't the U.S. saying—also a bit illogically—that when it comes to the crunch, two standards apply: we are the good guys and would never attack first; you are the bad guys and you might attack first, and that is why we must have a four-to-one offensive superiority and defensive parity (at least)—and a lead in whatever else we decide to build.

Last week was the time for patience and courage—patience to lecture the Russians once again on the reasons behind the eminently equitable U.S. plan to put a freeze on all missiles, offensive and defensive; courage, in the words of former Kennedy science adviser Jerome Wiesner, to run the risks of de-escalation instead of the risks of new escalation; and patience and courage to explain to the American people, even in a pre-election year, why the ABM is not good for their security.

Instead, Washington gave us the ABM. By some curious alchemy, the Administration has convinced itself that the thin ABM system doesn't really change the balance of terror: only a thick system would do that. But thin leads to thick. It is all like that celebrated biology experiment: a frog is placed in a tank of water; daily the tempera-

ture is increased one degree; the frog exists as always—until one more degree . . . the water boils . . . the frog dies.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, reading from Mr. Diamond's editorial in the issue of Newsweek magazine of October 2, he has this to say:

The truth is the ABM decision was dictated not by strategy, but by politics.

Mr. CLARK. That is entirely correct, in my opinion, and it is bad politics, in my judgment.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Diamond goes on to say:

It is well known in Washington that Secretary McNamara for months has opposed deployment of the ABM system despite the urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Democratic hawks and of Republicans sensing a hot campaign issue for 1968. As James Reston suggested last week, the ABM system launched by McNamara is not aimed at blocking the Chinese or even the Russians, but the Republicans.

If that is true, it seems to me to be a rather expensive campaign expenditure, to spend \$5 billion, to try to defend our party against political charges apparently next November.

It seems to me that, instead of evaluating this issue in terms of what it may or may not do to our chances in the next election, we ought to be more concerned about the security of our country, and the peace of the world and our economy at a time when it is already strained.

Mr. CLARK. I thoroughly agree. I think that if a man from Mars with some sort of a sense of intelligence were to come here and look at what is happening in this country, he would think human beings here were going mad when we talk about building an anti-ballistic-missile system of this kind to compound the already frightening arms race.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain excerpts from the testimony of Secretary McNamara on January 25, 1967.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS HEARINGS, JANUARY 25, 1967

Secretary of Defense McNamara, on cost: "In this connection, it is worth noting that had we produced and deployed the NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the NIKE-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned . . . (page 57)."

"Even before the systems became operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the United States would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked. And critics would point out that our strategic offensive force is premised on a much larger Soviet threat (the 'possible', not the 'probable' threat); they would conclude that the same principles should be applied to our strategic defensive forces. For

these and other reasons, I believe that, once started, an ABM system deployed with the objective of protecting the United States against the Soviet Union would require an expenditure on the order of \$40 billion over a 10-year period. (footnote, page 232).

"... if you put these around (deleted) cities, the Soviet planners are going to re-target their weapons to all the other cities, because there is no sense wasting weapons on (deleted) if you have got all the rest unprotected. ... And the danger to the other cities that aren't protected is increased by the fact that we protect (deleted) and make them less vulnerable and therefore less desirable targets. And that new factor is in addition to the fact that they just have no protection to begin with." (page 253).

Secretary McNamara; on Soviet reaction: "It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side." (Page 59).

Senator DOMINICK. I just want to be sure, Mr. Secretary, that I understand this. What you are saying in this first column is that the Soviets are technically capable of completely offsetting a NIKE-ZEUS system so that it wouldn't be worth much by the time it was installed.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, that's true. They could both technically and financially, because the financial cost of doing this is not in any way beyond their budgetary limits, and not disproportionate to our cost of having put in the defense system. (Page 238).

U.S. Reaction to Soviet ABM: Arms race: "Although we believe the strategic missile programs now proposed will be adequate to meet the threat, even if the Soviet Union were to carry out a full-scale deployment of an ABM system and develop more effective ICBM's, we are making a very comprehensive study of a new long-range missile system. (page 241).

"... I have not alluded in the statement to the arms race, although it would definitely escalate, in my opinion, at great cost and no real gain to either side. We are already reacting to their ABM." (Page 252, responding to question by Chairman Russell)

McNamara on ABM defense against China: "It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not be made now." (Page 60).

Mr. McGOVERN. I will now read into the RECORD two or three paragraphs from that testimony.

The Secretary had this to say:

In this connection, it is worth noting that had we produced and deployed the Nike-Zeus system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the NIKE-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned. . . . (page 57).

The Secretary then makes some other interesting points that, to me, are very conflicting.

He said:

Even before the systems became operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the United States would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked.

Mr. CLARK. The original argument included the suggestion that first 25 and then 50 of our cities would be protected by the antiballistic missile system consisting of the peripheral defense called Spartan, and the spot defense which is called Sprint. The Pentagon was pressured to make the choice of what cities should be selected, and they did issue a list of 25 cities, and then a list of 50 cities.

I was a little concerned at the inadequate protection going to some of the cities in my home State of Pennsylvania. High up on the list was Charleston, S.C., a city with a population in the neighborhood of 83,000.

It was suggested by me—and I was taken to task by the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] for the suggestion—that perhaps the Pentagon just might have been influenced in choosing Charleston, S.C., by the fact that the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee lives in that area.

I am not imputing motives to anyone. But can one think of the result of the Pentagon being involved in selecting particular cities for defense as opposed to letting it be done by the political agents, the President and the Congress, and can anyone think of what chances he would have to get elected in his own district or State if he did not insist that every city be included in the area? It would run the cost up overnight because of the pragmatic situation I have been talking about.

Mr. McGOVERN. Secretary McNamara in testifying before the committee said:

For these and other reasons, I believe that, once started, an ABM system deployed with the objective of protecting the United States against the Soviet Union would require an expenditure on the order of \$40 billion over a 10-year period. (footnote, page 232)

I can assure the Senator that every Senator would feel the same way. If my State were to be left out of a defensive system, I would feel obligated to do everything I possibly could to have it included.

I would not have any great confidence in the ability of the system to protect anybody, but nevertheless with the kind of emotional insecurity that exists, even if there were only some outside chance that we might hit one of these incoming missiles, one would want to make every effort to have his State included.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I point out what I have pointed out before on the floor of the Senate, and what I think is worth repeating.

In the hearings on the antiballistic missile system conducted by the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Foreign Relations Committee, on which subcommittee I serve—and originally in executive session, but later the classification was removed so that it is now public

information—all of our experts testified that we could destroy Moscow tomorrow despite its much vaunted antiballistic missile system, and that Moscow could destroy us the day after tomorrow—Washington, New York—pick the city or State. The experts were all of the view that our system would be utterly ineffective even if it were built, because the technology, which I will not attempt to describe in detail, requires that the incoming missile be identified by radar long enough before it reaches its target to enable the antiballistic missile to go up and intercept it in outer space, or possibly very high in space. This cannot be done because the effect of knocking down the first missile is to obfuscate the radar so that it cannot identify the oncoming second or third attacking missile.

Even if that were not true, there are so many devices by which the effectiveness of radar can be destroyed by an adequate offense which is aware of the problem, that the chances of the second, third, or fourth missile not getting through to its target are almost minimal.

Mr. McGOVERN. I know that the Senator, who is an expert, which I am not, has pointed out on the floor of the Senate a good many times how much more economical it would be to increase our offensive power.

Mr. CLARK. Of course, this is Secretary McNamara's deeply held opinion, and he has been overruled.

Mr. McGOVERN. A good many of our armament experts have pointed out over the years that they hope the Soviets would build an antiballistic missile system because they would be wasting their money when, by a much smaller expenditure, we could overwhelm that system.

Presumably, it would work the same way for the other side.

Mr. CLARK. I am sure the Senator is correct.

Mr. McGOVERN. I would like to read into the RECORD one other paragraph from the article by Mr. Diamond. With reference to the argument that it is not directed against the Soviets, but against the Chinese, Mr. Diamond has this to say:

If Peking is suicidally mad enough to mount an attack on a country possessing 200 times more nuclear power than it has, then no amount of objective reality in the form of an American ABM barrier can dissuade the Chinese from their insanity. If the Chinese are bent on nuclear genocide, they could smuggle an atomic bomb into San Francisco Harbor aboard a freighter and detonate it. No ABM system can protect us against such mad adventures.

It seems to me, considering the state of the Chinese economy today and their missile development, that even if they did have such an insane notion as attacking the United States, that would be the form it would take, using a ship or perhaps smuggling it into the country in various ways and exploding it in one of our harbors or one of our internal cities, rather than relying on shooting missiles, a field in which we clearly have the superiority.

Again, I thank the Senator for his excellent statement today. I agree with every word, and I hope that somehow the

wisdom of his remarks will be heard and felt in the executive branch.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend, the Senator from South Dakota, for his support, which I certainly welcome.

I yield to the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART].

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I, too, thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for speaking as he has this morning. I do not know what the odds are that he will be listened to or that those of us who say "amen" to him will be heard.

Mr. CLARK. We will hope for the best.

Mr. HART. I hope we are not performing a useless function here this morning, because I sense that nothing more important will be discussed today, tomorrow, or any week than the point that the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to call to our attention. I thank him for doing it.

The Senator from South Dakota made an important point. As I understand it, the offense outraces the defense all the time.

Mr. CLARK. This has been the case ever since the development of—well, I suppose before the development of atomic energy. I am sure I need not remind the Senator of the Maginot line in World War II.

I believe the Senator is clearly correct.

Mr. HART. My reason for underscoring this aspect of the matter is in anticipation of a reply that will be made to us by our critics, those who support the program that we are criticizing now. They will say, "So what? When gunpowder was developed, it outmoded the bow and arrow," but our critics will argue, it was known something would come along more effective than gunpowder. Did it follow that we should not have armed ourselves against those who used bows and arrows?

The point we are trying to make is that some major power at some point in today's devices of destruction must say, "Let's stop."

Mr. CLARK. "Let's stop and turn around and deaccelerate this mad arms race."

Mr. HART. Exactly. I hope sight is not lost of this point in reaction to our discussion this morning.

Those who propose the limited system and those who stand here this morning critical of it speak in an effort—and it is sincerely entertained, I know—to save lives. Those who want to put up this screen advocate it because, as they say, it will frighten the Chinese, or something, or it will reassure Paris, or it will undercut De Gaulle and reassure Berlin. Many nuances are put into this matter.

Those of us who criticize it say that if we do not stop at this point, how can we look forward to any kind of constructive arms control discussion? If we have 200 times—or whatever it is—more offensive power in these weapons than China, and if we put up this limited screen, when can we in logic look to the Kremlin to stand still? Our actions belie the fact that we want them to sit down and talk about turning down the heat in the interest of saving lives.

This is perhaps the most important

point the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to make this morning.

Mr. CLARK. I am delighted that the Senator from Michigan has put his finger on that point. I agree with him that it is very important, indeed.

Mr. HART. I heard a wise man comment that logic cries out against this limited system; that politics cries out for it; that there is no basis in logic for doing it, and there is no political justification for avoiding it. If we take that approach to all our problems, we will be in the kind of deep trouble the Senator from Pennsylvania cautions us against.

Mr. CLARK. I wonder whether the Senator would agree with me that this is not as politically wise as superficially it might appear.

Four or five billion dollars would be taken out of the economy to build this utterly useless antiballistic missile system, and that amount would be added to a contemplated deficit of \$30 billion for the current year. We are unable to devote the resources essential to remedy the plight of our cities and even to stop the riots, if we wish to take that limited point of view, and more and more people are beginning to appreciate this fact. Therefore, the primitive suggestion—I call it primitive advisedly—that the expenditure of this money is good politics just does not stand up.

I may well be running for reelection in Pennsylvania next year. I do not know whether or not I will. I certainly would not have the slightest hesitation in vigorously opposing, during the course of my campaign, the expenditure of this money for such a useless purpose. I have sufficient confidence in the commonsense of the people of my Commonwealth to believe that would be the better side of the political argument.

Mr. HART. I hope that others will consider the point that the Senator from Pennsylvania has made and reject, or at least question, the assumption that it is good politics to put up this limited screen.

I rise to protest the program not in the belief that I am doing something heroic. I share the notion of the Senator from Pennsylvania that there may be no political danger in standing on the floor of the Senate and saying that this program does not make sense. Many people believe it does not make sense, but do not say so.

Mr. CLARK. Those people, in my judgment, vastly underestimate the intelligence of the average American voter.

Mr. HART. I believe that the average American voter will, in his decision a year from now, include this action in the agenda that he will be ticking off. He knows that we have this morning the power to incinerate most of China. He knows that the Chinese leadership knows that too. The Chinese leadership will be responsible or irresponsible, and the setting up of a limited screen will not contribute to their degree of responsibility 7 cents' worth.

But it will cost us \$5 billion to start with, and on a bookkeeping basis alone, that makes no sense at all. The Russians put up ABM screens around several of their cities. The United States would now

put up a thin screen to protect, it is said, against China in the next few years. On it goes with each step calling forth greater and newer offensive weapon development, outmoding the screens, calling for still more screens. The way to save lives is by turning down, not up, and this moment in arms control negotiations calls for us to turn down—or at least not turn up—this ABM screen.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is correct. I certainly welcome his support.

Mr. President, the press in many areas has been quite incisive in its analysis of the futility and, indeed, the folly of the decision to deploy an antiballistic missile system.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks a number of press articles relating to this subject. They are as follows:

The first is an article entitled "Allies Foresee New Danger. Europe Suspects Thin ABM Is Step to Massive System," written by Murrey Marder, the well-known news analyst, and published in the Washington Post for today, October 9, 1967.

Second, an editorial entitled "Genie Out of the Bottle," published in the New York Times of September 20, 1967. The editorial takes the position that the decision is unsound.

Third, an editorial entitled "The Wrong Race," published in the Washington Post of September 19, 1967. The editorial quotes Secretary of Defense McNamara as saying:

There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry.

Fourth, an article entitled "In the Nation: A Nightmare Debate," written by Tom Wicker, and published in the New York Times of September 19, 1967.

Fifth, an editorial entitled "An Ominous Decision," published in the Providence Journal of September 20, 1967.

Sixth, an article entitled "A Defense Policy and New Dangers," written by Adam Yarmolinsky, and published in the Washington Post of September 28, 1967. Mr. Yarmolinsky was formerly special assistant to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and is currently a professor of law at Harvard University.

Seventh, an article entitled "State of Affairs," written by Clayton Fritchey, and released on September 25, 1967, by the syndicate which publishes Mr. Fritchey's able column.

Eighth, an article entitled "New Soviet Crisis Seen Over U.S. Missile Plan," written by Victor Zorza, who writes for the Manchester Guardian. The article is the first in a series and was reprinted in the Washington Post of September 20, 1967.

Ninth, an article published in the New Yorker magazine of September 30, 1967. It is the first item in the column, The Talk of the Town, which is always at the front of that brilliant weekly.

Mr. President, I believe that these statements of the press represent the most intelligent public reaction to this decision. I hope that they will be read most carefully by all readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there

objection to the request of the Senator from Pennsylvania?

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1967]

ALLIES FORESEE NEW DANGER—EUROPE SUSPECTS THIN ABM IS STEP TO MASSIVE SYSTEM

(By Murrey Marder)

A rumble of suspicion is spreading in Western Europe about the intentions behind the "light" anti-missile system announced by the United States last month.

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, in unveiling the \$5 billion project on Sept. 18, stressed that it was solely designed "to deter China from nuclear blackmail." A McNamara deputy, Assistant Secretary Paul C. Warnke, on Friday publicly underscored that limited objective.

Many European experts (and some American specialists as well) suspect, however, that the limited "China-oriented" anti-ballistic missile plan is the first step toward what the Johnson Administration adamantly insists it is not:

An ultimate, massive ABM system to try to ward off danger of a Soviet missile attack, matched by an equally massive Russian deployment to protect Soviet territory.

It is McNamara's determined desire, which Warnke reiterated for the Johnson Administration, to avoid that kind of an outcome by getting Soviet agreement to limit a missile race spiral. But the skeptics maintain that the U.S. foot has now joined the Soviet foot on the escalator.

The suspicion in Europe and elsewhere about the end result is not directed so much at McNamara's or the Administration's desires or objectives, but at their ability to accomplish them.

Despite Administration denials, the skeptics attribute the U.S. decision to launch a limited ABM system to internal political-military-industrial pressures in the United States, rather than to planned defense objectives. These pressures, they believe, will drive the United States into just the anti-missile race the Administration is pledged to endeavor to escape.

An advance guard of Western Europeans is beginning to worry if this will leave their security more dependent than ever on the two superpowers. They fear that Western Europe may be exposed to new danger as the United States and the Soviet Union mutually reinforce their own defenses.

What is potentially more troublesome for the two nuclear giants is that Western Europe's leaders are far readier than ever to challenge Washington-Moscow decisions that affect their fate. Moreover, they have opportunity to do so by footdragging on something that the superpowers want—the pending treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEMS

So far, the relatively few Europeans who have come to grips with the anti-missile problem are divided on the effectiveness of ABM systems and their impact on Europe. But even if their thinking does not coalesce, it can still mean grief for Washington particularly and for the North Atlantic Alliance.

At Ankara, Turkey, in a Sept. 28-29 meeting of the seven-nation Allied Nuclear Planning Group, McNamara succeeded in mollifying Western defense ministers about the American decision of Sept. 18 to deploy a "light" ABM system. It was sprung upon them with short notice, and no consultation, even though Britain had been scheduled since April to report at the meeting on the ramifications of a possible anti-missile system for Western Europe.

Once again, McNamara's dazzling style of showering statistics and rationales on skeptics

apparently was effective. But past performance shows that this technique often only suppresses doubt, without eliminating it. There are some indications that a "morning after" reaction already is developing.

Inquiries by The Washington Post in Western European capitals show there is widespread belief that political factors produced the U.S. decision of Sept. 18 for a limited ABM deployment.

SUSPICION AROUSED

This conviction, in turn, has aroused European suspicion that political and "military-industrial" forces inside the United States will, in turn, push it into massive ABM deployment, over McNamara's opposition, if necessary. McNamara has insisted that the result would be only a mutually offsetting expenditure of about \$40 billion each for the Soviet Union and the United States, without any gain in security, because each nation's offense could penetrate the other's defense.

According to American sources, the political suspicion is correct so far as the timing of the Johnson Administration's Sept. 18 decision was concerned. The Administration, inevitably, has denied that politics influenced its decision in any way.

The United States, in the absence of Soviet readiness to begin talks on limiting nuclear missilery, was originally headed, according to unofficial sources, toward a December announcement of a "light" ABM deployment.

President Johnson, however, confronted with soaring Congressional opposition on all fronts, suddenly accelerated the ABM timetable in an effort to ease the political pressures upon him, according to informed sources.

HEARINGS PLANNED

Among the President's typically multiple objectives, it is said, was a desire to outflank zealous pro-ABM forces in hearings planned by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), plus an attempt to solicit support for the President's stymied tax increase proposal from pro-ABM members of Congress.

The ABM announcement was geared to help counter charges from hawks on Vietnam policy that the administration additionally was risking the Nation's defenses by avoiding any ABM deployment.

A blanket denial that any "Outside and unrelated pressures" influenced the Administration's ABM decision was newly made Friday by Assistant Defense Secretary Warnke. The "decision to deploy," he said in a major Administration speech, "resulted solely from a careful consideration of the security interests of the United States and its Allies."

The "Chinese-oriented ABM system," said Warnke, was carefully designed to avoid triggering "an acceleration of the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union." By building protection against the outside possibility that "the Chinese leadership might panic and press the button," he said, the United States sought to remove doubts among Asians who ask, "for example, if the United States would really be willing to risk Detroit to save a small Asian nation."

NUCLEAR TREATY

Special concern, said Warnke, was given to the question of whether this thin ABM deployment might impair American-Soviet efforts to achieve a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. "We came to the conclusion," he said, "that our Chinese-oriented ABM deployment should make it easier, and not harder, for countries in Asia to sign the NPT (non-proliferation treaty)."

No attempt, however, was made to make the same claim where the Europeans are concerned. The decision, in fact, has had the reverse effect there.

To the Western Europeans, China is very

remote, its potential physical threat to them is remote, and extra suspicion therefore falls on the U.S. decision.

Western Europeans, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and their own security, automatically interpreted the U.S. decision in that dimension.

What looms in West Germany's official concern is that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that the Soviet Union and the United States are urging it to participate in, might preclude a Western European anti-missile systems, because an ABM system employs nuclear warheads to knock down incoming missiles.

REACTION IN BONN

From Bonn, Dan Morgan of The Washington Post Foreign Service reported that the American ABM decision has further undermined the credibility of U.S. intentions about the nuclear treaty. Some Germans are contending that the U.S. action has cast doubt on the stability of the existing nuclear "balance of terror," and that the whole structure of defense concepts may require reexamination.

But paradoxically, the British position, as stated at Scarborough, England, last week by Defense Minister Denis Healey is that: "There is no evidence whatsoever that any ABM system of which we have any knowledge today will produce a meaningful deterrent against a major nuclear power."

Healey expressed a similar position in private talks at Ankara with defense ministers of the United States, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Canada and the Netherlands.

There the defense chiefs discussed, inconclusively, whether any anti-missile system could be effective against the seven or eight hundred Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles targeted on Western Europe. The shorter range makes the problem technologically different from countering missiles fired between continents. Beyond that, Europe's close, crowded cities compound the problem of operating separate, national systems. The alternative, a multinational anti-missile system, raises the familiar nuclear force dilemma of who will pay for it, and more importantly, whose finger will be on the trigger.

EFFICACY DISPUTED

At the top, official level in Britain, the Washington Post bureau in London reported, one source said he accepts the American word that its limited ABM is directed at China and not against Russia. But he disputed the efficacy of that system and expressed belief it was adopted only because of intense political pressure in the United States.

An American counter-argument in this debate which is carried on largely behind the scenes, is this: Britain cannot admit that any ABM system is effective, for to do so would be to nullify Britain's own limited nuclear offensive force.

From Paris, Don Louchheim of The Washington Post Foreign Service reported that French officials are having a field day with the disquiet caused by the American decision.

"Predictably," he reported, the French "see a new vindication for their policy of disengagement from the Atlantic Alliance," and are "playing up the fact that there was little or no consultation before the decision."

"Some Frenchmen have even suggested that by creating an anti-missile barrier in the United States, Washington has made Europe more vulnerable, as a common enemy might prefer to send its nuclear weapons toward undefended targets."

REAFFIRMING THESIS

"The French, therefore, are quietly capitalizing on the ABM decision to reaffirm their thesis that 1. Europe must fend for itself; 2. A separate French nuclear force is more necessary than ever, and 3. NATO is for all practical purposes an American pawn, where

Washington calls the tune unilaterally and everyone must dance to it, whether they agree or not."

Gen. Pierre Gallois and other French nuclear strategists maintain that the limited French nuclear force, delivering weapons by low-flying supersonic planes, can elude any anti-missile defense. The French contend, Louchheim reported, that at comparatively low cost, new attack systems can be devised, rendering each new defensive screen a costly anachronism.

By uninterested timing, the new ABM debate inside the Alliance coincides with a conference in Ditchley, England, this week on proposals for modernizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to cope with the problems of the future.

Deputy Under Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler heads one of four subcommittees that will coordinate their private reports in a study initiated last year by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. These projections are scheduled to be presented to the NATO foreign ministers at their December meeting in Brussels.

The specific subject of a possible ABM system for Western Europe, however, presently is not scheduled for further major discussions until a spring meeting in The Hague of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. These additional studies were requested, at Ankara, by West Germany and Italy. But inevitably the ABM dilemma for Western Europe can recur and rebound almost anywhere in Europe.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 20, 1967]

GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE

Secretary McNamara's San Francisco speech was evidently a replay of his brilliantly reasoned, impassioned appeal to Premier Kosygin at Glassboro to halt a dangerous new round in the strategic nuclear arms race.

Between these two speeches there intervened President Johnson's decision to build a "light" anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system, probably designed for defense against the Republicans as much as against the Communist Chinese. The question now is whether this secondary decision, taken on what Mr. McNamara called "marginal grounds," will thwart the country's major security objective: to get the arms race under control. We do not think this will advance it.

Mr. Johnson has thrown a \$5-billion fish to the cats. Will it quiet the country's military-industrial complex and its Congressional spokesmen? Or will construction of the proposed ABM defense lead to irresistible political pressure to build a \$40-billion defense program for 25 cities, then fifty or more? The initial indications are that the advocates of heavy anti-missile defenses will not be appeased.

The illusory argument that population will be truly protected by ABM's and casualties reduced has a political appeal that the counter arguments, for all their logic, cannot match. The fact tends to get lost that offense always outruns the defense and that both the Soviet Union and the United States can build sufficient weapons to overwhelm the other's ABM system.

The probable effect on this country—a vast and essentially useless escalation of armaments expenditure in money and resources—is bad enough; even more dangerous is the likely effect on Russia.

"The Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans," Mr. McNamara points out. "Actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race."

The Soviet Union may be reasonably sure that the current American intention is not to go beyond a defense against the relatively weak Chinese threat; but they also know that present American intentions could change and that there are domestic American political pressures which prove especially effective every two years as elections approach. Thus what appears clear to Americans—that the ABM system is in fact being built primarily to cope with China—may not appear so clear to Russians. And if they act according to their fears, as they usually do, the race will be on again.

The irony in the decision to go ahead at this point with anti-missile defense is that, as Mr. McNamara said, "none of the systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States." The Soviet Union can build enough nuclear warheads to saturate any level of American defense. Even a Chinese missile attack on a small scale would probably destroy several American cities. Security against China will continue to rest largely on deterrence—and that means the existence of overwhelming offensive strength.

Some Administrative advisers believe American work on an anti-missile system will speed a Soviet response to American proposals for limitation of offensive and defensive missiles. But the Russians have more than sufficient incentive to open negotiations; the multiple-warhead offensive missiles the United States already is building will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses.

The decision to go ahead with a limited ABM system makes it less likely that the genie of a new nuclear arms race can be put back into the bottle. But it remains imperative that every effort continue to bring it under some kind of control.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1967]

THE WRONG RACE

"There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry," Secretary McNamara said yesterday in announcing President Johnson's decision to install a "thin," "China-oriented" \$5 billion anti-ballistic missile system over the next five years. And he added: "The danger in deploying this . . . system is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system."

This is indeed the danger, and it is demonstrated in no small way by the very decision which Mr. McNamara made the occasion for an eloquent and compelling argument against a race for armaments and in favor of a "race toward reasonableness." Just last January, Mr. McNamara was telling the Senate Armed Services that a decision to build a Chinese-oriented ABM system "need not be made this year." In the meantime, he has produced no fresh evidence which would suggest a heightened Chinese threat. There has, however, been very heightened political pressure for an American ABM system to counter suspected ABM deployments by the Russians. One can only conjecture whether this pressure may not have had something to do with the decision to announce the beginnings of a "thin," anti-Chinese ABM system at this time, and wonder, too, about the "reasonableness" of this.

Still less is the layman able to judge with much competence whether such a "thin" system is needed at all. On this point, the word and judgment of those who possess the intelligence data and the incredibly intricate technical knowledge must be taken largely on faith, for there was little in the Secretary's address to document this need.

Where Mr. McNamara was considerably more persuasive, however, was in his argument that the next step—towards a heavy ABM system—would take us and the Russians off on a "foolish and reckless course." It would, the Secretary said, be a strong

inducement for the Soviets to "vastly increase their own offensive forces." And this, he added, would "make it necessary for us to respond in turn—and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side."

This is the heart of the matter. And if we are obliged to assume that the Administration knows what it's talking about when it talks of the need for a "thin," Chinese-oriented ABM system, we must also assume that our officials and our experts and our scientists also know what they are talking about when they say that the Russian-American nuclear arms race has passed the point where either contestant can hope to gain decisively by continuing it.

If the Russians want to continue it anyway, out of false hope or for their own internal political needs, they would not require the pretext of the President's decision to deploy a new ABM missile system. Pretexts for arms spending can always be found. Conversely, if they see some merit in an agreement which would ratify the current stand-off, and slow or halt the nuclear arms race, they can quite readily ignore our ABM deployment for they are, after all, installing some such system of their own.

It is up to them—and up to us. If there is to be a race towards reasonableness, as Mr. McNamara rightly said, "we had better all run that race."

[From the New York Times, Sept. 19, 1967]

IN THE NATION: A NIGHTMARE DEBATE

(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON, September 18.—Secretary McNamara, in announcing the Administration's decision to build a limited missile defense system, provided an unusual glimpse into the grisly, Strangelovish world of megatonnage and "assured destruction," where it makes no sense to "over-destroy" a target, but where one calculates how many millions of people must be incinerated before the damage becomes "unacceptable" to a society that wants to remain "viable."

All of that, of course, is merely horrible. The nuclear planner's world becomes truly grotesque—a maniacal joke on humanity—only when it is realized that nuclear "capability" is both fearsomely destructive and practically impotent.

As McNamara points out, nuclear capability cannot stop subversion in Southeast Asia or force commercial concessions in Africa or keep Latin America subservient to Washington's wishes. Nuclear capability is not like the British Navy in the nineteenth century, or the Marines, or the Green Berets, it has none of the practical possibilities for asserting power or persuading the recalcitrant that all other weapons possess.

Thus, American nuclear capability, at root, exists to convince Russian nuclear capability that it cannot destroy the United States without causing the Soviet Union to be destroyed, too; and Soviet nuclear capability exists for the reverse reason. To use either for a lesser purpose would be both impractical and dangerous.

This is the macabre proposition that lies at the root of the dangerous and divisive political debate that is sure to follow McNamara's chilling speech. The question at issue will be whether the terrible balance that renders both Soviet and American nuclear power useless for anything but mutual destruction is slowly being disrupted so that nuclear warfare, however infernal, might become a practical proposition for the Soviet Union.

Already, influential members of Congress—backed by some powerful military voices—are saying that the limited missile defense system to be erected against possible Chinese attack should be expanded into a massive system capable of defending against a Soviet attack. McNamara argued vigorously against this proposition with the nightmare logic

that makes the nuclear planner's world so incredible and so blood-curdling.

Building a defense against Soviet attack, he said, would cause the Soviets vastly to increase their offensive capability. At the same time they would surely deploy their own defensive system to match ours, so that the United States would have to improve the American offensive ability. In the end, both sides would have spent billions; neither would have achieved additional security; and the arms race would have spiraled a notch higher toward that point where the ultimate confrontation might become inevitable.

The counter-arguments are that the Soviet Union will not in the long run have the technical and industrial capacity to maintain such a nuclear race with the United States; but that if Moscow deploys a missile defense first, the Soviets may come to believe that the American nuclear capability is no longer effective, and that they can launch a nuclear war without being themselves destroyed. There are also those who believe that the Soviets already may have made significant gains in defensive technology, which the United States will have to match.

At a less rarefied level of argument, there is not much doubt that if the Soviets do proceed with a missile defense, any American administration is likely to come under tremendous political pressure to match it, on the grounds that the security of the American people is at stake.

Thus, in announcing plans to build the limited defense system, the Administration took several calculated risks. One was that the announcement would end any chance of negotiations with the Soviets on nuclear arms limitations—although McNamara himself believes the limited nature of the Administration plan will, instead, encourage the Soviets to take part in such talks.

Another was that taking the little step will produce irresistible political pressure for taking a large step that McNamara plainly labeled dangerous and foolish, since he believes it would set both Washington and Moscow off on another form of nuclear arms race.

Finally, if the Soviets believe the limited defense system is only a first step in a larger system erected against their nuclear power, they might move ahead with their own defenses. That would leave McNamara and the Administration no choice but to enter the "foolish and reckless" competition they hope to avoid.

[From the Providence Journal, Sept. 20, 1967]
AN OMINOUS DECISION

The administration's decision to start building an anti-missile defense system opens an ominous new chapter in the nuclear arms race. It also puts the nation on a course that is clouded with doubts, uncertainties, and imponderables.

This is to be only a "thin" anti-missile deployment. As Defense Secretary McNamara pointed out, no existing or foreseeable defensive system could present an effective counter to a massive enemy attack on this country involving swarms of sophisticated ballistic missiles. The offense still enjoys a wide margin of superiority over the defense in this area. No matter how elaborate the defense system may be, it can be penetrated and frustrated if the attacker has at his disposal large numbers of missiles equipped with presently available penetration aids. Both Soviet Russia and the United States now have arsenals of such missiles, Mr. McNamara says, and neither can erect an effective defense against them.

Why, then was the decision made to proceed with any anti-missile deployment? It was made, Mr. McNamara explains, not to protect against an attack from Soviet Russia, but to protect against Communist China.

The Red Chinese now are developing a nuclear capacity. By the mid-1970s they are expected to have a few long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. At that time, Mr. McNamara says, Red China might be so "incautious" as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States.

"It would be insane and suicidal for her to do so," Mr. McNamara adds, "but one can conceive conditions under which China might miscalculate. We wish to reduce such possibilities to the minimum."

The "thin" deployment outlined by the administration, it is hoped, would be adequate to counter the relatively few and relatively unsophisticated nuclear missiles that China will have by the 1970s.

The price of this "thin" deployment of an anti-missile missile system comes high. Some four billion dollars already has been spent over the last seven years on preliminary development. Mr. McNamara suggests that an additional five billion may bring the system into being, though that estimate could balloon to a much higher figure as the complexities are worked out.

But far more disquieting than the costs involved are the pressures from many directions that are certain to be stimulated by this decision.

Some of the members of Congress—with Sen. John O. Pastore in the lead—already are demanding that we plunge ahead beyond the proposed "thin" deployment and erect a far more elaborate defensive system. They are quite unmoved by Mr. McNamara's arguments that such a system would be utterly futile.

No matter how carefully the "thin" deployment is worked out, there are certain to be some cities or some regions that feel they have been neglected. The consequence inevitably will be pressures from these cities or regions to extend the system to give them "protection."

Nor are our friends abroad likely to view this development with complacency. Some of them are possible targets of nuclear blackmail from Red China. If they see us erecting an umbrella to protect ourselves from the Chinese threat, is it not logical to expect that they will pressure us to extend the umbrella to include them?

More subtle pressures unquestionably will be brought to bear by the aerospace industries that will profit by this huge expenditure for an anti-missile system. The financial community already is fingering the potential gainers, and the reaction in Wall Street to Mr. McNamara's announcement was a surge in the prices of stock of affected companies.

The total effect of these various pressures will be a massive effort to force us far beyond the relatively modest proposal outlined by Mr. McNamara. The Defense Secretary must have been aware of this consequence, for at one point in his address he observed: "There is kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all nuclear weaponry."

There is, indeed, and a serious problem for the nation in the period ahead almost surely will be trying to keep our wits and our sense of values as we are swept along on this "mad momentum."

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1967]
A DEFENSE POLICY AND NEW DANGERS

(By Adam Yarmolinsky)

(NOTE.—The writer, former special assistant to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, is currently a professor of law at Harvard University.)

The administration's decision to produce a light anti-ballistic missile system as a defense against the threat of a possible Chinese nuclear attack by the mid-1970s was heralded by the most carefully hedged pronouncement of major military policy ever delivered in public. But all that care may

not have been enough to prevent a new arms race.

Secretary McNamara spent the great bulk of his oversize (for him) San Francisco speech explaining why an anti-ballistic missile system aimed at Soviet missiles would do us no good at all. He argued that the only reasonable U.S. response to a major Soviet anti-missile buildup would be to increase the number and sophistication of our own missiles, so that we would be quite sure that we still had what is called an assured second-strike capability. That is Pentagon language for the power to get through and knock out the Soviet Union with our surviving nuclear weapons, even after we had sustained the heaviest strike the Russians could launch against us. He also pointed out that the inevitable Soviet response to a U.S. anti-ballistic missile system aimed at catching their missiles in midair would be to build up their nuclear arsenal until they could saturate any ABM system we set up—and there was no doubt about their having the resources to do it. He went on to say that the United States had clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union—in raw megatonnage, as well as in numbers of weapons deliverable on target—but that this superiority, which would continue for the foreseeable future, did not and could not prevent the Soviets from acquiring a second-strike capability of their own.

With both sides able to destroy each other, but only at the price of self-destruction, we and the Soviets are indeed like Churchill's two scorpions in a bottle, and nuclear power is indeed an instrument of very limited effectiveness. In Berlin, in Korea, in Vietnam, nuclear power is of no value, on either side.

But the United States is still about to build an ABM system designed to catch any Chinese missile that might be thrown at us in the next decade. Secretary McNamara was at great pains to emphasize that neither the anti-Chinese system nor any system we could deploy would be effective against Soviet missiles. And he warned of the twin dangers of persuading ourselves that, with an anti-Chinese ABM system, our nuclear power could somehow substitute for conventional forces in Asia, or of sliding into the production of a more elaborate system directed against the Soviets.

There are a number of questions, however, that were not raised in his speech: why should the United States abandon reliance on its nuclear deterrent as an effective means to persuade the Chinese not to risk self-destruction? What if the Chinese were to threaten the United States with a surface missile based on a junk anchored a hundred miles off the California coast? Or a suitcase bomb smuggled into the country? If we can, and must rely on the deterrence of our assured second-strike capability not to be blackmailed by these possibilities, why can't we rely on deterrence against Chinese ICBMs?

But the decision has been taken. The important issue now is whether we can avoid dangers foreshadowed in the McNamara speech. Is it really possible to resist the pressures to expand the new system? If the projected talks with the Soviets fail to produce mutual restraints on building ABMs, will we find ourselves in another stage of the nuclear arms race that gives us no more military security, consumes immense resources, and only makes it harder to reach essential political agreements like the non-proliferation treaty?

Even Soviet scientists concede that a political decision by the Soviet Government to deploy a major ABM system would be irrational. Surely the United States can avoid playing follow-the-leader in so senseless and dangerous a game. The issue is complex, but not so complex that it can't be understood, if properly explained, by those who will stop to read about it. President

Eisenhower's warning about the military industrial complex is relevant here, but with vigilance it can be resisted, particularly since the defense budget has been remarkably well-protected from the kind of congressional log-rolling that goes on with, say, rivers and harbor appropriations.

[From Newsday, Sept. 25, 1967]

STATE OF AFFAIRS

(By Clayton Fritchey)

NEW YORK.—There is one unremarked peculiarity about the Administration's new "light" defense against the Chinese nuclear missiles which calls for further explanation.

The building of the projected anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system apparently can be stopped in its tracks by merely one Russian diplomatic move, or at least that seems to be the message that emerges from further study of Defense Secretary McNamara's exposition of the government's present nuclear strategy.

Not having any faith in the effectiveness of ABMs, and knowing they might ultimately cost the U.S. \$40 billion or more, the Administration has been trying for months to get an agreement with Russia against their deployment, either on a "heavy" or "light" scale.

Now, however, under increasing political and military pressure to build an anti-missile system in the U.S., the Administration has given ground, but it is significant that it emphasizes it has not lost hope that it can still reach an agreement with Russia to halt an ABM race.

McNamara is still pointedly saying "Both our nations would benefit from a properly safeguarded agreement first to limit, and later to reduce, both our offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces." And he added, "We hope we can . . . achieve such an agreement." Later, the State Department's spokesman said the same thing. "We intend to continue trying," he said.

Beginning today, Secretary of State Rusk will be at the United Nations for a week where he will be discussing missiles (among other things) with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister. The U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Llewellyn Thompson, and the chief U.S. disarmament negotiator, William C. Foster, also will be on hand.

But if Russia accedes to our wishes, and agrees to an ABM freeze, what happens to the Administration's newly-announced plan for a missile defense system against Communist China? The implication is that it would be dropped, but, intentionally or not, there remains some confusion about this.

It goes without saying that Russia would hardly agree to a freeze if the U.S. insisted on going ahead, as planned, for the next five years with an new ABM system which could be used to defend against Russia as well as China. But if the Administration halts its ABM program in order to get the agreement it desires so much, does that leave the U.S. exposed to a Chinese nuclear attack? Or was that threat mostly conjured up to justify spending billions to develop the ABMs?

Alas, poor McNamara: it always devolves on him to try to explain to the public why it is urgent for the Administration to do things that it previously had said were undesirable, unnecessary, impracticable, extravagant, and dangerous. Such as bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. Such as the "barrier" across Vietnam. Such as the new ABM defense.

In announcing the anti-Chinese missile plan, McNamara made a withering attack on the whole ABM principle of defense. He virtually reduced it to fantasy. As a clincher, he said: "The four prominent scientists (who served as advisers to Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson) have unanimously recommended against the deployment of an ABM

system designed to protect our population against Soviet attack."

McNamara's case against the effectiveness of ABMs is, in fact, so logical and overwhelming that it is hard to take seriously his involved explanation of why it is nevertheless necessary to develop an ABM system to save ourselves from China. Peking has already astonished the world with the speed of its nuclear development. If, as McNamara says, Russia can easily penetrate the "heaviest" possible ABM defense, it surely cannot be long before China is able to penetrate a "light" one.

The ABMs may not prove very effective against China when it develops long-range nuclear capacity, but momentarily at least they have knocked the wind out of Administration critics who had hoped to make political capital of the issue, which, after all, is an important mission, too.

Even more important, though, is what the Administration will say when and if the U.S. and Russia agree on an ABM freeze. Who will be tapped to tell the American public why China is suddenly no longer a nuclear threat to the U.S., and hence the new anti-missile system is no longer needed? We hope it isn't McNamara. He deserves relief.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1967]

NEW SOVIET CRISIS SEEN OVER U.S. MISSILE PLAN

(By Victor Zorza)

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's announcement that the United States is to build an ABM system to protect itself against China threatens to precipitate a major crisis in the Kremlin, of the kind that led to the fall of Khrushchev in 1964.

Many Soviet leaders will insist, in spite of McNamara's strenuous effort to reassure them, that the American ABM system is designed to neutralize not only Chinese but also Soviet missiles. They will therefore use the American announcement as ammunition in their struggle, which has grown increasingly intense in recent months, to get a much bigger slice of the nation's resources for a major rearmament program.

In this struggle Brezhnev, the party secretary, stands by and large on the military platform, and Premier Kosygin on the civilian.

Evidence gleaned between the lines of the Soviet press shows that Kosygin's position has already been dangerously undermined by the military political lobby. It is now in danger of collapsing altogether.

The Kremlin policy struggle is not a straight-forward contest between civilians and military. Nor is it a stark confrontation between those who simply want more money for defense, and those who prefer to have more consumer goods. Within this rough and ready outline, it is possible to discern contradictory trends and cross-currents, the most important of which concerns the Soviet ABM program.

Whether the Soviet Union is to build a full-fledged ABM system has been a major political issue in the Kremlin for many years. There is no reason to assume that the ABM installations around Moscow represent an advanced system. There is even less reason to make any such assumption about Soviet installations elsewhere—near Leningrad and Tallin, east of the Urals, or in South Russia.

EFFICACY QUESTIONED

The latest outburst of the Soviet ABM debate became evident in February, when some of Russia's highest military authorities took mutually contradictory positions in public on the efficacy of the Soviet system. Some of the statements, made on Armed Forces Day, could be read as saying that the Soviet ABM system was capable of providing reliable defenses—while others seemed designed to suggest that it provided no such thing.

The controversy was still at full tilt earlier this month when Marshal Krylov, the commander-in-chief of the strategic missile forces, listed publicly the factors which "ensure that rockets are virtually invulnerable, especially when used en masse."

For Krylov to say that missiles are "virtually invulnerable" is to deny any validity to the argument in favor of a Soviet ABM. For him to argue that large numbers make them even less vulnerable is to say that he wants more missiles, not more ABMs. This is much the same as McNamara's own arguments against "those who want an anti-Soviet ABM."

The contrary view has been expressed most recently by Marshal Chuikov, the head of civil defense, who listed "our ABM" as being among "the best means of defending our country against a nuclear attack." It was their task to ensure, he said, that hostile missiles "will be destroyed even before they approach Soviet borders."

The inconclusive nature of the Soviet policy debate and the shifting alignments within even the military leadership, are best shown by the fact that during the February outburst Marshal Chuikov was still among those who tended to cast doubt on the effectiveness on an ABM.

PRESSURE INCREASES

But after February it became evident that the pressure for a Soviet ABM had greatly increased, and Marshal Chuikov's change of front is only one of a number of indications of the growing strength of the military-political lobby. The pressure found vent publicly in the military press, which had also provided similar indications, just before the fall of Khrushchev, of the gradual weakening of his position.

At that time, the military-political lobby urged the allocation of greater resources to heavy industry and to steel production which provide, even in modern times, the necessary underpinning for defense industries. The same symbols, and issues, have re-emerged in the course of the current Soviet policy debate, but this time they are linked with the demand for even greater resources needed to develop and deploy an ABM system.

Modern weapons development, said "Red Star," the army paper, had raised the role of economic factors to an "extraordinary" extent, and had faced the economy—"and particularly heavy industry"—with a number of new demands. The production of new weapons, including "anti-missile defenses, requires huge economic efforts," the newspaper said.

The military competition with the civilian sector for more money was only one element in the struggle. Kosygin was the great champion of the economic reform which would, in his view, improve Russia's economic and scientific potential so greatly as to provide the country with the necessary defense capability. Indeed, Kosygin's argument can be read as pressing for economic reform as the best way to provide the necessary military strength.

But writers in "Communist of the Armed Forces" argued that the reform, and economic and scientific potential, did not of themselves constitute military strength. "Actual defense measures," they argued, "are also necessary." And the implication was that those who were stressing the economic aspect were neglecting the real needs of defense.

How the fortunes of the battle went could best be judged by observing the debate on steel production. Under Khrushchev, this fight led to the identification of the military-political lobby as "metal eaters" in attacks on them published in the Soviet press.

After the fall of Khrushchev the steel production target was increased, but last year the differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin on this issue were almost allowed to come out in public. At the Party congress, Brezhnev condemned (Khrushchev's) "in-

correct viewpoint" that modern substitutes would reduce the need for steel, and announced that this error would now be put right in the development of the steel industry.

BREZHNEV CHALLENGED

Kosygin, on the other hand, opened his remarks on steel by assuring the Congress that the industry had "considerable achievements" to its credit, and that in some ways it had even surpassed "the most developed capitalist countries." He was, in effect, challenging Brezhnev's implied view that the country needed much more steel. By last May Brezhnev also came to praise the steel industry—but only in order to bury Kosygin. He recalled that before the last war Russia was producing 18 million tons of steel; after the war this rose to 60 million, and now it was a 100 million. "And still," he said, "this cannot satisfy us."

It evidently satisfied Kosygin, but not the military-political lobby. Although the official steel target for 1970 is 124-129 million tons, Kosygin's planners had sabotaged it so effectively that the party leadership was constrained to issue a public rebuke to them.

This was in the form of a joint decision by the party central committee and the Government, which declared the "accelerated development" of the steel industry to be a highly important national task. It therefore ordered the "substantial intensification" of capital construction in the steel industry to enable it to achieve the 1970 output targets.

This can only mean that Kosygin, who is in charge of the economy, had viewed the proposed massive increase from just over 100 million tons this year to nearly 130 million tons within the next three years as wrong.

If he had provided the necessary production capacity in the first place, there would have been no need last month to issue orders for a speedup. The announcement was a major defeat for Kosygin, and a victory for the military-political lobby, whose pressure on behalf of heavy industry was also a pressure for steel—and for a Soviet ABM system.

As Marshal Krylov's article showed earlier this month, the victory of the military political lobby was confined to the steel issue—otherwise he would not have been able to publicly denigrate the effectiveness of the ABM.

But if the United States is building one, then those Soviet leaders who might have been willing to engage in talks on an ABM moratorium with the U.S. will have had the ground knocked from under them.

But might the American action provide a final incentive for the Russians, perhaps, to engage in talks with the United States, before deciding on a large-scale Soviet ABM development? It just conceivably might—but McNamara would first have to allay the misgivings which his announcement is bound to have aroused in the Kremlin.

[From the New Yorker, Sept. 30, 1967]

THE TALK OF THE TOWN

For a few encouraging years, it seemed as if President Eisenhower's valedictory warning against "the military-industrial complex" could safely be set aside. Civilian leadership, prodded and supported by President Kennedy, overwhelmed the startled generals with an almost terrifyingly brilliant combination of cost-analysis techniques, computerized strategy, and austere human intelligence. Secretary of Defense McNamara and his men soon knew more about the business of defense than the military itself, and combined the courage to make decisions with the skill to justify them. For a while, the enemies of "the McNamara revolution" were reduced to making the extraordinarily feeble and self-defeating assertion that the new civilian leadership was too intelligent and logical—as if the business of defense were properly an affair of the heart. In any event, new and

terribly expensive weapons, the B-70 bomber among them, were rejected by the civilian leadership—judgments that in retrospect are for the most part unimpeachable. The effects of the McNamara years are too deeply embedded to be wholly dislodged, but there is mounting evidence that the military is now using the increased leverage given it by the Vietnam war to reassert its primacy over civilian control, and is finding an increasingly responsive President and Secretary of State. The military chiefs' recommendations for escalation in Vietnam now become national policy, despite apparent objections by the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, disagrees ever more boldly and publicly with his civilian superiors, and clearly this superlatively cautious man would not venture to do so without considerable informal encouragement. Recently, Marine Commandant General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., took it upon himself to tell the country that Vietnam was far more important than any minor disturbances by a few Negro malcontents—exactly the kind of military intrusion into broad national concerns that seemed to have disappeared with the Eisenhower years. And now all these tokens of a military renaissance have culminated in the decision, after a decade-long battle, to build an anti-ballistic-missile, or A.B.M., system. Both the Secretary of Defense and the President were previously opposed to such a system.

Almost every independent scientific expert has concluded that a missile-defense system would be a costly, probably dangerous, and finally futile addition to the arms race. Yet we are going to build it just the same. Because the military and its allies want to. And because the President is unwilling to confront the political costs and pressures of a refusal. Apparently, the most important reason for the decision is the desire to deprive Republicans of the opportunity to make "the anti-missile gap" an issue in 1968. No one has clearly defined the phrase "military-industrial complex." Certainly, it's not, in any sense, a coherent and malevolent conspiracy. Nevertheless, it does exist. It consists basically of much of the military leadership, the large industrial firms that make weapons, and the members of Congress who have assimilated their public careers with the cause of armed strength. These people are impelled by motives ranging all the way from the desire for profits, through honest fear, to fierce patriotic dedication. However, the disparate impulses invariably converge in a continuous and powerful advocacy of more and better weapons and in an opposition to arms control. With the decision to begin the missile defense, they have won perhaps their greatest victory.

The arguments that are used to justify this decision indicate its remoteness from any logical analysis of the national interest. Until a few weeks ago, our official position was that we would not set up missile defenses if the Russians would also refrain. Now we intend to build a "light" system (only from five to ten billion dollars' worth), to defend ourselves against still nonexistent Chinese rockets. Plainly, if we need a defense against China, then to promise not to set up A.B.M.'s if the Soviet Union similarly held back was a dangerous blunder, since it would leave us defenseless against the Chinese. This mask of illogic must, therefore, conceal the real consideration: the military and its allies are eager to get going with missile defenses. We cannot afford a real defense against Russia, which by McNamara's estimate would cost forty billion dollars, and might well cost twice as much, and a smaller effort can be justified only by calling upon that convenient devil China.

The arguments that swirl around missile defense are labyrinthine and often technical. Yet there are some fairly clear considera-

tions—the same ones that led Secretary McNamara to oppose any defense and that now support his continuing hostility to a system for countering Soviet attack. The first such consideration—and one that in a different official mood would be conclusive—is that there is no way to build a defense that cannot be overwhelmed. If the Russians build enough missiles, or put more warheads on the missiles they already have, they will be able to blow us up no matter how many A.B.M.s we construct. As the Secretary has said, it is extremely unrealistic to assume that the Russians would not do this. Of course, we would do the same. (Soon, scientific progress will lay to rest the archaic formula "One rocket, one city" by topping a single missile with ten or more hydrogen bombs, which after crossing the Atlantic together would disperse to ten different urban areas.) Thus, after we had spent tens of billions of dollars and encircled our cities with nuclear weapons, both countries would still be able to destroy each other—which is exactly where we are now. If the Soviet Union should construct defenses while we refrained from doing so, we could nullify its efforts simply by improving our offensive power, and thus again preserve the now familiar assurance of mutual destruction. There is no escape from this logical certainty. For the important thing about missile defenses is that they will not stop all missiles. A certain number will get through. Perhaps twenty-five per cent, perhaps fifty per cent, perhaps seventy-five per cent. No one really knows, and no one will ever know until the day of Armageddon. There is no way of testing such defenses against all the stratagems and technological devices that may be contrived to deceive them. Anyway, air defense has invariably proved less effective in actual combat than on the testing fields. Even if some distant day of scientific wonders enables us to guarantee ninety-per cent perfection, then, as ten hydrogen warheads descend on Washington, there will be, at most, a few moments for quiet pride in the fact that nine of them will never reach the target.

The second consideration is that the potential cost of this particular upward spiral in the arms race is unlimited. In this respect, it is the ultimate dream of a weapons system. The flaw in previous strategies was that once there were enough missiles to blow the other fellow up a few times over, no more were really needed. (We have three or four times as many as the Russians, but we still assume they could destroy us.) However, once a race between defense and offense begins, there is never enough. Of course, it is possible to stop at any arbitrary point—say, ten billion dollars, or fifty—and we undoubtedly will stop, but that makes no logical sense. For if you are serious about defense, you must strive for a system that really defends you, and since there is no such system, you must build forever. Russia and, ultimately, China will increase their offensive strength to counter our A.B.M.s, which means we will need more. And we will increase our own offensive strength as their defenses grow. All this will be distorted by the pragmatic necessity of assuming that the other side has better defenses than it actually has and that our own will not work as well as we have calculated. In addition, there will be the pressure from unguarded cities. After all, it will be hard for the citizens of Butte, Montana, to understand why they should be left to nuclear incineration while New Yorkers are permitted to view the holocaust comfortably on television as A.B.M.s swat hostile rockets from Manhattan skies.

These are among the reasons our government has continued to reject a full-scale defense against Russia, though few doubt that, however limited the present step may be, it points the way toward far more extensive systems. For even if we accept today's justification at face value, the argument for a

defense against China lacks rational force. McNamara, with his fatal bent toward intellectual honesty, has practically said as much, announcing our decision with the far from ringing affirmation that since we must be "conservative" and must always take into account "the possible irrational behavior" of our foes, "there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment of U.S. A.B.M.s . . . is prudent," and, anyway, "the system would be relatively inexpensive." (Martin Luther King, Roy Wilkins, et al. will be glad to know it is only five billion dollars to start.) Such strained and reluctant prose must surely flow from the Secretary's knowledge of how little we are buying.

Defensive rockets will be pointed toward our northern border to intercept Chinese missiles taking, as the laws of physics recommend, the great-circle route to America (although some long-range A.B.M.s will theoretically be able to defend other approaches to the country). This will make it possible for most collisions to occur over Canada. Other A.B.M.s will be placed around our missile "farms," popularly known as bases. Once the Chinese build a large-scale striking force—say, from one hundred to two hundred warheads—this defense will be useless for exactly the same reasons that now apply in the case of Russia. Thus, its value is limited to the period between the present—when the Chinese have no missiles—and the time they enter the select company of nations able to devastate their enemies. This may be a very short interval indeed, since once a country has built its first dozen rockets it can easily, and swiftly, build a hundred more. If the Chinese manage to uncover the fact that many warheads can be carried on a single missile, the internal may be shortened even further. Moreover, the ingenious Chinese may well find ways to avoid their assigned routes and our defenses—for example, delivering their bombs by submarine and short-range rockets that will shoot under the system. While their force remains small, and if they are unable to fool or circumvent the "light" defense, it will probably stop a moderately high proportion of their missiles.

Although the abstractions of strategic thought lend themselves to infinite combinations of conjectural moves and counter-moves, the fact is that such a defense would have little effect on Chinese policy.

The most the Chinese can hope for from a small striking force is to hold a few American cities hostage to nuclear destruction, thus increasing our reluctance to get involved in a war with them. Since we must accept the likelihood that some missiles will slip through any defense, there is no way to frustrate this objective. Therefore, we will always have to assume that the price of an all-out war against China may well be Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago. If we ourselves should suddenly decide to make a surprise nuclear attack on China, defenses would be unnecessary, since we could destroy their missiles on the ground. So our A.B.M.s will save some American lives only if the Chinese impatiently decide to shoot their thirty or forty missiles at the United States in the knowledge that the consequence will be the total destruction of China, instead of waiting a few years, by the end of which time they can really do the job properly. Even this weak justification for the "light" defense is diluted by the probability that nuclear war between the United States and China would involve the Soviet Union, against which there is no defense.

If this decision takes us toward the probable goal of a much larger defense system, perhaps the most ominous consequences will be to the national psyche. Until now, nuclear war has been a terrifying but rather abstract possibility. Our weapons of destruction have been secreted on remote Western ranges, and their reality has been communicated to the average citizen through the dulling repeti-

tion of statistics and technical terms. If A.B.M.s expand, nuclear rockets will ring our major cities, and, undoubtedly, on Armed Forces Day and other patriotic occasions parents will drive their children out to see the impressive display of national might. The dawning awareness that we all live in armed camps will almost surely have a depressing effect on our thinking and our way of life. The constant physical reminder of danger, with its inevitable addition to the strains of daily life, may well bring closer the time when we will finally say, "Let's get it all over with." At least, we can be sure it will not help to liberate the more noble and creative impulses of the human spirit.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excellent article entitled "MIRV and the Offensive Missile Race," written by Robert Kleiman, and published in the New York Times of Monday, October 9, 1967; and an article entitled "The Grand Illusion," written by Edwin Diamond, and published in Newsweek magazine of October 2, 1967, from which I have quoted.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 9, 1967]

MIRV AND THE OFFENSIVE MISSILE RACE

(By Robert Kleiman)¹

Pressure from Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a heavy antiballistic-missile (ABM) system oriented to defense against Soviet attack reflects an old military weakness: preparing to fight the last war.

Technology has overtaken the ABM. The United States already has developed an effective antidote to it—sophisticated multiple warheads for the new offensive missiles, Minuteman III and Poseidon, which are to be deployed in the early 1970's. Official estimates indicate that the Soviet Union can do the same in five to seven years.

Whatever the case for a "light" ABM defense against primitive Chinese missiles, arguments for either superpower to build a \$40 billion missile defense to protect its cities against the other are now as dated as the Billy Mitchell bomber-vs.-battleship fight.

A hitherto-secret four-letter acronym, MIRV—Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles, and that key word is "independent"—describes an advance in nuclear weaponry that will enable the offense to penetrate any defense now foreseeable.

"Both our missile defense system and [Russia's] were designed before MIRV's came along as a serious possibility," Secretary McNamara admits.

One MIRV missile will be able to carry five or ten or more hydrogen warheads that can separate in flight, change trajectory several times and fly independently to five or ten or more widely dispersed, preselected targets. Equipped with MIRV, America's 1,700 strategic missiles could carry 17,000 or more separately targetable warheads, dwarfing the widely discussed Soviet increase this past year from 300 to about 450 single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's).

Early in the ABM debate, Secretary McNamara predicted that the Soviet Union and the United States would respond to the other's ABM deployment, if undertaken, by improving offensive capabilities. "All we would accomplish," the Defense Secretary said, "would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side."

But now, before substantial ABM systems have been deployed on either side, rapidly advancing technology has vaulted Washing-

ton and Moscow into the offensive missile race that was feared for the post-ABM period. And this race is far more dangerous and difficult to control than the race in missile defenses which the U.S. seeks to head off.

The vast increase in offensive warheads that MIRV can provide will spur fear by each that the other is achieving first-strike capability that permits pre-emptive attack.

Extraordinary advances in missile accuracy add to this fear. There was a time when ten incoming missiles were required to destroy one hardened ICBM and its single warhead in an underground silo. A one-for-one exchange is now almost attainable.

In the MIRV era, allowing for misfires and misses, ten missiles carrying 100 warheads will be able to destroy 80 to 90 ICBM's caught in their silos, thus wiping out 800 to 900 enemy warheads. If those 800 to 900 were launched first, the other side would need at least 800 to 900 antimissile missiles to intercept most of them.

The logic of this arithmetic—by increasing the fear that the other side may pre-empt—could turn the relative stability of mutual deterrence into a nightmare of nuclear nervousness.

Can this era still be headed off? Soviet-American talks on the limitation of offensive and defensive missiles have been pending since February. But Moscow has dalled in fixing a date, agreement within the Government evidently not easy.

There have been repeated hints that a concrete American proposal, rather than a plan for exploratory talks, would enable the Soviet leadership to shape an agreed policy more easily. Conversely, the lack of a firm date for a conference makes it difficult for the divided Washington bureaucracy to reach interagency agreement on a specific proposal; a deadline would force agreement.

Secretary Rusk told the Soviet Union in early September that, once a date was fixed, American negotiators would come to a conference with "specific and detailed proposals." Some of these proposals may have to be made in advance to get a Soviet response. But Washington is still unprepared to make them, despite months of desultory interagency consultations.

Here is a field in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Congressional Joint Atomic Energy Commission could make invaluable contributions. Instead of pressure to race in the building of obsolete defensive missile systems, what is needed is a plan to limit the ABM-MIRV race. It will not be easy.

Spy satellites can count ABM's and offensive missile silos without the on-site inspection Russia has always refused. But they cannot tell whether a MIRV-tipped missile contains five or fifty hydrogen warheads. New approaches to arms control need devising.

The tragedy is that both the United States and the Soviet Union, according to Secretary McNamara, already have strategic nuclear arsenals "greatly in excess" of their present security needs. And "we're planning another big increase" in offensive capability that will be able to overcome "the most powerful defenses the Soviets could build," Mr. McNamara has warned.

With Moscow, presumably, making a similar plan, time clearly is running out.

[From Newsweek, Oct. 2, 1967]

THE GRAND ILLUSION

(By Edwin Diamond)

Secretary McNamara's decision to go ahead with an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system is based on a set of brilliantly reasoned, highly sophisticated, and strongly persuasive arguments. But the decision is wrong, and the consequences of this error will burden every American for years to come.

Instead of strengthening the national security

¹ Robert Kleiman is a member of the editorial board of The Times.

curity, the ABM decision may well undermine it, for it upsets the present delicate balance of nuclear terror based on the twin implicit assumptions of a strong (four-to-one) but not overwhelming U.S. offensive missile superiority and a modest Soviet defensive advantage. Worse, the ABM move signals another dangerous upward spiral in the nuclear-arms race which may lead to a renewed drive by both the U.S. and Soviet Union to add new offensive weapons to the overkill arsenals each already possesses. Roswell L. Gilpatric, McNamara's own former Deputy Defense Secretary, fears the ABM means a U.S. global strategy based more on conflict than accommodation. The go-ahead, he said, "is certainly a move in the wrong direction."

Let's put these abstractions in concrete terms—and concrete is exactly where we are now heading. At the very least, this new nuclear escalation means the expenditure of untold billions in exchange for a wholly illusory security blanket. Whether the U.S. spends \$4 to \$5 billion for the "thin" ABM system to guard its Minuteman strike force, or \$40 billion for the "thickening" of the blanket to protect major American cities, or \$400 billion to protect smaller cities, the end result will be the same: all of us will still be 30 minutes away from nuclear annihilation.

MOLE SOCIETY

Indeed, with the ABM escalation, the possibility of this supposedly "unthinkable" missile Armageddon is greater, no smaller. All of us have now been propelled by the logic of nuclear events that McNamara grasps so well toward the next era of the atomic age—the mole society where the cities and civilians of the 1980's may have to burrow underground to join the concrete Minuteman silos sunk in the 1960s and the subterranean ABM control centers built in the 1970s.

Unlikely, you will say; right out of some science-fiction paperback. But who would have believed, ten years ago, at the time of Sputnik 1 and the "missile gap," that the U.S. within five years would possess the nuclear missile to destroy the Soviet society and population five times over?

What evidence have I that McNamara—one of the most brilliant and dedicated minds in the nation—is wrong about the ABM? What proof is there that the U.S. has embarked on a dangerous new course? The evidence is abundant. Precisely because McNamara has such a firm grasp of the complexities of the age, he himself has supplied some of the best arguments against the ABM and a new arms race. In fact, if an analyst were to overlay McNamara's speech with one of the cryptologist's sheets that cover some paragraphs while revealing others, the case for the present stabilized strategic situation would become compelling.

ACTION-REACTION

First of all, as McNamara makes clear, the U.S. now has "a numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate and effective warheads [that] is both greater than we had originally planned, and is in fact more than we require." This, to use the blunt term, is what overkill means. And politically motivated "missile-gap" cries of overkill, to be blunt again, is the legacy of politically motivated "missile-gap" cries of the late 1950s. The panic button was pushed in the U.S. and a real missile gap did eventually materialize. But as McNamara points out in his speech, this gap favors the U.S. At present the U.S. has 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons in readiness against 700 for the U.S.S.R. The Russian response to this U.S. superiority has been to concede an offensive disparity. In effect the Soviet Union acknowledged that the richness and ingenuity of American technology could not be matched. But it began an ABM system—the Russian military has been traditionally de-

fense minded—as part of what McNamara calls the "action-reaction" of the arms race.

McNamara has been conspicuously unworried by this deployment. As he explains it, the offense always has an advantage over the defense and any ABM system "can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending over more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them."

The logic of the situation calls for one of the superpowers to forgo the next turn in the vicious cycle of action-reaction. A Soviet McNamara—they have their sophisticated strategists and their war gamesmen, too—might argue that the Soviet ABM deployment represented a limited and measured response to U.S. superiority, a move intended to assure Russian second-strike capability and thus make the Soviet deterrent credible. Why not leave the arms race in this trade-off situation? Why upset the fearfully delicate balance of terror with a U.S. ABM system?

McNamara's answer last week was: because of the looming Chinese nuclear-missile threat of the 1970's. The proposed U.S. ABM system, in McNamara's words, is "Chinese-oriented," designed to deter Chairman Mao or his successors from an attack on the U.S. It is at this point that McNamara's computer logic breaks down.

MAD ADVENTURE

First, if Peking is suicidally mad enough to mount an attack on a country possessing 200 times more nuclear power than it has, then no amount of objective reality in the form of an American ABM barrier can dissuade the Chinese from their insanity. If the Chinese are bent on nuclear genocide, they could smuggle an atomic bomb into San Francisco harbor aboard a freighter and detonate it. No ABM system can protect against such mad adventures.

Second, the Soviet Union can also argue that its ABM is "Chinese-oriented," and merely a matter of insurance against an irrational attack by a country that shares an uneasy border with Russia and is violently hostile to it. After all, the same madness that might lead the Chinese to attack the U.S. might also push Mao over the brink with the Russians. Would we believe the Russians if they said, "It's the Chinese we are worried about—ignore our ABM"? Yet we expect them to believe our ABM is China-oriented.

The truth is the ABM decision was dictated not by strategy but by politics. Computer logic breaks down because men aren't computers; they are imperfect beings shaped by history and emotion as well as reason. There are really two McNamaras. One McNamara coolly attempts to manage the arms race by force of argument and intellect. He even on occasion does the Russians' thinking for them, patiently elucidating the nuclear strategic options available and their consequences in speeches and in briefings held for the press, but aimed at Moscow. The second McNamara is an American, a patriot and a member of the Johnson Administration (just as his opposite in the Kremlin is a Russian, a patriot, and a member of the Communist Party).

It is well known in Washington that Secretary McNamara for months has opposed deployment of the ABM system despite the urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Democratic hawks and of Republicans sensing a hot campaign issue for 1968. As James Reston suggested last week, the ABM system launched by McNamara is not aimed at blocking the Chinese or even the Russians, but the Republicans. By acceding now to the clamor McNamara has blunted the GOP charge that he is "indifferent" to the defense of the American people.

GOOD GUYS

Yet, isn't the U.S. asking—a bit illogically—the Soviet McNamara to be indifferent

to the defense of his people? More fundamentally, isn't the U.S. saying—also a bit illogically—that when it comes to the crunch, two standards apply: we are the good guys and would never attack first; you are the bad guys and you might attack first, and that is why we must have a four-to-one offensive superiority and defensive parity (at least)—and a lead in whatever else we decide to build.

Last week was the time for patience and courage—patience to lecture the Russians once again on the reasons behind the eminently equitable U.S. plan to put a freeze on all missiles, offensive and defensive courage, in the words of former Kennedy science adviser Jerome Wiesner, to run the risks of deescalation instead of the risks of new escalation; and patience and courage to explain to the American people, even in a pre-election year, why the ABM is not good for their security.

Instead, Washington gave us the ABM. By some curious alchemy, the Administration has convinced itself that the thin ABM system doesn't really change the balance of terror: only a thick system would do that. But thin leads to thick. It is all like that celebrated biology experiment: a frog is placed in a tank of water; daily the temperature is increased one degree; the frog exists as always—until one more degree... the water boils... the frog dies.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. I know that the Senator has already placed in the RECORD a most absorbing and provocative article published in this morning's Washington Post, but I think it would not be amiss to quote four or five rather pungent paragraphs from it.

As the Senator knows, I have been very much interested in the problems of the NATO alliance and in American policy in Europe. I think we have to take into account European reaction to the administration's decision to go forward with the deployment of an ABM system.

Let me quote the pertinent paragraphs from the article:

To the Western Europeans, China is very remote, its potential physical threat to them is remote, and extra suspicion therefore falls on the U.S. decision.

Western Europeans, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and their own security, automatically interpreted the U.S. decision in that dimension.

What looms in West Germany's official concern is that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that the Soviet Union and the United States are urging it to participate in, might preclude a Western European anti-missile system, because an ABM system employs nuclear warheads to knock down incoming missiles.

REACTION IN BONN

From Bonn, Dan Morgan of The Washington Post Foreign Service reported that the American ABM decision has further undermined the credibility of U.S. intentions about the nuclear treaty. Some Germans are contending that the U.S. action has cast doubt on the stability of the existing nuclear "balance of terror," and that the whole structure of defense concepts may require reexamination.

But paradoxically, the British position, as stated at Scarborough, England, last week by Defense Minister Denis Healey is that: "There is no evidence whatsoever that any ABM system of which we have any knowledge today will produce a meaningful deterrent against a major nuclear power."

Mr. President, I make reference to these paragraphs because I think they illustrate the extent of the argument which our decision has precipitated in Western Europe among our NATO allies.

Insofar as Mr. Healey's comments go, I think they coincide with the judgment of our own Secretary of Defense.

Mr. CLARK. I think this is so, if I may interject—although the Secretary of Defense, for reasons which are rather obscure to me, appears to have changed his view insofar as protection against China is concerned. I commented during the course of my speech that I thought the Secretary of Defense, for whom I have the greatest admiration, was singularly unconvincing when he said that there is no use building an ABM system to deter the Soviet Union but there is justification for doing so against China. This makes no sense to me whatsoever.

Mr. CHURCH. It places us in the anomalous position of building an ABM system, not to defend ourselves against Russian ballistic missiles, which they do possess but, rather, to defend ourselves against Chinese ballistic missiles, which they do not possess.

Mr. CLARK. That is quite correct.

Mr. CHURCH. It is now, of course, just a matter of speculation as to the size, dimension, and capability of a Chinese delivery system. Moreover, if the Chinese are going to embark upon the construction of a sizable delivery system for their developing nuclear arsenal, it only makes sense that they will strive to create a system which will have effectiveness; they are not going to be content with a system so small in its delivery capability that it could, presumably, be fended off by an ABM system.

So, what Secretary McNamara is saying, really, is that we are now going to build an ABM system to protect ourselves against an anticipated Chinese capability of very limited scope. But, as the Chinese capability grows, then the pressures are going to increase to enlarge and deepen the system, until it becomes a major and enormously expensive new addition to the nuclear arms race. The argument that if a few ABM's are good, more must be better, will prove irresistible, yet, Mr. McNamara says that, against a major nuclear capability, an ABM system will not be effective?

That is why I say we ought not to deceive ourselves. We are not talking about a \$5 billion ABM system; we are talking about the first step toward the creation of a \$50 billion—indeed, before we are finished, a \$100 billion—system, which, in my judgment, will be the most extravagant and expensive sieve ever constructed in history.

What is worse is that, as we proceed with its construction—given the fascination of the American people with our advanced technology, as we invest enormous sums in this system, as we publicize its capabilities, as we demonstrate that an antiballistic missile has successfully intercepted another missile in flight, the American people are going to embrace the system with an eagerness to believe in it, and we will enthrall ourselves with the fancied belief that we

have fashioned a marvelous shield. And as we assume that we have, indeed, fashioned such a shield, the risks of nuclear war will increase. They will not diminish; they will increase, because once the balance of terror is tipped by the assumption that we have designed a shield for ourselves, which will give us protection against a massive nuclear onslaught, the risk of nuclear war will increase. Our leaders will be emboldened to undertake and assume risks that they otherwise would avoid, because of the knowledge that nuclear war would result in certain obliteration.

So I think, on balance, this is not a contribution to the security of the United States, but ultimately a contribution to the ultimate insecurity of the United States, for, in the end, it may well result in enhancing the risks of a nuclear catastrophe which would see us consumed by the witchfire of a thermonuclear exchange.

I thoroughly agree with the statement, which I think was made earlier in this debate, that the real reason for this decision has nothing to do with China, which presently has no capability whatsoever of reaching the United States. We are not building this system for the Chinese; we are building it for the Republicans. Mr. Reston has written that it is internal politics which dictated this decision, so that this administration will not have to explain to the American people why we are not building an ABM system, when the Russians are.

The difficulty, in the coming campaign, of explaining that an ABM system really does not contribute to the security of the country, really does not constitute a meaningful defense, is too much to face against the simplicity of the argument that "they are doing it; therefore we should do it, also." This has been the major impetus for the decision to deploy a so-called thin ABM shield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have an additional 15 minutes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I had a couple of matters to put in the Record, if the Senator will yield to me long enough to do that.

Mr. CLARK. I shall be happy to. The majority leader asked me to request additional time. If the Senator will permit the Senator from Idaho to complete his statement—and the Senator from Oregon has been waiting for a long time—I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I wanted to take only a moment.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, may I have a second or two to conclude my statement?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. I want to commend the Senator from Pennsylvania for an excellent presentation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to granting the request of the Senator from Pennsylvania for an additional 15 minutes? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield briefly?

Mr. CLARK. I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I welcome the speech of the Senator from Pennsylvania and associate myself with every word of it. Once again, I follow his leadership on a very vital foreign policy issue. I call his attention to the speech I made last Friday concerning the policy of the Johnson administration in freezing funds needed for domestic programs; but I wish to make these further brief comments.

This ABM program is a program that the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, speaking for the Johnson administration, is throwing out to appease the war wings of both the Republican and Democratic parties. I think that is the politics involved here. The Senator from Idaho used the word "deceived" quite properly. I think it is a deceptive program, for it will not give the American people the protection that the propagandists seek to fool them into believing it will give them. Even from a scientific standpoint, scientists give little assurance that it will give any protection whatever.

Mr. CLARK. In fact, if I may interrupt the Senator for a moment, there is not a reputable scientist in the country today who believes that this system would be of the slightest protection against a Russian attack.

Mr. MORSE. That is the point I wish to make; and I point out further that this program cannot be sold, nor can most of the war programs of our Government be sold, without scaring the American people almost to death. This is part of the fear psychology or the fear propaganda being built up to frighten the American people. The American people can be frightened, as well as other people can be frightened. When people are frightened, they act emotionally and glandularly, not rationally.

That is part of this sales program to get us past November 1968. As I explained on Friday, I cannot be a party to it. It is also a part of the fear program being used to force through an unjustifiable income tax increase, while this administration refuses to face up to plugging tax loopholes and making cuts so as not to take away from the American people what they are entitled to in meeting our critical economic problems here at home.

But going back to the fact that it is not going to give us protection, let us go all the way, and assume that we knock out all the enemy missiles. We would still not knock out the fallout; and it is the fallout that will do most of the killing, not the explosive effects of the bombs. The explosion would kill thousands in the proximity of the bomb; but the fallout would kill additional hundreds of thousands hundreds of miles away.

That is why we do not find the Pentagon and the administration talking about another scientific fact that they are ignoring. They cannot give the American people these facts and receive support for their fear propaganda. All this talk about dropping nuclear bombs and the hydrogen bomb in North Vietnam and in

China—that is what the hydrogen bomb boys want to do, but they forget to tell the American people that if they drop them over there, hundreds of thousands of Americans will die in the United States, as far east as Chicago, from the fallout of the bombs we drop in Asia. That is easily seen, if we familiarize ourselves with the force and direction of the prevailing winds.

I am simply at a loss to understand how my country could get itself into the plight that it is in, and that there could be loose in this country supporters of this war, doing the bidding of the industrial-military complex that is taking over the policies of the Republic. The American people desperately need to recognize, before it is too late, that we are being run, in this country today, by an industrial-military complex that makes its profits out of American blood, and jeopardizes all the future generations of American boys and girls. I do not know how we can get the American people to recognize these facts before it is too late.

That is why I stand firm on every word I spoke on Friday, and apply every word I said then to the Senator's speech this morning. I can only say, the Senator is completely right. I do not intend for any of the blood of this war to be on my hands, and therefore I shall continue to fight in opposition to American continuation of a war in Southeast Asia in which we never should have involved ourselves in the first place, and in which we should not continue to involve ourselves.

It is time for us to stop making war in Southeast Asia and to insist that other nations of the world, which, as a Washington Post article this morning points out, are becoming scared to death of us—and they have every reason to be afraid of us, because we are following a military course of action that is jeopardizing the peace of the entire world—come in and settle this war for us. Apparently we cannot settle it. All we seem able to do is kill enough people and destroy enough property until we can hope to force a surrender. Even if we succeed, that will give us no peace; only a truce, endangering the lives of millions of American boys and girls in future generations as the world organizes against us, during the next century, to destroy us, if we do not stop this mad expectation of the United States to militarily dominate the world.

I am proud to associate myself with the speech of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend from Oregon for his comments, and welcome his support.

(The following colloquy between Senator CLARK and Senator NELSON, which occurred during the delivery of Senator CLARK's address, is presented at this point in the RECORD by unanimous consent.)

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I left the Presiding Officer's chair momentarily to come to my desk to commend the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] for his very thoughtful remarks about the thin ABM system.

The Senator has always had the courage to express forthrightly his views on any issue, no matter how controversial.

Mr. CLARK. Let me interject there to say that I thank the Senator for his kind remarks but, in my opinion, my statement requires no courage at all. I think it is good policy, in addition to being right. I intend to campaign on this issue, if I should run again next year, and I am confident that the majority of the people of Pennsylvania will agree with me.

Mr. NELSON. I am also confident that the Senator is correct. What astonishes me is the lack of opposition in Congress to the launching of this program which will provide a thin ABM system, which was described by one of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate, Mr. CHURCH, as the most expensive sieve ever constructed.

Mr. CLARK. I have often wondered whether we in the Senate are not more terrified of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than the Vietcong.

Mr. NELSON. It frightens me, too, when I consider the kind of judgment they have exercised in advising us on our intervention in Vietnam. In any event, I think, tragically, this is the first step down the road to the construction of what they are now saying will be a \$40 billion ABM system, if we construct the most expensive and sophisticated one we can think of—and, of course we will; and that antiballistic missile system will not be any more effective, in my judgment, than the thin ABM will be.

Mr. CLARK. I am sure the Senator is correct.

Mr. NELSON. I conclude by saying that I commend the Senator for his thoughtful statement. At a later date I shall make a further statement on this matter on the Senate floor.

Mr. CLARK. At which point, in the best tradition of senatorial courtesy, I shall come over and agree with the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I must say that I find considerable merit and food for thought in the argument that an antiballistic missile defense system, while perhaps adding to a degree to our national security, could also have the paradoxical effect of making us feel overly secure. This is a crucial consideration, because it bears on one of the most elemental problems of the nuclear age; namely, that of maintaining restraint, both in the public at large, and within the Government. If we had not exercised supreme restraint at the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—which is the only true nuclear showdown the world has yet seen—we might have descended then and there to the Armageddon that would have erased vast portions of civilization as we know it from the earth. My fear is that the ABM may in some subtle way erode our restraint and permit our military leaders—and the public, too—to have a kind of unjustified overconfidence which will allow them to take greater risks and press stronger nuclear threats, on the mistaken and tragic

assumption that we can afford to inflict astronomical damage because at least some of the retaliation will be diminished.

I recognize, of course, that another vital factor of the nuclear age is involved here, and that is our credibility. Our adversaries may be more inclined to take threats more seriously if they know that we have at least minimal protection against their retaliation. And it may be that for this reason we must reluctantly acquiesce in this latest increment to the arms race. But it seems to me that we must do so with the greatest caution and deliberation, remembering at every step of the way that nuclear defense does not in any way absolve us from awesome responsibility and restraint.

It must also be remembered that hostile nuclear missiles can be put in position in the United States by stealth and by trick, as well as by rocketry, and that the most sophisticated antiballistic missile system might in some circumstances be of no use whatsoever. In this regard, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD an article by the sagacious and distinguished columnist, Stewart Alsop, in the current Saturday Evening Post.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BUT IF 25 TRUCKS FANNED OUT

(By Stewart Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—The following exchange between Sen. Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island and Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is excerpted from the record of a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. The subject of their conversation was a grim one—the planting of nuclear bombs in American cities by stealth.

"Senator PELL. Is it not conceivable that missiles could be planted within our cities... no matter how good our antiballistic-missile screen was?"

"General WHEELER. This is a possibility... (deleted)."

"Senator PELL. But if twenty-five trucks fanned out over the United States they could do the same job and negate the most excellent ABM device, could they not?"

"General WHEELER. If they could get the devices into the country, assemble them and fan them out, the answer is yes."

This colloquy has inspired the following experiment in science fiction:

From a document marked *London, Most Secret, Eyes Alone; From M16 for PM, FS, and M only*:

The records we have been enabled to obtain indicate that neither the Hertz nor the Avis auto-rental companies had the slightest suspicion that the American-International Shrimp Corporation was anything other than an authentic business concern. At the request of the corporation, Hertz therefore unhesitatingly delivered 13 refrigerated lorries to a dock in the vicinity of Port Isabel, Tex., while Avis supplied 12 lorries to the shrimp corporation's representative, at the unloading platform on the Caloosahatchee River, near Fort Myers, Fla.

According to a reconstruction of the event by our agents, 13 heavy containers smelling strongly of shrimp were hoisted aboard the Hertz lorries from three shrimp boats. The Avis lorries were similarly loaded from two shrimp boats tied up in the Caloosahatchee River. The loading of all 25 lorries was completed between 2 and 3 A.M. on July 11, 1971.

The lorries thereafter fanned out over the then excellent U.S. highway system, the

Hertz lorries heading for Chicago and points West, whilst the Avis lorries sped toward the 12 largest Eastern cities. Only one lorry failed to reach its destination.

We have obtained a still legible copy of the Washington Evening Star of July 12, 1971, which on page 2 reports a "mysterious explosion of a refrigerated truck" 110 miles south of Pittsburgh, Pa. The explosion apparently killed the driver and two policemen. Presumably the police had, for some reason, stopped the vehicle and begun to investigate its contents, thus triggering a "dead-man" fuse. In any case, alone of the major Eastern cities, Pittsburgh survived physically intact, although the majority of its citizens subsequently succumbed to the heavy fallout from Cleveland.

The driver-agents (who were doubtless unaware of the contents of their lorries) must have been exceedingly well briefed, for all the remaining 24 lorries arrived at their assigned destinations 36 hours after the start, give or take a half hour or so. It has been established from blast patterns that the Avis lorry in Washington was parked near the intersection of 16th and K streets, a few blocks from the White House, while the Hertz lorry in Chicago was parked a block from the Tribune Tower. Other locations were chosen with similar care.

The timing devices must have been extremely accurate, for all 24 explosions occurred within less than a minute of each other.

MI6 has been able to obtain a portion of the tape recording of the final conversation between the general commanding the Strategic Air Force, in his underground command post near Omaha, Nebr., and the commanding general of North American Air Defense, in a cave in Colorado:

"SAC: No word from the Classified Locations, General?"

"NORAD: Not a word, General. Congress was in session and the President was in the White House. The Vice President had the Second Satchel, but he must have got it too."

"SAC: Then I guess it's up to us."

"NORAD: Yes. . . . Must have been the Russians, of course. Funny we got nothing on the radar—never did trust that goddamn radar."

"SAC: Anything from Nudets?"

"NORAD: Nudets estimates fatalities in the eighty million range. Only preliminary, of course."

"SAC: I guess we've got to go. You concur?"

"NORAD: I concur. Over and out."

Within 28 minutes the first missile in the U.S. salvo exploded on its programmed target in the U.S.S.R. The salvo delivered 400 megatons on Soviet targets, the megatonnage calculated by the Pentagon's cost-effectiveness analysts as the minimum required to destroy the Soviet Union as a functioning society. The Soviet counter-salvo, on top of the great damage already done, achieved the same purpose in the United States. Several of the larger American cities suffered the ignominy of being destroyed twice over.

In the opinion of MI 6 there is no question that the American-International Shrimp Corporation was the cover name for an elaborate Chinese Communist operation. Although Fidel Castro hotly denied it before he died of fallout from the mainland, there is little doubt that there was some element of Cuban collusion—the shrimp boats certainly embarked from Havana.

In his 78th year at the time, the late Mao Tse-tung was near death and unquestionably mad. But in destroying at one stroke both the hated "modern revisionists" and the "American imperialists" Mao surely displayed a certain genius in his madness. He was doubtless acting according to one of his

favorite precepts, from Sun Tzu's *Art of War*: "Make a Noise in the East, Attack in the West."

The Chinese, of course have never acknowledged their role in the catastrophe, which utterly destroyed the world's two greatest powers. Given the unchallenged global domination of the People's Republic of China today, the Chinese role, on orders of the PM, may only be mentioned in a Most Secret document, such as this one—Destroy on Reading.

This little nightmare is not, of course, a prediction of things to come. And yet, as the colloquy between Senator Pell and General Wheeler indicates, there is no purely technical reason why something of the sort might not take place. According to the intelligence estimates, by the early 1970's the Chinese Communist intercontinental missile capability will still be rudimentary, but the Chinese by then should have been able to stockpile a considerable number of multi-megaton thermonuclear devices. A three-megaton device should weigh on the order of one ton, and could easily be carried in a truck.

We Americans harbor a stubborn illusion that everybody else must do it our way—because we depend on an elaborate and immensely costly missile system to deliver nuclear warheads, we assume that every other country must do likewise. The above nightmare may serve as a reminder that there are more ways than one to skin a cat—or kill a country. Finally, it may also be worth noting that most U.S. intelligence experts believe that the senile genius, Mao Tse-tung, is already, to a degree which cannot be precisely determined, insane.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States submitting a nomination was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the nomination of Asher E. Schroeder, of Maquoketa, Iowa, to be U.S. attorney for the northern district of Iowa, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

CORRECTION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE CANAL ZONE CODE

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a letter from the Secre-

tary, Panama Canal Company, Washington, D.C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to correct and improve the Canal Zone Code, and for other purposes, which, with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDING OFFICER:

Petitions adopted by the City Councils of the City of Oroville, and the city of Breau, both in the State of California, favoring the enactment of some form of a Federal tax-sharing program; to the Committee on Finance.

A petition signed by members of the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, of the State of Minnesota, relative to the provision of jobs, housing, and education to solve the problems of American cities; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

A resolution adopted by the Robert B. Elliott Law Club, of Columbus, Ohio, commending the President and the Senate for the nomination and confirmation of the Honorable Thurgood Marshall to the U.S. Supreme Court; ordered to lie on the table.

REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

The following reports of a committee were submitted:

By Mr. PROXMIER, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, with amendments:

S. 1084. A bill to permit Federal employees to purchase shares of Federal or State-chartered credit unions through voluntary payroll allotment (Rept. No. 590); and

S. 1085. A bill to amend the Federal Credit Union Act to modernize the loan, investment, dividend, and reserve provisions; to require the establishment of an education committee; and for other purposes (Rept. No. 591).

RESOLUTION

TO PRINT ADDITIONAL COPIES OF HEARINGS ON THE "COSTS AND DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES TO OLDER AMERICANS"

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia (for Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey) submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 174); which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

S. RES. 174

Resolved, That there be printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging two thousand additional copies of its hearings of the Ninetieth Congress, first session, entitled "Costs and Delivery of Health Services to Older Americans."

SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967—AMENDMENTS

AMEND. ENT NO. 386

Mr. RIBICOFF submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (H.R. 12080) to amend the Social Security Act to provide an increase in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance system, to provide benefits for additional categories of

*Nudets; Nuclear Detection and Reporting System currently being emplaced in more than 50 U.S. cities.

individuals, to improve the public assistance program and programs relating to the welfare and health of children, and for other purposes, which were referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 387 THROUGH 390

Mr. FONG submitted four amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 12080, supra, which were referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 391 THROUGH 392

Mr. METCALF submitted two amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 12080, supra, which were referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

THE NEED TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS TO FIGHT WATER POLLUTION—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 393

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I am submitting an amendment to the Public Works appropriations bill to appropriate the full \$450 million which the Congress unanimously authorized last year for Federal grants for the construction of waste treatment works.

In passing the Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966, the Congress made a firm commitment to the American people to help in the battle against the pollution of our Nation's lakes and rivers. This is no time to back down from that commitment.

Our budget is strained by the rising costs of the war in Vietnam and it is apparent that there will have to be some budget cuts made. However, it does seem to me to be false economy to cut back on this important program.

Last year it was estimated that \$3.5 billion was needed over the next 5 years for the Federal Government to meet its share of the responsibility for the costs of construction works. Section 8 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was amended by the Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966 to authorize appropriations of \$150 million for fiscal 1967, \$450 million for fiscal 1968, \$700 million for fiscal 1969, \$1 billion for fiscal 1970, and \$1.2 billion for fiscal 1971.

Because the Congress authorized \$450 million for fiscal 1968 for the construction of sewage treatment works, many State and local governments went ahead with their planning for pollution abatement based on that authorization. Many municipalities have already passed bond issues in order to provide their share of the costs.

Our programs to abate the disastrous pollution of our waters are just picking up momentum and now is not the time for the Federal Government to renege on its promises. To withhold funds now will cost us much more in the long run.

There are numerous examples of the need for more Federal money. I will not cite them all but I would like to mention just a few.

For the six New England States, the total cost of their pollution abatement program has been estimated at about

\$1.1 billion. Further, it has been estimated that those States will need about \$61 million in Federal grants in fiscal 1968 to keep up their programs. With the full \$450 million appropriation, they would receive only \$28 million, while with the proposed \$225 million, they would receive only about \$14 million.

Under the full \$450 million appropriation, the State of New Jersey would be eligible for about \$14 million in Federal funds in fiscal 1968. If the appropriation is cut to \$225 million, New Jersey would receive about \$5.7 million. At the present time, there are 32 construction projects pending at the State, local, and Federal levels for New Jersey. These projects have a total construction cost of \$35.9 million, of which the Federal share would be about \$10.1 million.

In Wisconsin there are currently 71 applications pending for Federal grants-in-aid, with a total cost of \$45.5 million. If these projects were approved and the Federal Government were willing to pay 30 percent, the Federal share for Wisconsin alone would be \$13.7 million. If the State were willing to pay 25 percent and if the State's water quality standards were approved, then the Federal share would be 50 percent, or \$22.8 million. Under the proposed \$225 million appropriation, Wisconsin would receive about \$4.5 million. Quite obviously, this is not enough.

As of July 31, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration was processing 153 projects which contained requests for Federal grants totaling \$43.5 million. At the same time there are 829 projects being considered in State agencies and an additional 823 projects in preparation. These 1,652 projects would require about \$910 million in Federal grants.

I have prepared a list comparing Federal money available and projected needs of 21 States and the District of Columbia for 1968. Total money available for these States is \$125 million while their needs total \$404 million. Even if the full \$450 million were to be appropriated, not all of these needs could be met. I would like to have this table made a part of the RECORD.

I have some detailed information on the State of Wisconsin including a list of the cities who have applications for Federal grants-in-aid and a letter from Gov. Warren Knowles to Secretary Udall which describes in some detail the problem that Wisconsin faces if the full authorization is not appropriated. I would like both of these items made a part of the RECORD.

The problem of water pollution in this country is enormous and at the present time we are fighting a losing battle. Unless the Federal Government is willing to meet its commitments and carry its share of the load, the tide of pollution which is sweeping the country will never be stemmed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and lie on the table; and, without objection, the material will be printed in the RECORD.

The material presented by Mr. NELSON is as follows:

REQUESTS FROM SELECTED STATES FOR FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID FOR SEWAGE CONSTRUCTION WORKS AS COMPARED TO MONEY AVAILABLE FOR THOSE STATES

| State | Money for fiscal 1968 ¹ | Money needed (in fiscal year 1968) |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Alaska..... | \$883,000 | \$1,663,600 |
| Arkansas..... | 3,692,541 | 5,000,000 |
| District of Columbia..... | 1,226,250 | 4,300,000 |
| Indiana..... | 4,985,658 | 15,900,000 |
| Maryland..... | 5,268,380 | 20,700,000 |
| Massachusetts..... | 6,260,078 | 20,000,000 |
| Michigan..... | 7,622,632 | 14,000,000 |
| Minnesota..... | 5,255,246 | 10,000,000 |
| Nevada..... | 887,800 | 3,230,000 |
| New Hampshire..... | 1,786,825 | 3,500,000 |
| New Jersey..... | 6,133,316 | 14,000,000 |
| New York..... | 22,167,360 | 175,000,000 |
| North Carolina..... | 6,678,171 | 9,800,000 |
| Ohio..... | 9,796,211 | 27,000,000 |
| Oregon..... | 2,908,175 | 4,500,000 |
| Pennsylvania..... | 11,793,520 | 25,100,000 |
| Rhode Island..... | 1,756,764 | 2,900,000 |
| Tennessee..... | 6,056,436 | 12,295,000 |
| Virginia..... | 6,803,650 | 11,000,000 |
| Washington..... | 4,473,231 | 6,300,000 |
| West Virginia..... | 3,467,710 | 5,000,000 |
| Wisconsin..... | 5,019,267 | 22,800,000 |
| Total..... | 124,922,221 | 403,988,600 |

¹ Total available under proposed \$200,000,000 appropriation plus \$63,160,644 left over from fiscal 1967.

² 30 percent Federal share; all other figures are at 50 percent Federal share.

THE STATE OF WISCONSIN,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Madison, August 17, 1967.

MR. STEWART L. UDALL,
U.S. Department of the Interior,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SECRETARY UDALL: Several months ago, Wisconsin municipalities were required to file by August 1 their plans for sewage collection treatment facilities construction in the 1968 fiscal year. The purpose was to permit early assessment of the need for Federal matching funds in the current fiscal year.

Sixty-seven local governments have filed applications. Total construction costs represented in these applications are estimated to be in excess of \$46.2 million. It is conceivable (although not likely) that as much as one-third of the planned construction may not be under way by June 30, 1968. However, if \$30 million in projects prove eligible for Federal assistance, we must assume that these projects would be eligible for more than \$15 million in funds under Section 8 (b) (7) of P.L. 84-660. If all were to begin, the amount would exceed \$25 million.

Inasmuch as it would appear that less than \$5 million will be available to Wisconsin for these projects under the terms of the appropriation measure recently passed by the House of Representatives, I would appreciate your counsel as to our future course of action.

We are already using the reimbursement provisions of the Act, under which a community builds now and hopes to be reimbursed later and, in FY 1967, persuaded our communities to accept one-third of the total Federal grant for which they were eligible. We did this so that we could begin more projects with the limited funds then available.

We are well aware of the escalating costs of the war in Viet Nam, which have been cited as justification for the failure of the President to request the funds authorized by Section 8(d) or P.L. 84-660. Since the costs of the war show no sign of receding, it does not seem prudent for the State of Wisconsin to advise communities to accept partial grants or proceed in the expectation that Federal funds will ever be appropriated to match the purposes of the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966.

Wisconsin and her cities will undoubtedly do their share to preserve and enhance the

quality of Wisconsin's water but what assurance can you give that the brave words of the Clean Water Restoration Act will be matched by the Federal dollars of assistance that the Act promised? And when?

My query is serious, practical and immediate. Wisconsin has decisions to make.

Sincerely,

WARREN P. KNOWLES,
Governor.

WISCONSIN—CURRENT APPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL
GRANT-IN-AID

| Name | Project No. | Estimated cost |
|---|-------------|----------------|
| Barron..... | 179 | \$764,462 |
| Do..... | 343 | 238,587 |
| Beaver Dam..... | 348 | 152,000 |
| Bloomer..... | 345 | 164,430 |
| Bonduel..... | 328 | 148,400 |
| Brookfield..... | 334 | 6,495,000 |
| Cable..... | 221 | 45,000 |
| Caddy Vista S.D..... | 266 | 208,600 |
| Cameron..... | 175 | 78,650 |
| Casco..... | 319 | 20,000 |
| Chetek..... | 120 | 105,579 |
| Colby..... | 346 | 245,400 |
| Darien..... | 299 | 139,000 |
| Deer Park..... | 269 | 67,000 |
| De Forest..... | 274 | 265,990 |
| Delton, Tn. S.D..... | 285 | 504,000 |
| Edgar..... | 323 | 174,265 |
| Elcho..... | 241 | 75,300 |
| Fox River Heights S.D..... | 295 | 63,028 |
| Genoa..... | 278 | 70,828 |
| Germantown..... | 313 | 194,400 |
| Gleason..... | 240 | 87,792 |
| Green Bay M.S.D..... | 293 | 115,000 |
| Do..... | 294 | 1,450,785 |
| Greenfield, Tn. of (La Crosse County)..... | 217 | 46,055 |
| Janesville..... | 349 | 4,564,100 |
| Johnson Creek..... | 230 | 272,359 |
| Kendall..... | 318 | 150,981 |
| Kewaunee..... | 325 | 189,950 |
| Knapp..... | 246 | 57,700 |
| Lena..... | 171 | 195,895 |
| Menasha, Tn. S.D. No. 4..... | 336 | 220,000 |
| Menomonee..... | 344 | 320,000 |
| Milwaukee M.S.D..... | 315 | 7,620,000 |
| Milwaukee M.S. Comm. (County)..... | 337 | 676,200 |
| Do..... | 338 | 4,075,600 |
| Do..... | 339 | 575,000 |
| Do..... | 340 | 920,000 |
| Milwaukee M.S. Comm. (City)..... | 341 | 1,437,500 |
| Do..... | 342 | 3,162,500 |
| Mount Calvary..... | 321 | 224,281 |
| Mount Hope..... | 84 | 75,658 |
| Nekoosa..... | 327 | 339,083 |
| Neosho..... | 264 | 146,852 |
| North Freedom..... | 282 | 85,400 |
| North Park S.D..... | 331 | 74,800 |
| Northwestern Colony and Training School..... | 330 | 193,200 |
| Oscola..... | 335 | 98,410 |
| Pembine..... | 248 | 79,945 |
| Pewaukee..... | 306 | 206,400 |
| Plainfield..... | 58 | 68,740 |
| Platteville..... | 324 | 580,200 |
| Port Edwards..... | 322 | 515,181 |
| Potter S.D..... | 279 | 67,800 |
| Rosholt..... | 212 | 165,594 |
| Rothschild..... | 334 | 597,635 |
| Salem, Tn. (Hooker Lake area)..... | 309 | 267,640 |
| Sauk County Hospital and Home..... | 298 | 9,500 |
| Scandinavia..... | 329 | 83,467 |
| Sheboygan County (Rocky Knoll Som. and Hospital)..... | 332 | 85,953 |
| Sheboygan County Hospital..... | 304 | 65,600 |
| South Wayne..... | 284 | 96,110 |
| Stevens Point..... | 351 | 1,051,000 |
| Sturgeon Bay..... | 333 | 35,000 |
| Thorp..... | 181 | 135,530 |
| Union Grove So. Colony..... | 307 | 274,500 |
| Upsan..... | 213 | 18,100 |
| Wausau..... | 350 | 2,702,160 |
| West Racine County M.S.D..... | 308 | 347,000 |
| Wild Rose..... | 152 | 109,312 |
| Williams Bay..... | 347 | 300,000 |
| Total (71 applications)..... | | 45,457,544 |

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF
RESOLUTION

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the distinguished Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] be added as a cosponsor to Senate Resolution 173 at its next printing.

The purpose of Senate Resolution 173 is to strengthen the hand of the administration in the obtaining of commit-

ments of manpower and resources from our allies in support of the effort in Vietnam so as to assist in this mutual undertaking and effort in Southeast Asia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, last Friday evening I briefly visited the riot areas of Newark, N.J., and talked with citizens of that community in the now quiet aftermath of that tragic event.

It is quite obvious that the price that will be borne for a long time to come by the citizens of that community is very great indeed—great in that many merchants have now left the area, left their stores that were looted and fired upon and set afire and the broken plate glass is now boarded up.

These vacant stores are now working a hardship on the citizens of the community. Some residents there told me that it is necessary now for them to walk a mile or more to find some of the articles they need for their household living, articles that could have been found within a block or two of their homes before.

It will take some time for the community to rebuild so that normal commercial transactions can be carried out and the needs of the people of the community adequately served.

I found great desire on the part of the citizens of Newark to rebuild the image of that fine city, however, and carry on some of the great work that was being done before.

Very close to the riot area is a section called Hyde Park. Instead of the 20-storied high-rise public housing which has put people from the rural South and housed them in a type of living to which they are not at all accustomed, there are three-storied apartment houses that have been constructed and offered to the occupants for homeownership.

The maintenance level of these buildings is very high, indeed. They are meticulously cared for by their occupants.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to continue for an additional 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PERCY. The apartment houses are meticulously cared for and the universal feeling in this homeownership area, where not one dollar's worth of damage was done during the Newark riot is that the difference between renting and enjoying homeownership is the difference between a feeling of wanting to care for the property and a feeling on the part of others that the destruction of property was the only way they could show their frustration and bitterness.

This visit reaffirmed my view that my colleagues in the Senate and those in the House under the leadership of Congressman WILLIAM WIDNALL who have been working with me toward expanding homeownership opportunities for lower income American families are going to help bring about a program that will

more stabilize our communities and democratize our cities.

In this connection, I pay high tribute to a Member of the House, the Honorable LEONOR SULLIVAN who has herself pioneered in this area and has contributed importantly through section 221(h) of the Public Housing Act toward opening up greater homeownership opportunity.

I am pleased at the reports that the \$20 million allocated to this program this year will be fully expended and, as a result, a great many additional lower income families who could not otherwise have the stabilizing influence of homeownership will have the opportunity to enjoy the same advantage that has been offered to many other middle-income families in America through the years—to be somebody and have something in which they can take great pride.

THE POVERTY WAR

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, in the Washington Post this morning there is a column by William S. White entitled "Friends Hurt Poverty War."

This column, I regret to say, is full of inaccurate statements of fact and erroneous conclusions about the status of the war on poverty. I ask unanimous consent that the column may be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The article ordered to be printed in the RECORD is as follows:

FRIENDS HURT POVERTY WAR

(By William S. White)

The real question for the antipoverty program is not whether it will be crippled by conservatives but rather whether it will ultimately be killed by the left by excessively dotting friends who are in a characteristic determination to support all appropriations and oppose all tax increases.

The Senate has now approved a \$2.26 billion authorization for the next fiscal year; so far, so good. And in the process it has wisely struck down a truly wild blue yonder ultra-liberal attempt to double the amount, at a time when Congress generally is demanding very heavy spending cuts all along the line as its price even to consider the Administration's request for temporary tax surcharges.

But then the Senate has marched back downhill to add a budget-busting item of \$198 millions at the behest primarily of Sens. Robert and Edward Kennedy.

This additional and unwanted item is not a very big thing in itself but it may be just provocative enough to an economy-minded House of Representatives to give it more excuse to lay the meat ax upon the whole of the poor old war on poverty. The end of it all thus may be a gutting of a program that, ironically, is directed by the Kennedy brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver.

If this is to be the outcome, it will be a great pity. For while the war on poverty has undoubted shortcomings, the fact is that down where it counts the thing is doing a good job.

The heart of this program, practically speaking, lies in the Job Corps. This is a sensible scheme to train unemployable and tax-spending boys to be employed boys able and willing to enter the ranks of self-supporting and self-respecting America.

They are trained for work with care and prudence and there is no room for real doubt

that the Job Corps is reclaiming a human wastage that this nation simply cannot afford. It is keeping underprivileged youngsters out of beatnik hoodlumism. And in some cases it is making them not only able to work honestly for an honest living but also capable of fighting for this country in a place called Vietnam.

Beyond all this, however, the underlying concept here is indispensable to the national health. For it goes without saying that a majority of the Job Corps trainees are Negroes, since this is the race most disadvantaged, any fair-minded man must recognize that the Negro most of all needs simply a chance to earn his own way.

All talk of "unemployment" in this country is in truth nonsense, except insofar as unemployed means unemployable.

This is the bed-rock problem; and this problem the Job Corps is getting at in a rational way. Granted that some of these boys get into trouble—and who in the circumstances could expect otherwise?—the fact remains that they are handled without any of the syrupy social-worker ideology of the old leaf-raking days.

The truth, too, is that the administrators of the plan are more unpopular with, and have more trouble with, the most doctrinaire of reformers than with the most crusty of conservatives.

It would, therefore, be a genuine calamity should those who "demand" more and more outlays manage to create at least a climate of rejection of the whole business.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, this column deserves an answer in the interests of accuracy. Mr. White's conventional attack on the liberal defenders of the poverty program might well have been ignored and could have been ignored, but his distortion of the basic facts requires public correction.

Mr. White approves of the \$2.26 billion authorization. At least, that is what he states the authorization is. Actually the authorization was \$2.258 billion. Then, he disapproves of what he calls a budget-busting item of \$198 million, which actually is a part of the larger figure he approves. One wonders what careless inaccuracy caused Mr. White to become so involved.

Second, Mr. White refers to this \$198 million as unwanted. Who, it might be inquired, does not want it. The items totaling this amount were proposed by Republican members of the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which subcommittee I chair, with Democratic support.

The programs included in this \$198 million are all approved by the Office of Economic Opportunity, although officially and in public Mr. Shriver's lips and those of his associates are sealed by the Bureau of the Budget. An effort to strike the item was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 50 to 36.

I have no evidence which would satisfy me that the administration was interested in striking that item. It was left to Republican Members of this body to make the motion to strike.

Third, the "truly wild blue yonder ultraliberal attempt to double the amount" of the bill, referred to by Mr. White, to provide for the emergency employment of 200,000 restless and unemployed residents of urban and rural ghettos is one-fifth of the program recommended by the Urban Coalition.

I think it is worth while to read into the Record the names of some of those so-called or alleged "truly wild blue yonder ultraliberals" who make up the Urban Coalition. The first such "wild blue yonder ultraliberal" is David Rockefeller, president, Chase Manhattan Bank; the second is Roy Ash, president, Litton Industries; third is Frederick J. Close, chairman of the board, Aluminum Co. of America; fourth is Archbishop John F. Dearden, of Detroit; fifth is Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, president, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., New York; sixth is Henry Ford II, chairman, Ford Motor Co.; seventh is Andrew Heiskell, chairman of the board, Time, Inc.; eighth is Gerald L. Phillippe, chairman of the board, General Electric Co.; ninth is James Rouse, president of the Rouse Co. and president of Urban America, Inc.; tenth is Theodore Schlesinger, president, Allied Stores Corp.; eleventh is Asa Spaulding, president, North Carolina Mutual Insurance Co., Durham, N.C.

In addition, representing the National Council of Churches, is the Right Reverend John E. Hines, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church; Roy Wilkins, head of the NAACP, and Whitney Young, Jr., executive director, National Urban League, representing civil rights leadership; Mayor James H. J. Tate, mayor of Philadelphia, president of the National League of Cities; Mayor Joseph M. Barr, of Pittsburgh, president of the U.S. Conference of Mayors; distinguished labor leaders such as I. W. Abel, president, United Steelworkers, and Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers; and an entire spectrum of the American establishment.

Mr. President, these are the people who want five times as much for an emergency employment program as the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare requested the Senate to adopt. These are Mr. White's "wild blue yonder ultraliberals" because they want a program for 1 million jobs, not merely 200,000 jobs. One million jobs for 1 year would have cost \$5 billion; we sought 200,000 jobs for 2 years costing \$10 million. Perhaps Mr. White did not see the entire picture.

Mr. President, the fourth point I would like to make respecting Mr. White's column is that the Job Corps, which he praises is indeed, as he said, "a sensible scheme to train unemployable and tax spending boys."

The bill which we passed provides \$295 million out of a total of \$2,258 million for this purpose—slightly more than 10 percent. The capacity of the Job Corps camps is 42,000. The number of poor people presently being reached by the multitude of poverty programs is in the neighborhood of 4½ million. So that the Job Corps has responsibility for about 10 percent of the people who are currently being helped by the war on poverty. I welcome Mr. White's support for the Job Corps, which is certainly a worthwhile project, but it can hardly be called, as he does, the heart of the poverty program. Mr. White is correct in making the statement that a majority of Job Corps trainees are Negroes, but he is only correct by a little bit, because the figure is 55 percent.

My fifth point is that there is massive unemployment in the urban and rural ghettos of America today, running as high as 15 percent in Cleveland, and well over 10 percent in such cities as Oakland, St. Louis, Phoenix, and Los Angeles. To refer to "unemployment in this country" as "nonsense," as Mr. White does, is to put one's head in the sand.

Nor are these people, most of them young and able bodied, unemployable. They just do not happen to have the particular skills for which employers and Government are looking today. I think, with a little training, they can probably acquire those skills. That is what the program calls for. Without training, they can still do the kind of work which could easily be made and usefully made to repair and bring up to date a thousand projects all over the country where relatively unskilled labor is in demand.

My sixth and last point is, with respect to Mr. White, that I know of no liberal Member of the Senate with whom the administrators of the poverty program are unpopular. Mr. White makes that charge. It is the arch-conservatives such as Mr. White with whom Sargent Shriver and his able assistants are in trouble.

I am glad indeed that Mr. White's views did not prevail in the Senate. I hope they will not prevail in the House.

Mr. President, I just wanted to note that I had, earlier in my remarks, referred to the ABM system as a very expensive flying erector set. I think that is the kind of term which makes it easier and simpler to persuade the American people that they are wasting their money in a proposal which has no countervailing benefits over and above the huge sums of money which it will cost.

TAX INCREASE

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, there appeared in the Sunday Washington Post a very interesting article by James Tobin, entitled "Tobin: Case for Tax Increase Simple, Powerful." I would commend it to the reading of Senators and the public.

It is interesting to note that the analysis of Professor Tobin would indicate that prior to this time there had been no real economic case compelling a tax increase, even though the Government is running a substantial budget deficit. The professor makes an interesting argument that for the future a tax increase may be necessary. He points out in his article that certain reductions in the name of economy have to some extent had the effect of calling upon the poor of the Nation to bear the burden of reduction of proposed expenditures.

I would suggest that it might be worth considering the fact that we are going to pass a social security bill in this Congress which, in my judgment, will go substantially beyond that which was voted by the House of Representatives. This bill may very well go far beyond what many people anticipate in an attack on poverty in its own way, and in a very dignified fashion, by increasing social security benefits and providing medical care and improving upon public welfare.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1967]

TOBIN: CASE FOR TAX INCREASE SIMPLE, POWERFUL

(By James Tobin, sterling professor, Yale University)

(Prof. Tobin, a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, writes a special article for *The Washington Post* every other month during the academic year.)

The case for a tax increase is simple and powerful. Growing steadily at full employment, the American economy can normally be expected to generate a supply of private saving that just about matches private investment and state and local borrowing. This balance of saving supply and demand is predicated on current tax rates, and on monetary and credit conditions, easier than during the squeeze of 1966. If the Federal Government piles on additional demands for savings to finance a large budget deficit, there will simply not be enough saving to go around. The result will be either inflation or a tightening of credit markets and interest rates, or most likely a mixture of the two, until enough competing demands are squeezed out of the market to restore balance.

Here are the details of the rough balance of full-employment private saving and investment:

Normal Demands for and Supplies of Saving
(Percent of full employment GNP)

| DEMANDS | |
|---|--------------|
| Private investment in new structures and equipment..... | 10-10½ |
| Accumulation of inventories..... | ¾ |
| Residential construction..... | 3½-4 |
| Foreign investment (exports less imports) | ¾ |
| Total | 15-16 |
| SUPPLIES | |
| Capital consumption allowances..... | 8½ |
| Corporate retained earnings..... | 2½-3 |
| Personal saving..... | 4-4½ |
| Total | 15-16 |

State and local fiscal operations do not disturb this balance by as much as one percentage point either way. These governments are more likely to be in slight deficit than in surplus, adding to the demand for saving rather than to the supply.

INFLATIONARY GAP PROSPECTS

The Federal budget, unless taxes are increased, will be in large deficit in 1968, between 1½ and 2½ per cent of full employment GNP. Therefore, the prospects are for a sizable inflationary gap—excess demand of the order of 12 to 20 billion dollars.

The Federal Government has already begun to run a big deficit on a national income accounts basis. The deficit was \$15 billion annual rate as early as the second quarter of this year. Yet so far no inflationary gap has appeared. Indeed the economy had a narrow escape from recession early this year, and has not yet eliminated slack in the utilization of industrial capacity or even in the labor market. So far this year rising Federal deficit spending has been a welcome stimulus to the economy rather than a source of inflationary pressure. This is because special circumstances have depressed some of the private demands for saving below the "normal" values of the table above, and have raised the supply.

This year inventory accumulation has been abnormally low—below the amount needed

for stocks of goods to keep pace with normal growth of output and sales. Sooner or later the excess stocks with which businessmen began 1967 will be worked off. Residential construction, though gradually reviving, has not fully recovered from its 25 per cent recession in 1966. Eventually home building will return to a more normal relationship to income and to population growth—unless failure of the government to take other anti-inflationary measures forces the Federal Reserve to administer a new dose of tight money. Plant and equipment expenditures have grown abnormally slowly this year, reflecting in part delayed impacts from tight money and suspension of investment credit in 1966 and in part the depressing influence of the excess capacity and low profits of 1967. Surveys already indicate more rapid growth next year. Finally, consumers cannot be counted on to maintain the unusually high saving rates of recent quarters.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES TEMPORARY

These special circumstances are surely temporary. Sooner or later private investment and saving will return to normal, and the latent inflationary imbalance will become a reality. The only question is, as it has been all year, how soon. The basic situation is not hard to diagnose; but it has been very difficult to tell when it will prevail over the transient influences which have controlled the course of the economy in 1967.

The Administration's diagnosis has been essentially correct. The recent accumulation of statistical indications of accelerating private demand should convince open-minded skeptics. Good marksmen lead moving targets, and the government economists deserve credit for recommending policies appropriate to the future when they will take effect. If the Council of Economic Advisers somewhat overestimated the speed of this year's recovery, their error is harmless compared with the stubborn myopia of their critics. It has been distressing to observe the most economically literate newspapers, *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, use their editorial influence against responsible and foresighted fiscal policy.

CASE FOR THE SURCHARGE

The case for the 10 per cent tax surcharge, enacted at this session of Congress to take full effect no later than January, is overwhelming on grounds of economic stabilization. Even with the surcharge, it is likely that demand will be strong enough to take up the slack now in the economy, to reduce unemployment and tighten labor markets—a most desirable development—and to increase the rate of price inflation. The tax surcharge will probably still leave some anti-inflationary work for the Federal Reserve to do. Without any tax increase, the inflationary gap will be much too big for monetary policy to close except by drastically restrictive measures with very uneven, disruptive, and inequitable incidence.

All too many people, unfortunately, refuse to view the tax increase solely as a measure of economic stabilization. True to form, Professor Galbraith favors and Professor Friedman opposes raising taxes; they both have the same reason, that higher taxes at any season will make the public sector larger in the long run.

Influential members of Congress find the surcharge proposal a lever to obtain reductions in civilian Federal expenditures they don't like anyway. The politically marginal items are welfare and anti-poverty expenditures, and foreign economic assistance. Somehow when fiscal conservatives call on the government to "tighten its belt" and forgo "luxuries," they are always referring to programs intended to make life more tolerable for the poor of this country and the world. Surely the affluent taxpayers of the country are better able than these people to shoulder the economic burden of the Vietnam war.

The press reports that Congress will exact \$5 billion cuts in expenditure as the price of the tax increase. (Perhaps the Galbraith-Friedman assumption that higher taxes and higher expenditures go together is wrong, at least in the short run.) The price might be too high to pay. No doubt there are budget items that could be eliminated or postponed without hurting the country (e.g., supersonic transport, agricultural subsidies, space exploration, highways, irrigation projects), but these are not the items likely to be axed. There are some expenditure cuts that would do more damage to the country than inflation would.

Other critics, in the Congress and out, justify their reluctance to increase taxes by pointing to the many loopholes and inequities in the income tax code. Tax reform is needed all right, and has been for years. The case for reform is independent of the current need to raise taxes to check inflation. Oil depletion allowances, for example, are a scandal, but that has been true for many years. Let us wage each fight on its own battleground. If tax policy is to be used, as it must be, for economic stabilization, we cannot reopen all the complex issues and conflicts of interest involved in tax structure every time the economic situation calls for a rise or fall in tax revenues. For stabilization we must have a simple, quick, neutral way of adjusting taxes up or down. The proposed tax surcharge is an excellent device.

WRONG TARGET

Finally, there are those, including many of my colleagues in academia, who refuse to support the proposed tax increase even though they may recognize its economic merits. They oppose the war in Vietnam. Their protest is aimed at the wrong target. War and war expenditures have already been escalated. A vote to deny the Administration the tax increase is a vote for inflation and instability, not for peace. The scale of the war would not be diminished by failure to enact the surcharge, but expenditures to promote domestic tranquillity probably would be. If the object is to bring home to the American people, prior to the 1968 election the costs of the Johnson Administration's adventure in Southeast Asia, the responsible course is the one the President himself has recommended, to raise the tax bills of almost every taxpayer.

BRITISH SPIES FOR THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, there appeared in the Washington Sunday Post an article entitled "How Philby Stabbed Into the Heart of British Security," and another entitled "Maclean's Spying More Vital Than British Have Admitted."

These articles should be read by people interested in the history of the Korean war. They highlight the fact that when the Chinese Communists came into that war British traitors made it possible for the Chinese to know for certain that the United States would not use the atom bomb against the Chinese aggressors in that fight, and also that America's enemies in that war were in a position to know what this Nation was planning to do before we could get around to doing it. Having that information in advance, they must have felt safe in taking the gamble to risk a major war with the United States.

Traitor Philby and traitors Maclean and Burgess, it seemed, had very successfully taken charge of the highest connections of British intelligence. This

Nation, it seems, had an understanding with the British that we would not use atomic weapons or attack the Chinese coast without consultation with them. The Attlee government was subjected to such treachery that the Communists were in a position to know, through the Russian connections conveying information to the Far East, every move that America communicated to its allies.

That was a very unfortunate situation, and is something we should keep in mind in the future, when this Nation takes steps that it regards as being essential and vital in its own defense and to help preserve the liberty of other countries fighting to defend their liberties.

I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1967]
**HOW PHILBY STABBED INTO THE HEART OF
 BRITISH SECURITY—DISGUISED SPY SLIPPED
 PAST HIS LAX SUPERIORS**

LONDON.—Harold (Kim) Philby's achievement in becoming head of the Soviet section of the British Secret Intelligence Service, while himself being a Soviet agent, must rank as one of the great professional coups in the twisted history of espionage.

Philby later went on to higher things when he became the linkman between the SIS and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, from which position he could give his Soviet spymasters thorough general knowledge of the operations of both the major Western intelligence agencies.

But there is a classic quality about the earlier achievement. The selection in 1944 of Philby, already a Soviet agent of more than ten years' standing as the man to conceive, build and control a new British operation against the Russians is an event embodying the purest essence of espionage.

WELL EQUIPPED

How was Philby able to do it?

First, he was superbly equipped for the role of spy: His marksmanship was excellent, his mind was swift and clear, his nerves were strong. Despite some powerful drinking, he remained physically tough and resilient. He was also extremely attractive to women.

But above these qualities Philby had the capacity to disguise his feelings and intentions, a crucial professional attribute of a spy. For 30 years he lived as a passionate Communist behind the facade of a middle-class Englishman with Liberal-to-Conservative opinions.

It is still almost impossible to find chinks in the mask that Kim Philby first put on when he was 22. There are one or two clues: His writing was careful and restrained, and many people who knew him recall an elusive sense of distance or remoteness. Rarely did he allow himself to be engaged in such a way as to reveal his inner thoughts.

Had Philby been forced to spend more time in first-class intellectual company during those 30 years, it is questionable whether he could have kept up the charade. But the ineptitude of the British Intelligence Service helped to make his fantastic career possible.

Because the SIS bureaucracy was protected by layers of official mystery, the agency was even less prepared than others in the British establishment to cope with the mid-20th century. The Service was a caricature of the establishment, and so this is an account of a great breach that opened up the defenses of a social class, and therefore the defenses of the nation.

Philby was born on New Year's Day, 1912, in imperial India. Ironically, young Philby's Indian playmates nicknamed him "Kim,"

after the half-caste boy of the Kipling book whose central theme is intelligence work.

The boy's father, Harry St. John Bridger Philby, was an officer of the Indian civil service, a distinguished Arabist who, though he came of middle-class background, rejected its ordered virtues for the passionate, egotistic culture of the Arabian deserts. St. John Philby, like T. E. Lawrence, fought to free the Arab lands from Turkish rule and later came to share the Arab belief that Britain reneged on her promises at the end of World War I.

In 1929 Kim Philby entered Cambridge, where he met future colleagues Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. Philby's political bend was steadily leftwards. His views were expressed more in private, although with great conviction.

Philby had traveled in Central and Eastern Europe during university vacations, and after graduation in 1933 he went for an extended stay to Germany and Austria. It was here and then, in the early days of the Nazi terror, that Philby's resolve was hardened. He became a determined Communist, and he was recruited as an agent.

A few months after he left Cambridge, Philby was given his lifetime task—to penetrate British intelligence. Every piece of objective evidence available points to this period in late 1933, and is corroborated by the accounts Philby has given to his children who have visited him in Moscow since his defection from Beirut in 1963.

On Feb. 23, 1934, Philby married an Austrian Jewish girl, Alice Friedmann, in Vienna. She was an avowed Communist, and now lives in East Berlin with her third husband.

Philby and Alice returned to London, where he became an assistant editor on a dying liberal magazine. But Philby was to spend the next five years carefully obscuring his left-wing past beneath a right-wing camouflage.

Obviously an excellent way to insulate oneself against charges of communism was to condone Hitler's Nazi regime, which both Philby and Burgess did by joining the Anglo-German Fellowship. Philby managed to have his picture taken at a Swastika-decked dinner. This was in 1936, just before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, which gave Philby another opportunity to establish his public political position.

Philby went to Spain in February, 1937, and began reporting as a free-lance writer from the Franco side.

Recently in Moscow, Philby told his son John: "I wouldn't have lasted a week in Spain without behaving like a Fascist." He behaved so well, in fact, that General Franco awarded him the Red Cross of Military Merit.

THE FIRST GLIMMERS

When the civil war ended, Philby had completed two years as an undercover Communist in Franco's camp. But was he already spying on the British? There are two bits of evidence.

One is that an officer named Pedro Giro recalls that in a cafe in Salamanca a German agent passed a note to him with a warning against two men then in the cafe. According to the German, these men were British agents. Twice subsequently, Giro saw Philby locked in conversation with the same two men.

Another point was noticed by Sam Pope Brewer, a New York Times correspondent (whose wife, Eleanor, Philby was to acquire 20 years later in Beirut). At press conferences, Kim was always the last questioner and the man who wanted to know just which regiment had made just which move.

Perhaps at this point Philby, anxious to ingratiate himself with British intelligence men, was collecting and passing on any tidbits he could get.

ZANY CORRESPONDENT

When the British expeditionary force left for France to fight the Germans, Kim Philby went with them as the London Times'

No. 1 war correspondent. His colleague, Bob Cooper, thought Philby a wild, slightly drunken and rather brutal young man. Kim, it seems, was addicted to a curious bar game which involved busting people's knuckles. Also, as in Spain, where he had acquired a Royalist mistress, he was rather conspicuously living with a girl, this time Lady Margaret Vane-Tempest-Stewart.

Other colleagues still saw him as slightly pro-fascist. He wore the Franco decoration on his uniform. The disaster of Dunkirk in June, 1940, brought Philby back to London. At last conditions were ready for his crucial penetration of British intelligence.

These conditions were nowhere better than at the house where young intelligence officers set up residence. Among them were Guy Burgess and a number of homosexuals, heavy drinkers and hangers-on of varying types.

Philby was immediately taken into the department for sabotage, subversion and propaganda. His particular job was lecturing on propaganda leaflet technique. Philby was later transferred to a unit training for unarmed combat behind enemy lines, but his stammer and the fact that his work in Spain had made him known to a great many German military people made it seem suicidal to send him into occupied Europe.

So in the summer of 1941 Philby was recruited for work in the Secret Intelligence Service.

This agency, better known as MI-6, was and is concerned with espionage and counter-espionage in foreign countries. (MI-5, the home unit of the mythical James Bond, concerns itself with counter-espionage in Britain and the colonies). Both agencies had suffered a severe contraction since the palmy days of World War I.

MI-6 had escaped any basic reforms. During the 30s it had done its recruiting, in the tradition of the Great Game of the establishment, from the British police force in India and partly among rich, upper-class young men from London's financial district.

It was these men, often known as "the stockbrokers," who gave the Service its connection with White's Club, one of London's most exclusive men's clubs. This notorious liaison stands at the center of any picture of the wartime secret service. And it epitomizes the roughish, dilettante quality of MI-6, of which the rest of Whitehall, and especially the embryonic professionals of MI-5, were to become increasingly contemptuous over the next decade.

Most of the top brass belonged there, including Sir Steward Menzies, the MI-6 chief until 1951 and the model for Ian Fleming's fictional security chief "M." The etiquette of the time was to leave Menzies alone with his personal assistant when they were together, since it was understood that they were "running the secret service or something."

White's provided, too, a fertile source for emergency wartime recruits, on the basic English principle that if you could not trust your club, who could you trust?

As for Menzies himself, one former subordinate recalls: "He was terrifying to work with because he acted entirely on instinct. He rarely read a single case right through, yet he often came in with the answer."

COUNTERESPIONAGE

Kim Philby became part of Section Five of MI-6 which was responsible for counter-espionage, or more exactly, spying on the German spies. Through personal contact supplied by his old colleague Guy Burgess, Philby became head of the Iberian subsection.

"Philby just did not have the contacts to get that sort of job on his own," said one of his colleagues. "I know it was Burgess who rang up someone and got him in."

The Iberian subsection's theater was a vital one. Spain was a neutral, friendly to Germany, and provided the perfect base for operations against Britain's communications

keystone, Gibraltar. Portugal was friendly to Britain, but Portuguese Mozambique was the center of German espionage operations in southern Africa. It was in this connection that Philby sent Malcolm Muggeridge to Lourenco Marques and Graham Greene to Sierra Leone.

As a boss, Philby was a quick success. He possessed both grasp and human sympathy, faculties which evidently won him intense personal loyalty. This was to be a feature of his entire career, and it is with an almost unspeakable sense of irony that associates recall the word which they always felt summed him up: "integrity."

"You didn't just like him, admire him, agree with him," says one man who saw him often from the war until his defection. "You worshipped him."

By 1943, two years after coming in, Philby was firmly established as one of Menzies' very best men.

But by early 1944 Philby was getting bored by the limitations of the Iberian subsection.

It was then that Menzies asked Philby, just a few months before D-Day, to revive the defunct counter-espionage operation against the Soviet Union. To Philby, this must have seemed the ultimate opportunity, and also to represent the ultimate folly of the men above him.

Philby's appointment is a measure of the blind faith in him on the part of his superiors, whose own reputations had been aided by Philby's work. Had Philby's early Communist experience been forgotten? Had it been obliterated from the record by his excellent performance? Or was it, just conceivably, noted and, in a moment of supreme political naivete, ignored?

The aging colonel who was the sole incumbent of the inactive Soviet section was pensioned off, and Philby moved in to build an empire which, within 18 months, occupied an entire floor and employed more than 100 people. Within two years, the section had accumulated a vast store of information on Communists in Western countries, front organizations and the other now-familiar stuff of Cold War counter-espionage. And Kim Philby had acquired the confidence of his staff.

"He could get them to do anything for him," one of them has recalled.

This witness remembers that everyone there came from a strict security background, where the rigid tradition was that office desks should be locked at night. But Kim broke that tradition as he broke so many others. "Don't worry about that," he said, "I'll lock them up later."

"I didn't like to do it," this witness now says, "but he was so charming that I couldn't refuse anything he asked."

MACLEAN'S SPYING MORE VITAL THAN BRITISH HAVE ADMITTED

LONDON, OCTOBER 7.—A secret intelligence report which the Sunday Times tracked down in Washington in the course of its investigations into the Philby conspiracy makes it clear that, contrary to repeated British government assertions since 1951, Donald Maclean had access to every crucial Anglo-American policy decision at the height of the Cold War.

The report was compiled in 1956 by U.S. State Department intelligence officers in an attempt to assess the damage done by Maclean and Guy D. Burgess who fled with him in 1951. For the first time, the report reveals the magnitude of Maclean's espionage achievements.

It is also the first evidence from official files that the British government has been consistently misleading in its statements on Maclean's duties and the type of material to which he had access.

In fact, the U.S. intelligence report reveals that Maclean had knowledge of secret Anglo-American exchanges on the North Atlantic

pact, the Korean War and the Japanese peace treaty.

It also shows, for instance, that Maclean had full knowledge of the critical American determination to "localize the conflict," and therefore of its decision not to allow the United Nations forces under Gen. MacArthur to carry the war against the Chinese coast.

Both MacArthur and his chief of intelligence, Gen. Charles Willoughby, were certain at the time that this information had been passed to the Russians. Just before he died, MacArthur complained that the Chinese not only knew of this policy decision but "all our strategic troop movements."

Until now it has generally been believed that Maclean, first secretary in the British Embassy in Washington and later head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, passed to the Russians only marginal atomic secrets. He saw these in the course of his duties as U.K. secretary of the combined policy committee—the body set up to regulate the Anglo-American exchange of scientific information on the atomic program.

This information was vital enough, the report reveals. Maclean was able to tell the Russians the estimates made at that time of uranium ore supply available to the three governments—Britain, America, and Canada.

To appreciate the significance of this the circumstances of 1947 have to be recalled. In the early post-war years the world supply of uranium was thought to be limited. The West therefore embarked, in extreme secrecy upon a program of "pre-emptive buying" of uranium, in an attempt to corner all the known resources. Maclean was in a position to tell the Russians every detail of these vital negotiations.

The revelations provide the first credible explanation of the necessity that drove the master-spy Harold Philby to risking, and in the event wrecking, his whole espionage career, to tip off Maclean before the British security services could reach him.

Maclean was not, as previous explanations have suggested, simply an old friend. He was Russia's most important known diplomatic spy in the cold war years.

THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION OF FAITH

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I have just returned from 2 weeks' official assignment to Europe. Designated by the Vice President as congressional adviser to the 11th International Atomic Energy Conference at Vienna, it was also my privilege to attend at Geneva the 336th plenary meeting of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I talked to and listened to leading figures of many nations with a common concern—nuclear progress for peace.

Everywhere, everyone asked about our American President, whose authority is not surpassed anywhere in the world, whose responsibility is not matched, whose burden is not equaled by anyone.

Our President answered for himself and for his Democratic Party last Saturday night.

I missed the President's party, but I would not miss his declaration of faith. It is a most important document of our times.

I ask unanimous consent that the remarks of the President of the United States, delivered at Washington on October 7, 1967, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT THE PRESIDENT'S BALL, WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Thank you so much, Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Humphrey, distinguished Governors and outstanding Mayors of the Nation, Members of the Cabinet, Members of the Congress, and my beloved friends.

This is a very enjoyable evening. It is very thoughtful, to say nothing about how generous it is of you to bring us all together for this most pleasant evening.

I have been watching the polls pretty closely here of late. As you might imagine, I like some of them quite a lot more than I like others. The ones I like best are those that like me best.

But in this era in which we are living, I wasn't too sure of their credibility—so the other day I just went out and had a poll of my own made.

You may be interested. The question went this way:

"If President Johnson were to run against the following nationally known Republican leaders, who would you vote for?"

The first pairing showed:

Lyndon B. Johnson: 73%

William E. Miller: 27%

Then we added another picture that would involve the entire ticket. The second pairing dealt with the ticket of both President and Vice President. Once again I am happy to report that I think we did very well under the circumstances.

Lyndon Johnson and Hubert H. Humphrey—71%

Harold E. Stassen and Ezra Taft Benson—29%

I think I should tell you that we circulated our poll among leading editors throughout the country—and other experts. The response seemed to be very good. One telegram I remember came in from a very important national magazine. It said:

"Congratulations, Mr. President, on a very fine and well conducted poll."

It was signed, "Editor, Literary Digest."

A President, of course, sees a great many expressions of public opinion. The other day someone handed me this evaluation of the state of the world:

"The earth is degenerating these days. Bribery and corruption abound. Children no longer mind parents. Every man wants to write a book and it is evident that the end of the world is approaching fast."

I wonder who the columnist was. Later I discovered that, whoever he was, he wrote what he had to say on an Assyrian tablet almost 5,000 years ago.

You don't have to look far to see the same kind of thing today—much of it is directed at the man in the kitchen that President Harry Truman talked about.

Some people think we are spending too much, and some think we are not spending enough.

Some people think we shouldn't raise taxes, and some think we should have raised them last year.

Some think that we are not doing enough for the people in need, and some think we have done too much already.

Some think we should escalate the war in Vietnam, and some think we should get out of there tomorrow.

There is no lack of advice—however contradictory. In the crises of this hour—as in all others that we have faced since our Nation began—there are plenty of recommendations on how to get out of trouble cheaply and fast.

Most of them in the last analysis really come down to this: Deny your responsibilities.

In world affairs, behave as if you were a small nation with few interests; behave as if the oceans were twice as wide as they really are; behave as if you don't care what happens to people with different tongues or different cultures, or colors of skin—so long

as they aren't shooting at your house—just now.

Here at home, behave as if every baby is born with the same chance to succeed in life—although his crib may lie in the squalid back room of a slum. Behave as if rats were funny—too funny to fight with Federal help. Behave as if health and education and jobs were somebody else's concern—not yours. Behave as if the farmer is getting as much as he deserves. Behave as if you have no interest in helping local authorities protect their communities from crime and violence. Behave as if runaway inflation is inevitable—above all, never send up a tax bill designed to fight inflation.

I hear and read a good deal of this kind of advice. It is much more subtle than I have described it tonight, more "reasonable". It is the voice not of the dove or the hawk, but of the ostrich.

Be certain of this—in the time that I have been given to lead this country, I shall not follow that kind of advice.

The Democratic Party has never chosen the road of irresponsibility. In the 1960's, America, under Democratic leadership, has faced up to the poverty and discrimination in its midst. It has not yet mastered them. But it has started—started on the road toward mastery—toward healing and educating and training and employing those whom life was passing by.

This party, and the programs it has inspired and legislated and turned into action, has set a standard in the 1960's by which every Administration that follows must be judged.

For it was we who said poverty must be abolished.

A good education must be the birthright of every child.

Our cities must be made fit for a free people.

The environment must be cleansed and protected for every family.

Our streets must be made safe for law-abiding citizens.

And basic human rights must be made real for every man and woman among us.

Let them say that we have aroused expectations. So have all of those who have liberated men from dreamless sleep and sullen apathy—and set them on the way to becoming what their Creator intended them to be.

Let them say that we have not accomplished our goals entirely—that there is still ignorance and misery and despair in our cities and rural towns. Yes, there is—and there always will be, unless America completes the work we have already begun in these seven years.

My friends, next year will be a testing time for America.

The question our people are going to have to answer is clear:

Shall we go on building?

Or shall we become discouraged with ourselves, impatient that the work is not yet finished? Shall we bury all that we have begun—begun with such hope and promise—and bury it in a shroud of inaction and reaction?

You here tonight have come a long way to give your answer. Every State in the Union is represented in this hall tonight.

You are making it possible for the party that believes in building to take its case to the people—to tell them what we promised to do on that August evening in 1964 at Atlantic City we have done—and that America is a richer and stronger and fairer Nation today because Democrats made it so. And we have only begun.

Our party and our country is greater than any of us. It is entitled to the best from all of us.

As for myself, my first and last business is trying to win and trying to secure the peace. That task will take all that I have—and I shall give it gladly.

So tonight I tell you that I will work as hard as any man can work for his country, and I will do everything in my power to build a record for our Democratic Party that America will enthusiastically embrace 13 months from now.

I regret that I cannot predict, this evening, when the issue that most concerns us will be resolved.

I do know that we are following the road of responsibility in Vietnam, as we are here at home. I know—I know probably as well as any man, save those who are fighting for us out there tonight, at this very hour—that it is a rough road to travel. But the road, I think, does lead to a free Asia—and the road does lead, I think, to a freer and a happier and a more secure United States.

I believe the American people will follow its course—not blithely, not cheerfully—for they all lament the waste of war; but they will follow it with a firm determination, now that we have begun it, to see it through all the way.

A very brave man, reflecting on the years that lay ahead for his country, back in 1960, had this to say:

"Now the age of consolidation is over and once again the age of change and challenge has come upon us."

The result, John Fitzgerald Kennedy said, is that

"The next year, the next decade, in all likelihood the next generation, will require more bravery and wisdom on our part than any period in our history. We will be face to face, every day, in every part of our lives and times, with the real issue of our age—the issue of survival."

So we are.

I live with that knowledge.

I live every day with the responsibilities it entails—with those our country bears, because it is the strongest and it is the freest of all nations, and also with those that I bear, because of the office I hold.

If I may, let me speak quite personally to you for a moment.

I have—as you know—spent my entire life in the political arena. I treasure the support of our people. I treasure that support as much, I think, as any man could. And I know, as you must know, that there are many who suggest ways to increase that support—temporarily—by softening or renouncing the struggle in Vietnam, or escalating it to the red line of danger, by giving in and retreating on the tax proposal, by abandoning the fight against discrimination—the fight for the poor—here at home.

Some say there is short term political gain for me, and for our party, if we could follow this kind of a course.

But what about a year from now? What about five years from now? What would choosing that course mean—not just for Lyndon Johnson, not just for the Democratic Party, but for the glorious United States of America?

It would mean, in my opinion, greatly increasing the chances of a major war—not this year, but in the years immediately ahead.

It would mean imposing a far more onerous tax, a tax of inflation, on all of our people—and the poorest among us—not just this year, but next year.

It would mean dooming our cities to angry strife and squalor—in every year yet to come.

So we do have a choice.

We can take the easy road tonight, denying our responsibilities, hoping that a rise in our polls will compensate for what we ought to have done for our country.

Or we can take the harder road of responsibility. We can do what we believe is right for our children's future, though it may mean a great deal of present pain.

I have made my choice. And I pray that I—and we—will have enough of that bravery,

unselfishness and wisdom that Jack Kennedy said we would need—to see it through, all the way.

Just an additional minute. I won't be long. You have been here too long already, I know.

This is not in the text, but I want to say it while I have the chance.

This party tonight, this salute, should have been given to the man who really deserves it. The next one that the Democratic Committee gives is going to be for the man who deserves it more than any Vice President who ever served this Nation—Hubert Humphrey.

And to those great Governors of great Democratic states, those outstanding mayors from Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, from throughout the country, who have come a long way to be here tonight to give us their support and their inspiration, to those of you who have made sacrifices from your family and your own luxury to come here and make it possible for your country to get the truth message, I want to tell you that we are so grateful.

It gives us such encouragement and strength to know that all of you in this room, and in the other room, would want to do what you have done.

To the National Committee, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, Mr. Bailey and Miss Price, to Mr. Criswell, who has done a remarkable job, I want to say thank you very much.

This is not a group of big men, rich men. This is not a group of little men and poor men. This is not a group from the Eastern Seaboard or the West Coast.

This group comes from every state in the Union—more from New York, Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania, some of the larger states, than from the smaller ones. But every state has sent someone here tonight.

The person who is most responsible for that, and the person who is most responsible for ridding us of all the troubles and heartaches that come from trying to meet leftover bills, is a quiet, silent, humble man from New York named Arthur Krim, who the people who believe in the Democratic Party owe as much to as any man who ever served the Democratic Party.

Thank you very much.

CHIEF LAYTON COMMENTS ON CRISIS IN LAW AND ORDER

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, having been recently advised by the Postmaster General of the plans for the issuance of a postage stamp during fiscal year 1968 as a law and order commemorative stamp, I communicated with the District of Columbia Police Chief, John B. Layton, to advise him of my gratification and satisfaction on learning of this decision.

Chief Layton's acknowledgment states plainly his feeling that we are reaching a crisis stage in this country as it relates to respect for law and order. As a person who has long deplored the passivity of a large portion of the people in the Nation toward persons openly and continuously displaying contempt for law and order, I feel it is well for the general public to have access to Chief Layton's remarks.

I support his view. Moreover, I am convinced that actions and expressions of support for greater law enforcement and greater respect for law enforcement officers will go a long way toward creating a better atmosphere for community relations throughout the United States.

I ask unanimous consent that the let-

ter from Police Chief Layton be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SEPTEMBER 29, 1967.

HON. ROBERT C. BYRD,
U.S. Senate,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: Many thanks for sending me copies of the letter you sent to Mr. Quinn Tamm and the one you received from Mr. Lawrence F. O'Brien relative to the approval of a stamp based on the theme of respect for law and order.

I am delighted that the stamp will be issued and certainly appreciate your efforts in that direction. I feel that we are reaching a crisis stage in this country as it relates to respect for law and order; therefore, every forward step we can take in increasing such respect for obedience to the law is most desirable. There is no doubt that the U.S. Postal Stamp is a positive action in that direction.

With kind regards and appreciation for your continuing support of effective law enforcement, I am,

Sincerely yours,

JOHN B. LAYTON,
Chief of Police.

HEART FUND PROGRAM OF AHEPA

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, my good friend Andrew Fasseas, who was elected last month Supreme President of the Order of AHEPA, has brought to my attention the Order's heart fund program and its accomplishments in the last few years.

Through the efforts of the fraternity, young boys and girls from Greece, suffering from a heart condition which can only be corrected with special surgery in the United States, were brought here and through open heart operation were given a new normal life.

I consider this an excellent humanitarian effort for which the Order of AHEPA and its membership ought to be commended.

There are over 800 youngsters whose condition is reported to require this delicate operation before they are able to live normally again.

I sincerely feel that everything possible will be done to help restore their health and give them a new chance in life.

I hope also that several, fresh surgeons who, after being properly trained in this type of surgery in the United States, can go back and perform these life-saving operations in Greece.

I commend Andrew Fasseas and the Order of AHEPA's heart fund program for its great humanitarian efforts.

WHY TAX INCREASE WILL NOT STEM INFLATION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, for many weeks I have been contending on the floor of the Senate that Members of this body should recognize that their vote for a tax increase is unlikely to have much effect on inflation.

A front-page article written by John O'Riley and published in this morning's Wall Street Journal says why persuasively and concisely. With the reputation, the

time, and the intellectual equipment, it would seem likely that some of the Nation's brilliant academic economists would make some analysis of the impact of a tax increase on the economy in terms of its effect on particular prices.

It would be hard to conceive of a more appropriate basis for tax policy decision by Congress.

Certainly with the responsibilities borne by governmental economists one would expect this kind of analysis. But if such an analysis has been made it has been suppressed. No governmental economist has explained to Congress just what prices will be restrained by a tax increase. Certainly the consensus is that food will not be affected. It is clear that commodities for which the supply is abundant and demand deficient will not be affected. As for steel, autos, and chemicals, the tax increase will not stem the inflation we are already suffering in these areas.

Mr. O'Riley suggests another area: where demand has been for years consistently outpacing supply and promises to do so for years to come, as in medical care service and household service, the tax increase will have little effect in stemming a steady, relentless inflation. In the many areas where costs are predominant—that is, where the labor component is big and decisive and the supply of that labor is limited—it will take years of time, not a 10-percent surtax, to stem inflation.

Where, then, will the tax increase slow down the rise of prices? There may be some products whose prices would be sensitive, but it is doubtful whether in the aggregate they would have much real effect on the cost of living.

Certainly, if Congress is to increase every American's taxes by 10 percent, and if the principal reason for the proposed tax increase is to stem inflation, the administration owes the Congress far more than wild statements that without the tax increase the economy will be in shambles, or that the inflation tax without a tax increase will be far worse than the inflation and tax increase that our citizens will suffer if we pass the tax increase. But no such analysis has been made available.

Mr. President, I can only conclude that when such competent economists as the present council of economic advisers, and such able national tax-hike proponents as Walter Heller, Joseph Pechman, Otto Eckstein, James Tobin, and others, fail to come up with the kind of specific analysis of just how the tax increase will solve the inflation problem—the long-run conclusion is that they cannot show how the tax increase will do the job, simply because it will not. If the tax hike would slow inflation, the proponents of the tax increase would give us more than generalized appeals to their prestige; they would give us a specific commodity-by-commodity analysis, and then an overall quantitative summary.

I ask unanimous consent that the O'Riley article, which gives us at least a beginning of the commodity-by-commodity argument, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE OUTLOOK: APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS IN BUSINESS AND FINANCE

If a few million people who heretofore couldn't afford to eat steak at all suddenly find themselves able and eager to eat it every day, the price of steers will go up. And they will stay up until cattle men can get more beef on the market. This is elementary supply-and-demand economics. Some might call it kindergarten economics. Yet it may be worth pondering by those who expect a boost in Federal taxes, if it comes, to put a big brake on the rising cost of living. Chances are good that the proposed tax increase will do no such thing.

Few economists can contemplate with comfort the huge Federal deficit that apparently lies ahead. The prospect of the Government, unable or unwilling to cut its spending, pumping out maybe as much as \$30 billion a year more buying power than it takes in, hardly promises price stability. It looks like a price pusher-upper if there ever was one. And a tax hike should nip some of its potency. But a close look at the pull and tug of supply and demand suggests that the prices most responsible for the climbing cost of living will probably keep on rising with or without a tax boost.

The so-called "cost of living index" comes out every month. It reflects what consumers pay for (1) all kinds of commodities and (2) all services—haircuts, bus rides, hospital care, and so on. The index always makes page one headlines. It is nearly always up. It is often described as "spiraling."

When this index is broken down into its internal components, it is quickly apparent that some components—mostly services—have risen drastically more than others in recent years. The commodities, or physical consumables, have in general been the slow risers.

The table below, using price index figures with the 1957-59 average as a base and rounding off fractions, shows what's happened to the service costs in this decade.

| Service | 1957-59 | Now | Percent change |
|----------------------------|---------|-----|----------------|
| All services..... | 100 | 128 | +28 |
| Household services..... | 100 | 127 | +27 |
| Public transportation..... | 100 | 133 | +33 |
| Medical care service..... | 100 | 147 | +47 |
| Other services..... | 100 | 132 | +32 |

The following table shows the record for the average of prices on all consumer-bought commodities, as well as that for some of the key commodity groups.

| Commodity | 1957-59 | Now | Percent change |
|------------------------------|---------|-----|----------------|
| All Commodities..... | 100 | 112 | +12 |
| Food Eaten at Home..... | 100 | 114 | +14 |
| Men's, Boys' Apparel..... | 100 | 114 | +14 |
| Women's, Girls' Apparel..... | 100 | 109 | +9 |
| New Cars..... | 100 | 97 | -3 |
| Household Durables..... | 100 | 98 | -2 |
| Housefurnishings..... | 100 | 101 | +1 |

Behind the big difference in the two tables are the forces of supply and demand. The richly prospering American society in recent years has simply been demanding services in greater quantity than they could be supplied—at old prices. In the area of physical commodities, the producers, generally, have been keeping up.

The most dramatic example in the service area, of course, is medical care. Health insurance—Blue Cross, Blue Shield—has enabled rapidly expanding millions of people to effectively demand far more medical care than

they ever had before. And medical facilities are hard put to meet this demand.

Here's a quick rundown on the swift rise in the number of people covered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield over the past two decades:

| Year | Blue Cross | Blue Shield |
|------|------------|-------------|
| 1948 | 30,498,682 | 9,934,908 |
| 1950 | 37,515,745 | 16,182,014 |
| 1960 | 56,063,215 | 44,492,603 |
| 1966 | 63,713,722 | 54,627,902 |

Nor does this complete the medical demand story. Medicare for the old and Medicaid for the poor now add new demand pressure. Some 19 million elderly folks are already covered by Medicare. And in the 27 states which have so far adopted Medicaid, 10.6 million poor are estimated to be eligible for this coverage.

How all this immense pressure pushes hospital costs skyward is too well known to be detailed. It means heavy demand for more hospital help at higher wage rates and for more costly hospital equipment.

Will a tax increase perceptibly abate this upward pressure on medical costs? It is hard to argue convincingly that it will.

In other service areas—hair cutting, house cleaning, bus driving, TV repairing—it is harder to put the supply-demand factor sharply in focus. But it is there. With a prosperous and growing population demanding more services, it is hard to increase the supply. College-minded America puts a low status rating on many service jobs. Many a hard working bus driver, or barber, is putting his boy through college. And when the boy gets out, he most likely won't drive a bus. Or cut hair. Or repair TV sets. Yet the buses still have to run. Hair keeps growing. TVs keep conking out.

Will a Federal tax hike put a halt to the rise in New York bus or subway fares? Or the climb in the repairman's fees? It may, but it is not the sort of thing you'd want to bet on.

The area where consumer price increases have been the smallest in recent years is that of manufactured products. The cost of such things as automobiles and household appliances is simply not inflated. In relation to rising incomes, they are notably deflated.

Holding down the prices of manufactured products, of course, is massive capacity to produce—and the sharp competition that goes with it. Cars, television sets, refrigerators, toasters, garden tools flow from U.S. factories in increasing torrents. Capacity to increase the flow expands every day.

Competing with this big home output is the heavy flow of goods from the factories of Europe and Japan. It all lands in the retail stores.

No one strolling through the jam-packed consumer durable department of a big retail store can fail to see why it isn't easy to raise prices on this merchandise.

Thus while supply-demand forces work against cost-of-living increases where such increases have been smallest, they still exert an upward push where gains have been sharpest and will likely continue doing so—with or without a tax boost.

JOHN O'RILEY.

COLUMBUS—"TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS"—BY DR. JAMES FORRESTER

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, in this world which has known turbulence for thousands of years—a world that in this day looks to an America of an age less than 500 years, looks to this comparatively new land for security and responsibility—it seems fitting to look back to

America's beginnings as we approach Columbus Day.

A scholarly treatise on Columbus, his trial and his triumphs, has just come to my attention.

Its author is a distinguished educator and churchman—not of Columbus' ancestry nor Columbus' faith. He is Dr. James Forrester, president of Gordon College and Gordon Divinity School, in Wenham, Mass.

A native of Scotland, a graduate of Canadian and California universities, Dr. Forrester was an Air Force chaplain in World War II, serving in the Pacific combat zones of the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and the Philippines.

He was the first American chaplain to conduct a Christmas Eve service on Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima, and he delivered the Easter Sunday message of 1965 at the Boston Naval Shipyard from the deck of the historic U.S.S. *Constitution*.

As a man who has made American history himself, the history of America is close to his heart and his essay on Columbus deserves a place in every American classroom.

It is the product of deep research and is in a literary framework of the finest expression. I deem it an honor to have the privilege of making it a permanent chapter of our American history by asking unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the treatise was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COLUMBUS—"TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS"

(By Dr. James Forrester, president, Gordon College and Gordon Divinity School, Wenham, Mass.)

America is the story of costly discovery, prodigious effort and the conviction that in a context of responsible freedom, human life can achieve its God-intended fulfillment. Christopher Columbus never could have imagined what he initiated when he hoisted his flag on the Santa Maria in August, 1492, and sailed her out of Palos Harbor and over the western horizon. His subsequent discovery was to double man's geographical knowledge and open the way for the greatest expression of human freedom ever attained. This courageous Italian mariner has an incontestable place of honor in the vanguard of our national heroes. The sufferings and trials which he endured in achieving his goal are little known.

Through the gate he opened to the west nearly 500 years ago has flowed an ever-widening stream of freedom-seeking humanity. Those who came in his wake can read a nation's creed which he could never have written:

"Give me your tired, your poor—

Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,

The wretched refuse of your teeming shore
Send these, the homeless tempest-tossed to me:

I lift my lamp beside the golden door."

Let no voice discredit this Italian navigator of amazing ingenuity and dedication. His indefatigable efforts were motivated by two clear purposes. He had a religious dedication. He wanted to propagate the Christian faith in Asia and convert the Grand Khan. He wished to rescue the holy sepulchre of Jerusalem from the Moslems. He had also an explorer's dedication. He wanted to reach the far continent believed to be Asia. Attempts have been made to diminish the importance

of his role in the discovery of America. Let these documented facts speak for themselves. Let every Italian-American stand in the proud glory of this historic event as we celebrate Columbus Day!

Christopher Columbus was born in Genoa about 1435, the son of Domenico Columbus and Susannah Fontanarossa. He was given a good basic education in geometry, geography, astronomy, and navigation at the University of Pavia. As early as 14 years of age he made sea voyages which were filled with daring. As a young man Columbus was identified with some of the naval action related to the wars between the Italian states. He commanded a vessel in a small flotilla led by a cousin called "Columbo the Younger," to intercept four Venetian galleys returning, richly laden with merchandise from Flanders. Battle was joined off the Portuguese coast. Columbus engaged a huge Venetian vessel. In the heavy exchange of missiles, the Venetian vessel caught fire. Preliminary to boarding, the ships had been fastened together with grappling chains. They became one flaming mass. The crews threw themselves into the sea. Columbus seized an oar among the floating debris and swam two leagues to the shore of Lisbon.

Lisbon became the place of opportunity for Columbus to advance his knowledge of navigation and to heighten his curiosity about the world. He married Dona Felipa, the daughter of Bartholemew Monis de Perestrelo, who was an Italian cavalier in the service of Prince Henry and one of his most distinguished navigators. Perestrelo founded a colony in the Madeira Islands and was visited by Columbus at Porto Santo. Here Columbus made a living by drawing maps and charts. When Perestrelo died, Columbus came into possession of all the logs and navigation records of his deceased father-in-law. He talked with seamen who had made voyages in the western seas. He knew that Prince Henry of Portugal believed the Continent of Africa to be circumnavigable and he had heard and read tales of the riches of Asia. Columbus sailed occasionally the Portuguese trade routes and knew the narratives of Marco Polo.

Fortuitously, at about the time the vigorous mind of Columbus was wrestling with the hypothesis of a direct sea route to Asia westward from Spain, an important aid to ocean navigation was being developed. The physicians of John, II, of Portugal, Roderigo and Joseph, the latter being a Jew, together with the celebrated cosmographer Martin Bohen, developed what was to be the forerunner of the sextant. The use of the astrolabe enabled seamen to ascertain their distance from the equator by measuring the altitude of the sun.

Step by step Columbus pieced the data together which convinced him that by sailing west he could reach Asia. He had no idea that America and the Pacific Ocean lay between Spain and Asia by the western route. But the brave dream of Columbus was taking shape which was to launch him toward the setting sun and the historic opening of the new world.

Columbus needed ships, men and supplies to implement his daring concept. He first tried to interest the city of Genoa but the Genoese wrote him off as a visionary schemer. Columbus appealed to King John, II, of Portugal. He referred him to a committee or junta charged with matters of maritime discovery. They treated Columbus' project as extravagant and visionary. This junta, seeing that King John, II, might help Columbus, suggested that Columbus be kept in suspense. The Bishop of Ceuta and the junta secretly dispatched a vessel to see if there was any foundation to Columbus' theory—that the world was round and if there was a western route to India. King John, II, assented to this scheme and they required Columbus to submit a detailed plan of his proposed voy-

ages, with all charts and documents. A caravel was dispatched with the ostensible design of carrying provisions to the Cape Verde Islands but with private instructions to follow Columbus' routes. The vessels ran into severe storms and wild tumbling waves. The sailors lost courage and came back ridiculing the project of Columbus as extravagant and irrational. Columbus was without support, had suffered the loss of his wife and found himself destitute and disillusioned by the fraudulent treatment of his patron. Then began the lonely testing of the strength of his purpose.

He left Lisbon in secret with his son, Diego, and offering the princes of Europe the discovery of the new world, he begged his way from court to court. One day while passing a convent he begged a piece of bread for his famished lad. In 1485 he turned to the Spanish Duke of Medina Cell and opened up his plan to give the concept to the King of France for implementation. The Duke at first thought that he might by himself furnish the caravels to Columbus for his grand design. He kept him waiting more than two years and finally referred the matter to Queen Isabella of Spain. The Spanish Court was too heavily involved in the Moorish wars, however, and Columbus with his scheme was referred to a committee presided over by the Queen's confessor, Fray Hernando de Talavera.

After much time-consuming delay, the committee reported that it was vain and impracticable. Columbus did not give up but instead continued to gather support among influential friends of the Queen. Difficulties plagued his efforts continually. The scarcity of funds, the jealousy of courtiers, the doubts of King Ferdinand, the perfidy of those he trusted would have turned aside anyone but this lion-hearted mariner with the vision of the New World in his eyes.

Finally Queen Isabella consented to support the expedition, declaring, "I undertake the enterprise for my own Crown of Castile and will pledge my jewels to raise the necessary funds." Eighteen years of heartbreaking disappointment and unrelenting pursuit of the goal had brought Columbus to the first major step in fulfillment.

But there was still critical struggle ahead. When Columbus went to Palos to obtain and prepare his vessels, the owners refused to furnish them. When that difficulty was resolved, the ship builders did faulty work sabotaging critical components and did a sloppy job on the caulking of the vessels. Stories spread among the seamen of the wild visionary who would launch them on stormy untraveled waters with his primitive charts. Seamen had to be impressed by force to man the ships. Fortunately, two brothers named Martin and Vincente Pinzon, who were navigators of demonstrated courage and ability, threw in their lot with Columbus and furnished one of the vessels which had an effect of allaying opposition.

The vessels were ready in 1492 and August 3, Columbus hoisted his flag on the Santa Maria. The Pinta was commanded by Martin Alonso Pinzon, with his brother Francisco Martin as pilot. The Nina was commanded by Vincente Yaney Pinzon and had latine sails.

One hundred and twenty persons were on the three ships, including a physician and surgeon.

When the ships set sail from Palos, a deep gloom spread over the community because almost everybody had relatives on board.

On the third day at sea, the Pinta's rudder was discovered broken and unhung, sabotaged by her owners. They finally made the Canary Islands where repairs were made. While sailing among the islands, the crews were terrified by the belching volcano, Tenerrife.

Columbus faced new dangers. While taking on water, he received word that Portuguese caravels were hovering off the islands to cap-

ture him. Fortunately he put out to sea quickly and avoided them. When out of sight of land, his own crew was in a constant state of panic and had to be reassured continuously. The crude navigation instruments deviated by five of six degrees from the North Star on September 13. This brought consternation to the pilots. Columbus had to keep two sets of calculations, one known only to himself and the other for the consolation of the crew. For twenty-one days they sailed on beyond the Canaries without any sight of land into wholly unknown seas. Would threat of mutiny now deter Columbus from the answer to the question which would open a new epoch in history? Would sullen officers and superstitious seamen break the firm resolve which had stood the testing of eighteen years of cruel reversal. Joaquin Miller poetically depicts Columbus giving his answers from the bridge to the "blanched mate's" question:

"These very winds forget their way
For God from these dread seas is gone.
Now, speak, brave admiral, speak and say—
He said, "Sail on! sail on! and on!"

(From "Columbus" by Joaquin Miller, 1839-1913.)

Then came October 12, 1492, after Columbus had spotted a wavering light on the horizon and a sailor on the Pinta announced a landfall. Columbus and his men went ashore, knelt before God in thanksgiving, and named the island San Salvador which means Holy Savior.

What does it matter now if Columbus thought the island close to India and called the natives Indians? The great Atlantic had been crossed and the intrepid Italian navigator had opened "the line of unimaginable coasts" and had established forever in history his rightful claim as the discoverer of the new world.

But having discovered America Columbus still had no peace, for new problems arose which would try the patience of any ordinary man. On November 19, 1492, while exploring the islands, the Pinta, commanded by Martin Alonso Pinzon, slipped away and deserted. Columbus thought Pinzon intended to take upon himself a separate command or hasten back to Spain and bear off the glory of discovery. On December 24, 1492, Columbus set sail from Port St. Thomas. The steersman in charge of the helm put a ship boy in charge and went to sleep. This was in violation of Columbus' orders, and subsequently the ship was driven upon a sand bank and broken up. Here they built a fort of the wreck and called it La Navidad. On January 4, 1493, Columbus set sail for Spain.

On the way they met the Pinta, and Pinzon told Columbus he hadn't deserted, but was looking for gold. Columbus accompanied Pinzon to the place where the gold was supposed to be, and the natives protested to Columbus that Pinzon had captured four men and two girls to be sold in Spain as slaves. Columbus found this to be true and forced Pinzon to return the captives. On his return to the Old World, he landed at Portugal and was received with great acclaim, but the king and court were so jealous they planned to assassinate Columbus. Fortunately, the king would have no part in it. He then returned to Spain and was treated like a Roman conqueror. On the evening of his arrival in Spain, the Pinta, commanded by Martin Alonso Pinzon, entered the river. Pinzon, seeing that Columbus had arrived already and learning of his triumphant reception, feared to meet Columbus because of his desertion in Cuba. If he had arrived first, he intended to proclaim discovery of the New World to himself. However, the Spanish court refused to admit him, and he died a few days later in disgrace.

On September 25, 1493, Columbus made a second voyage from Cadiz, Spain. When he arrived at La Navidad, he found the fort

sacked and burned. He then founded the Christian city of Isabella. While making further explorations, he discovered a mutiny among his men, and Columbus ordered the ringleaders arrested. This bred hostility among the Spaniards since he was a foreigner among them. Disease and shortages of supplies caused great anxiety to Columbus plus the fact that the Spaniards did not treat the natives as kindly as Columbus desired. On March 15, 1495, hordes of native Indians gave battle, and it was very fortunate that the forces of Columbus won. Some of the mutineers returned to Spain and made trouble for Columbus. Other Spanish subjects were given licenses to make voyages and settle on the island. This brought many adventurers to the New World in search of gold.

On March 10, 1496, Columbus returned to Spain with 225 sick persons after a rough voyage. Upon his return, he found that envy and malice had undermined his popularity. On May 30, 1498, he made his third voyage to America and discovered Trinidad. When he arrived in Isabella, he found his followers in revolt, and eventually he had to hang some of the mutineers and was beset with internal troubles. At this time Ferdinand and the Spanish court became discouraged because there wasn't more profit in these enterprises of Columbus. They sent one, Don Francisco de Bobadilla, over to investigate Columbus in August 23, 1500. While Columbus was away, his brother, Don Diego, was seized, thrown in irons and confined on board a caravel for no reason. When Columbus returned, he and his other brother, Don Bartholomew, were also seized and bound in chains. The rebels claimed that Columbus had treated them cruelly.

Columbus and his brothers were returned to Spain in chains. When they arrived in Cadiz, Spain, it caused a sensation. Ferdinand and Isabella were incensed and ordered Columbus freed and his property restored.

On May 9, 1502, Columbus undertook his fourth and last voyage to the new world. On this trip his crew mutinied. He was shipwrecked on an island for a whole year before help came. On returning to Spain, Isabella died and Ferdinand refused to give him his just honors and estates. This last voyage had shattered his frame beyond repair, and the suspension of his honors robbed him of that repose so necessary in old age. Columbus died broken-hearted on May 20, 1506, at the age of about 70 years, and his remains were finally buried in Havana, Cuba.

Surely no explorer ever underwent such suffering and hardship as Columbus, and no explorer has ever discovered so much for so little a reward. Let us never attempt to take away from Columbus the honors of his discovery which were denied him during his lifetime.

Let him rest in peace as the discoverer of America.

GEORGE J. CONKLING, CONNECTICUT COMMISSIONER OF FINANCE

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, one of the key men in the government of the State of Connecticut is George J. Conkling, finance commissioner. George is a man of outstanding ability, unswerving integrity, and deep knowledge. There is no man in the State of Connecticut who better understands the problems of State government. I consider it a great privilege to have appointed him as finance commissioner. Gov. John Dempsey reappointed him and reposes the highest confidence in him.

Robert Conrad, of the Hartford Times, wrote a most perceptive article on George as a public servant and as a person. I

ask unanimous consent that the article, dated October 5, 1967, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONKLING WATCHES STATE'S PURSE

(By Robert Conrad)

"I was just thinking while I was driving home last night," said George J. Conkling to a close aide one day recently.

And the well-worn phrase again introduced a matter that the state's commissioner of finance happened to be mulling over as he headed for home in North Haven after a typical day at the office.

People who work with Conkling, or the scores of officials who have business with him frequently, have heard the phrase many times. Sometimes there is a variation. "I was thinking while I was shaving this morning."

NEXT MOST POWERFUL

With the possible exception of the governor, Conkling is the most powerful official in state government. He may have earned that status because of his nearly three decades of working for the state. More importantly, though, it is because of his handling of Connecticut's most demanding public job since Gov. Abraham A. Ribicoff appointed him in July, 1957.

In that time, Conkling has learned how to ride with the political punches and to keep quiet when discretion so dictates. Even so, campaign barbs wound him more than he likes to admit.

At 61, George Joseph Conkling long ago qualified for retirement. He can at any time tell his critics to go fry and toddle off to the shelter of his hammock. Conkling's problem is that he has what a close friend describes as a "love affair" with the State of Connecticut.

He is a perfectionist who demands the best from everyone else. His small staff at the State Capitol includes the top people in their fields in state government. Conkling can be as tough with them as he sometimes is with commissioners of equal rank in the governor's cabinet.

Conkling is also a softie when any of his grandchildren are around the house in a corner of North Haven that juts into Hamden. The children are often there. And Conkling loves nothing better than a family party. His three children are married.

The early years were far different than the routine today. Conkling went from high school into the big bands. He played the guitar back in the days when it was a musical instrument. He was also skilled with the banjo.

The commissioner still has the instruments at home, but it takes the greatest kind of pressure to coax him into playing for company.

The tough hide he can turn toward commissioners and agency heads when they are looking for money can be penetrated by criticism he judges to be inaccurate or unfair. Such was the case last fall when Republicans characterized him as the "financial governor," one of three running the state.

Gov. Dempsey was the "social governor and Democratic boss John M. Bailey rated" political governor in the GOP jibe.

While it was a cute figure of speech that hit close to the truth at the capitol, the label was offensive to Conkling because of his regard for the authority of the real governor's office.

Conkling worships the capitol. One story attributed to a member of the administration's inner circle has it that tears filled Conkling's eyes one evening as the two men paused a moment in a car on Capitol Ave., and the commissioner viewed the golden-domed structure in the moonlight.

COMPLEX ESSENTIAL

When Conkling feared that the capitol dome was losing its lustre, he decided to have a close look. He summoned Timothy J. Murphy, then public works commissioner, and the two hovered over the building in a helicopter to see how the paint job looked.

In Murphy's last year as commissioner, relations were strained with Conkling because the two disagreed over a stunning, \$200 million complex of state government buildings which a high-priced planning firm recommended.

Conkling insisted that a new capitol and a complex like the one in the fancy drawings were essential. Murphy hated the idea. Now a legislative study committee has the task of proceeding with plans which will go to the 1969 General Assembly.

Whether critics go along with Conkling's policies or not, other states have shown interest in some of his innovations here. One was his plan to pay for the highway program with state bonds, and use federal grants to pay off the bonds. That way, a holdup in the federal program has not cut off the road building.

He lost patience when the state colleges increased the size of the faculty rolls and then wondered why the money for expected raises ran short.

The commissioner arrives at the capitol early each day and stays late. He eases his Cadillac into its parking place by the east wing at 8:15 or a few minutes later and hikes to the elevator for a ride up to his third floor office in the west wing.

His staff knows better than to beat the boss to work. Conkling doesn't like that. But they should be on hand by 8:30.

When he breaks for lunch, Conkling usually picks up two or three of the men on his staff, and sometimes is joined by a high-level administration crony or two, for a stroll to the State Armory and its Officers' Club dining room.

OPEN-DOOR POLICY

The finance commissioner holds to an open-door policy at the conference-type room he uses for an office. Traffic is steady on most work days, but no one ever has to knock.

Conkling has a desk in one corner of the room. He rarely uses it, except as a receptacle for the papers and files that go with the job. Instead, he prefers to sit at the end of a long conference table with his work spread out before him.

News men find him immediately available, and always able to rattle off figures that may range from an obscure appropriations in an agency budget to the salaries of most key officials in government.

Reporters have given up trying to keep track of the committees and commissions on which Conkling serves, many times as chairman.

The story of Conkling's early career in the band business has been told many times. Best known of his one-time employers were Hal Kemp and Rudy Vallee. Conkling was expert with the guitar.

He quit professional music in 1931 when the constant travel and long-range outlook began to dim his interest in the band. He switched to the more stable line of accounting, after working as a bookkeeper by day and studying at the New Haven YMCA night school.

STARTED IN 1938

The start in state service for Conkling came in 1938, when he took a job with the Public Works Department. He became a state auditor in 1942 and was promoted to deputy under Finance Commissioner Frank Lynch (a Republican) in 1951.

When a Democratic administration took over in 1955, under Gov. Abraham A. Ribicoff, Conkling was retained in the deputy's post by the new top man, Joseph M. Loughlin. Conkling moved up to the commis-

sioner's post when Loughlin died in July, 1957.

As a bug on geography, Conkling makes a hobby out of driving. A trip to the West for this year's vacation was typical. And for any journey, long or short, a passenger with Conkling had better be prepared to leave the main arteries at any moment. The commissioner is great for poking into the byways and seeing more of the country.

If driving is his favorite form of relaxation, stamp collecting is a close second. It ties in with his interest in geography. Conkling has been a collector since he was a boy.

FLOOD INSURANCE ACT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement by the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WILLIAMS] in connection with the Flood Insurance Act.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILLIAMS OF NEW JERSEY

I was gratified by the prompt action given the Senate-passed Flood Insurance Act by the Committee on Banking and Currency in the House of Representatives last Thursday. The Committee voted 31 to 0 to report the measure favorably to the floor of the House. This, coming so soon after Senate passage of the bill on September 14, should ensure early and, I hope, favorable consideration by the House of Representatives.

We have been working toward this goal since 1962. It has been a long, and sometimes frustrating, struggle. But it will be well worth it when President Johnson signs into law this flood insurance legislation.

I first introduced in 1963 a bill providing for a federal study aimed at devising a workable flood insurance program. Authorization for such a study was finally incorporated into the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 1965. The Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted the study and reported that the flood insurance program could, and should be established. It recommended a joint program involving the Federal Government and the private insurance industry.

The bill which I introduced, the basic provisions of which were passed by the Senate and reported by the House committee, provides for the private insurance industry to sell and service the insurance policies and the Federal Government to provide financial assistance and flood data to be used in determining premium rates.

The major differences between the Senate version and the House-reported bill lie in the coverage each provides. Our bill would only provide flood insurance for one- to four-family homes in the initial stages. It would later allow the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to extend flood insurance to small businesses and other non-covered risks as experience indicates it is practical. The House bill would provide for initial coverage for small businesses. The House committee also deleted an amendment added by the Senate which would provide some assurance that the companies would not receive excessive profits at the expense of the Federal Government. I was disappointed to see this amendment deleted, but I am sure we will be able to work out the differences.

Flood insurance cannot presently be purchased. The result frequently is tragedy. A flood victim faces not only the loss of his home and its furnishings, but he may very well be left with a mortgage on property which for all practical purposes no longer exists. We have from time to time appropri-

ated emergency funds to aid flood victims, but it has been just that—emergency aid. It is never enough, and it cannot be depended upon. Our flood insurance legislation will give home owners and possibly, at least later, businessmen, the opportunity to make prudent provision against floods by purchasing insurance. It will also get the Federal Government out of this particular kind of emergency relief program.

I am hopeful that by the time the hurricane season comes around next fall, home owners will be able to insure themselves against disastrous financial loss from flooding which hurricanes usually leave in their wake.

HEROISM OF ARLAN GREVE, OMAHA, NEBR.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate for a moment to a feat of heroism performed by a civilian in Omaha, Nebr., several days ago.

I wish to pay tribute to a young man by the name of Arlan Greve for a lifesaving feat which I believe will go down in history as one of the outstanding acts of courage and valor in our time by a private American citizen.

Mr. Greve, who is 26 years old, is by no means an ordinary citizen. Fifteen years ago he was stricken with poliomyelitis. He cannot walk without crutches.

At about 1:15 p.m. last Thursday, Mr. Greve looked out the back window of his home at Omaha and saw the motionless body of a 3-year-old boy hanging from a gym set in the backyard of a neighbor.

Mr. Greve, who was alone at the time, called aloud for help, but no one in the neighborhood heard him. He made his way through his backyard to the wire fence between his and the neighbor's yard. He saw immediately that the gym set, although close to the fence, was not close enough for him to reach the boy across the fence.

When he came to the fence, Mr. Greve threw his crutches over it and leaned backward into the fence with all his weight and all the force he could muster. He managed to bend the fence downward until the weight of his body plunged him into the yard where the boy was hanging, according to an account in the October 7 issue of the Omaha World-Herald.

Mr. Greve found that the hood on the jacket which the boy was wearing had caught near the top of the gym set and choked the youngster.

I don't know how I got up or got the boy down. I usually can't do that sort of thing—

Mr. Greve recalled in commenting later to a reporter.

But he did manage to remove the boy, who by then had turned blue and stiff, from the gym set. He checked quickly and found no signs of breathing or a heartbeat.

Mr. Greve, who works at night as a laboratory technician at Nebraska Methodist Hospital, began administering mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. When that did not work, he switched to artificial respiration. The boy started breathing but remained unconscious. Mr. Greve continued his efforts, periodically yelling for help but getting no response, for about 15 minutes.

When he was convinced the boy was breathing well enough to be left alone for a few minutes, Mr. Greve went to the boy's house and summoned the youngster's mother. The mother quickly called the rescue squad and called other neighbors for help. At Children's Hospital later, doctors credited Mr. Greve with saving the tot's life.

There is one additional fact of interest to Members of the Senate, Mr. President. The boy whose life was saved is Dean Alexis Zerbe, son of Mr. and Mrs. Mason Zerbe, Jr., of Omaha and grandson of the Hon. U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

For his heroic feat, I am recommending Mr. Greve for the Nation's highest civilian lifesaving award.

MEETING THE WORLD'S FOOD EMERGENCY

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, a splendid and thought-provoking address on the world food problem has been delivered to the American Society of Agricultural Consultants by James G. Patton, former president of the National Farmers Union and a former president of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, who has been involved in world food programs for many years.

Jim Patton, known to most Senators, is sure that the world food problem can be solved, but he realistically warns that the development of modern agricultural techniques in the underdeveloped world will be a long and difficult task, but a task that we must undertake if we want a peaceful world. He speaks from extensive, firsthand observation of conditions around the world and an intimate knowledge of the state of agricultural technology.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Patton's address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEVELOPMENT IN WORLDWIDE AGRICULTURE

(Address by James G. Patton, president, James G. Patton & Associates, before the American Society of Agricultural Consultants, Los Angeles, Calif., September 29, 1967)

Developments of agriculture in the world are occurring at a fast and furious rate. Such developments can be discussed from several vital approaches and in many different phases.

One can discuss the fantastic rate of new discoveries in basic sciences that relate themselves to food and agriculture. The production of new sources of proteins and the implications of protein feeding in relation to raising the level of intelligence. The manufacturing of proteins through petro-chemistry—by fermentation of petroleum—the synthesis of amino acids, fish meal derivatives or the new high protein genes of high-lysine. One can also discuss proteins from the standpoint of upgrading animal production by improving animals and their feeding. The increased production of proteins under factory-type industrialized food production such as broiler production and SPF sanitary quarantined hog production is still another rapidly developing area.

The technological and scientific developments of higher yielding rice strains at the International Rice Institute in the Philippines and production of the new Mexican

wheat developed by Rockefeller Research are significant breakthroughs in plant genetics.

One can approach agricultural development from the standpoint of chemistry in relation to soils with use of the needed number of plant food units of nitrogen, phosphate, potash and trace minerals. The application of herbicides and insecticides is a part of the chemical breakthroughs. The use of basic sanitation plus chemicals has helped to eliminate the mass killers of people such as malaria, cholera, dysentery and other diseases in many parts of the world.

One of the most fundamental negative developments which is closely inter-related to agriculture is the population explosion which is now being so widely discussed. The more success achieved by the World Health Organization and other organizations who strive toward mass health improvement and life preserving techniques, the greater the food population gap and the greater the problem of food production and agricultural policy formation becomes.

There is some evidence, however, that as more deaths are prevented in the earlier years, a smaller number of children will be conceived in order to provide the culturally desired one or two sons for social security purposes. In other words, if people in the less-developed countries conclude that they will only need two sons to have one living long enough to provide their security in their old age, they will reduce the number of children they conceive. Whether this is a correct anthropological conclusion no one really knows and cannot know for at least a generation. But our business—the business of world agriculture and its related industries and services is to fight the War Against Hunger which is the toughest war we have.

Most of us could go around the world to Latin America, India, Africa, the Middle East and Asia—and with but a few exceptions, in country after country—observe starvation and crisis after crisis. *There is starvation in the world every day.* It is not a question of whether large numbers of how many will starve each day, month and year and how long before the "have" countries will inherit the political and economic instability this must inevitably bring to the world arena.

A prominent agricultural economist, now deceased, once said half cynically—"Of course the earth can feed her people—because what she does not feed will starve to death." I never thought that he really meant to be cynical because he was a man of faith, charity and compassion.

What is probably more to the point is: In a world wracked with revolutions and counter-revolution that hunger and starvation breed revolution, violence and war. "Stomach Communism" is not an idle play on words. Many who seek freedom, food and land will follow after those who make glib promises of food, land and security of tenure and improved opportunity.

I do not wish to bore you with statistics and facts with which you are already familiar. The problems of food and agricultural development and population explosions have been repeatedly covered. You have all read the generalizations which have been made with regard to hunger and malnutrition.

You all have available to you, and many of you have read the "State of Food and Agriculture" published every year by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Such publications as the three volume Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee (May 1967) entitled "The World Food Problem," the United Nations Economic and Social Council's report entitled, "Increasing the Production and Use of Animal Protein" (E/4343—25 May 1967) provide ample information for challenging thought.

The Society for International Development devoted its entire conference in 1966

to the subject of International Development. The discussions of this conference are in a book entitled "International Development 1966." You will find that the principal area of the discussion at this SID Conference revolved around agricultural development, food production and population management.

"The subject of the world food problem has been treated so thoroughly in orations and editorials during the past two decades that both its size and significance tend to be obscured by rhetorical 'overkill.' All has been said and said extremely well—all has been repeated, reiterated, and rephrased."

"So repetitively has the problem been brought to the attention of the American public during the past several years that they seem almost to have lost the ability to respond to the stimulus: they are aware of the problem, they converse about it from time to time, but there is no longer any depth of understanding or concern. The situation has been aptly put."¹

"A nation conditioned by affluence might possibly be suffering from compassion fatigue, or conscience sickness, the peril of narrowing our field of vision to leave out the unpleasant view of life disfigured by hunger."²

The people of the United States and other developed nations have spent about 150 billion dollars in Foreign Aid. Using PL 480, the USA has given and sold on concessional terms billions of dollars of food and fiber products. Through A.I.D. and its predecessors we have granted, invested and loaned additional billions of dollars. Through the U.S. Department of Agriculture and A.I.D. we have provided millions of man-years of technical assistance to less-developed countries.

Along with other nations through the United Nations agencies such as FAO, WHO, World Bank and UNESCO, we have provided billions of dollars of capital and millions of technical and scientific man-hours to the problems of food and population. Yet there are more hungry mouths in the world today than there were ten years ago.

The President's Science Advisory Commission properly asks, "Why is the race between food and population being lost?"

They have many plausible answers and suggestions. Obviously, agricultural development and general economic development are thoroughly interwoven. Obviously the problems of population and food imbalance are interwoven. The problem is to convince both governments and people of the necessity to manage population and to give sufficient income and other incentives to primary producers so that they will rapidly increase food production where they are. India is a case in point.

The provision of these incentives requires a broad array of economic, social, cultural and political considerations by governments and people which differ between countries.

History has shown that in such crisis the culture and fabric of traditional societies will be re woven either by violent revolutions or rapid evolution before the situation will change perceptibly. *The changes must and will be made.*

We must recognize but should not be complacent about the fact that the elimination of world hunger and starvation will take many years—and require many and far-reaching changes.

Furthermore, the problem of food production is only one part, although a very important part, of the enormous job of economic development in the poor nations of the world.

The original concept of Point IV in President Truman's Inaugural Address still stands as a basic guideline despite international

political emergencies which have necessitated military assistance. But, it is almost correct to say that technical assistance which is so vitally important to securing lasting and continuing increases in food production is still in its infancy.

Unfortunately the technical services of the United Nations agencies have been so small and passed around in such small allocations to the hungry countries of the world that in spite of some very fine and well-trained technicians, they have little lasting effect and practically no influence in securing improved policy decisions on the part of nation states. In other words, unless there is more and improved technical assistance, both the United States in a unilateral way and the United Nations' multilateral agencies will spend billions of dollars in these hungry countries without any lasting benefits or improvements. Along with technical assistance the basic problems of land tenure, income and price incentives must be met. Until this is done the money spent is almost wasted and we only put off the day of reckoning for a very short time.

The President's Science Advisory Committee also states: "Despite chronic reiterations for the need to involve private industry in economic assistance, no significant progress in engaging this rich reservoir of resources and skills can be reported at this time."

Such an admission is not just an indictment of business in the developed countries but is a black mark on the ingenuity of our policy-makers of the less-developed countries. Obviously, one must recognize the different political, cultural and social structures in the less-developed areas of the world, but the War on Hunger, as with any war, costs money, time, and effort on the part of all involved.

Finally, I wish to set forth a few ideas which I believe will help to substantially increase the use of the developed world's available and known food and agricultural technology with its required huge capital inputs, its industrial aspects, its fine technicians and scientists and its ability to assist the jump from the feudal and tribal state of agriculture in most underdeveloped countries to a vertically-integrated type of modern agriculture.

There are, of course, many factors which must be put together if we hope to avoid mass starvation and World War III.

First, it is obvious that agriculture with its present antiquated and unjust institutional structures is not fulfilling its role in the less-developed areas of the world. There are many reasons for this.

The land tenure and use pattern in many areas of the world is such that it discourages human and capital investment. In many countries agricultural land is still operated under feudal or tribal conditions. The people who work on these huge private and tribal holdings are slaves or near slaves. They hate their masters, have no incentive—economic, social or personal—to work hard.

The absentee owners of the huge private estates put very little money or managerial skills back into the farming operations they own. They use extensive rather than intensive farming and stock-raising methods.

The profits they receive from their vast holdings are not reinvested in the land, but are invested in city apartments and industries or in foreign corporate stocks or mutual funds, which purchase stocks of successful U.S. corporations. They exhibit little or no confidence in the future of their country. In some countries the land is held as a social status symbol of wealth and power. Increased production and profit offers little incentive to landowners in this category.

Almost universally where there are still large estates with poorly used or underused resources, the system of taxation of land and water use provides no incentive to do anything but to use these resources willy-nilly

and even wastefully. In some countries production taxes levied by city "consumer dominated" legislative bodies finish the job by removing whatever incentive there may be to increase production. Low income, poor health, degradation and hopelessness make for very inefficient production on the part of the "sharecropper" tenants.

Many underdeveloped countries where a very high percent of the population is rural have a great outward surge of the poor people away from the land to the cities. And as food is so short, much emphasis is given to keeping food prices low in these cities. In most countries the incentives to increase production are nil. The rural areas are where the worst starvation is and these rural areas have the poorest services as to schools, hospitals, doctors, transportation and other services necessary to give people in rural areas a desire to stay there. As poverty-ridden and poor as the cities are, they do have better health facilities. Food is rationed and there are more social services. Once in awhile there is a chance to get a job.

With cybernation and automation in industry, the number of jobs resulting from industrialization in the underdeveloped countries will be fewer and fewer. Industrialization will not end unemployment and underemployment in the developing countries.

Several basic and fundamental things can be done:

(1) Stabilize raw material price levels in the world markets so that sharp rises and drops in prices will not adversely affect and destroy the primary producers of monoculture and other commodities sold on the world market. Billions of people depend for their meager incomes on world prices and markets. What good does it do for the wealthy countries to provide billions in foreign assistance while the primary producers are losing billions of dollars in the same period by a drastic drop in world price levels?

If price stabilization is undertaken (international), its benefits should be extended only to countries that have improved land-tenure conditions—otherwise, international price stabilization efforts will simply make the rich absentee landowner richer. In fact, some countries would not even enter into an international commodity agreement preferring to "take their chances"—they would hope that the stabilization scheme would so improve long-range prices that their rich absentee landowners would benefit from improved prices without undertaking any tenure-improvement at all—an important part of the international commodity price stabilization is the strength with which it is administered—so that unless the producer-nations take important and necessary land-tenure-improvement-steps, they will be shut out of the rich market areas. Otherwise, we in the market-area countries will be paying to keep the land-barons on top throughout the world.

(2) Provide market price incentives for farmers to use fertilizer and better techniques to produce more food right where they are without moving.

(3) Establish a World Land Bank with regional branches. This bank should be empowered to issue Land Income Bonds which can be marketed and the proceeds used for providing land transfers and production credit on a supervised basis. Such banks should provide credit for purchase of machinery, seeds, fertilizers and breeding animals. Such a credit program should be supervised and tied to technical assistance and farm management.

Long term credit to establish an efficient farm product processing, quality control, preservation and marketing structure through cooperatives and other non-governmental structures should be made available.

(4) Provide a multibillion dollar guarantee fund to American firms, farmers and tech-

¹ *The World Food Problem.*

² Cousins, Norman; *Saturday Review*, March 25, 1961.

nicians to go out in the world and enter into joint ventures in developing vertically-integrated modern agricultural and food production on a vast scale. Large sums of money should be invested in fertilizer production and its efficient distribution and use.

Adequate safeguards must be included so that human exploitation too common in the past will not be guaranteed by this fund—legal minimum wages, profit-sharing plans, proper education and health protection, etc., must be included in any such international guarantee scheme.

(5) Provide a large sum of funds for fundamental and applied research on tropical agriculture about which we know practically nothing compared to what we know about soils, plant foods and production methods in the temperate and subtropical belts.

(6) Seek out large areas of arable land around the world which have a low density of population and develop them through modern technology and large (per man) capital investments. One such area is the Campos Corado area of Brazil, the LaPlata basin of Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina. Help in establishing public-private corporations to invest in these areas. The nation state should contribute the raw land as capital along with grants as to water, security and other available assets. The public-private corporation should be authorized to issue long-term income bonds to be purchased by the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, AID and other international financial institutions. The proceeds from the bond sales should be used to build an infrastructure of roads, transportation, utilities, irrigation, test farms and pilot processing industries.

Private capital with proper guarantees should be asked to participate in developing agricultural production, processing, preservation and marketing and distribution of the products of the area and in providing the manufacturing, processing and services which would be increasingly needed as the area grew and developed a more sophisticated social and economic structure.

Several such areas exist. Madagascar is one such area, Angola is another. The Middle East, with nuclear desalination, is another.

Lastly, the fundamental policy of the wealthy nations in relation to the poor nations must change.

The wealthy countries, for their own safety, must plan on an annual investment in the capital and technically-starved underdeveloped countries of not less than 5% of the wealthy country's Gross National Product. This is more important than getting to the moon by 1970 or having the first supersonic jet liner. It is positively ridiculous to talk about feeding two to three billion people with the penny ante approaches which the wealthy nations of the world are now discussing. Eliminating hunger and starvation is a war that is bigger than Korea or Viet Nam or World War II. It is going to cost billions upon billions for manpower, fertilizer, seeds, animals and other requisites. So far the rich nations have spent billions of dollars in money while contributing hundreds of billions of almost meaningless words to the hungry and starving people of the world.

Wendell Wilkie once said that the wealthy nations of the world could not live in the "big white house on the hill" while the poor people of the world live in the dirty, disease-ridden mud huts in the swamps. The challenges are tremendous—but we have the capacity to meet them. *We must meet them if we are to have lasting peace.*

DISSENT OR DESTRUCTION?

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, for a great many years, Mr. Eric Sevareid has ranked

as one of America's keenest and most articulate observers of national and international problems. His radio and television broadcasts, as well as his columns and articles, have always reflected scholarship and erudition, in addition to being lucid and incisive. As a consequence he has gained a deservedly wide and enthusiastic audience.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that an article entitled "Dissent or Destruction?" written by Mr. Sevareid, and published in the September 5, 1967, issue of *Look* magazine achieves a new pinnacle. While the article is a comment—one of the best I have seen—on the apparent new fad of dissent for the sake of dissent, in no way could it be construed as a polemic designed to restrict the freedoms that Americans hold sacred. It examines carefully both the unreason and irresponsibility of all extremists in these times.

For example, Mr. Sevareid writes:

Thousands of Americans . . . are busy invoking self-serving "higher laws" to supersede the national rulebook. None of them seems familiar with the words "duty" or "obligation."

He adds later:

The notion is abroad that if dissent is good, as it is, then the more dissent the better, a most dubious proposition. The notion has taken hold of many that the manner and content of their dissent are sacred, whereas it is only the *right* of dissent that is sacred.

Perhaps most important, however, is Mr. Sevareid's thoughtful contention that the United States, rather than being on the road to conformity and mass-mindedness, has never before been so varied and individualistic. He writes:

It is not our freedom that is in peril. . . . We have never had more freedom to speak out, to organize, to read what we choose, to question authority, whether political or cultural, to write. . . . Never has the police authority been more restricted, never have defendants been so girded with legal protections.

Our freedom will be imperiled only if it turns into license, seriously imperiling order. There can be no freedom in the absence of order. There can be no personal or collective life worth living in the absence of moderation.

Although Mr. Sevareid makes certain observations in his excellent article with which I do not fully agree, his insight and perception make this one of the more important commentaries on our times and conditions.

In order that "Dissent or Destruction?" does not escape the attention of other Members of Congress, and that it be made available to a wider audience, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DISSENT OR DESTRUCTION?

(By Eric Sevareid)

These are odd times. Tens of thousands of Americans of every age, color, sex, and economic and intellectual condition are daily and hotly invoking every right and privilege mentioned in the Constitution, the Bible and Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations*. Others are busy invoking self-serving "higher laws" to supersede the national rulebook. None of

them seems familiar with the words "duty" or "obligation."

The production curve on putative saints and martyrs has been rising rapidly—possibly in direct proportion to the availability of press and TV cameras. The country bears the aspect of one vast wailing wall, washed down daily with the tears of the self-pitying.

The general import of their varying messages, taken as a whole, seems to be that: all American policemen have joyfully renounced their days off in order to bludgeon Negroes as a wholesome exercise; the armed services of the United States, drunk with bloodlust, eagerly notch their guns for every Vietnamese civilian they kill; administrators burn the midnight oil in order to conceive new ways to coerce, threaten, silence and otherwise "alienate" that oppressed *lumpen-proletariat*, American college students.

And all the while, a mysterious group known as the "Power Elite" or the "Establishment" sits in Washington, New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, fat cigars in one hand, telephones in the other, engaged in a round-robin conversation featured by chortling remarks, such as "Hi, fella, how many of the downtrodden did you trod on today?"

As a result of all this, the familiar quotation that comes first to mind for an increasing number of other Americans is one of the opening lines of *The Man Who Came to Dinner*—"I may vomit."

Still others who believe firmly in free speech can no longer find the strength even to murmur Voltaire's celebrated remark that while he disapproved of what you say, he would defend to the death your right to say it, because they are already half-dead—with boredom.

When we reach the point, which we have, where an organization is formed, called "Proxy Pickets," to rent out picketers for any cause at so much an hour, then we know that the fine, careless rapture of this era of protest is all over and that the corruption of faddism has begun to set in. Every movement becomes an organization sooner or later, then a kind of business, often a racket. This is becoming the age of the cause. Cause kids will soon be hanging around back lots trading causes the way they used to trade agglies.

One of the oddest things about the period, no doubt, is that anyone like me should feel moved to say these things. I have always believed in the Negro "revolution" if that's the right word. I have not believed, for some time now, in the Vietnamese war because to me the official rationale for it simply does not add up, and as a college kid in the thirties, I was a hollering "activist" and even voted for that Oxford oath—"I will not fight for flag or country" (though I couldn't sleep that night for doubts about it, which will merely prove to today's hip set that I had the seeds of squaredom in me at an early age).

But it seems clear to me now that a high percentage of today's protests, in these three areas of civil rights, the Vietnam war and college life—all of which commingle at various points—have gone so far as to be senselessly harming the causes themselves, corroding the reputations of the most active leaders and loosening some of the cement that holds this American society together. There never was any real danger that this country would find itself groaning under Fascist oppression, but there is a measure of real danger that freedom can turn into nationwide license until the national spirit is truly darkened and freedom endangered.

The notion is abroad that if dissent is good, as it is, then the more dissent the better, a most dubious proposition. The notion has taken hold of many that the manner and content of their dissent are sacred, whereas it is only the *right* of dissent that is sacred. Reactions of many dissenters reveal a touch of paranoia. When strong exception is taken to what they say by the

President or by a General Westmoreland, the dissenters cry out immediately that free speech is about to be suppressed, and a reign of enforced silence is beginning.

What is more disturbing is that a considerable number of liberal Left activists, including educated ones, are exhibiting exactly the spirit of the right-wing McCarthyites 15 years ago, which the liberal Left fought so passionately against in the name of our liberties. For the life of me, I cannot see the difference in morality between the right-wing woman in Texas who struck Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and the left-wing students and off-campus characters at Dartmouth College who howled down ex-Governor Wallace of Alabama and tried to smash his car.

The use of force to express a conviction, even if it takes so relatively mild a form as a college sit-in that blocks an administration building, is intolerable. When Dr. Martin Luther King, who may well be one of the noblest Americans of the century, deliberately defies a court order, then he ought to go to jail. Laws and ordinances can be changed, and are constantly being changed, but they cannot be rewritten in the streets where other citizens also have their rights.

I must say that, kooky as we may have been in that first real American student movement in the thirties, we never, to my memory, ever dreamed of using force. We thought of the university, much as we often hated its official guts, as the one sanctuary where persuasion by reason must rule alone and supreme, if the university itself were to be preserved from the outside hands of force and unreason. What makes today's college activists think they can take the campus forcibly into national politics without national politics—in the form of police or legislature or troops—forcibly coming onto the campus? (Some of the activists, of course, are pure nihilists and *want* this to happen, but that's another story.)

The wild riots that have exploded in the Negro areas of American cities the last few summers should not be confused with protest movements. Most of them do not even deserve the designation of race riot. We had genuine race riots in Chicago, Detroit and Tulsa nearly half a century ago, whites against Negroes, and mass murders occurred. Nearly all the recent summer-night riots have chiefly involved Negro kids smashing and looting the nearest property, most of which was owned by other Negroes. This is sheer hoodlumism, involved as its psychological and sociological origins may be. It is a problem for sociologists, psychologists and economists only in the second instance. In the first instance, it is a police problem, as are the episodes of mass vandalism staged by prosperous white kids on the beaches of New Hampshire or Florida. Majorities have a right to protection quite as much as minorities, heretical as this may sound.

If there were no protests at all about the Vietnamese war, the American society would really be in sad shape. We were in this war very deeply almost before the average busy citizen grasped what had happened, and there was no serious congressional debate on the issue until the winter of 1966. The present national disunion, including the disaffection of so much of the "intellectual community," is just what happened in the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846-1848, the Spanish-American War and the war in the Philippines that followed. As historian Henry Steele Commager has pointed out, the only wars during which the President had all but universal support were the two world wars, and both were debated and discussed all over the nation for many long months before we got into action.

So the present protests about Vietnam are entirely within the American tradition. Even so, the law, public necessity and human reason must impose certain limitations.

It is outrageous and insupportable for anyone to desecrate the flag, the one symbol of nationhood that reminds all citizens of the country's meaning. It is disgusting for paraders to chant, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" These deaths in battle are eating at his soul, too, and vulgarities can help no high-minded cause.

It is a crime for rioters to terrorize cities as they did in the disgraceful upheavals in Newark and Detroit.

It is silly for a group of American artists to ask Pablo Picasso to withdraw his famous Spanish Civil War painting, *Guernica*, from the Museum of Modern Art in protest against our bombings in Vietnam.

It is unreasonable to become indignant about the civilian casualties our forces accidentally cause in Vietnam while remaining silent about the thousands of assassinations of civilian leaders by the Vietcong's "murder committees." The President rightly calls this "moral double bookkeeping."

It is unfair to say that some members of Congress don't mind the war because it helps defense industries in their districts, as Senator Fulbright did say—and then apologized.

It is damaging to the national awareness of reality, and to his own name and cause, for Dr. King to declare that the U.S. "is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world," and that "we may have killed a million [Vietnamese civilians]—mostly children." These statements are untrue. The first is a subjective generalization. The second bears no relationship to what civilian casualty figures we have been able to gather.

It is unreasonable to maintain that President Johnson does not *want* a negotiated peace and is intent on a military victory, because to say that is to say he has deliberately and repeatedly lied to the people, and for that, there is no convincing evidence.

If some of the war protesters go out-of-bounds, so do some of the war supporters and counterprotesters:

It is unfair for them to charge that the protesters are "letting the boys down." Serious protesters want to save the boys entirely by getting the war ended, and in the meantime will insist they have every bullet and article of use they require.

For the same kind of reason, it is unfair for the President to imply, as he did, that a Medal of Honor winner died by an enemy weapon shipped down during one of the bombing pauses. Rightly or wrongly, those calling for a pause in the bombing believe it may lead to an armistice saving the lives of all our heroes in Vietnam, and while they can only ask for the pause, it is the President who decides it.

It is grossly self-serving for Administration spokesmen to imply repeatedly that our domestic disunion over Vietnam keeps Hanoi fighting on in expectation that we will quit the war. Of course, Ho Chi Minh's regime *hopes* our will is going to break; but the overwhelming American reality they see before their eyes and that surely governs their reactions is our ever-increasing land force and our continuous bombing of the North. I am persuaded that were there no debate whatsoever in this country, Ho's regime and the Vietcong would be fighting just as relentlessly as they are today.

It was pettifogging, and indeed illegal, for General Hershey to support the drafting of young protesters by deliberately reclassifying them I-A. The draft is not a punitive instrument.

It was pettifogging for state boxing commissions to strip Cassius Clay of his title—even before his conviction—because he refused to accept the draft. If he can lick any man in the world, he's still champion of the world. These silly irrelevancies are counterproductive.

It is wrongheaded for any maritime union to refuse to load or unload a foreign ship because they disapprove of that nation's

philosophy or actions. It is hard enough for the Government to conduct foreign policy, without such presumptuous handicaps.

I happen to feel that the experience of American Negroes these many generations is the one deep stain in the American national soul. I cannot help a greater readiness to condone their excesses than those of prosperous white college students (though the law cannot be morally choosy). But there are some basic misconceptions about both.

One is that youths of both colors have been driven to action because their conditions of oppression were becoming intolerably miserable. The reverse is the truth. The barriers to Negro equality were beginning to fall before the period of mass physical action set in; this, in fact, is *why* mass action swept the nation. It is a commonplace now among social historians that change produces revolution before revolutions add to and institutionalize change. Basically, it has not been the street orators and marchers who have been bringing desegregation, for example; the marchers were set in motion by the fundamental changes of principle and law won in the courts by the quiet work of leaders like Roy Wilkins and Thurgood Marshall.

Totally oppressed people, here or in Africa or Asia, do not go into action. It is when the chains have been loosened, when they see some light at the end of the tunnel, that is, when *hope* is aroused, that the people arouse themselves.

In a certain sense, this pattern also applies to white college students protesting their "alienation" and the "establishments" they feel oppress them. Youth in any generation feels alienated because youth is the precarious, emotionally uprooted stage between childhood and maturity. But while individual youths of any generation are self-conscious because of this biochemical transition, today's collective self-consciousness of the young was not generated by them. The great American "youth cult" was generated by older people concerned with youth, from popular psychologists to advertising writers who realized that youth for the first time had sizable spending money, to publishers of girls' magazines who realized old moral barriers were giving way—and not, incidentally, from pressure by the young.

It is easy to sympathize with students in the massive institutions who feel they are treated as index-card numbers, not as individual souls, and various forms of decentralization must come about. But these youths will never persuade the graduating classes of the thirties, who faced the quiet desperations of the jobless Depression and the unmistakable imminence of a vast world war, that their lot is a tragic one. From my own life experience and travels, I would happily hazard the conjecture that to be young and to be a student in the United States of today is to enjoy the most favored condition that exists for any large, identifiable group anywhere in this world.

But experience, as every parent knows, is scarcely transferable. That hilarious slogan—"you can't trust anybody over thirty"—is, indeed, the explicit denial of the validity of experience.

When I listen to the young vigorously suggesting that if they had the governing influence, peace, love, beauty and sweet reason would spread o'er the world, I am tempted to remind them of the barbarities of the Hitler *Jugend*, the Mussolini Youth, the Chinese Red Guards, the Simbas of the Congo—but perhaps that would be overegging the pudding, as the English say.

When I hear the passionate arrogances of a Mario Savio (the Berkeley fellow) or read about hundreds of University of Wisconsin students smashing windows and stopping traffic because they're sore about a bus-route schedule (or was it the price of textbooks?), I mutter to myself a private remark of Winston Churchill's: "I admire a manly

man and a womanly woman, but I cannot abide a boyly boy."

If youth were complacent, devoid of the spirit of innovation and challenge, we would be in a bad way because some of the source springs of the American genius would dry up. Yet I think the "generational gap" in viewpoint will always be with us, for this reason: Youth can measure society only in one direction—forward, from things as they are, to their ideals. Older people, by the imperatives of experience, must add two other equally valid directions—backward, to things as they used to be, and sideways, to the other societies in the world they know.

Older people know something else: that the Savios, the Adam Clayton Powells and the Stokely Carmichaels are not, despite appearances, genuine leaders. Because they are not the strong men but the weak ones. They have not the moral stamina for the long haul, with its inevitable routines and periods of boredom. Eloquence, brilliance and perhaps even physical bravery are not what count in the end. What counts is the quality the Romans defined and respected above all others—*gravitas*, meaning patience, solidity, weight of judgment. As Eric Hoffer puts it, "people in a hurry can neither grow nor decay; they are preserved in a state of perpetual puerility."

Furthermore, it is usually true that the habitual protester, the man with a vested emotional interest in protest, unconsciously does not want his goals to be realized. Success would leave him psychically bereft. Many successful revolutionaries in other lands had to be replaced as leaders when the new order of life was installed, partly because of their practical incompetence, partly because they continued in one way or another as protesters, as their nature obliged them to do.

There is a great deal wrong with American society of mid-twentieth century. There are some very ugly areas in our life; but never have they been so thoroughly exposed, researched and organized against. Never in our history have we seen an assault on these evils mounted on the level of Federal action to compare with the legislation and programs started under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, particularly the latter. Were it not for the creeping calamity of the Vietnam war, Mr. Johnson would, I think, stand revealed to everyone as one of the most vigorously humanitarian Presidents America has had, in spite of those personal crudities that upset the fastidious.

America has never been a frozen, rigid society, caught in conformity. At times we may seem becalmed, but as the Frenchman Jacques Maritain wrote, "Wait a moment, another current will appear and bring the first one to naught. A great country, with as many windshifts as the sea." We are not repeating the experience of Europe, whatever the Marxists and other doctrinists may think. America has eloped with history and run away with it, says Eric Hoffer.

Conformity, mass-mindedness? Go to the totalitarian or to the primitive societies, if you wish to see them. Not here. If we live in a web of conforming laws and regulations, it is because we are so individualistic, so infinitely varied in our ideas, desires, ambitions and fears, and so very free to express them and to act upon them. Those who despair of getting public action on, let's say, our fearful urban problems, are wrong in thinking this is because "people don't take enough interest in public affairs." It is for the opposite reason; it is because so many groups, interests, points of view conflict. Ask any mayor. Ask any congressman whose desk is daily heaped with windrows of petitions, complaints, suggestions or denunciations.

It is not our freedom that is in peril, in the first instance. We have never had more freedom to speak out, to organize, to read what we choose, to question authority, whether

political or cultural, to write, to film, to stage what would have been impermissible years ago. Never has the police authority been more restricted, never have defendants been so girded with legal protections.

Our freedom will be imperiled only if it turns into license, seriously imperiling order. There can be no freedom in the absence of order. There can be no personal or collective life worth living in the absence of moderation. Repeatedly, since the ancient Greeks, people have had to relearn this. Aristotle expressed it no better than Edmund Burke, the Anglo-Irish statesman, who said:

"Men are qualified for civil liberties in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites . . . society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters."

WEST VIRGINIAN ACHIEVING PROMINENCE

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, an editorial in the Fairmont, W. Va., Times of October 6, calls attention to the rapid rise to a position of high responsibility in the corporate and business world of Mr. C. Howard Hardesty, Jr., a former State tax commissioner of West Virginia. Citizens of our State are proud of the fine record Mr. Hardesty is making and the prominence he is achieving as an official of Consolidation Coal Co., and its parent firm, Continental Oil Co. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial by William D. Evans, editor of the Fairmont Times, be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A METEORIC RISE

If this newspaper went for predictions in areas other than politics, it would guess that one of these days Charles Howard Hardesty Jr. will become president of Continental Oil Co., an industrial giant which owns, among other things, Consolidation Coal.

The rise of this young man, still only 45, can be described only as meteoric. He left here only four years ago to become general counsel for Consol, participated in the transaction which resulted in its acquisition by Conoco, and now is headed for a senior vice presidency of the parent firm.

There has been a feeling among Hardesty's friends and associates here that he would one day be in line for the top job in Consol. His shift to New York does not completely preclude this, but his progression up the Conoco ladder now becomes more probable.

Modestly, Hardesty says he happened to be in the right place at the right time when someone was looking for a man. That was the case when Gov. William Wallace Barron talked him into becoming State Tax Commissioner. And it was true when he joined Consol and then rose in two swift steps to become an executive vice president.

When he elected to follow the path of coporation law instead of staying in politics, Hardesty apparently made a wise choice, for his progress has been steadily onward and upward. Yet he turned his back on what appeared to be a shoo-in opportunity to be nominated—and elected—governor of West Virginia either in 1964 or, more probably, in 1968.

Hardesty still could command the support of the many diverse factions in the Demo-

cratic party for high political preferment, but he made his choice at the crossroads he reached four years ago and is not going to backtrack now.

Fairmont has been right proud of Howard Hardesty—and with good reason. His latest promotion is due to the high degree of intellect and ability he brings to the corporations which had the foresight to hire him. And, to our way of thinking, he's just started to move up.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MEETING PRODUCES GREAT PROGRESS, SOME PROBLEMS

Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. President, an excellent article by Hobart Rowen, published in Sunday's Washington Post, does a fine job of pinpointing the substantial strides taken during the recent International Monetary Fund meeting in Rio de Janeiro toward a plan for special drawing rights that would be a step away from, in Rowen's words, "a blind dependence on gold."

Together with this giant step went the very real problem of a demand by the common-market countries for veto control over certain fund transactions. As the Rowen article points out, a decision to initiate the special drawing rights plan will undoubtedly depend on final acquiescence, at least in part, to the veto requests.

On balance, nevertheless, we can look back on the Rio meeting with real pride in the accomplishments of our negotiators. It may well prove to be a watershed in the history of international monetary arrangements.

I ask unanimous consent that the Rowen article, which sums up the IMF achievements so well, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IMF ACHIEVEMENT AT RIO WAS GREAT

(By Hobart Rowen)

Any way you measure it, the 107 nations who comprise the International Monetary Fund turned in a great accomplishment at Rio de Janeiro last week. The plan they adopted for Special Drawing Rights (SDR)—paper gold—is a step toward deliberate creation of international monetary reserves, and away from a blind dependence on gold.

To be sure, what "paper gold" can ultimately do can easily be oversold. But never before in history has the international community decided, in principle, to control deliberately the supply of monetary reserves, instead of letting the reserves control or overwhelm the community.

On the other hand, the timetable for making paper gold a reality—certain to be slow and arduous in any event—was thrown into uncertainty by other developments at Rio.

Chief among these was the notice served by the Common Market that it intends to seek a change in the entire power structure of the IMF in order to achieve a role more equal to that of the United States.

My impression after talks with many of the principals at Rio is that if the United States does not agree to some of the changes the EEC wants, approval of the SDR plan will be delayed.

Already, it is apparent, the Anglo-Saxon bloc and the European Continentals had sharply differing ideas about what they were signing at a London conference last month, preliminary to Rio.

The U.S. thought it agreed only to studies "in parallel" of the changes in IMF rules sought by the EEC. But the Europeans, without exception, insist they made clear they wanted action timed to co-incide with the SDR scheme. "A study?" asks a Frenchman. "Why, that is a joke! We want reform in the rules, not a study."

If nothing else, this illustrates the fragility of international agreements, whether they relate to arms control or financial liquidity.

But U.S. officials were disingenuous in briefing Congress and the press after London. They kept their lips buttoned about prospective changes in IMF rules, in their anxiety to crow about the SDR scheme.

As a tactic, it boomeranged: if the Europeans looked out-maneuvered after London, the Americans and British looked outfoxed after Rio.

Europe is flexing its economic muscles. Having agreed, subject to a veto over actual activation, to the creation of paper gold, the Commart countries want the same veto control to govern an increase in IMF quotas and normal borrowings. As of now, the fairly stringent rules governing the extension of credit could be liberalized by a simple majority vote.

This question—changing the IMF rules—is now "wide open." Managing Director Pierre-Paul Schweitzer said in Rio.

By far, this is now a bigger obstacle to the actual implementing of the paper gold scheme than the existence of the U.S. balance of payments deficit. Despite tough French talk on the need for elimination (actually, the French would grandly allow us a \$500 million deficit) the Germans, Italians, and other European powers insist only on a trend toward reduction of the U.S. deficit.

But the EEC got together more easily—and will stay there—on the new related question of a change in the rules. They want the power, the prestige, and the control, and figure that the U.S. thirst for paper gold gives them the leverage they need. It looks as if they hold strong cards in this international poker game.

The SDR plan and a change in IMF rules, said German Economics Minister Karl Schiller firmly, "are for us a single entity." And the French, who approach the whole issue with the aggressiveness of a Walter Reuther posing a list of labor grievances, say the acceptance of new rules is an absolute precondition for the SDRs.

The French want the veto to apply not only to quota increases and the credit tranches (drawings), but to any changes in the par value of currencies; to the gold guarantee of members' credits; to decisions on what portion of quota increases should be paid in gold; and to the Fund's gold "operations"—specifically its purchase of U.S. Treasury bills with gold.

And in a direct swipe at Schweitzer—about whom the French are bitter—they want any contested interpretations of the Fund's articles sent to "a court of three wise men."

There will be a meeting of the Common Market ministers in mid-November designed to deflate this French shopping list. But it can be predicted with assurance that there will emerge from this conference a joint position demanding a veto privilege on quotas and on any changes in the credit tranches.

Doubtless, the U.S. will try to whittle back the new European demands exposed at Rio. For example, it has a good case for suggesting that if the EEC wants more power over quota changes, it can get it by increasing its payments into the kitty.

But ultimately, if the U.S. wants to see the paper golden egg produced at Rio go through a hatching stage, there will be an additional price to pay the shrewd European bargainers.

EXCELLENT SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING OUR SOCIAL DATA

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, after the introduction last February of S. 843, the proposed Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act, and particularly during the hearings on the bill held in July by the Subcommittee on Government Research, I have become seriously concerned with the gaps existing in our social knowledge.

Very sophisticated efforts are now being made within the executive to appraise and evaluate our social programs. Repeatedly, as demonstrated by Elizabeth Drew in an article entitled "HEW Grapples With PPBS," published in the most recent issue of the Public Interest, these efforts have been stymied, substantially slowed, or reduced in scope because we lack some very basic data about this society and its troubles.

Some excellent suggestions for improving our ability to gather increasingly accurate and meaningful social statistics have been advanced in recent months. Among the better recommendations are those advanced by the Conference on Social Statistics and the City, convened by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University in Washington this past June.

I invite these recommendations to the attention of the Senate, and I also wish to underscore those suggested actions pertaining to the importance of accurate social statistics to a democratic government committed to improving the lot of all its citizens. Viewed in this light, the specific problem of underenumeration of minority groups, whose members happen to be among the more impoverished of our population and among those most in need of the assistance provided by various governmental programs, assumes urgent importance. In addition, the rapidity with which change is altering our social landscape makes imperative, I believe, early action on the conference recommendation of a full national census every 5 rather than every 10 years.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolutions of the Conference on Social Statistics and an editorial supporting "A Quinquennial Census," published in the New York Times, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL STATISTICS

The Conference on Social Statistics and the City, convened by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, meeting in Washington, D.C., June 22-23, 1967, by general concurrence resolved the following:

IMPROVING ENUMERATION OF NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, AND MEXICANS

1. While American population statistics are among the very finest in the world, papers presented to the Conference have established beyond reasonable doubt that the Decennial Census, the Current Population Survey, and to a lesser degree, the Vital Statistics of the United States, seriously and significantly under-enumerate or under-estimate the size of the Negro, Puerto-Rican, and Mexican-

American populations. As much as 10 percent of the Negro population may not have been counted in the 1960 Census, and there is considerable probability that the Puerto Rican and Mexican-American were similarly under-counted.

In 1960 as many as one Negro male in six within the age group of 20 to 39 years may have been omitted altogether.

In a modern society statistical information is not only a primary guide to public and private actions, in itself it profoundly influences patterns of thought and basic assumptions as to the way things are and the way they are likely to be. Were national statistics merely inadequate, but uniformly so, the nation would be at a disadvantage, but no special injury could be claimed by any region or group. As it happens, however, where American population statistics are inadequate, they will normally be found to be so in terms of the under-enumeration and under-estimation of minority groups, defined in terms of race, or national origin, and concentrated in specific neighborhoods, usually in densely populated central city areas. They are also, characteristically, defined by poverty. But a larger issue than that simply of efficiency and convenience must enter the consideration of this subject. A constitutional issue enters.

Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution provides for the enumeration once each ten years of all persons residing within the United States. This enumeration is explicitly and primarily designed to provide the basis for representation in the House of Representatives. In the years since the adoption of the Constitution, the Census enumeration and other statistical programs, such as those conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, have come to be the basis for a host of public activities, and most particularly provide the basis on which public funds are allocated in a whole range of government programs at the national, state, and local level. In some cases funds are allocated on a straight "head count" basis. In other cases, as for example the Economic Development Act, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and in the Model Cities legislation, public funds are allocated on the basis of population together with a range of special economic and other information collected by government agencies.

The record of these agencies, notably the Bureau of the Census, in gathering and compiling this information with the highest technical competence, the utmost standards of impartiality and integrity, and at the most modest cost is a matter of national pride. Typically it has been the Census Bureau itself that has been the most diligent in discovering and analyzing the problems of gathering statistics relating to minority groups.

Nonetheless, the problem of under-enumeration of minority groups is likely to persist unless it becomes a matter of more general concern. We believe that what were initially at least technical problems have by their very magnitude been transformed into social problems with powerful legal and ethical implications. Specifically, we hold that where a group defined by racial or ethnic terms, and concentrated in specific political jurisdictions, is significantly under-counted in relation to other groups, then individual members of that group are thereby deprived of the constitutional right to equal representation in the House of Representatives, and by inference in other legislative bodies. Further, we hold that individual members of such a group are thereby deprived of their right to equal protection of the laws as provided by Section I of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution in that they are deprived of their entitlement to partake in Federal and other programs designed for areas and populations with their characteristics.

Injury, while general, is real; redress is in order. This would seem a matter of special concern to the nation in view of recent Supreme Court rulings establishing the one-man, one-vote principle in apportioning legislatures, and in view of the extensive Congressional activity in the establishment of programs designed to improve the economic and social status of just those groups that appear to be substantially under-represented in our current population statistics.

The Bureau of the Census, and other government statistical agencies, have set a superb standard of public accountability in themselves calling attention to this problem. We feel it is incumbent on the Congress to provide the Bureau of the Census, the National Center of Health Statistics, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and such other agencies as are concerned, with the funds necessary to obtain a full enumeration of all groups in the population, and also to gather the usual information on special and economic characteristics that is necessary to implement the laws of the nation.

2. The Conference likewise emphasizes that there is an obligation on the part of every resident to be enumerated.

3. The Conference commends the Bureau of the Census for the innovative use of the Post Office for the purpose of insuring a more complete enumeration. The Conference believes that the Post Office will contribute to the improvement of the coverage of the census not only in general, but particularly, in the central cities.

4. The Conference wishes to encourage the Bureau of the Census to explore more flexible personnel procedures from the standpoint first, of enlarging the number of people who can be located to serve usefully as regular enumerators and, second, to employ people in various auxiliary roles to help insure completeness of count.

5. The Bureau of the Census, working in concert with other groups, public and private, should work to develop enumerator skills, particularly for conditions in the central cities, and to instill a professional spirit among enumerators.

6. The Conference suggests consideration of the appointment of enumerators or supervisors by Presidential commission as a step to impress them with the seriousness of the task.

7. The Conference wishes to encourage the Bureau of the Census to take an experimental approach toward the use of various incentives for respondents.

8. The Conference is impressed with the extent to which improvements in close-out procedures¹ and procedures for following back to apparently vacant housing units may contribute to the reduction of under-enumeration. We put high priority, therefore, on changes in procedures and in allocation of resources that promise an improvement in this area.

9. The Conference would like to urge financial support for further studies of under-enumeration in the 1970 Census such as the study of 1960 under-enumeration by Jacob Siegal, extended to specific estimates of under-enumeration by age, sex, race, ethnic group, and residence.

IMPROVING VITAL STATISTICS FOR NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS AND MEXICANS

1. We recommend that the Bureau of the Census and the National Center for Health Statistics study methods for improving the completeness and quality of Census data to

¹ Close-out procedures determine the number of calls an enumerator must make at a particular household in an attempt to gather information. If no information can be gathered after the specified number of calls, characteristics of the household are allocated by a computer.

enable the computation of vital rates for minority groups, particularly those groups which have been included with the white population in the past.

2. We recommend that the National Center for Health Statistics through the mechanisms of the Public Health Conference on Records and Statistics and the American Association of Vital Registrars and Public Health Statisticians ask state and local health departments to make more tabulations and classifications of vital records for minority groups.

3. We recommend that the National Center for Health Statistics make known what material state and local health agencies collect, tabulate, and publish concerning vital rates for minority groups.

4. We recommend that the Bureau of the Census and the National Center for Health Statistics conduct a birth registration and enumeration matching test in conjunction with the Census of 1970. The aims of this test should be (a) test completeness of birth registration, (b) ascertain census under-enumeration of the young, (c) determine quality of both birth registration and census data, (d) study differentials in infant mortality by characteristics in family or household.

5. We encourage the National Center for Health Statistics to work through the Public Health Conference on Records and Statistics and the American Association of Vital Registrars and Public Health Statisticians to assure that a question concerning legitimacy will appear on the birth certificate and certificate of fetal death. This can be accomplished by having this item in the confidential section as recommended for the standard certificates² for 1968.

6. We recommend that the National Center for Health Statistics encourage record linkage studies utilizing birth, fetal death, death, marriage and divorce records. We recommend that the Bureau of the Census encourage record linkage studies based on the 1970 Census of Population and Housing.

7. We encourage states to retain the question concerning race on the birth and death certificates and we encourage states to include questions on race on marriage and divorce certificates. This can be accomplished by having this item in the confidential section as recommended for the standard certificates of 1968.

8. We urge the National Center for Health Statistics to continue and expand studies of the completeness of death registration and studies of the quality of data obtained on death certificates.

9. We urge the National Center for Health Statistics to encourage local agencies to classify birth and death certificates by city block or census tract, perhaps using the address register being developed by the Bureau of the Census for the Census of 1970. This will make possible further studies of the vital rates of minority groups.

10. We support efforts to obtain a quinquennial census and we recommend that such a census obtain adequate information to permit study of the vital rates of minority groups.

11. We urge states to affiliate as rapidly as possible with the Marriage and Divorce Registration Areas established by the National Center for Health Statistics.

12. We encourage the National Center for Health Statistics and the Bureau of the Census to explore, support and conduct surveys of fertility expectations and performance. In particular, adequate information should be obtained for minority groups with distinctive fertility patterns.

² The standard certificate is that form which the National Center for Health Statistics recommends to the States as most appropriate.

NEEDED ENLARGEMENT IN AVAILABLE SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, AND MEXICANS

1. The Conference recommends that the Census Bureau continue to clearly identify Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, white persons of Spanish surname, and American Indians in the Census. For the specific groups for which more data are desired Census publications should replace the categories of white and non-white with more specific ethnic or racial designations; for example, Negro, American Indian, and Cuban.

2. Federal statistical surveys should be designed from the beginning to provide data for specific minority groups. This may require special sampling and tabulation programs in addition to specifications of content appropriate to the social situation of minorities.

3. The Bureau of the Census and other statistical agencies should continue to experiment with methods of identifying ethnic groups; for example, by ethnic origin, language spoken in the home and birthplace of grandparents.

4. The presentation of survey and census results should be expanded in two ways—in summary form for general users and in easily available special tabulations for professional users.

5. The Conference recommends that the Census Bureau conduct frequent surveys to provide for individual cities and the minority groups within cities data of the type included in the program of the Current Population Survey.

6. A full census should be carried out more frequently than at present. A 5 year census should replace the present 10 year census.

APPRISE ORGANIZATIONS ABOUT THE CENSUS AND OTHER SOURCES OF SOCIAL STATISTICS

1. The Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard should apprise organizations interested in social statistics, particularly those concerned with minority groups, of the proceedings of this Conference.

[From the New York Times, Aug 20, 1967]

A QUINQUENNIAL CENSUS

Instead of the regular decennial census, the House of Representatives has voted to take a head and place count of Americans every five years. Congressmen from fast-growing urban and suburban districts are for it because more current data would mean a better shake in allotting Federal and state aid and devising programs to meet urgent civic needs.

The half-decade census makes sense on several counts. City administrators, sociologists and scholars cannot plan for the future unless they know who's where. Some forecasters say that one out of two Americans no longer live where they did in 1960.

A significant census point has been underscored by the Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T.-Harvard. It is that Negroes and Americans of Puerto Rican and Mexican origin are undercounted. As much as 10 per cent of the real population of these minority groups may have received a short count. The poor, especially in the slum areas, frequently avoid the official knock on the door.

In the trial runs next year for the 1970 census, social statisticians suggest improved head-counting methods. The Post Office can contribute to fuller coverage; greater cooperation with state and city agencies is required, and enumerator skills must be improved.

In ancient Rome a census of citizens and their property was taken for purposes of taxation. In a more complex and greater society, a census is required to serve the people instead of the state. A quinquennial national census can help toward that end.

THE F-111 CONTROVERSY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in connection with discussions incident to the F-111 program, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Secretary of the Air Force be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Washington, October 5, 1967.

HON. STUART SYMINGTON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: You have asked me to comment on the materials (two magazine stories, two newspaper articles, one television broadcast, and three brief editorial comments) inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 20. Having reviewed them, I conclude that they do not present a balanced picture of the testimony on the F-111 program.

One story, for example, features the "jolting admission" that there are penalty provisions in the F-111 R&D contract—a fact that has been public knowledge for almost five years. Another is headlined "Navy's Plane Requires Excessive Wind for Carrier Landings," yet fails to mention that the F-111 in this respect outperforms any supersonic fighter in the fleet. I have similar difficulties with the piece captioned "A New Plane—and Hardly Anybody is Happy." It is unfortunate that the author of this article did not take the trouble to talk with the Tactical Air Command crews who are eagerly forming F-111 operational units at Nellis Air Force Base today.

There has never been and will never be a major development program that does not provide grist for the critic's mill, and I say this without questioning either the sincerity of the critics or the utility of the function they perform. I will say only that these few selections are in no sense representative of, much less a substitute for, the comprehensive testimony given this year before Committees of both the Senate and the House, particularly the testimony of such responsible officials as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and myself, who are on record that the F-111 is the aircraft we want and need.

Sincerely,

HAROLD BROWN.

BILINGUAL EDUCATION BILL
HAILED AS MAJOR STEP IN
BREAKING DOWN LANGUAGE
WALLS

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, the recent issue of *Commonweal*, dated October 6, 1967, contained an article by Dr. Frank Cordasco, professor of education at Montclair State College, N.J., entitled "Knocking Down the Language Walls." Dr. Cordasco is a recognized expert in the field of language education and was one of the many expert witnesses which the Special Subcommittee on Bilingual Education heard during the course of its hearings on S. 428. His article on this problem is incisive and clearly indicates the nature of the problem which my bill attempts to attack.

I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Cordasco's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

KNOCKING DOWN THE LANGUAGE WALLS

It has long been an American illusion that for a child born in the United States English is not a foreign language; therefore, virtually all instruction in the schools must be through the medium of English. Some states (New York included) have mandated this ethnocentrism in statutes which expressly forbid instruction in any language but English. One result was that the schools became the agencies of social disaffection, cultural assault, and enforced assimilation. The schools had to minister to children who brought with them myriad cultures and a multiplicity of tongues. More often than not (almost always in the cities where immigrants clustered) the children also were poor. And within the perimeter of this poverty were cultural differences, language handicaps, social alienation and disaffection. In this sense, poor Negroes, migrating from rural areas to the urban ghettos of the 1960's, and the Mexican-American poor, largely an urban minority, are not newcomers to the American schools, nor do they present American educators with new problems.

In its efforts to "assimilate" all of its charges, the American school very often destroyed the cultural identity of the child; it forced him to leave his ancestral language at the schoolhouse door; it developed in the child an ambivalence of language, of culture, of ethnicity, and of personal self-affirmation. It held up to the children mirrors in which they saw, not themselves, but the stereotyped middle-class, white, English-speaking child who allegedly embodied what the American child was (or ought) to be. For the minority child, the images which the school fashioned were cruel deceptions. In the enforced acculturation there was bitterness and confusion, but tragically, too, there was the rejection of the wellsprings of identity, and more often than not, the failure of achievement. The non-English-speaking child (almost inevitably poor) was the easy victim of cultural assault, and his ancestral language was a target against which the school mounted relentless resources.

Against this tragic background and quixotic effort, largely unnoticed, is a "sleeper" amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (E.S.E.A.) which in essence proposes that we banish the ghosts of ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism, and turn to the cultivation of individual differences which better reflect our pluralistic society.

The history of this "sleeper" amendment is a good illustration of what Kenneth Clark has characterized as "the dilemmas of power." Where would one have sought the power in the Congress to recognize the particular needs of Puerto Rican children, if previous Congresses had chosen largely to ignore millions of other children who were non-English-speaking? The tactic here was obviously to relate the Puerto Rican child to the needs of another group long indigenous in America but equally long disenfranchised, and for whom English was not their native language. In the five-state area of the Southwest (Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, California) there are at least 1.75 million Mexican-American school children whose linguistic, cultural and psychological handicaps cause them to experience, in general, academic failure in our schools, or at best limit them to only mediocre success. The Mexican-American child classically demonstrated that an almost inevitable concomitant of poverty was low educational achievement. Thus, it was out of Texas, unlikely as it may seem, that an extraordinary amendment to the ESEA was proposed.

On Jan. 17, 1967, Ralph Yarborough (D-Texas) introduced in the Senate S. 428, which proposed "to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in order

to provide assistance to local educational agencies in establishing bilingual American education programs and to provide certain other assistance to promote such programs." At long last the Congress had before it legislation which would make legitimate the cultivation of individual differences in our schools. Understandably, Senator Yarborough was concerned with the problems of his Mexican-American constituents, but his bill explicitly noted, "For the purpose of this Title, Spanish-speaking elementary and secondary students means elementary and secondary school students born in, or one or both of whose parents were born in, Mexico or Puerto Rico, and, in states for which such information is available, other students with Spanish surnames." The very proposal of the bill was tantamount to the recognition that Mexican-American children had been neglected by American schools.

But Senator Yarborough's legislation went far beyond this elemental recognition. It proposed (1) bilingual educational programs; (2) the teaching of Spanish as the native language; (3) the teaching of English as a second language; (4) programs designed to impart to Spanish-speaking students a knowledge of and pride in their ancestral culture and language; (5) efforts to attract and retain as teachers promising individuals of Mexican or Puerto Rican descent; and (6) efforts to establish closer cooperation between the school and the home. What extraordinary proposals!

As was to be expected, Senator Yarborough's bill (which had as co-sponsors Mr. Javits and Mr. Kennedy of New York) created a flurry of activity in the House (although the bill went largely unnoticed outside the Congress) and a spate of companion House bills were proposed. Chief among them was H.R. 9840 offered by James H. Scheuer (D-New York). Congressman Scheuer wished to include not only Spanish-speaking students, as Yarborough proposed, but all those whose native language is not English. Scheuer asked for five times the money Senator Yarborough had proposed (\$25,000,000 as against \$5,000,000 for fiscal year 1967-68); further, his bill provides for participation by full-time non-public school students (children in parochial and other private schools).

Of course, a few objections have been raised against such legislation. Some linguists have objected to linking the bill to poverty; they insist that the bill be completely unrestricted to allow the cultivation of a vast bilingual resource. But this is truly another problem. What the legislation has really proposed (no matter how awkwardly, and despite all the programming intricacies which will have to be worked out) is that the school, as a social institution which serves the children of an open society, must build on the cultural strengths which the child brings to the classroom; to cultivate in this child ancestral pride; to reinforce (not destroy) the language he natively speaks; and to give this child the sense of personal identification so essential to his social maturation.

Senator Yarborough's Senate Bill 428 was unanimously reported out of the Senate Subcommittee on Education in August. If it achieves passage, his "sleeper" will have thrust greatness upon him, and Texas will have become as illustrious in educational history as Massachusetts.

FRANK M. CORDASCO.

(Dr. Frank Cordasco, sociologist and author, is professor of education, Montclair State College, N.J.)

BIG REASON FOR SST-CONCORDE
COMPETITION IS FADING

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the world's airlines are having second

thoughts about the Anglo-French supersonic transport, the Concorde, which is scheduled to go into service in 1971.

Orders for this first entry in the SST sweepstakes have been lagging well behind expectations, according to a report published in this morning's edition of the Wall Street Journal. Not only that, some airlines that had purchased options to buy the plane now say they may not exercise them, the Journal reports. The options were picked up at a cost of up to \$280,000 apiece.

These reports demonstrate that the Concorde is not going to be the enormous competitive threat to our aviation industry that had earlier been predicted for it. Some airlines have indicated they are willing to wait for the American SST not only because of its superior engineering but also because they are beginning to feel some strain on their financial resources imposed by purchases of Boeing 747's—the jumbo jet—on which they will take delivery in late 1969.

I submit—and so argued last Thursday when I offered an amendment to the transportation appropriations bill to slow down the SST development program—that delaying our SST program a year or even 2 years will not do one iota of damage to the sales outlook for the plane.

As the Journal report pointed out:

The world's airlines aren't particularly averse to delaying their next period of major spending for several years . . .

Despite the fact the Senate and the House have voted to go ahead full steam with SST development, I hope President Johnson will take note of the Concorde's difficulties when he casts about for items to cut out of this year's budget. There is absolutely no reason to rush our SST development program. A 1- or 2-year delay will not hurt our competitive position at all; and certainly there is no military necessity for this project.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ORDERS FOR EUROPE'S CONCORDE PLANE LAG— SOME AIRLINES MAY AWAIT BOEING'S SST

The world's airlines appear to be having some second thoughts about the Concorde, the supersonic, 136-passenger jet being developed jointly by Britain and France and expected to go into service in 1971.

Orders for the aircraft haven't been coming in as fast as was earlier estimated and some airlines that already have purchased options to buy the jet, at up to \$280,000 each, indicate they may not exercise them.

Reasons for the Concorde's apparent sales lag are varied, but one possible result could be that in forgoing the Anglo-French plane the airlines will put their money on Boeing Co.'s 2707, the 1,800-mile-an-hour, 350-passenger SST that's expected to go into operation in late 1974, at the earliest.

The Concorde is expected to sell for about \$21 million, including spare parts, and Boeing's SST for about \$40 million. More important than this difference in price, however, is the fact that airlines are coming into a period of severe strain on their financial resources, mostly in expanding current jet fleets and in borrowing to pay for Boeing's 747. This is the so-called jumbo jet that will carry up to 380 passengers and cost \$20 million each. Initial deliveries of the 747 are expected in late 1969.

Also, there will be potential purchases of short and medium-range jets currently under development, such as the so-called air-bus being designed by Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and another air-bus version planned as a joint venture by Britain, West Germany and France, both being readied for the early 1970's.

Thus, the world's airlines aren't particularly averse to delaying their next period of major spending for several years—to 1974, when they can buy the Boeing 2707, from 1971, when they would be taking delivery on the Concorde.

RESERVATIONS ABOUT ENGINEERING

Among other reservations the airlines are said to have on the Concorde is its engineering. In the U.S., especially, potential buyers are concerned with an increase in the plane's overall weight from original specifications to about 370,000 pounds from 350,000.

It's understood U.S. engineers who have evaluated the Concorde aren't satisfied the plane, with the additional weight, will be able to fly the 3,600 miles between New York and Paris nonstop.

Contributing to the increased weight is the addition of two more thrust reversers, used to slow the plane on landing; this is being insisted on by U.S. airlines. The Concorde's developers recommended only two thrust reversers plus a drag parachute, but U.S. evaluators turned this down. Additional galley and other interior items asked for by U.S. airline engineers also are increasing the plane's weight.

The tight design of the Concorde to preserve its aerodynamic qualities, experts say, preclude enlargement of the fuel tanks to increase range. It's also considered possible the craft will be able to carry only 120 to 125 passengers on long-range flights instead of the planned 136.

Another point in controversy is the Concorde's projected high landing speed of about 158 knots, compared with 130 to 140 knots for current jets. Stress on tires and on runways at certain airports, plus high noise levels, also pose problems.

But British Aircraft Corp., and Sud Aviation, the plane's builders, claim they have made provisions for extra weight and that they will solve these problems. The buyers have about a year before they must make firm commitments tying down to accepting the plane, during which period definite guarantees by the manufacturers will be worked out.

As for the airlines that already have ordered the Concorde, a spokesman for Air India said last week. "We have two Boeing 747 jumbo jets on order, and we have reserved three positions for the U.S. supersonic jet. The possibility of our taking up our Concorde positions must now be regarded as very remote."

Also, it's understood Australia's Qantas Airlines is considering canceling its four Concorde options. Says a Qantas spokesman, "We haven't made and aren't in the process of making any decision on the Concorde." He noted the line doesn't have to make a decision until six months after the first prototype flies, expected next February. "It would be fatuous to say we don't want it until we see how it flies," he adds. Qantas has six Boeing SSTs on order.

Irish International Airlines says it is by-passing the Concorde entirely.

SALES BELOW EXPECTATIONS

There's little question but that sales so far of the Anglo-French plane have failed to come up to expectations. British Aircraft confidently predicted earlier this year that orders in 1967 would reach 100 from the then-current 69.

But only five more options have been taken to date, three by Lufthansa, the West German line, and two by Eastern Air Lines. The latest order was in June.

A spokesman for British Aircraft concedes the earlier estimate of 100 orders by the end of this year was optimistic, but he says, "We are still confident the plane will do what we say it will do, operationally and saleswise."

Adds the BAC spokesman: "It isn't crucial to the project that we reach the 100-order mark by the end of 1967. We have our first three years of production pretty well committed (with existing orders) and when we reach the 100 mark is fairly immaterial. . . . There could well be an order lull until the prototypes fly."

The Concorde is costing the British and French \$1.4 billion for development and construction of just four planes—a prototype and a preproduction model by both BAC and Sud.

Beyond this, it's believed it will take another \$560 million total from the two countries to begin production runs of the aircraft. So far, this money hasn't been forthcoming, and there's continued speculation that the British government is unhappy with the project, that it's costing too much and that it doesn't want to put up its share. The French withdrawal from the "swing wing" fighter joint project this summer didn't make the British particularly happy about joint projects.

The British government insists it's fully committed to the Concorde, however, and that it isn't yet necessary to put up the extra cash. Indeed, John Stowehouse, minister of state in the Ministry of Technology, asserts the government already has spent \$9.8 million in tooling and some materials for production models of the plane.

WILL THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD BE THE NEXT PUBLICATION TO BE BANNED IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, today's press carries the story that the October 9, 1967, issue of Newsweek has been banned by the South Vietnamese Government for carrying a story showing how poor and corrupt the Vietnamese Army is.

According to the new Vietnamese Constitution, there is supposed to be freedom of the press in South Vietnam. As was shown when there was a newspaper crackdown just before the September 3, 1967, so-called free elections, there is freedom of the press in South Vietnam only so long as the newspapers publish what the South Vietnamese military junta approves.

The article in Newsweek is entitled "Their Lions—Our Rabbits" and gives a factual account of the failure of the South Vietnamese Army to fight, of how corrupt it is, and of how so many members of that army are "opting out" of the war and turning it over to the U.S. forces. The article points out how, in August of this year, more Americans were drafted than the South Vietnamese Government had drafted in the preceding 6 months.

I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "Their Lions—Our Rabbits," published in the October 9, 1967, issue of Newsweek, be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

It may be that because the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will carry this Newsweek article, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD itself will now be banned in South Vietnam.

I shall have the article reprinted and offer to send a copy to anyone in South Vietnam who wants one—if they ever

find out there that it was reprinted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alaska?

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1967]

THEIR LIONS—OUR RABBITS

(NOTE.—By common consent, there is only one native institution in South Vietnam sufficiently strong and cohesive that it might be able to insure the country's survival as an independent, non-Communist state. That institution is the South Vietnamese armed forces. Recently, Newsweek Correspondent Merton D. Perry was asked to appraise the capacity of the South Vietnamese military to meet that heavy responsibility. His report follows.)

At Dak To in the central highlands of Vietnam, an entire South Vietnamese regiment has taken itself out of action in order to concentrate upon supplying the 173rd U.S. Airborne Brigade base with beer, prostitutes and laundry service. A Vietnamese Ranger unit performs a similar function for the Fourth U.S. Division near Pleiku. And in Bien Hoa, next to a sprawling airfield crowded with GIs, another enterprising Ranger outfit has built a red-light district known as "Tijuana East."

All across the shell-pocked face of South Vietnam these days, a distressing fact is evident: an uncomfortably large number of South Vietnamese fighting men have virtually opted out of the war, leaving the field to their big American brothers. In each of the past three months, U.S. combat deaths have exceeded those of the South Vietnamese. Total American casualties now regularly outrun the South Vietnamese draft call, and in August alone the U.S. drafted more men than South Vietnam had in the previous six months.

The South Vietnamese Army, in short, is sick. Like the society which created it, it is riddled with factionalism, nepotism, corruption, inefficiency, incompetence and cowardice. As a result, the RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) all too often prove either unwilling or unable to perform even the relatively limited task which is now their chief mission: the protection of rural pacification teams.

HEADS AND HEARTS

There is, of course, no inherent reason why the South Vietnamese Army should not be a first-class fighting force. As a Vietnamese colonel recently remarked to me over breakfast: "The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong fight like lions while our soldiers fight like rabbits." Yet the rabbits come from the same stock as the lions. Often, they even come from the same families.

Why are "our" Vietnamese so poor and "theirs" so good? My colonel friend supplied part of the answer. "The Communists fight," he said, "because their officers have something in their heads and hearts—and the soldiers know what they are fighting for." Beyond that, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong benefit from the impressive expertise in guerrilla tactics developed by their commanders in decades of war against the French and Americans. By contrast, the South Vietnamese serviceman is frequently led by venal and inept commanders and usually has no reason for wanting to fight at all.

To begin with, the South Vietnamese soldier is extremely poorly paid (a private draws about \$15 a month) and poorly cared for. His officers generally make no attempt to motivate him. "Most enlisted men do not have any clear understanding that they are fighting Communists," a Vietnamese lieutenant recently told me. And because com-

manders often pocket part of their unit's food allowance, the soldiers are virtually forced to steal their food from the peasants. This, in turn, engenders in many South Vietnamese troops a contempt for the peasantry. On one operation near Bong Son which I witnessed recently, the men of a crack regular unit foresightedly brought along empty sandbags in which to carry their loot.

HISTORY

Such a sorry state is not achieved overnight, and, indeed, the present dilemma has sprung from years of ineptitude and missed opportunities. Created after the second world war as part of the French Army, the South Vietnamese military establishment was organized first into light-infantry battalions, for which French officers had little but contempt. After France's defeat, the destiny of the South Vietnamese Army was largely guided by two American advisers, Lt. Gen. John (Iron Mike) O'Daniel and Lt. Gen. Samuel (Hanging Sam) Williams. Between them, they eventually forged a system of heavy divisions and cumbersome staffs designed to repel a Korean-type attack across the 17th parallel by North Vietnam. By 1961, the South Vietnamese had an unwieldy, road-bound army that was incapable of meeting and defeating a guerrilla enemy on its own ground. And in 1961, the Communists launched just that sort of attack.

Then, it has been said, was the time for the U.S. to force the Vietnamese to redirect their efforts. Instead, the American military command in South Vietnam concentrated on beefing up its advisory force and bringing in a lot more military hardware. Thus, by early 1965, the South Vietnamese were very nearly beaten, and the U.S. had to send in its own troops to stave off disaster.

Since then, the South Vietnamese military have staggered haphazardly along the road to recovery. U.S. military men, in fact, steadfastly maintain that dramatic progress is being made, and the Pentagon's favorite ammunition—statistics—is liberally expended to prove the point. South Vietnam's armed forces have grown by more than 50 per cent a year in each of the last three years and now total more than 700,000 men—of whom 250,000 are regulars and the rest militia. The number of combat battalions rated "satisfactory" by U.S. observers has risen about 40 per cent since the end of 1965. Desertions have decreased sharply (although soldiers still are going over the hill at the rate of about 74,000 a year), the kill ratio is rising and the South Vietnamese, according to official statistics, are capturing more weapons than before.

DEATHS

To many, however, it still appears that the U.S. command is inclined to label as "progress" any action in which the Vietnamese have merely done their duty. There are, admittedly, some highly effective Vietnamese units—notably among the Marine and Ranger outfits. But the fact remains that 360 pacification workers have been assassinated so far this year—often while army units stood idly by not far away.

Corruption, moreover, continues to be endemic in the RVNAF. One South Vietnamese division commander was recently found to have sold to the Viet Cong rice that had been provided by the U.S. aid program. Other officers conduct a brisk smuggling trade across the Cambodian border, even importing such Red Chinese items as flashlights and ball-point pens. And commands in the RVNAF often are bought for officers by a syndicate of backers, assured of an immense profit out of illegal deals.

WHITEWASH

The Saigon government has pledged that it will stamp out all this, but frequently its efforts boil down to a whitewash. The district chief of Cu Chi, north of Saigon, was fired

recently for his misdeeds, but soon surfaced again as chief of another province, having been promoted from captain to major.

Efforts at reform, however, continue. The Vietnamese Joint General Staff already has approved a 42-point plan to improve the quality of the armed forces; it includes provision for dependent housing and ration allowances for troops and several steps to upgrade military education. More promising yet is a scheme for a wholesale reorganization of the armed forces, scheduled to go into effect the first of next year. This scheme would strip corps commanders of their war-lord powers and put 54 battalions directly under the control of province chiefs to concentrate on pacification security.

According to a knowledgeable officer in the U.S. command, however, the reorganization is in "limbo" for the moment. "It looks like there's still a lot of horse trading going on among the generals," this officer says. But the hard fact is that if this and other reforms are not carried out, if the Vietnamese armed forces do not somehow acquire the will and ability to fight, then the American shield will be needed in South Vietnam for a far longer time than anyone cares to contemplate.

AMBASSADOR EDWARD CLARK, TEXAN IN AUSTRALIA, IS A GREAT AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, we are all familiar with the job that Hon. Edward Clark is performing for our country as Ambassador to Australia. At this time of increasing importance of that part of the world and our vital friendship with Australia, Ed Clark is the right man to represent our interests.

Yesterday's New York Times Sunday magazine contains an article written by an assistant editor of the Melbourne Sun which colorfully describes our Ambassador's 2 years in Canberra, and what happened "When a Texas-Style Diplomat Hits Australia." I was pleased that the article reports the love this sixth-generation Texan feels for his home State, which strongly flavors his diplomatic style, but all of us can feel equal pride in the job of representation he is doing for our country.

He has traveled over a quarter of a million miles since his appointment and has taken the story of our country, and often the personal words of our President, into every corner and every organization in that country. I am privileged to count Mr. Clark as an old and close friend and know that the article rightly describes him as the finest Ambassador the United States has ever had in Australia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHEN A TEXAS-STYLE DIPLOMAT HITS AUSTRALIA

(By Harry Gordon, assistant editor of the Melbourne Sun)

CANBERRA.—The bus pulled up outside the large red-brick Georgian building, and the driver called out, "Okay, then. Everybody out for the American Embassy." The tourists spilled across the sidewalk and into the marble-floored entrance, between framed replicas of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. They emerged on the other side of the hall, trooped across a formal

garden and reached another front door. A rich Texan voice boomed: "Well, howdy folks. I'm the Ambassador, and this here is Missus Clark. Just take your time looking around, and ask me anything you want. It'd make me very happy if you'd all accept a Texas yellow rose and some literature about my home state."

The Hon. Edward Clark, Ambassador for the United States of America in the Australian capital city of Canberra, was wearing a yachting jacket that day, with a yellow rose in the lapel and watch chain that carried a golden miniature map of Texas; when he lifted his arms wide or pointed to his treasures—"That there's a Pic-cass-ee-oh, and here's a chart showing all the oldest houses in San Augustine, Texas," he revealed bright blue, three-inch-wide braces, decorated with reindeer.

Afterwards, the tourists marched back to the bus, loaded with little yellow roses, bundles of booklets and a mild air of bewilderment. They had just been hit by Hurricane Ed, and this can be an overwhelming experience. He had kissed babies, posed for snapshots beside his elm tree ("Miz Eleanor Roosevelt planted that") and extracted sincere, puzzled promises from a bunch of Indonesian students that they would visit his home in San Augustine. Other passengers had been treated to a series of jokes ("So President Lincoln said, 'If you-all think General Grant's drinking too much, I just wish you'd find out what brand he's drinking... he's the only one we got who's winning'"), and still others now possessed recipes for mixing drinks from bourbon, a potion not easily available in Australia.

The next stop on the bus tour was at the Japanese Embassy, and the disembarking tourists were disappointed to find that nobody was waiting at the front door to greet them. "Where the heck's the Ambassador?" asked several passengers of a butler who had obviously been told to keep an eye on the silverware and the ashtrays, but the butler remained silent and inscrutable. Nor were the tourists howled at the British, the French and the German Embassies. At the Soviet mission's building, the bus did not even stop.

The bus jaunt around Canberra's embassies that day in 1965 had been organized to raise money for the Red Cross, and it was quite successful. But it did not endear Ed Clark, the newly appointed United States Ambassador, to all members of the resident diplomatic corps. What was the man trying to do, some of them asked, turn the place into some kind of fairground stall? Did he think he was running for office? Today Clark grins proudly as he recalls that the man who was then Prime Minister of Australia, Sir Robert Menzies, took him gently aside and told him: "You keep that stuff up, Ed, and they'll throw you out of the ambassadors' union."

In fact, Ed Clark has kept up the practice of meeting tourist coaches; he is, of course, the only ambassador in Canberra to do so. He shook hands with nearly 2,000 on that first strenuous, memorable Red Cross day, and his personal howdy-total (after two years in the job) is something over 14,000. So far, nobody has tried to throw him out of the ambassadors' union; indeed, most of his fellow diplomats have come to regard him with deep affection—although he is still apt to make the more pukka of them wince when he calls a greeting like "Howya, Charlie, y'ole hossfly," at a cocktail party.

Clark, at 61, is one of the United States Foreign Service's most unusual exports, and he is undoubtedly the leading character in the Australian national capital. Canberra (pop. 100,000) is a beautifully laid-out, rather staid city, which possesses a well-defined Establishment whose members come from the Australian National University, the diplomatic corps, the civil service and the

Houses of Parliament. The pattern of living inside this Establishment is quite formal; with the bulky exception of Ed Clark, it has included only two really colorful ambassadorial characters in recent years. One was a Malaysian who disappeared mysteriously last year for nine days after striking up a friendship with a King's Cross (Sydney) stripper; the other was an Indonesian who insisted on performing somersaults in his garden each morning, clad only in a sarong. Both have now returned to their homelands, leaving Clark undisputed as the most refreshing personality in the rather pompous protocol-conscious diplomatic round.

Clark is a large, 200-pound extrovert who rambles at formal functions through an apparently endless supply of folky, cracker-barrel, Texas-flavored stories. He has been branded a clown by some critics, and "Mister Ed" (after TV's talking horse) by others. He has certainly talked a lot, often in Texan superlatives, and he has a formidable reputation as a backslapper; he has dropped a few diplomatic clangers, is reputed to own the loudest (and thus least diplomatic) whisper in Canberra, and has shown an almost pathological determination to view the world through yellow-rose-colored glasses. His obsession with that Texas bloom asserts itself in many ways; at a conservative estimate, he has handed out some 50,000 of them; he rarely is without one in his button-hole; there is, in fact, a rumor that he wears a yellow rose in his dressing gown lapel. He has 850 yellow rose bushes in his 10-acre gardens at the embassy, and when these are out of season he goes to extraordinary lengths to keep up the supply—he has even had them flown, packed in ice, from Texas.

This past Aug. 26 he sponsored Australia's first Texas race meeting in Canberra. Events included the election of a Yellow Rose Maiden, the Lone Star Flying Handicap, the Texas Handicap, the San Augustine Improvers' Race and the Austin Progressive Handicap. The Ambassador and his Chinese butler Huong dispensed bourbon and yellow roses to special guests under a flagpole from which fluttered the flag of the Lone Star State. The winning jockey in the Texas Handicap received a decanter full of bourbon and the lucky horse a garland of 300 yellow roses flown specially from Texas. Some of them, it ate.

It would be wrong to describe Clark as a discrete conversationalist at cocktail parties. He has been heard to say of one nationality, "They're not like Australians... they put their hand out to you, but it's not for shaking." And again, "Y'know, if you were on fire, those guys wouldn't even bother to extinguish you." (In truth, he expressed this sentiment a little more bawdily.) He prefaces many remarks with "Shoot, man," says "you-all," refers to himself as "Ah" and shortens the word "mister" to "mist" or "mizzuh."

In a quiet way, he has managed to match his wardrobe admirably to his personality and his vocabulary. Not long ago he astonished natives in a New Guinea marketplace by arriving in a Stetson—and when he adjusts his bowler at a jaunty angle, low over one eye, he immediately takes on the look of an aging but enthusiastic vaudeville comic. He is not a wild dresser; but in striped pants, cutaway, silk topper and other formal gear, he always gives a mischievous, Groucho Marx impression of someone who has been playing at dressing up.

All of these things would seem to make Ed Clark rather unlikely ambassadorial material—and there is no doubt, frankly, that he is. He has been the target of a good deal of unsympathetic criticism. It is significant, though, that most of the criticism occurred soon after the Ambassador's arrival, when the general impression was that this was a noisy, over-jovial extrovert who had blundered, by reason of a close friend-

ship with President Johnson, into diplomacy. Some of his most vehement early critics are now quite fervent admirers.

The most blistering early attack came from Douglas Brass, editorial director of Australia's only national newspaper, *The Australian*, and a columnist for that paper. A month after Clark presented his credentials in Canberra, Brass wrote: "He obviously has a heart of gold, but there's no disguising that the new American Ambassador to Australia is something of a disappointment. The general impression in the capital is that if Mr. Edward Clark has any talents to match the significance of his post, he does his genial best to conceal them. It is grossly undiplomatic to say these things—but diplomacy is no more my business than Mr. Clark's; and I think it tragic that the United States Administration should have so little regard for us as to send a folksy gladhander to Canberra at a time of mutual delicacy, in war, investment and trade..."

Exactly six months later, Douglas Brass wrote about Ed Clark again. He recalled his charges that the Ambassador was a folksy gladhander with no talents for what should be an important job, and then he went on: "I eat my words now. Mr. Clark, though he still loves to clown in public, has endeared himself to Canberra as a very shrewd operator and genuine friend of this country. I can do no more than acknowledge it, and nobody has asked me to do it."

In the past couple of years, many revised their first unflattering opinions of Ed Clark, and it is no exaggeration to say that he is now regarded as the most successful Ambassador the United States has ever sent to Australia. The Premier of the state of Victoria, Sir Henry Bolte, says candidly: "No other American representative has attempted to learn about the country and know the people the way Ed Clark has. Never before has the U.S. been so well represented—and with our alliance in Vietnam, our closer trade ties and the growing U.S. investment in Australia, that representation has to be good."

How has Clark, the clown in the Stetson, done it? By displaying a massive appetite for work and a determination to see every one of Australia's 3-million square miles, by being totally sincere, by being closer to his head of state than any ambassador in the country. He has surrendered none of his flamboyance, and his extravagant behavior still causes a few shudders among the professional diplomats; but his overall performance has been so impressive that a member of his staff was recently moved to remark, "If this guy's not a professional, I just hope he never loses his amateur status."

It is hard, of course, to estimate the quality of an ambassador's work. His basic jobs are to feed information back to his government and to build good will between the two countries concerned. While there is no reliable gauge available to assess the quality of Clark's reports, it is known that last year, when President Johnson asked his ambassadors to poll the governments to which they were assigned on whether the U.S. should bomb Hanoi and mine the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong, Clark's reply was reported to be on the President's desk 10 days before the next reply was received.

In the field of goodwill, there is no doubt that the man has been immeasurably successful. Along with all the homilies, the platitudes and the Texas hokum that he dispenses comes a great deal of genuine warmth—and Australians, who normally distrust wordiness, have reacted well to him. They know that he has become a potent salesman in America for Australian trade, travel and investment.

"I asked the President just before I came out here what I was supposed to do," says Clark. "The President, he says, 'I want you to spread yourself around, Ed. Don't get stuck in no martini belt. Don't confine yourself to

the striped-pants circuit. I want you to go out and meet these people. And I want you to tell us everything about Australia . . . what they're thinking, what they're doing, how stable they are, how friendly they are."

That Clark has followed the President's advice there can be little doubt. He may indeed have followed it too well, from the Australian point of view. Washington columnist Leslie Carpenter, whose wife Liz is press secretary to Mrs. Johnson, recently speculated that Clark may soon be named a White House "troubleshooter"—the latest in a spate of speculations that he will shortly be moving on, now that he has served a two-year stint in Canberra.

But Clark professes to be astonished by the report. He will be in Washington this week, but the visit, he says, "was my idea, not theirs. I have a number of matters to discuss with the Departments of State, Defense, Interior and Agriculture on matters concerning Australia—but I'm not looking for any trouble to shoot. If the President has any plans for me, I just don't know about them." He adds that he intends to be back in Australia in time for the Melbourne Cup, the nation's most famous horse race, which will be held Nov. 2. "I've picked the last two winners," he remarks, "and I intend to keep picking 'em."

An example of Clark's thoroughness in following the President's counsel has been his unprecedented record in going out and meeting the people. He has really "spread himself around." He flew 154,000 miles in 1966 and has flown another 110,000 miles this year—crisscrossing every Australian state, visiting as far north as New Guinea and as far south as Australia's Antarctic base. He has talked all the way, averaging a formal speech every five days, working a circuit that embraces churches, schools, Rotary and Lions clubs and all sorts of professional and trade organizations; his aides say that he has made far more speeches than any ambassador, from any country, in the capital.

More important Americans have visited Australia during Clark's term of office than ever before; mostly they are personal friends, and they seem to respect his judgment entirely. He is credited by many Canberra observers with having been responsible for the visit last year by President Johnson—the first to Australia by any American President-in-office. He has worked hard to promote American investment in Australia.

Clark is known to have intervened on Australia's behalf when U.S. Government authorities were discussing capital outflow restraints and possible restrictions on American investments overseas; several U.S. corporations were being questioned about programs involving the investment in Australia of sums of between \$15-million and \$250-million. "That's when I got into the act," Clark confesses. "The authorities who were doing the questioning backed off . . . maybe just to get rid of me." He induced a 14-man Texas business delegation (most of them wearing cowboy hats) to tour Australia in July, and recently persuaded leaders of two New York banks and representatives of the oil, steel and aluminum industries to offer to put up the money for the establishment of what may be Australia's first post-graduate school of business administration. He has worked hard this year at getting the U.S. Armed Forces to buy supplies for American troops in Vietnam and the Pacific in Australia.

Undoubtedly, Clark's great advantage over all other ambassadors in Canberra is his ability to communicate immediately without recourse to formal diplomatic channels, with his President. He has done this quite often. One such instance came before Vice President Humphrey visited Australia and Asia last year; when his itinerary arrived from the State Department, it showed that Humphrey was due to have a half-day in Canberra, then

two days in Manila, two in Bangkok and longer periods in other Asian capitals. Other ambassadors would have had no option but to accept the itinerary, even though the shortness of the Australian stay might have been construed as a small snub to the Australian Prime Minister; Clark was counseled by his own professionals not to take any official action.

According to Canberra newsmen, Clark ignored the advice. He telephoned the President and told him, "It's not good enough, Mr. President. You can't wipe these people off like that . . . it's an insult! If half a day is the best you can do, I suggest the Vice President doesn't call here at all." The itinerary was changed, and Humphrey stayed in Canberra for two days. The Australian Prime Minister, Harold Holt, who had been in office only a short time, was extremely grateful to Clark.

Ed Clark's direct route to the President has been the cause of some embarrassment. One veteran Canberra newspaperman met the Ambassador recently in a crowded lounge at the city's airport. "Waal, fancy meetin' you," Clark called. Then Clark lowered his voice to a gentle roar: "Y'know, I was talkin' 'smornin' to the President, and . . ." Suddenly the lounge was hushed; 500 people craned forward to hear what the President of the United States had been thinking. "Whatever it was, it was pretty insignificant," says the reporter. "But when Mister Ed decides to drop a name, he does it from a great height."

The Mister Ed label was first applied maliciously, but now it is used with total affection. Sometimes it appears in newspaper headlines, and reporters who attend conferences at the American Embassy have christened the cocktail he serves them—an old-fashioned with a bourbon base—"Mister Ed's drink." His relationship with local newspapermen has been particularly affectionate ever since he played host at a press conference for Pierre Salinger, the late President Kennedy's press secretary. After the formal questioning had ended, Clark said to Salinger, who is an excellent pianist: "Hey, Pierre, what about you play a few tunes for the boys?" Salinger obliged, and somehow the affair developed into a singsong, with newspapermen, Clark and embassy aides grouped around the piano singing tunes like "Chicago" and "Give My Regards to Broadway."

Clark's nature is so aggressively jolly and his desire to be loved so obvious that it would be easy to underrate the man. But even while he's telling Texas jokes, indulging in Texas reminiscences and generally behaving like a Texas caricature, the eyes behind his rimless glasses are operating independently. They are cool, level, calculating—the eyes of a very shrewd man. Just how shrewd might be gauged from the fact that he has built up, from a stake of \$150 in 1932, a personal fortune in the region of \$10-million. When he left Texas for Australia, he was chairman of the Capital National Bank and a board member of Texas Southern University; his law firm of Clark, Thomas, Harris, Denius and Winters has handled the affairs of the Lyndon Johnson family for many years. He has been active in Democratic party politics since the early thirties, and has been an active supporter of L.B.J. since the pair met in 1934. In 1937 Johnson stood for Congress, and his campaign was handled by Clark; then, in 1949, Johnson was elected to the Senate in a close and disputed contest.

In the legal wrangle which followed—there were charges of vote rigging and claims that Johnson had no right to stand for Senate office while he was still a Congressman—Clark acted as Johnson's senior legal counsel. "A lot of people think Ed owes a great deal, including this job, to L.B.J.," says one friend of the Clark family. "In fact, the truth

is probably the opposite. Lyndon owes more to Clark than he could ever pay back." Whatever the case, there can be no doubt that the two men are very close; President Johnson is godfather to one of Clark's four grandchildren—three girls and a boy, all children of his daughter, Lelia. (Clark is fiercely proud of the fact that these grandchildren are sixth-generation Texans: "My family arrived in 1842, when Texas was still a republic.")

In mid-1965, Australia had been without a United States Ambassador for exactly a year; the job was being held down very well by a charge d'affaires, but there were many Australians who regarded the absence of an ambassador as a considerable slight. Sir Robert Menzies, who was then Australia's Prime Minister, visited Washington.

"Sir Robert knew how to talk tough," says Clark. "He went to Washington and told President Johnson that Australia had waited long enough for an ambassador. The two countries had a lot of ties, and the Prime Minister made it obvious that he was getting ready to be offended. To be fair, the President had had a lot of things on his mind, and he simply hadn't gotten around to picking the right man."

"All right," says the President. "What kind of man you got in mind?"

"I want you to appoint a close friend," says Menzies. "Someone you've got confidence in . . . somebody who can ring you on the telephone and get straight through to you."

"How would you feel about a Texan?" the President asks, and the Prime Minister says, "I think that would be great . . . as long as he's a Texan who knows you very well."

"Mister Prime Minister," says the President, "I think I got your man."

On that summer day in 1965, Ed Clark and his wife Anne were driving from Washington to Austin, Tex. They arrived home to find a message asking Clark to ring the President immediately. "Ed," said the President, "I want you to come right back here and bring Anne with you."

"What's it for?" asked Clark. The President answered, "I can't tell you, Ed, but it's pretty important." That night Johnson introduced the Clarks to Menzies, and told him, "I think I've got your ambassador."

"We stayed at the White House that night and talked a lot more about the job at breakfast next morning," Clark recalls. "Then my wife and I went upstairs to talk it over. That Sir Robert was a very eloquent, persuasive man, but I had a lot of reservations. I kept telling my wife I was as busy as a bee with the law practice and the bank. I told her I felt I ought to keep working, and I said something about saving for a rainy day. 'As far as you're concerned, Ed Clark,' she said, 'it's raining right now. If you don't take this, you'll just keep on doing what you've been doing for the past 40 years.' I told her we'd better get on down, because we'd kept those two important men waiting a long time."

The couple went downstairs and had a cup of coffee; and suddenly Ed Clark, native son of Texas, banker, attorney, hamburger connoisseur and amateur breeder of bulls, was Ambassador-designate to Australia. "It all happened faster than a bull's blink," he says.

Recently, shambling amiably around his dining room, living room, "Texas Room" and garden, pausing often to point out the attractions (Steuben glass penguins, paintings, a husky-sled harness he brought back from the Antarctic, tennis courts—"Charlton Heston played there"—and a Texas pecan tree), Clark admitted frankly that he had been very nervous when he arrived in Australia. Interviewing the man is like standing under a waterfall: the torrent of words cascades all around, and it is utterly impossible to divert the flow. But when he talks about himself, Clark's honesty can be quite touching.

"I knew all the guys at the embassy here were professionals, and I was a rank amateur," he said. "I knew they'd look upon me

as a political appointee, and I felt they would resent me. Yet I needed them so much. I didn't know a thing about diplomacy—I had no reason to. I didn't even know anyone in the Foreign Service. I knew it was important to have good manners, to be kind and considerate to people, but I didn't know when I was supposed to wear a cutaway or a silk hat. If I was due to call at some formal function, say an embassy party, I didn't know how long I was supposed to stay or who I was supposed to talk to or what I was supposed to talk about. I didn't know the rules of the game, and if they had wanted to make me look a fool, those professionals at the embassy could easily have done that. They turned out to be wonderfully loyal and cooperative, and they advised me well."

The loyalty has worked both ways. Ed Clark has 112 people on his embassy staff, and he has made some sort of history by entertaining all of them at barbecues and small lunch and dinner parties. He discusses every speech he makes and conference he attends with senior counselors, and is usually guided by their advice.

Mrs. Clark is a small, gray-blond woman whose gentle, rather shy and wry manner makes her an ideal foil for the gregarious Ambassador. She pretends to disapprove of Clark's almost belligerently friendly invitations—in back-country towns like Wagga Wagga and Coonabarabran he has been known to announce, "If you folks ever find yourselves in Canberra suffering from frost-bite or snake-bite, just call in on Miz Clark and me for our bourbon cure." She chides him often about "talking too big," and tells him to remember that he is a foreigner in Australia. But they have been married for 39 years; she is intensely devoted and proud.

Mrs. Clark's gardening, church (they are Episcopallians) and needlework activities, plus a very catholic taste in books and magazines, give her a breadth of interests outside the embassy; Ed Clark has very few. A nongardener and nongolfer, he spends just about all his waking time in some form of embassy work, though he does keep in close touch with his Texas banking and legal interests, even to the point of staying abreast of all staff salary adjustments. Both send frequent tape recordings to their daughter and her family in Greenville, Mo.; they often show home movies (most of which happen to be about Texas) and entertain at barbecues which range from the intimate to the congested. One of the latter type was thrown on a cattle ranch owned by a friend during the Johnson visit; it was attended by 400 guests and a group of friendly kangaroos.

A couple of weeks ago, on a visit to Sydney to address the Institute of Engineers, Clark heard there were two American destroyers in town, fresh from Vietnam. He visited the ships, shook hands with everyone on board and asked his perennial question: "Anyone here from Texas?" There is always somebody there from Texas. This month Americans serving in Vietnam will begin taking short furloughs in Australia, and Ed Clark will be waiting to meet each plane load, watching specially for the inevitable Texan.

"People say to me 'You're not the Ambassador for the United States; you're the Ambassador for Texas,'" says Clark. "I say, 'That reminds me of the guy who threw a rock at a cat and hit his mother-in-law. It ain't so bad after all.'"

How much longer Ed Clark will remain the Ambassador for the United States (and for Texas) is, as indicated, open to some doubt. "Just before I came out," he said recently, "I asked Senator Fulbright how long an ambassador usually stayed, and he said a man usually had the job during the pleasure of the President. Other people have said that about two years is the normal term." Clark's two years were up on Aug. 15; it is known that the State Department has offered him three other ambassadorships, but so far he

has chosen to remain in Canberra. "I wouldn't take another diplomatic job just for the honor of it," he said, but if the President told me that I might lighten his burden in some small way by accepting an appointment, I'd take it."

At this point his large face quarried itself into a broad grin. "I used to say that I didn't want to go any place where there was a language barrier," he said. "But my wife, a little unkindly, said, 'Let's face it, honey, wherever you go with that Southern accent, you gonna wind up with a language barrier.'" He dug his audience in the ribs, chuckled at some length and said good-by. Ed Clark is a troupier, and like all good troupiers, he likes to leave 'em laughing.

FOREST SERVICE TIMBER SALES

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on September 21, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, in response to a letter I sent him on August 2, submitted to me a résumé of actions underway by the Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest which relate to timber supplies.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary Freeman and his response be printed in the RECORD so that they will be generally available to all who are concerned with this vital subject.

Secretary Freeman has outlined four specific areas of activities where efforts are being made to deal with the critical log supply situation in the Pacific Northwest.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUGUST 2, 1967.

HON. ORVILLE FREEMAN,
Secretary of Agriculture,
Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed is a photostatic copy of a letter addressed to me by an Oregon constituent, Mrs. Anna Bevans of the Northside Lumber Company, Philomath, Oregon. Also enclosed is a newspaper article which appeared in the July 13 issue of the Newport, Oregon, *News Times* announcing the signing of a contract for the purchase of logs to be shipped to Japan through facilities to be established at Yaquina Bay.

As you will note, Mrs. Bevans, a partner in a small business log and lumber operation, expressed deep concern over the fact that Japanese bids to be placed on logs within shipping distance of Yaquina Bay will be so excessive as to prohibit small lumber operations such as the Northside Lumber Company from bidding successfully. Mrs. Bevans makes special reference to the arrangements whereby the representatives of the Japanese firms who will bid on this timber will work on a cost plus basis. My constituent feels that a cost plus bid arrangement may possibly be prohibited on sales of Federal timber. I have not heard of such a provision, but I will appreciate information as to whether such practices are prohibited by the Government.

Any information you may be able to supply concerning the subjects discussed in Mrs. Bevans' letter would be appreciated.

For your information, I have suggested that Mrs. Bevans give consideration to filing a request with the Forest Service and the Small Business Administration for small business timber set aside sales in appropriate cases. I have made this suggestion with some reservations, however, because of the fact that the record concerning small business set asides in timber sales in Oregon is not at all impressive as compared with sales of this type in Washington, California and

many of the Southern states. If you have any comments concerning the willingness and desire of the Forest Service Regional Office to entertain applications for small business timber set asides in the area in which the Bevans' firm would be bidding, such information would be most helpful to me for future guidance.

Finally, Mrs. Bevans inquires concerning the possibility that restrictions be placed by the Forest Service on log exports from Oregon and Washington in the same fashion that exports are excluded in Alaska. Upon the basis of the hearings that were conducted a few years ago on the proposal to establish the states of Oregon and Washington as a marketing area in which log exports would be restricted or limited, I cannot offer Mrs. Bevans much encouragement in answer to this specific inquiry.

However, the subject of log exports from Alaska raises this question in my mind: Would it now be appropriate for the Department of Agriculture to give serious consideration to lifting the present restrictions on log exports from Alaska in relation to Forest Service lands? If no limits were placed on log exports from Forest Service lands in Oregon and Washington, why should not the same rule be made applicable to Alaska? Your comments on this matter will be appreciated.

I continue to receive communications and representations stressing the adverse effects log exports are now having and are likely to have on the timber industry.

This is a matter I have raised before with you, in the last five years I think the Forest Service has responded by efforts to improve its timber management and sale operations. However, many in the industry continue to complain to me that agencies of the Federal government have not met the issue adequately.

The purpose of this letter is to acquaint you with a recent action I have taken, and to suggest specific actions for your prompt consideration.

Enclosed is a copy of my July 22 letter to Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge. It asks for a mill survey of the log export business so that the government and the industry generally can understand the causes and the effects of the actions of those who are producers and exporters.

The Forest Service, in a letter of July 24, points out that revisions of Federal agency allowable cut procedures should await completion of the Douglas fir supply study.

However, these are basic problems and the log export situation is at least an expression of the overall problem, namely, the lessening availability of timber for the domestic Pacific Northwest industry, and especially that segment dependent upon public timber.

The quarterly data I receive on exports do not place particular emphasis on the fact that log exports are predominantly timber other than Douglas fir. This tree, as I understand it, is the short domestic supply species. Is this a correct impression? If this impression is correct, I would like to have your views on the steps that might be taken to place the situation in a proper focus.

Also, is or is not the volume of Douglas fir going into export significant on both a regional or more localized basis? If the export volume of Douglas fir is significant, then the question of exports regulation devices becomes pertinent.

If exports are not significant, but the supply is short, then the question is what specific steps are reasonable, feasible and proper to increase the yield on a sound basis from public and private timber lands?

In my view the broader issues—those of timber demand and supply and sources of supply and their relation to the nature of the industrial production demand—are the compelling ones.

If the supply can be increased through

sound forest methods, now is the time to outline the potential and the actions needed.

I have opposed the use of political pressure to resolve the allowable cut issue. I shall continue to do so. However, if there are steps that should be taken in such matters as forest planting, reforestation, waste reduction in the forest and at the mill, tree breeding, aerial logging and other similar steps which increase timber availability to fill a genuine need, I think now is the time to act.

I would like a full report on the points I have raised, along with the estimates of funds and manpower that could be effectively used in this and the next fiscal year plus a statement on the immediate and long range benefits to be derived from programs of the types just mentioned.

Sincerely yours,

WAYNE MORSE.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Washington, D.C., September 21, 1967.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Your letter of August 2, 1967, about log exports and related National Forest timber management considerations has added stimulus to reviews of several aspects of Forest Service management and planning. We think it will be helpful if we reply to your letter insofar as we can at this time and to organize our response along lines of four broad subjects we discern in your letter.

1. Set-aside sales.

We are initiating a new review procedure about the ability of small firms in Washington and Oregon to obtain a fair share of National Forest timber sales. Henceforth this will be done routinely as a part of formulating each year's timber sale program on each National Forest. We plan to start now, by reviewing the remainder of this fiscal year's sale program. Where we can establish a clear need, appropriately selected sales will be offered as set asides. In the process, we will, of course, give consideration to any set-aside applications received. Whether this procedure will always provide open and shut answers on the need for and propriety of set asides, or whether the number of such sales will be increased in some areas, remains to be seen. We do think the plan will provide a systematic approach.

While set asides may be helpful to some small firms which are strongly dependent on the National Forests, there is much question whether set asides are a suitable answer to export problems, including the aspect of high stumpage prices. As you know, a substantial part of the logs exported now originate on private lands. Restraints imposed on the use of logs cut from public lands would probably further stimulate these shipments. This, in turn, could result in a new source of aggressive bidding on National Forest timber sales as firms attempt to replace the exported logs cut from private lands.

The planned evaluation of the success of small firms in obtaining National Forest timber sales will reflect consequences of competition stemming from both export and domestic buying forces. We doubt if it is feasible to separately evaluate these forces and, in effect, offer some set asides for possible anti-export benefits and others to meet impacts of domestic, intra-industry competition. Over the past three years, some 40-50 percent of the sales tributary to Puget Sound in Washington State have been made set asides because the exports there have had an impact on the ability of small firms to get a fair share of the logs. We should not extend this policy to other areas without having a basis to appraise its value. We are initiating a review of this program.

2. General log export situation and the Alaska situation.

The statement is made by your correspondent that representatives of Japanese firms

bid on National Forest timber offerings and are reimbursed on a cost-plus basis. The question is then asked: Is a cost-plus bid arrangement prohibited in sales of Federal timber?

We are required to award sales of National Forest timber to the highest qualified bidder. There is no legal basis for denying anyone an opportunity to bid simply because of the source of his financing.

Export of logs from Alaska is more complex. Regulations under the Act of June 4, 1897, comprise the authority for the policy being followed on National Forests in Alaska. The specific requirement that logs harvested from the National Forests in Alaska receive primary manufacture within the State was established by Secretary W. M. Jardine in 1928, and this requirement, is still in effect. The reason given by the Secretary for this requirement, which in effect restricts the exporting of logs from Alaska, was to protect the development of the Territory's pioneer economy. The primary manufacture requirement is being maintained because Alaska is still in a stage of pioneer development where it needs large-scale expansion of forest products industries to develop the local economy and to provide the type of facilities essential for acceptable utilization of National Forest timber.

The authority for requiring the processing of National Forest timber in a stated area would be much the same elsewhere as in Alaska provided that similar administrative determinations could be made.

For this calendar year, it is expected that as much as 200 million board feet of cants and squares will be manufactured in Alaska for export to Japan where they are further remanufactured. Plans are under way to further increase this production of sawn material. The Japanese market has indicated willingness to accept large volumes of squares and cants from Alaska. This production plays an important part in meeting total Japanese lumber requirements, and we cannot see how anything can be gained by authorizing such material to be exported as logs. Consequently, we see no reason at this time to modify the primary manufacture policy in Alaska.

3. Export of Douglas-fir species.

In response to your inquiry regarding the export of Douglas-fir, we have reviewed our information on species distribution of log exports. In 1966, Douglas-fir log exports from western Washington and western Oregon amounted to 128 million board feet. This represented about 11.5 percent of total log exports. Other softwood species, primarily western hemlock and true fir, accounted for the remaining 88.5 percent.

The cut of Douglas-fir logs in western Washington and western Oregon in 1966 is estimated at 7.6 billion board feet, or about 60 percent of the total cut of all species. Although Douglas-fir exports accounted for only 1.7 percent of the total cut of Douglas-fir that year, it is probable the exports have added in an important way to the competition for Douglas-fir stumpage and logs in local areas in western Washington. This is especially so in heavy exporting areas around Grays Harbor and Puget Sound ports. The volume of Douglas-fir exports for 1967 is running about 50 percent ahead of last year.

Exports of Douglas-fir logs from the Oregon Customs District in 1966 were 48 million board feet—less than one percent of the production of Douglas-fir logs in western Oregon. Most of the competition for Douglas-fir logs in this area, and it is intense in many places, is among domestic mills. This competition reflects an economic scarcity of Douglas-fir timber.

We are considering expanding our research program on log exports at the Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station so that we can better understand the economic effects of exports.

4. Increase in timber supply.

We agree with you that the basically compelling issues are, as you put it, those of timber demand and supply and sources of supply and their relation to the nature of the industrial production demand. In general, the demand-supply outlook is tight, and exports make it tighter. Considering all ownerships, the annual supply of timber available to industry in western Washington and western Oregon is now expected to increase by about 10 percent by 1985. This expansion is far below expected increases in domestic demands in the Pacific Northwest. Nationally, projections indicate supplies of timber will fall below demands by around 1980.

In the National Forests in western Washington and western Oregon, timber is being harvested at rates equivalent to their allowable cuts, plus substantial and increasing volumes obtained annually from thinnings of young stands and salvage cuttings.

We are constantly revising and updating inventories, management plans, and allowable cuts for individual working circles. We have an intensive study under way to consider management alternatives and costs. We do not propose considering any general changes in rotation lengths or other factors affecting allowable cut until we have had full opportunity to study the results of the Douglas-fir Supply Study. We are anxious to achieve the highest level of sustained yield that is technically supportable.

We are continuously conscious, in our budget presentations, of the need to increase available supplies of stumpage. Where such can be shown to be economically practicable and susceptible to being accomplished by the manpower and other resources that can be made available to us, we include requests for funds to accomplish this work. We are conscious of potential opportunities to increase production, such as aerial logging, fertilization, and other similar steps to increase availability and production. However, we do not include these in our project budgets until the procedures have been tested through controlled studies and research. We do appreciate your continued interest and support in these programs as they are proposed.

Sincerely yours,

ORVILLE L. FREEMAN.

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION ASSISTS A COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, as a member of the Committee on the District of Columbia and the Select Committee on Small Business, I have a continuing interest in District of Columbia small business and welfare matters.

I invite the attention of Senators to an Operation Impact loan made last year by the Washington regional office of the Small Business Administration, which draws in other Federal agencies, State and local programs, and the private sectors, as well. Community Laundries, Inc., located at 1125 Pennsylvania Avenue SE., was formed to promulgate the pattern created by James Thomas Lee, a laundromat manager in Southeast Washington, and a club of 30 warm-hearted men in the community, the Twangers.

The Twangers recognized in the people around them, the nature of our American heritage, and saw a paradox in the fact that this independent heritage formed a ghetto mental block; that of being unable to receive without giving. They also recognized the back-to-the-wall stance; that of doing without, rather

than asking for help. They listened to the people in the laundromat and requested their active assistance to effect their desired community improvements. Friendship was found in the action generated and many personal problems were brought to light and solved.

From his knowledge of the Twangers, Bruce Terris, a young attorney serving as a volunteer community organizer, decided that a community center connected to a neighborhood business would reach people more effectively than traditional centers. He began the project by forming two corporations: Community Action, a nonprofit corporation, to operate the center and, Community Laundries, Inc., a profitmaking corporation, to run the laundry. Sara Jane Hardin agreed to direct Community Action, Inc., and James T. Lee assisted in establishing the laundry facilities. The Philip M. Stern Foundation pledged its support to get the project started. It was the first project in Washington that began at neighborhood level to be approved by the Metropolitan Citizen's Advisory Council and the United Planning Organization. The Office of Economic Opportunity granted Community Action, Inc., \$28,992 in June 1966.

The Small Business Administration made a \$15,000 loan to Community Laundries, Inc., in February 1966. In early September, the sale of stock began at \$2 per share and was limited to 25 shares per individual with one vote per stockholder irrespective of the amount owned. By the time of the stockholders' meeting in December, a total of 260 shares were owned by 92 people. At the first meeting and every succeeding one, about one-half of the people present were men and over two-thirds represented low-income neighborhood residents. These people take an active interest in the affairs of the business and are being strengthened in business techniques as they formulate and execute the necessary plans and decisions. The laundry has functioned well and its Small Business Administration loan is current.

The business give-and-take action of Community Laundries, Inc., has successfully created an atmosphere of receptivity for the services of Community Action, Inc. Eighty homeowners were reached by the volunteer staff and the students of the Legal Aid Society of Georgetown University Law Center who informed them that many unscrupulous home improvement salesmen were combing the neighborhood and cautioned them to screen contracts for "balloon" notes and other fraudulent practices. Besides the volunteer attorneys and law students, 100 volunteers work for the project in the whole range of welfare problem solving. In a sense, each customer of Community Laundries, Inc., becomes an active volunteer in the work of Community Action, Inc., through friendship.

Mr. President, Community Laundries, Inc., clearly reflects the desires of President Johnson's administration and Congress that all Federal programs be responsive to the people.

The Small Business Administration, with Robert C. Moot as its Administra-

tor, deserves recognition for its part in carrying out President Johnson's and Congress' mandate of providing loan assistance to small businesses that are not only profit motivated but ones, such as Community Laundries, Inc., that provide a real community service.

DESPICABLE RACKET

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I feel the Washington Post has done the citizens of Washington a real service in exposing the nauseating manner in which low-income families have been defrauded and taken advantage of in the home improvement racket. I agree that vigorous prosecution is called for, and that, if it is found that new legislation is required, it should be enacted. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial of October 6 from the Post dealing with this subject be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

The second-mortgage, home-improvement racket that has been uncovered here takes high rank among the most despicable forms of fraud. Its victims are for the most part low-income Negroes who have been swindled because of their ignorance of the law and of sharp business practices. In many cases the net effect of the fraud has been to deprive people, advanced in years, of their homes, the basic element in their economic security. In a few cases there are charges of false notarization and forgery, but most of the damage appears to have resulted from flagrant deception of gullible people.

Probably the worst aspect of the racket has been the manner in which the original swindlers escape responsibility for the consequences. As disclosed by Leonard Downie Jr. and David A. Jewell in this newspaper, low-income homeowners are canvassed by telephone. High-powered salesmen follow up the calls that give some promise of being productive. They sell home improvements, television sets and other much-desired items and secure the signatures of the victims on notes and deeds on their homes.

Sometimes old debts are consolidated into the new obligation, but the old debt may be paid by the smooth operator only in part or not at all. Frequently the victim discovers months after the transaction that he has unknowingly pledged himself to pay far more than the sums agreed upon. And the demand for payment comes, not from the firm which makes the slick deal, but from a finance company which has bought the paper involved at a discount.

By the time the law catches up with the racket, if at all, the original operator is thus out of the deal. Indeed, he is likely to have moved on to another city to repeat his skin game. The firm taking over the note and mortgage can thus demand payment on the theory that it is a "holder in due course," an innocent beneficiary of the fraud because it had no part in the tainted deal.

This theory wears patently thin, however, when any firm or firms consistently take over tainted contracts at heavy discounts. If they don't know what they are doing, they ought to. Both local and Federal authorities have been painfully slow in moving against the original perpetrators of this racket and against its chief beneficiaries in the financial world. In our view a double-barreled attack is essential. Though the primary responsibility may fall on the culprits who prey directly upon the poor, their shrewdly calculated schemes could not succeed without the aid of the financiers who pay them off and take over the actual fleecing of the victims.

This racket calls for far more vigorous prosecution than it has had to date, and if new legislation should be needed, it should be promptly forthcoming.

THE TOTAL FAILURE OF U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last night Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., noted historian, author of "The Vital Centre," "The Coming of the New Deal," and of "A Thousand Days," the Pulitzer prize-winning account of the Kennedy administration, delivered a noteworthy address before a group assembled in response to the call "Negotiation now." Arthur Schlesinger has analyzed the various follies which the United States has committed and continues to commit incidental to the overall folly of getting involved in a land war on the continent of Asia when no vital interest of the United States was at stake, and which moreover President Johnson in his 1964 campaign said he would not do. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this speech be printed at the conclusion of my remarks. I trust that it will have the widest reading by my colleagues in Congress and by the public.

I would say that the cry of "Negotiation now," if it is to be interpreted as a part of the rising tide of opposition to our military involvement in Southeast Asia deserves widespread support. But "Negotiation now" as a program seems to me to be futile as long as the administration persists in reiterating the myth that we are fighting the aggression of Hanoi. As long as that is the basis on which the United States is trying to bomb North Vietnam into coming to the conference table, that will never happen. The North Vietnamese know perfectly well that they are not the aggressors. They know that it was only after the United States, in violation of all its treaty commitments—the United Nations Charter, article 1 of the SEATO Treaty, and the commitment of Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith that we would support the Geneva agreements—and started bombing north and south, it was only then that the infiltration of North Vietnam to help their fellow Vietnamese in the south began.

Actually it is the United States which is the aggressor. Consequently there is little prospect for "Negotiation now!" until the administration confesses its error or at least ceases to proclaim North Vietnam as the aggressor, and on that basis offers to negotiate. Obviously, no negotiation is possible as long as the administration tries to bomb North Vietnam into submission and into admission of a false premise. Also it must offer to negotiate the National Liberation Front of Vietcong who are the real adversaries. The administration has consistently refused to do this because it would discredit the myth of aggression from Hanoi. Consequently, while I welcome "Negotiation now!" as evidence of the rising opposition to our totally unjustified, illegal, unconstitutional and immoral war, I think it is an exercise in futility as long as the administration persists in its present policies.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alaska?

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Vietnam and the 1968 Elections

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

Thirty-two months ago, in February 1965, the American government embarked on a new course in Vietnam—a course marked, first, by the bombing of North Vietnam, and, second, by the commitment of American combat units to the war in South Vietnam. These two and two-thirds years have seen a steady increase in both efforts—an increase which, in the melancholy jargon of our age, designed to hold horror at one remove and make it schematic and technical, has won the name 'escalation'.

Our planes, originally bombing North Vietnam under careful rules and limitations, now roam across the country, dropping more explosives than we used to drop on Nazi Germany, striking the major cities, striking within a few miles of the Chinese border, on occasion invading Chinese air space itself. Our ground troops, originally sent to stiffen and supplement South Vietnamese resistance, have now taken over almost all the fighting. We have over half a million soldiers in Vietnam today—more than we had in Korea at the height of the Korean War; more than we have had in the field in any war in our history, except for the Civil War and the two World Wars.

Since February 1965 the administration has operated on the assumption that the steady intensification of military pressure would end the war and force Hanoi to the negotiation table—that widening the war would prove the best way to shorten it. For most of this period, the escalation policy has commanded the backing of a sizable majority of the American people. But recent weeks and months have shown a visible and widespread increase in doubt and disquietude over this policy. The Harris poll of October 2 reported a sharp decline since July in support of the war, a sharp increase in the opposition to the bombing of North Vietnam, a sharp increase in the number of Americans who want to get out of South Vietnam as quickly as possible, a decline in the number who favor the pursuit of total military victory. Less than a third now express confidence in President Johnson's handling of the war.

The Democratic Party has long been divided on the Vietnam policy. It is increasingly evident today that the divisions are equally deep in the Republican Party. More and more newspapers criticize the bombing of the North. Here in Washington, the *Star*, long a supporter of the war, has proposed a halt to the bombing. There are even signs that the *Post* is entertaining second thoughts after its long and able defense of escalation. Such meager support as escalation has ever had abroad is ebbing away. In the United Nations our European allies urge an end to the bombing. On October 1, the *London Sunday Times*, an unimpeachably conservative paper, declared in a lead editorial:

"The time has come for the Americans unconditionally, and for an indefinite period, to stop bombing North Vietnam . . . The argument for stopping the bombing has become so strong that to withstand it any longer is going to make it far harder for the friends and allies of the U.S. to understand and support her case."

The reasons for both the initial support and the spreading disenchantment are not too mysterious. Vietnam has always been a highly complicated problem. The proper line of policy was not clear and self-evident. No one could be sure in February 1965 what would be the best course for the United

States to follow. Given the murkiness of the situation, the administration, after earnest and conscientious consideration, made a choice and settled upon a certain hypothesis. This hypothesis was based on a number of premises which, when the escalation policy began, may have had—for many thoughtful people, did have—a strong *prima facie* plausibility. What has happened in the last 32 months has been the testing of these premises—the testing under fire.

How do the assumptions behind the escalation policy stand up after this period of trial? Let us cast a balance on the seven basic propositions on which this policy has been based:

1. *That escalation would break the will of North Vietnam and bring Hanoi to the conference table.* "The objective of our air campaign," said General Taylor two years ago, "is to change the will of the enemy leadership." After 32 months what has been the result? Newspapersmen and others who have visited Hanoi are almost unanimous in testifying that the effect of the bombing has been, not to break, but to harden the will of North Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense recently said: "There is no basis to believe that any bombing campaign, short of one which had population as its target, would by itself force Ho Chi Minh's regime into submission." To those who say that we just haven't bombed the North Vietnamese enough, Mr. McNamara replies:

"As to breaking their will, I have seen no evidence in any of the many intelligence reports that would lead me to believe that a less selective bombing campaign would change the resolve of N.V.N.'s leaders or deprive them of the support of the North Vietnamese people."

Moreover, far from bringing the Hanoi regime to the negotiating chamber, our bombing of the North is at present the insuperable obstacle to having any negotiation at all. The Hanoi regime has made it abundantly clear that, so long as the bombing continues, it will not come near the conference table. In short, experience has plainly disproved the first premises of the escalation policy.

2. *That escalation would reduce the infiltration of supplies and men from North to South Vietnam.* Again this proposition had a certain initial plausibility. But does it stand up after 32 months of testing? Though our bombing has certainly increased the cost of infiltration, it has at the same time increased the quantity of men and the quality of arms infiltrated. The reason for this is that our escalation has invariably stimulated counter-escalation on the part of our enemy.

The administration has always assumed that, while we escalate, the other side would sit still; and that we would therefore improve our relative position. This has been the reasoning behind every step of escalation. It has always proved wrong. The other side, instead of obliging us and sitting still, has escalated too. Far from achieving a clear margin of superiority, all we have done is to make the stalemate more bloody and explosive.

Thus, in March 1965, after the bombing had started, the Hanoi regime, according to our own Department of Defense, had only 400 regular troops in South Vietnam. Today it has 50,000. In March 1965 our adversaries in South Vietnam were fighting with small arms and mortars. In the months since, with each new escalation on our part, their weaponry has grown more sophisticated and effective. As for stopping infiltration, Secretary McNamara has pointed out that "the quantity of externally supplied material, other than food, required to support the VC-NVN forces in South Vietnam at about their current level of combat activity is very, very small—significantly under 100 tons a day—a quantity that could be transported by only a few trucks." Nor does he see any reason

to suppose that even wider bombing could miraculously achieve what the present very wide bombing has failed to achieve. "No improvements and refinements," Mr. McNamara has told us, "can be expected to accomplish much more than to continue to put a high price tag on NVN's continued aggression." So, too, the second proposition falls by the wayside.

3. *That escalation would lessen American casualties in the war.* This is the argument for the ever wider bombing of North Vietnam which has had the greatest influence with the American people. On occasion, this argument has even taken the contemptible form of suggesting that those who oppose the widening of the war are responsible for the deaths of young Americans. If this is the level on which our leaders desire to conduct the debate, they should consult their own statistics.

These statistics show that more than half the Americans killed in the whole length of the Vietnam war, from 1961 to the present, were killed since the beginning of this year—killed, in short, during the period of the most intense escalation. The statistics also show that the number of American deaths declined during the bombing pause last February. The statistics, in short, strongly suggest that the way to increase casualties is to escalate the war—and that the way to reduce casualties is to slow down the war. And, of course, the way to end casualties is to end the war. So, after 32 months and 13,000 deaths, one more premise of the escalation policy has been condemned by events.

4. *That escalation would strengthen the government and will of South Vietnam.* This was one of the three reasons cited by President Johnson in April 1965 when he explained the decision to start bombing North Vietnam; and there is reason to believe that it may in fact have been the major reason. How does this argument look 32 months later?

On the political side, it is true that South Vietnam has had an election and now boasts a 'constitutional' government. It is only coincidental, no doubt, that the new government consists of essentially the same faces as the military junta which preceded it. But the presidential election took place after the disqualification of the two most formidable opposition candidates, Au Truong Thanh and General Big Minh, both of whom were advocates of a negotiated solution—an action which meant that the election was rigged long before the voting took place. As for the voting itself, though given the seal of approval by President Johnson's team of Innocents Abroad, it was regarded with less enthusiasm by the Special Election Committee of South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly, which voted 16-2 to invalidate the results. In the end, the Assembly itself was induced to confirm the results only by a vote of 58-43.

Moreover, the winner, General Thieu, and the escalation policy received only 34.8 per cent of the vote; while the next three candidates, all of whom were for peace, received together 38 per cent. As for 'constitutional' government, the Saigon police since the election have detained Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran second in the election, as well as Au Truong Thanh; and, though the constitution expressly forbids press censorship, the Saigon government has suspended four Vietnamese-language dailies in the last month. All this hardly suggests that the escalation policy has strengthened the commitment of the people of South Vietnam to their government or to the war.

The sharper test, of course, is the Army of South Vietnam. There are nearly 700,000 troops—certainly an impressive number for a small country. But the soldiers are miserably paid and miserably led. They have no faith in their officers, indeed, of the officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel or

higher, only two fought against the French in the war for Vietnamese independence. They have no faith in their government or their cause. Naturally many of them go over the hill whenever they can.

They don't fight at night. They don't fight on weekends. "Most of the troops," Peter Arnett of AP recently reported from Vietnam, "insist on a 5½ day week, taking Saturdays and Sundays off, while their allies and the Viet Cong go on fighting." According to the *National Observer* of September 25, "Collecting tales about the incredible inefficiency, slovenliness and laziness of South Vietnam's Army is perhaps the easiest work in all of the country. The Army is the No. 1 scandal of the war, and it is the No. 1 failure of the American military command."

Our escalation of the war, far from strengthening the government and will of South Vietnam, has had precisely the opposite effect. The more we do, the less they do; and, in consequence, the less they do, the more we do. In some months more Americans are killed than South Vietnamese are drafted. We have taken over the fighting. We are taking over the management of the economy. We are beginning to take over pacification. And, in the meantime, the weight of our presence crushes the frail fabric of Vietnamese society; our money degrades and debauches the people we are trying to save. We leave in our trail, not rising purpose and commitment, but deepening corruption and contempt. So, after 32 months, still another proposition turns out wrong.

5. *That we are holding the line against general communist aggression.* This, of course, has been the fundamental defense of the escalation policy. If this were simply a local war in Vietnam, no one would dream of sending half a million American soldiers there. But from the start the administration has conceived this conflict in loftier terms. Expounding the escalation policy in April 1965, the President said:

"There are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to the conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next."

He repeated this theme the other day in San Antonio, calling Southeast Asia "the arena where communist expansionism is most aggressively at work in the world today" and concluding, "I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time, and by meeting this danger now, and facing up to it, thereby reduce the danger for our children and for our grandchildren."

The President's words deserve the most careful attention. What does he mean when he talks about "communist expansionism"? Though on occasion he likes to compare Ho Chi Minh to Jack Dempsey, he cannot seriously believe that Ho and his ragged bands present America and the world with a threat comparable to that presented by Hitler in the thirties or by Stalin in the forties. If his statement makes any sense at all, it can only be on the assumption that communism is still some sort of coordinated, unified, centrally controlled world movement, that nothing important has happened to communism since the days of Stalin, that polycentrism is a delusion and national communism a fraud and that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are the spearhead of a Chinese program of aggression in East Asia.

The proposition that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are the obedient instrumentalities of Chinese expansionism is absolutely crucial to the President's San Antonio argument. Otherwise the speech makes no sense at all. Yet the administration has at no point produced convincing evidence to sustain this proposition. Nor is there any reason to sup-

pose that North Vietnam has been, is or will be a puppet of Peking's. If communist North Korea, which would not even exist had it not been for Chinese intervention in the Korean War, now declares its independence of Peking, why should anyone suppose that North Vietnam, whose whole history has been shaped by resistance to China, would become a compliant adjunct to the Red Guard? As good a probability—and for a long time in the past a much better probability—is that North Vietnam, with its vast Russian support, would resist Mao's pressure and Chinese expansionism—and do so a good deal more effectively than the parade of gimcrack regimes we have sponsored in Saigon. The long-run bulwark against China in Asia will be, not white intervention from across the seas, but local nationalism, even if that nationalism sometimes assumes a communist form.

In Cambodia, for example, that inveterate and wily neutralist Prince Sihanouk has begun a purge of Chinese influence in his government and his society. The State Department no doubt thinks this is the consequence of our presence in Vietnam. But Sihanouk doesn't. In the midst of his campaign against the Chinese, he continues to urge us to pull out of Vietnam: "If the American government . . . one day took such a decision, the whole world, including Cambodia, would cheer America. For once America would be popular."

Our escalation policy in the last 32 months, far from discouraging North Vietnam from serving as an instrument of Chinese aggression, has had precisely the opposite effect: it has increased North Vietnam's dependence on China, increased the number of Chinese in North Vietnam, driven the two states closer together than they ever were before. Again, a basic premise of the administration argument has been refuted by events.

6. *That escalation proves we will keep our commitments everywhere.* This has been another fundamental thesis in the administration's case for widening the war. We are in Vietnam, the Secretary of State said in 1966, because we made a promise. We have made other promises in other parts of the world. If Moscow or Peking ever discovers that the promises of the United States do not mean what they say, then this world goes up in smoke. How does this pious stand up under the test of events? Has our deepening involvement in Vietnam persuaded anyone that we will involve ourselves equally elsewhere in new cases of aggression? Quite the contrary: on this point, let us consult the hawkish hawk in the nation, Richard M. Nixon. (At least he has been the hawkish hawk up to now: as he studies the public opinion polls, we may confidently expect that our flexible former Vice President will, in due course, stop screaming and start cooing—and I trust that you will continue to give his views on world matters the respect they deserve.) Mr. Nixon puts it this way:

"One of the legacies of Vietnam almost certainly will be a deep reluctance on the part of the United States to become involved once again in a similar intervention on a similar basis . . . If another friendly country should be faced with an externally supported communist insurrection—whether in Asia or in Africa or even Latin America—there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress would now support a unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host government."

The storm of senatorial criticism when we sent three innocuous Air Force jet transports to the Congo last July proves Mr. Nixon's point.

Escalation has thus gravely damaged our national credibility as a keeper of promises politically. It has also done so militarily. For, if our assistance were sought today in some other part of the world, what in fact could we do—with 40 per cent of our combat-

ready divisions, more than 50 per cent of our air power and more than a third of our naval power tied down in a small country 10,000 miles from the United States? Moreover, if the United States, with its fantastic military strength, cannot defeat the guerrillas of Vietnam, and, if in the attempt it wrecks the country it is trying to protect, why should any rational nation ever seek our protection again?

The administration denounces its critics as isolationists. But the real isolationists are surely those who, in their dedication to the escalation policy, have isolated the United States from its traditional allies and from the people of the world. At San Antonio the President went through the litany of the Asian leaders who have given our policy verbal support. But words are cheap. Except for our client state, South Korea, no nation in the world has sent us the support which counts—that is, a combat detachment of any size in Vietnam. We are going it alone as a nation in a way we have not done for thirty years.

More than this, the escalation policy has set in motion through our land a basic questioning of the whole idea of overseas commitments. Not in our time has there been such doubt about our military, economic and political ties with other nations. The lesson of Vietnam is not, as the administration keeps saying, that America will meet its commitments everywhere on earth.

The lesson of Vietnam, as read not only by the American Congress and people but by our friends and enemies around the world, is: "No more Vietnams." The escalation policy, after 32 months of trial, far from proving that we will keep our promises elsewhere, has had precisely the opposite effect: it has been the greatest stimulus and boon to American isolationism in the last thirty years. So one more proposition must be struck off the list.

7. *That military men know how to win wars.* We have embarked on the escalation policy because the Joint Chiefs of Staff have told the President that this is the way to win the war. In recent months the military has boldly escalated its own campaign with Congress and the public. Admiral Sharp has said that a bombing pause would be "a disaster for the United States." General Wheeler has promised that the war could be ended in a "relatively short time" if we bombed the port of Haiphong and all lines of transport from South China. General Greene has had the presumption to tell the American people that the war in Vietnam is more important than the crisis of the American city.

Let us not make the mistake of condemning all military men. Such generals as James M. Gavin, Matthew Ridgway, David M. Shoup have offered searching criticism of the escalation policy. Within the Defense Department itself, Secretary McNamara has evidently—though with decreasing success in recent months—stood against the program of insensate escalation. Nor can one condemn the present Joint Chiefs of Staff for their insistence on a military solution. That is their business. The fault lies not with those who give such advice but with those who take it. There is nothing infallible about the JCS. I know what they recommended during great crises of the Kennedy Administration—the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin crisis of 1961, the missile crisis of 1962, the test ban debate of 1963—and in each case their recommendations were plainly wrong. President Kennedy took their advice on his great decisions once—before the Bay of Pigs. He did not make that mistake again. I know of no reason to suppose that the present Chiefs are wiser than their predecessors.

This sudden worship of the military is not in the American tradition. When General MacArthur carried his campaign for the escalation of the Korean War to Congress and the public, President Truman fired him. When Union generals in the Civil War showed that

they could not succeed, President Lincoln fired them, one after another. Judging by the record, the present military leadership in South Vietnam is as disastrous as any we have had in the life of our nation. With over 500,000 American troops, better equipped than any troops in history, with 700,000 South Vietnamese, with 50,000 South Koreans, with total command of the air, with total command of the sea and, until recently, with total monopoly of heavy artillery, we have been fought to a standstill by 280,000 characters in black pajamas mostly armed, until recently, with rifles and mortars. In the last month, at Con Thien, our generals, in their wisdom, placed a group of gallant Marines in—and I quote that superhawk Joseph Alsop—“just about the only position in the entire country where the North Vietnamese can hope to attain relative parity in heavy weapons when battle is engaged.” Because, as General Westmoreland has elegantly put it, “There is more firepower concentrated in that area than on any single piece of real estate in the history of warfare,” we have evidently staved off the assault; but the question remains whether the strategy of putting the men in this terribly exposed position made sense.

The inescapable conclusion is that our military leadership has grossly misjudged and misconceived the character of the war. The foremost authority in the west on counter-insurgency and the leading British expert on Vietnam, where he headed the British Advisory Mission for three and a half years, is Sir Robert Thompson, who organized the defeat of the guerrilla uprising in Malaya. Sir Robert recently pointed out that General Giap's strategy “has one main aim, to keep the American combat forces fully occupied on ‘search and destroy’ type operations in the Demilitarized Zone and in the spinal column of the Annamite mountain chain as far south as Zone D. . . . These are areas where he can most easily deploy his main units and where American forces can achieve, in comparatively unpopulated mountain and jungle, no permanent gains.” The costs of this strategy for North Vietnam, Sir Robert says, are quite acceptable. If they lost twice as many troops per year as we claim they are losing, “it would still be less than half one annual age group (and there is an enormous reserve of these age groups between 18 and 30).” And American strategy, Sir Robert points out, is exactly what General Giap wants. It plays exactly into his hands. And the result? As Rowland Evans reported from Vietnam a few days ago, “The US position here in the critical northern provinces of South Vietnam is deteriorating as the communists press their remorseless campaign of attack, parry and retreat.”

Let us liberate ourselves from this illusion of the infallibility of generals. Stewart Alsop, the wiser brother, recently wrote in the *Saturday Evening Post*, after citing the historical record, “Almost all generals are almost always wrong about all wars. Generals should be listened to with skeptical respect, but never with reverent credulity.” If the experience of the last 32 months proves anything, it proves that the administration's 7th assumption is as wrong as all the rest.

In February 1965 it was permissible to suppose that some, or all, of the administration's assumptions might be right. No one then could be certain whether or not the escalation policy would work. But now, for 32 long, terrible months, war has put to trial the validity of the propositions on which this policy is based. What may have seemed plausible in the abstract in February 1965 has received the laboratory test. It is no longer a question of speculation but of verification. The evidence is concrete. It is overwhelming. It is irrefutable.

History is the great executioner; and, in these months and years, as the basic assumptions, one after another, have run the

gantlet of experience, none has survived. We are a pragmatic people. We believe in the process of trial and error, of experimentation. But we also believe in heeding the results of experiment. As Franklin Roosevelt once said, “it is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another.”

That is the way most Americans think—and this, I submit, is why there has been in recent months so marked a disillusion with the escalation policy. Some of us may have known from the start that the policy would not work. But let us be charitable to those who preferred to suspend judgment until the results were in. Let us unite now in the determination to slow down this ghastly war and move as speedily as possible toward a negotiated settlement.

This is the way most Americans are coming to think. But is it the way the American government is coming to think? So far as one can tell, our leaders remain stubbornly unimpressed by the collapse of their case for escalation. They continue to reiterate the propositions which experience has so cruelly disproved. Lashed to their own past policies, they seem incapable of admitting error or changing direction.

And so their only response to the failure of escalation is more escalation—like a doctor who, when the medicine fails to cure—doubles the dose.

Their only response to the misconceptions of our generals is to capitulate more and more to their demands.

Their only response to frustration and stalemate is to issue ever more fatuous statements about turning the corner of the war, turning the tide, the beginning of the end, victory in sight and so on.

It is difficult to see how serious men can, year after year, with the straight face, repeat the same optimistic predictions and do so, very often, in the identical words. Nor should we forget that herald angel of the hawks, Joseph Alsop, in this connection. *The Washington Post* on October 4 adorned his most recent effusion with the encouraging headline: “Vast Gains in Vietnam War Evident in Last Few Months.” Hark how this herald angel has sung through the years. Thus February 1964, “In Communist North Vietnam . . . the situation is close to desperate”; in September 1965, “The whole pattern of the war has been utterly changed. . . . At last there is light at the end of the tunnel”; in October 1965, “Final defeat is beginning to be expected, even in the ranks of Viet Cong hard-core units”; in February 1966, “The enemy's backbone of regulars can even be broken this year. And when and if that happens, this war will be effectively won”; in April 1966, “The Vietnamese and American forces are now imposing a rate of loss on the Viet Cong which the enemy cannot indefinitely withstand”; in October 1966, “Within six, eight, ten or twelve months—before the end of 1967 at any rate—the chances are good that the Vietnamese war will look successful.” Now in October 1967, just at the time when this last gorgeous prophecy is due for fulfillment, Mr. Alsop finds improvement so great that “the contrast between then and now is all but incredible.” One is compelled to conclude that it is not the contrast but the columnist who is incredible. How consistently silly can an intelligent man be?

How do our leaders explain the failure of the escalation policy to produce the results so glowingly promised at such regular intervals? For some time, of course, they have been building their alibi. We all know what it is: that dissent in the United States is responsible for frustration in Vietnam. This is a familiar reflex of military disaster. One need only remember the *Dolchsteig* legend—the stab-in-the-back myth concocted by the German generals to account for their defeat in the First World War.

The argument, like the escalation theory itself, has a certain initial plausibility. But let us consider what it really means—and the best way to do that is simply to invert it. If it means anything, it must mean that, if only everybody in the United States would shut up and rally behind their President, then Ho Chi Minh and his friends would stop doing what they are doing, and the war would be over. Simply to state this proposition is to demonstrate its absurdity. Serious leaders base their military decisions on the actual battlefield balance of force, will and opportunity, not on speculations about anti-war protests on the other side of the world. Our adversaries are fighting not because they count on protest at home but because they believe fanatically in their cause and because they have not been beaten in the field of battle. They would fight just as hard if everyone in America thought the escalation policy was perfect.

The rise of the Great Alibi has been paralleled by a curious sense of persecution within the administration as if it were some sort of beleaguered and impotent minority. A good example of this cry-baby reaction is the speech that Ambassador Gronouski gave this August at the University of Wisconsin. “Those charged with the conduct of foreign policy,” the Ambassador said in his long wall of self-pity, “. . . find it difficult to maintain an attitude of rapport with a group (the intellectual community) which incessantly challenges their motives and morality.”

Let us be clear about this. We are not questioning the motives and morality of the makers of policy; we are questioning their judgment, which is a very different matter. I know a good many of the men who have sponsored the escalation policy. They are not evil men. They are, as I suggested earlier, earnest and conscientious men. They are doing what they are doing because they profoundly believe it serves the interests of American security and world peace. They are doing their best for their country according to their lights. But it may justly be said, I think, that, in certain cases at least, their lights are dim. Historians have sometimes noted that the most underrated factor in the conduct of public affairs is stupidity.

Fortified by this sense of persecution, exonerated by their Great Alibi, deluded by their own propaganda and phrophecy, still convinced that escalation is the road to peace, our leaders persist in their course. And, as they do so, another political year approaches. The 1968 election will provide, I believe, a test of the adequacy of our political process. For, given the size and intensity of dissent in our land, if this election does not offer the country a clear choice on the question of Vietnam, then something will have gone badly wrong with our political system. Now no political system works automatically. People make it work—and they make it work well, or they make it work badly. It is up to us, and people like us through the country, to do our best to make sure that our system meets its responsibilities.

Our objective is to bring the war in Vietnam to the end. We must not be under any illusions about the ease of a negotiated solution. While I have little doubt that an unconditional halt of the bombing of the north would soon lead to talks with Hanoi and the Viet Cong, I have considerable doubt that these talks would lead very soon to a mutually acceptable solution. So far as one can tell at present, each side continues to insist on terms which would mean, in effect, the defeat and humiliation of the other side. So long as this remains the case, no settlement will be possible. What both sides must come to in the end, I believe, is agreement on the creation of a structure in South Vietnam within which contending forces, including the communists, may compete by peaceful means for political representation and

control. Such a structure would require some form of international supervision for a stated period in order to guarantee against reversion to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. It will take time—perhaps a long time—for such a solution to win mutual acceptance.

How do we move in this direction? The first necessity obviously is to slow down the war—to stop the bombing of the north, to reduce the fighting in the south, to do everything we can to lessen the killing.

The next necessity is to make it clear that we will keep an American military presence in South Vietnam until a negotiated settlement can be achieved. Let us have no confusion here. There will be no chance of negotiation if the other side thinks it is going to win; therefore a military stalemate is a self-evident precondition to negotiation. The advocates of a political solution and the advocates of unilateral withdrawal agree on the indispensability of slowing down the war; but, after this point, it seems to me, their paths diverge and their policies become incompatible. One cannot, of course, wholly exclude the possibility of unilateral withdrawal; it would not be America's finest hour, but it would obviously be greatly preferable to a policy of unlimited escalation. But the option of withdrawal is always open to us. It would be foolish to rush at once to that extreme without exhausting the possibilities of negotiation. It need hardly be said that, up to this point, we have not, despite fine words, pursued negotiation with a fraction of the zeal, ingenuity and perseverance with which we have pursued war.

This leads to the third necessity: we will not have a negotiated solution until we have a leadership which desires a negotiated solution—which has freed itself from the obsession with the idea of a military victory, or at least of a spectacular and favorable reversal of the present military balance: the obsession which evidently continues to possess the present administration. If our present leadership can think of nothing better than persistence in the policies which, after full and fair trial, for 32 bitter months, have proved a dismal failure, then this country, if it is to save itself, requires new leadership.

How do we make sure that the 1968 election offers an alternative? Let us be clear about another thing: the idea of a third party is an illusion. A third party based on the Vietnam war would get nowhere in the elections; it would run well behind George Wallace in the electoral college; and the only result would be drastically to understate the size of the opposition to the escalation policy and thereby to discredit the cause of peace. The serious issue must remain within the major parties. This means, I think, that the Republicans among us must work for anti-escalation candidates in their party—and that all of us must work for delegates to the party conventions pledged to an anti-escalation platform. As we do this, we may all be encouraged by the expectation that disenchantment with the war is bound to grow in the weeks and months ahead.

It is bound to grow so long as the present leadership remains frozen in its ideas, locked into its system of error, unable to think of anything to do but more of the same. How much more proof will they require before they recognize that the escalation policy has been a disaster? They began that policy in February 1965. Today, after 32 months, after the death of more than 13,000 American soldiers and of countless Vietnamese, after the expenditure of nearly \$90 billion, after our increasing isolation in the world, after the irresponsible and dangerous neglect of the urgent problems of our national community—to which President Johnson's Great Society was so prominently dedicated—after all the blood and killing and waste and degradation, are we any closer to a solution than we were when we began? Are we nearer

to winning the war? to establishing a healthy society in South Vietnam? to pacifying the countryside? to winning world confidence in American purpose and American sense? Are we not ever more deeply and hopelessly mired in the quicksand?

I say again: how much longer do our leaders insist on reinforcing error and dragging us down this dirty and hopeless road? Can nothing demonstrate to them the futility and folly of their course? "My brethren," said Cromwell, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken." If this administration lacks the moral or the intellectual courage to conceive the possibility that it may be wrong, then the American people, I hope and believe, will turn next year to leadership determined to meet this tragic problem with the realism, the rationality and the high idealism that have marked the finest moments of our history.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

PUBLIC WORKS AND ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated by title.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 11641) making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Water Resources Council, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JORDAN of Idaho in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will state the first amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 3, line 21, after the word "construction", strike out "\$33,745,000" and insert "\$36,246,000".

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I should like to propose a unanimous-consent agreement, that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc; that the bill, as thus amended, be regarded for the purpose of further amendment as original text; and that no point of order shall be considered to have been waived by reason of agreement to this request.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I agree with my able friend—it has been brought to my attention that the Senator from Delaware might desire to object. I wonder, therefore, whether my able friend would withdraw his unanimous-consent request for a moment.

Mr. ELLENDER. Certainly.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc; that the bill, as thus amended, be regarded for the purpose of further amendment as original text; and that no point of order shall be considered to have been waived by reason of agreement to this request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Louisiana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The amendments agreed to en bloc are as follows:

On page 3, line 21, after the word "construction", strike out "\$33,745,000" and insert "\$36,246,000".

On page 4, line 13, after the word "construction", strike out "\$935,074,000" and insert "\$1,010,823,000"; and, in line 19, after the word "appropriated", insert a colon and "Provided further, That in connection with the rehabilitation of the Snake Creek Embankment of the Garrison Dam and Reservoir Project, North Dakota, the Corps of Engineers is authorized to participate with the State of North Dakota to the extent of one-half the cost of widening the present embankment to provide a four-lane right-of-way for U.S. Highway 83 in lieu of the present two-lane highway".

On page 5, line 23, after the word "navigation", strike out "\$189,000,000" and insert "\$190,000,000".

On page 6, line 5, after "(33 U.S.C. 702a, 702g-1)", strike out "\$83,400,000" and insert "\$91,480,000".

On page 7, line 7, after the word "exceed", strike out "\$156,000,000" and insert "\$162,000,000".

On page 10, line 22, after the word "expended", strike out "\$16,000,000" and insert "\$21,555,000"; and, in line 23, after the word "which", strike out "\$13,058,000" and insert "\$16,113,000".

On page 11, at the beginning of line 16, strike out "\$172,700,000" and insert "\$185,005,000".

On page 14, line 9, after the word "program", strike out "\$15,000,000" and insert "\$15,400,000".

On page 21, line 2, after the word "area", strike out "\$5,035,000" and insert "5,015,000".

On page 21, line 23, after the word "Act", strike out "\$90,800,000" and insert "\$94,935,000".

On page 22, line 7, after the word "expended", strike out "\$203,000,000" and insert "\$225,000,000".

On page 23, line 26, after the word "vehicles", strike out "\$2,125,000,000" and insert "\$2,142,402,000".

On page 25, line 10, after the word "aircraft", strike out "\$367,733,000" and insert "\$369,633,000".

On page 27, at the beginning of line 10,

strike out "\$6,115,000" and insert "\$6,100,000".

On page 28, line 11, after the word "purchase", strike out "(not to exceed two hundred and thirty-two for replacement only)" and insert "(not to exceed two hundred and seventy-two of which two hundred and thirty-two shall be for replacement only)"; and, in line 15, after the word "vehicles", strike out "\$60,000,000" and insert "\$62,150,000".

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, we have under consideration this afternoon H.R. 11641, a bill making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, particularly with respect to the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation and the power marketing activities, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Water Resources Council, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968.

The amount of the bill as passed by the House totaled \$4,622,922,000. The Senate Committee on Appropriations made a net increase in the sum adopted by the House of \$153,142,000. Therefore, the total in the bill as reported to the Senate is \$4,776,064,000.

The amount of the budget estimates considered by the Senate committee for fiscal year 1968 was \$4,867,813,000.

The bill as reported to the Senate is under the budget estimate by \$91,749,000, and over the appropriation for fiscal year 1967 by \$465,893,000.

In view of the large financial requirements for meeting our commitments in Vietnam, the committee has deferred the initiation of many worthy projects which in fact, should be constructed now to prevent serious flood losses in many parts of the country or to promote and strengthen our economy here at home. Requirements for storage to meet the ever-increasing demands for municipal and industrial water supply, navigation, flood control, and work to protect and preserve our shoreline must be weighed against the fiscal requirements of other programs. However, the construction of works to preserve and protect our precious land and water resources cannot be postponed long without serious detriment to our domestic economy.

The President has submitted budget requests totaling \$124,163,707,004, of which \$4,867,813,000 was considered in this bill. Included in the budget estimate of \$4,867,813,000 is \$2,646,100,000 for the Atomic Energy Commission, leaving a balance of \$2,221,713,000 for water resource development, of which \$306,034,000 is for the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. It is apparent, therefore that less than 1.8 percent of the budget has been allocated for the development and preservation of our most important resource—water, including pollution control. At this point I would like to state that I agree completely with the views of the House Appropriations Committee, as expressed in its report, that unless it is possible at an

early date to make provision within the national budget for funding the most essential water resource projects, our Nation will be faced with a serious situation necessitating a costly and inefficient crash program.

Unfortunately, the committee was faced with the very practical problem concerning the large budget deficit with which this Nation is confronted, and its recommendations had to be tempered accordingly.

Mr. President, I am very hopeful that consideration of the bill can be concluded this afternoon so that, as soon as possible, we may go to conference with the House on the disagreeing amendments.

The bill passed the House of Representatives on July 25 and was referred to the Committee on Appropriations on July 27. The bill was reported to the Senate on September 28.

I believe it is not necessary for me to give a lengthy explanation of the bill. The report on it is on the desks of the Senators, and it very clearly sets forth the actions of the committee.

The Senate has adopted the committee amendments en bloc with the understanding that the bill as thus amended shall be considered as original text, so that the Senate will have every opportunity to work its will on the bill.

Mr. President, as is customary, the Subcommittee on Public Works divided itself into three panels for the consideration of the pending bill. The portion of the public works appropriation bill dealing with the Bureau of Reclamation and the power marketing activities of the Department of the Interior was handled by my good and able friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], who is also chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. The portion of the bill covering the Atomic Energy Commission and the Tennessee Valley Authority was handled by my good friend, the distinguished senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL]. I handled the portion relating to the civil functions of the Department of the Army, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, and the Water Resources Council.

The hearings on this bill started on March 14 and continued through August 3. The subcommittee held 38 sessions for the purpose of taking testimony, and three executive sessions for the purpose of marking up the bill. The subcommittee heard 874 witnesses, which included representatives of various organizations and local communities, in addition to departmental representations; 780 of the witnesses appeared before the panel handling the civil functions of the Department of the Army and the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration; 79 of the witnesses appeared before the panel headed by the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN]; and the remaining 15 witnesses appeared before the panel headed by the senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL]. The hearings comprise four volumes which

contain 4,568 pages of testimony. A complete set of the hearings is on each Senator's desk. The hearings constitute the basic information upon which the subcommittee based its recommendations to the full committee.

Mr. President, I wish to reiterate what I have stated on many occasions on the floor of the Senate—that we have no project in this bill that has not been completely justified by the Corps of Engineers. The committee looked closely into the benefit-to-cost ratio on each project. I am happy to say that all of these projects, including the new starts that were recommended by the committee, as well as those included in the House-passed bill, have been thoroughly studied. All the projects recommended are economically justifiable and within the capability of the Corps of Engineers.

Mr. President, with respect to title I, before marking up the civil functions portion of the bill, we reviewed every project which was presented to the subcommittee, either budgeted or unbudgeted. We examined into every request made to the subcommittee for planning or construction funds. After all the requests had been received, the Engineers were called back for the purpose of obtaining their views on the projects presented to the committee. The intention of this recall was to determine whether the Engineers could economically and efficiently utilize the additional funds requested by the local witnesses, and whether the Corps of Engineers had the capability to undertake the unbudgeted new starts requested.

Mr. President, with respect to title I, which concerns the civil functions portion of the bill, we reviewed, as I have just said, every project and studied it thoroughly, to insure that each project conformed with the regulations that the committee adopted years ago. Under no conditions have we recommended any project that cannot be justified or that has not been authorized and that is not within the capability of the Corps of Engineers.

The Senate has before it a complete justification for all planning and construction projects which are included in the bill as recommended by the Senate committee, as well as for all the projects which were recommended by the House.

The President's budget contained nine new starts on projects, the total estimated cost of which is \$152,223,000, and the amount recommended for funding in the budget for fiscal year 1968 is \$7,458,000. The House reduced the budget estimate of \$3,726,000 on three planning items to \$750,000, and the budget estimate on 11 construction items under "Construction, general," from \$32,577,000 to \$21,123,000. Four reservoir projects included in this latter category were new budgeted construction starts and the funds allowed by the House for those four projects were for land acquisition only. The House of Representatives also provided funds totaling \$905,000 for 11 unbudgeted planning items having a total estimated cost of \$62,153,000, and increased one budgeted planning item from \$200,000 to \$450,000 on a project with an estimated total cost of \$25,800,000.

The subcommittee, as well as the committee as a whole, agreed with the House action.

The House added 16 new construction starts having a total estimated cost of \$93,245,000, and the House allowance for these projects was \$5,843,000. The House also included unbudgeted funds for resumption of planning on one project and for resumption of construction on three projects, the total estimated cost of which is \$84,790,000, and the House allowance for both planning and construction on these resumptions was \$2,730,000. The House also added to the bill \$6,275,000 for unbudgeted land-acquisition items on seven projects having a total estimated cost of \$257,890,000.

The bill as passed by the House provided \$935,074,000 for "Construction, general," for the Corps of Engineers. This amount was \$37,918,000 below the budget estimate. In order to show such a reduction below the budget, the House increased the reduction for savings and slippage by \$39,491,000.

I wish to pause at this moment to state exactly what the House usually does with respect to slippages. As a rule, the overall amount of slippages aggregates about 5 percent of the amount appropriated. In this instance the budget estimate for slippage was 9 percent and the House has increased the slippages by about 3 percent in addition, or a total of 12 percent. It can easily be seen that such a procedure has a tendency to reduce the amount that can be allotted to a project. That is why the House was able to come before us with a bill that was more or less in line with the budget estimates.

That is due, of course, to the fact that this additional cut for slippages took place.

Mr. President, what that amounts to, if Congress should agree to it, is a cut of 12 percent on all of the budgeted items included in the bill. This procedure, Mr. President, is one with which I have taken issue on many occasions—in fact, practically every year that I have been handling these bills, or more than 14 years.

The sum of all the individual amounts recommended by the budget as shown in the committee report under construction, general, beginning on page 8 and continuing through page 21, totals \$1,063,017,000. Recognizing that in any program of this size there will be unavoidable delays and slippages, the budget bureau recommended an appropriation of \$972,992,000 to carry out this program—an underfinancing by \$90,025,000—or about a 9-percent reduction. The sum total of the individual items in the bill as passed the House amounts to \$1,064,590,000, or an increase of \$1,573,000 in the program but a reduction of \$36,242,000 in the appropriation to carry out the program. This was accomplished by increasing the reduction for slippage by \$39,491,000. The reduction for slippage in the House bill amounts to about 12.2 percent compared to the budget estimate of 9 percent for slippage.

This year, Mr. President, even the Corps of Engineers has gone beyond its usual practice of providing a slippage of about 5 percent, and in some cases 6 percent.

The Senate committee felt that the House reduction for slippage was too severe and has recommended the budget figure for slippage.

Except for one planning item in California, the Senate committee has approved all of the House increases in planning and construction. The committee has recommended restoration of House cuts in the budget on five construction items in the amount of \$1,801,000, and two planning items in the amount of \$1,726,000. The committee recommendation provides \$819,000 for 11 unbudgeted planning items. The committee also recommended the initiation of construction on 25 projects having a future commitment of \$303,603,000. On one of these projects the House had recommended land acquisition only, while on five others the House had approved planning funds only.

As to land acquisition, Mr. President, I point out that that is really construction, because no construction can be started on a program unless ways and means are worked out so that the necessary land to construct the project is acquired. This is a new approach, different from what has been used in the past; and I consider that it really represents new construction starts, although the funds are mentioned in the report as available only to acquire land.

As a matter of fact, every time we put money in a bill for construction, one of the first expenditures made on a project is for the acquisition of land upon which the project will be constructed or, in the case of a dam, land that may be inundated, or land upon which to relocate roads, highways, or railroads.

So, Mr. President, despite the fact that the House of Representatives has stated that the amount in this bill is for merely land acquisition, nevertheless construction is involved.

The increase recommended by the Senate committee on these 25 projects was \$11,258,000. For projects under construction, the committee recommended additional amounts on 18 projects totaling \$19,620,000. Similarly, the committee recommended increases on six budgeted planning items by \$705,000.

Mr. President, considering all of the unbudgeted new construction starts and all of the unbudgeted planning starts put into the bill by the House, in comparison with the Senate additions, the difference between the total added by each House will entail an expenditure of only between \$4.5 million and \$5 million; so the difference between the amounts added by the House and the Senate is really very small, and compares with differences that have occurred in previous years. Ever since I have been a member of this subcommittee, in presenting a bill to the Senate, our committee has invariably added a number of new projects. I can well remember, several years ago, when we met a challenge by the executive department, during the administration of President Eisenhower, when he tried to follow a policy of no new starts.

That, of course, was contrary to the policy that had been followed in the past; and the Senate committee, as well as the House committee, insisted on following the past procedure by adding new

construction starts and new planning starts. We took the position that if we suddenly cut out new planning and construction starts, the important program for the development of our water resources would soon dry up.

The matter was debated on the floor of the Senate, as well as the floor of the House of Representatives, and a bill was passed wherein, as I recall, we added, altogether, around 65 or 68 new construction starts, as well as a number of planning starts, and the bill was sent to the President for his signature.

President Eisenhower vetoed the bill; it was sent back to Congress, and Congress overrode that veto. From that time until now, we have had no trouble, Mr. President, in incorporating in a bill a reasonable number of new starts in construction as well as in planning.

I think it is a good thing. I do not know of any expenditures which have inured more to the benefit of our Nation than these public works programs; and I am hopeful that Congress will continue to agree with that viewpoint.

Mr. President, under title II the committee considered budget estimates amounting to \$468,498,000 for the Bureau of Reclamation and the other power activities of the Department of the Interior; and recommends an appropriation of \$462,921,000. This is \$18,240,000 more than was approved by the House of Representatives, and is \$5,577,000 less than the budget estimates.

Of the increase proposed by the committee, \$5,555,000 is for general investigations, and includes an additional \$5,250,000 for expanding the atmospheric water resources research program.

For construction and rehabilitation, \$12,305,000 is recommended for addition to the amount approved by the House of Representatives. Of this increase, \$10,850,000 was budgeted for a transmission line from Fort Thompson, S. Dak., to Grand Island, Nebr., for which needed legislative authorization has now been enacted.

The bill includes two new construction starts which were proposed by the Department of the Interior in its budget submission.

For the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the committee approved an additional \$4,135,000 for water supply and water pollution control; and \$22,000,000 for construction grants for waste treatment work.

Mr. President, title III deals with the Atomic Energy Commission. I shall not discuss in detail the Atomic Energy proposal, but hearings were held, and my good friend, the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], who is an ex officio member of the subcommittee, was present. Our committee followed his recommendations, and I am sure that the committee has provided a sufficient sum for the Atomic Energy Commission.

The committee recommended \$2,142,402,000 for the operating expenses of the Atomic Energy Commission. The committee recommendation is \$17,402,000 above the amount allowed by the House; \$27,498,000 below the budget; and \$219,402,000 above the appropriation for 1967.

For plant and capital equipment, the committee recommended \$369,633,000,

which is \$1,900,000 above the amount allowed by the House and \$106,567,000 below the budget.

Mr. President, title IV covers several independent agencies.

For the Tennessee Valley Authority, the committee recommends \$62,150,000, the budget estimate, and an increase of \$2,150,000 over the amount allowed by the House.

The bill provides for the Federal participation in the Delaware River Basin Commission.

The bill also provides \$6,100,000 for salaries and expenses of the Atlantic-Pacific Intercoastal Canal Study Commission, which is \$1,400,000 below the budget estimate, and \$15,000 below the amount allowed by the House. The amount recommended by the committee is the balance of the available authorization. A bill to increase the authorized expenditure for this study is pending in the House of Representatives.

As we all know, fairly good progress has been made by this Commission. However, lately the Commission has found that the amount originally authorized was insufficient. The amount of the additional authorization is about \$6.5 million, as I recall. The Commission ran short, and Congress is considering an additional authorization which I hope will be enacted sometime soon.

Mr. President, included in the bill again this year are appropriations for the Water Resources Council. The committee recommends \$1,070,000, of which \$290,000 is for salaries and expenses of the Council, and \$780,000 is to finance the U.S. share of river basin commissions.

Mr. President, as I indicated in the earlier part of my remarks, the Senate has had before it the report which deals with all of the appropriations recommended.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana for the superb job he has done for many years in handling this bill.

The Senator from Louisiana has been very ably assisted this year as in previous years by Kenneth Bousquet, and by Edmund King who has so ably served the ranking minority member of the committee, the distinguished senior Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL].

I should like to point out some of the benefits these projects have brought to my area. I am also quite familiar with the benefits that have accrued to other areas of the United States. However, along the Missouri River for 1,000 miles or more we have suffered devastating floods year after year. Now, because of a series of dams on the Missouri River, there is no chance whatever of experiencing any major floods in the future.

Along with this great accomplishment, of course, there will be plenty of water for irrigation and for navigation downstream.

Each year the Federal Government is collecting very large sums of money for electricity generated by these hydroelectric dams, to say nothing about the

great benefits derived from recreation and other related activities.

Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator two or three questions regarding some language appearing in the report.

I direct the Senator's attention to the language appearing on page 7 of the committee's report under the heading, "Red River of the North."

In the Senator's opinion, would this language in any way preclude the Corps of Engineers from requesting survey funds, if they can be justified, for a survey of the Sheyenne River above Bald Hill Dam in their budget for the next fiscal year?

Mr. ELLENDER. No, certainly not. The limitation to which the Senator from North Dakota refers applies only to the current fiscal year, fiscal 1968.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. In the Senator's opinion, would this language preclude the Corps of Engineers from proceeding with any existing or on-going flood control investigations in the Red River of the North Basin such as the so-called Kindred Dam study?

Mr. ELLENDER. It would not. The language in the committee report refers only to a new—and I emphasize new—study.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. If the so-called Kindred Dam has a favorable benefit-cost ratio, the Corps of Engineers would not be prevented from recommending its construction, would they?

Mr. ELLENDER. No, certainly not. It is my understanding that that project is currently under study as a part of the Red River of the North investigation.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. In including this limitation in our report, the committee's only purpose was to prohibit the Corps of Engineers from, in effect, starting a new study of a tributary stream by increasing the scope of the existing Red River of the North Basin study with the result that the submission of that important report would be further delayed, was it not?

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct. And, as I said, it applies to this river only, and we are hopeful that with the money provided, substantial progress on this study can be made in fiscal year 1968.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator because this should straighten out any possible misunderstanding as to the intent of the language in the committee report.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct. In addition to what my good friend, the Senator from North Dakota, has said about the good that has come from all of these great projects we have had constructed in the past 15 years, I could stand before the Senate and recite project after project and point out the good that has come to the area and the Nation because of the wisdom, in my opinion, that was exhibited by Congress in providing the funds for these programs.

I would have included several other worthy projects in the pending bill if it were left to me, and in my opinion more money could be used to complete many of these projects at an accelerated rate.

I am confident that it would be very beneficial to the country as a whole, and would help this Nation to build up its economy.

I wonder what would have happened to our economy, especially with respect to transportation, had we not insisted, for example, on building new locks on the Ohio River. The Senator is aware that for the past 14 years the committee has added projects on that great river to replace the system of 49 small locks that were there with a system of 19 large locks. In the past 14 or 15 years, we have constructed one large lock to replace the two or three small locks, so that we could accommodate the large increase in the tonnage that is taking advantage of the economical water transportation provided the area by the Ohio River.

The Senator knows that in the beginning many of the railroads in that area fought these works. But the railroads are now learning that they are making more money in carrying finished products than they would earn by carrying the bulk products.

Not only has this river navigation been instrumental in carrying millions of tons of raw materials and bulk products, but by the creation of these locks along the Ohio and Monongahela Rivers, we have created large pools of water; and the record indicates that around these pools over \$25 billion has been invested by private industry within the past 14 or 15 years.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Only a few years ago, as the Senator will recall, this was one of the most controversial bills before Congress. It is now one of the least controversial, and its great contribution to our economy is now generally recognized.

Mr. ELLENDER. I have specific figures to indicate, for example, that in 1948, around the time I became a member of the subcommittee, the entire tonnage on the Ohio River was 42.8 million tons. Today it is 103.2 million tons. These figures apply only to the Ohio River.

I do not wish to burden the RECORD with all of the figures I have; but if the occasion should arise, I shall be glad, in the course of the debate on the bill, to indicate the good that has resulted from many of the projects that have been constructed in the past 15 or 16 years. This program has been good for our economy, and it has been money well spent.

For example, by harnessing the tributaries of the great Mississippi River, we can hold back the destructive floodwater behind these great dams. Not only does this prevent flood damage but these reservoirs provide water for irrigation and for the development of electricity, by permitting the floodwaters to flow gradually down the river; so that today, in the lower reaches of the Mississippi River, beginning at Memphis and going down to the mouth, we have a steady flow of fresh water at all times, instead of having it all in the spring or in the autumn, followed by salt water intrusion during the dry summer months.

The result has been a boon to business, and I am happy to have had a part in fostering this program, together with

all the other Senators who worked on this program as members of the subcommittee, in order to provide the funds to make all these good projects possible.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I shall detain the Senate for just a moment. My purpose in rising is to pay a deserved tribute to the senior Senator from Louisiana, the floor manager of the bill. His devotion to duty is characteristically high for as he has suggested, the printed hearings on the items, most of which have come before him, constitute three volumes of testimony 6 or 7 inches thick.

I am particularly grateful for the manner in which he has passed judgment, with his committee, on the projects in which I have been interested. Sometimes his judgment has not been consonant with the position I have urged, as the Senator is aware; but in every instance, whether he has agreed or disagreed, his judgment has been based upon facts.

I heartily concur that what is in the bill is amply and completely justified by the testimony that was adduced at the hearings. I pay tribute to the Senator as one who has performed a high service to the people of this country in passing on the recommendations for civil public works in the manner he has done, once again, in handling this measure.

Mr. ELLENDER. I thank my good friend, the Senator from California. As he knows—I am sure that many Senators in the Chamber will agree—when a bill comes before us, it is sort of out of balance, in that some areas of the country seem to be better taken care of than others. The members of the committee tried to balance the situation by providing worthy projects so that every area of the country would benefit.

I repeat: All projects in this bill—in fact, ever since I have been on this committee—have borne fruit and have been worthy. Often, the Corps of Engineers has been criticized because on a certain project they have made estimates which are out of line sometimes 4, 5, or 6 percent. I had the committee check into that matter, and it was found that for the 51 projects for which completion funds are requested, some of which have been under construction over a period of 10 years, the total of the estimates made by the Engineers at the time the first construction funds were requested and the present estimate, were off by less than one-tenth of 1 percent.

We sometimes read in popular magazines a sensational editorial about "pork barrel," and so forth. I believe the Engineers have done a good job in estimating costs. Their estimates, in my opinion, have been as accurate as could be expected, because all of these estimates have to be made far in advance of construction, as the Senator knows. I am surprised that their estimates have been as close as one-tenth of 1 percent.

Mr. KUCHEL. I agree with the Senator.

I wish to include in my congratulations the very able staff member, Ken Bousquet, and the very able staff member for the minority, Ed King, and all

those who have worked with the Senator in bringing this bill to the floor.

Mr. ELLENDER. They undoubtedly are our right hand and left hand. They are excellent workers. Of course, under the proper guidance we have given them, they are bound to do a good job.

Mr. KUCHEL. I concur.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I believe I understand the major items in the bill, but I wish to reiterate the same thought that the Senator from California has just stated. Unless someone has worked on this bill, as evidenced by these three volumes of testimony, I believe it is impossible for him to understand the almost infinite amount of detail and testimony and figures involved in the matter. I pay tribute to my good friend, the Senator from California, for the fine work he has done in this matter.

If it were not for the distinguished Senator from Louisiana and the staff members, Mr. King and Mr. Bousquet, who have followed this bill day by day and hour by hour, it would not be possible.

There are other difficult bills—one of which I am involved in at present—but in my opinion the pending bill requires more constant attentive energy than any other appropriations bill or any other bill that is before Congress.

I would be very remiss if on this occasion I did not express my plaudits to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, and on behalf of myself and, I am sure, on behalf of many other people, thank him for the great job he has done on this bill.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I wish to echo the sentiments which have been so ably expressed by the Senator from Colorado. They are well deserved by the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. ELLENDER, and by the staff.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I join in these tributes being paid to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, the chairman of the subcommittee, and the members of the staff.

The Senator from Louisiana has done a magnificent piece of work for many years in handling this bill, and he has had these very able staff members by his side helping him. I heartily congratulate the distinguished Senator from Louisiana and his staff.

Mr. ELLENDER. I appreciate these remarks. They are really unnecessary because most of the Senators making the compliments are members of the committee, such as my friend from Alabama, who is responsible for a good part of this bill in connection with TVA and the Atomic Energy Commission. There is, as the Senator knows, a lot of detailed work involved in connection with the bill.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, being members of the subcommittee has given us the opportunity to see the magnificent work which the Senator from Louisiana has done and to see the fine help that has been given by the staff.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONDALE in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I wish to join Senators in complimenting the Senator from Louisiana. I am a member of the subcommittee, as are many Senators in the Chamber. When the Senator from Louisiana suggests that he receives help from other members of the subcommittee, that is true, but he does not receive help to the extent he probably should, inasmuch as there are literally hundreds of items involved in the bill.

I remember 2 years ago we added up the number of witnesses who appeared and that tabulation showed that 829 witnesses testified in connection with all projects all over the United States. This task takes some doing and it also takes a man of the broad background of the Senator from Louisiana who knows most of these problems intimately. It takes a man of great experience to handle this matter, and a man who is reasonable and responsible. This is the job that the Senator from Louisiana performs every year. Members of the subcommittee are very fortunate to have him as their chairman.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I am pleased to note that the Senate Appropriations Committee in its report, No. 574 on H.R. 11641, has indicated its support of nuclear power development for the Bonneville Power Administration. The committee report points out—page 36—the need for a high degree of integration of power facilities in the Pacific Northwest, which requires close cooperative planning by all concerned power entities. The committee anticipates advance notice of contracts contemplated with respect to nuclear power generation.

The Appropriations Committee certainly has a direct interest in Bonneville Power Administration contracts for nuclear power generation. Development of great nuclear power offers great possibilities for savings of appropriated funds, and cost savings for the indus-

tries, utilities, public utility districts, cooperatives, and municipalities which purchase power from Bonneville Power Administration. The Tennessee Valley Authority is already developing a substantial nuclear generating capacity, as practically all power systems must in order to continue toward our goal of abundant power and lower and lower rates.

The Federal Government invested more than \$2 billion in development of civilian nuclear power. The investor-owned utilities are presently engaged in a brazen effort to monopolize nuclear power—now that the taxpayers have made it profitable. A number of utilities are trying to exclude Federal, municipal, and cooperative power systems from nuclear generating facilities. The Federal yardstick has been growing shorter and shorter. Consequently, the overcharge of the investor-owned utilities has been growing higher and higher. Federal power generation now amounts to about 13 percent of the national total. During the fifties it was 13 percent.

In addition, the preference clause, provided by Congress to facilitate energy acquisition from the Federal Government by nonprofit power systems, is becoming less and less meaningful. Increasingly, Federal power generation is going to private industries and private utilities.

During the past 3 years Federal agency

use of Federal power dropped sharply, from 32.2 percent of the total to 17.8 percent. The percentage purchased by cooperative utilities decreased, from 11.9 to 11.6 percent. The percentage purchased by State and miscellaneous public utilities also decreased from 11.3 to 8.2 percent.

Meanwhile, the percentage purchased by investor-owned utilities increased by more than three-fourths, from 5 percent of the total to 8.9 percent. The percentage purchased by private industry increased by three-eighths, from 18 to 24.7 percent. The percentage purchased by municipals increased by one-third, from 21.6 to 28.8 percent.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD the September 25, 1967, letter to me from Chairman Lee White of the Federal Power Commission, which includes the statistics on distribution of Federal power.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., September 25, 1967.

HON. LEE METCALF,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR METCALF: In answer to your letter of September 20, 1967, the following tabulations give the figures you request pertaining to distribution of Federal power:

BILLION KILOWATT-HOURS

| | Fiscal 1948 | Fiscal 1953 | Fiscal 1958 | Fiscal 1963 | Calendar 1966 |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| Private industry..... | 9.1 | 13.4 | 19.4 | 23.0 | 36.0 |
| Federal agencies..... | 2.5 | 8.6 | 31.9 | 41.2 | 26.0 |
| Private utilities..... | 8.4 | 8.6 | 12.9 | 6.5 | 13.0 |
| Municipal utilities..... | 8.4 | 14.0 | 21.1 | 27.6 | 42.0 |
| Cooperative utilities..... | 1.0 | 3.3 | 9.1 | 15.3 | 17.0 |
| State and other public utilities..... | 1.7 | 5.7 | 10.5 | 14.4 | 12.0 |
| Total..... | 31.1 | 53.6 | 104.9 | 128.0 | 146.0 |

PERCENTAGE

| | Fiscal 1948 | Fiscal 1953 | Fiscal 1958 | Fiscal 1963 | Calendar 1966 |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| Private industry..... | 29.3 | 25.0 | 18.5 | 18.0 | 24.7 |
| Federal agencies..... | 7.8 | 16.1 | 30.5 | 32.2 | 17.8 |
| Private utilities..... | 27.1 | 16.1 | 12.3 | 5.0 | 8.9 |
| Municipal utilities..... | 27.1 | 26.0 | 20.1 | 21.6 | 28.8 |
| Cooperative utilities..... | 3.1 | 6.1 | 8.6 | 11.9 | 11.6 |
| State and other public utilities..... | 5.6 | 10.7 | 10.0 | 11.3 | 8.2 |
| Total..... | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Data for the fiscal years 1948, 1953, 1958, and 1963 were taken from the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association *Rural Electric Fact Books*, while the calendar year 1966 figures were prepared by our staff from reports to the Federal Power Commission.

Sincerely,

LEE C. WHITE, Chairman.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, a recent speech by a Member of the House is pertinent to this public works and atomic energy appropriation bill and to my remarks. Representative JOHN E. MOSS addressed the East River Electric Power Cooperative in Madison, S. Dak., on September 13. He develops the point that public thermal generation is necessary to maintain the yardstick of competition in the electric power industry. Most of the hydro sites are gone and, so far, TVA is the only Federal entity with its own thermal generation. I ask unanimous consent to have this excellent speech by Congressman MOSS inserted at

this point in the RECORD and commend it to all who wish to be informed on the disturbing increases in monopoly in the energy field.

There being no objection the speech was ordered printed as follows:

SPEECH OF HON. JOHN E. MOSS, DEMOCRAT OF CALIFORNIA, AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE EAST RIVER ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, INC., IN MADISON, S. DAK., SEPTEMBER 13, 1967

I am delighted to be here with you today. You, as officers and members of the electric cooperatives, exercising local initiative and self-help in the American tradition, are building a better and more abundant life for your people here in South Dakota. You are lowering the cost and increasing the efficiency of the farming business, at a time when other forces seem in conspiracy to crush it to the wall between increasing costs and lower prices. You are making feasible other local industry which depends on abundant and reasonably priced electric power. And indirectly you are even helping to solve the

urban problems we hear so much about nowadays, by making it possible for people to remain and prosper in the country instead of fleeing to the cities in penniless despair.

You perform another public service also to the nation at large, over and beyond the service you render to your communities and your members. You represent and protect the interests of the electric consumer.

Traditionally there have been three principal means to protect his interests. First, by the competition of other forms of energy, but such competition is now rapidly becoming obsolete even where the local power company doesn't own the gas company too. Second, by governmental regulation of rates and conditions of service, but such regulation has seldom been very effective and frequently it is pure sham. I'll have more to say about this later. And third, by the yardstick of public and cooperative power which helps measure the reasonableness of the rates and services of electric companies by comparison with the operations of municipal, PUD and rural cooperative electric systems.

You help provide the yardstick. Since much of cooperatives' electricity is sold to their own members they are probably more sensitive than all other power marketing entities to the consumer's interest in obtaining reliable electric service at the lowest possible cost.

We need more people today who are sensitive to the electric consumer's interest—among the informed public, in the administration, yes, and in Congress.

Of all the electric energy generated in this country in 1966, all but 24 percent was produced by the investor-owned, profit-making companies. State and local bodies produced 10 percent; cooperatives only 1 percent. The Federal Government produced 13 percent. It used to produce 15 percent. According to 1963 data, which is the latest published, less than half (45 percent) of this Federal output was sold to preference customers such as municipalities, rural cooperatives, public utility districts, States and other public agencies. Almost one-third (32 percent) was consumed by the Federal Government itself, and the balance (23 percent) was sold to private industry and investor-owned utilities.

Federal power production has been the backbone of the yardstick. This is because of the economy of size. A little generator just can't produce a kilowatt hour as cheaply as a big generator. And generators are getting very, very big—and very, very expensive.

Total electric consumption in the United States will at least double between now and 1980. Federal power production, therefore, should also double, at least, if we are to maintain even the present inadequate yardstick. Unfortunately, the trend is in the other direction.

We must begin to think very seriously about public thermal generation if we are going to be able to maintain the Federal yardstick. Traditionally, Federal power has meant hydropower. Even today, TVA is the only Federal entity with its own thermal generation. However, hydro alone will not provide the large increase in Federal power and energy required to maintain the present minimum Federally-generated proportion of all power produced in this country.

Furthermore, as new hydropower sources become scarce, and existing Federal hydropower is more and more reserved for peaking operation, it tends to lose its yardstick quality. With private steam plants carrying the base load, and the coordinated output sold at composite rates, which often include a private wheeling toll, it becomes difficult or impossible to compare Federal and private prices.

At the same time, however, the growing importance of hydropower for peaking purposes will make it feasible to develop many marginal hydro sites which previously were thought to be uneconomic because of their

limited amount of water to produce energy. We should therefore urge that all such sites be reevaluated for Federal development as peaking plants. In many cases, these marginal sites can be made very useful for peaking power by inclusion of pumped storage facilities, which make possible the carrying of large peak loads with very small streamflow, provided, of course, they are operating as part of an adequate base load system.

Hydropower, therefore, can still have a great role in the future of the yardstick. However, the yardstick is under heavy attack. It has been whittled very thin. Unless the people learn the facts, and act to protect their interest as consumers of electricity, public power is not going to increase; it is going to disappear.

The trend began in 1953, when the Hell's Canyon dam site was awarded to the Idaho Power Company. In recent years, well-financed campaigns of misinformation, and the misguided opposition of well-intentioned people who are as devoted to conservation as I am, knocked out Echo Park Dam in Wyoming, Marble Canyon Dam and Hualapai Dam in Arizona, the Dickey-Lincoln Project in Maine, and the greatest of all, the Rampart Project in Alaska.

The power provisions of the Central Arizona bill, recently passed by the Senate, illustrate who is benefiting and who is suffering by the defeat of hydropower. The two Colorado River Dams were deleted from the bill. One of these alone, Hualapai, with pumped storage would have produced 5,000 megawatts of power. In place of the dams, the Senate approved a provision for the Secretary of the Interior to pay \$103 million dollars, in advance, to a group of utilities to build a steam plant. In return for this vast expenditure of public money the Government will receive the right to use merely 470 megawatts of power for 50 years, in place of the 5,000 megawatt lost capacity of Hualapai Dam. The Federal Government's cost of money at present is at least 1.1 percent lower than that of private utilities. Thus, the Federal prepayment on the steam plant will represent a subsidy to its owners of at least \$1,133,000 a year. Meanwhile, to finance the project minus power dams, the Interior Department will have to raise the rates it charges to preference customers for Hoover Dam power by 48 percent, according to information provided by the Department itself. So the power consumers will suffer, and the utility companies will benefit, from the elimination of these hydropower dams.

Hydropower dams, unlike fossil fuel and nuclear power plants, do not pollute the air with smoke and radioactivity, or the water of our rivers and lakes with heat or radioactive wastes. On the contrary, the reservoirs provide water for municipal purposes, flood control, irrigation, industrial use, and many forms of recreation, including boating, swimming, fishing, etc. Hydropower dams are a renewable resource, and frequently are less destructive to the natural environment than any other form of electric generation. Eliminating hydropower is not a conservation measure.

Conservation consists of the most effective long term use of the resources of nature for the benefit of mankind. It involves respect for mother earth. It does not imply idolizing one value—for instance, the sport of shooting rapids in rubber boats—to the exclusion of all others. It means reverent use, not non-use, of the gifts God has provided to man.

If we are to have more Federal dams, we must take our case to the public. We must describe the dangerous alternatives. We must explain the true meaning of conservation.

The campaign against new dams is only one part of the war against public power.

You all know how the Supplemental Financing Bill, which you worked for so long, failed. It was gutted by the private power lobby, and your own organizations had to request the House Rules Committee to kill it.

Less than 6 weeks ago, the Secretary of the Interior signed the 40 year contract with the Pacific Gas and Electric Company which makes the entire Central Valley Project power system an appendage of the company, freezes the load growth of existing preference customers, excludes the opportunity of other preference customers to obtain the benefits of low-cost Federal power, and subjects the Government and its customers to an intricate set of restrictions that will almost inevitably insure their permanent domination by the Company.

For 4 years I fought, along with several other Members of Congress, to eliminate or modify the many unconscionable features of the contract, some of which were severely criticized by the Federal Power Commission and the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice. Our efforts resulted in various changes which improved the contract in some respects for both the Government and its preference customers.

I am sorry to say, however, that the contract, when it was signed on July 31, was still heavily loaded in the company's favor. Secretary Udall has said we will try to help the various smaller municipalities of Central and Northern California to assure their future power needs at economical cost. However, I have the gravest misgivings that the contract which he signed with the Company, over my objection, will make it most difficult, if not impossible, for the municipalities to develop their own sources for their future power needs, and for the Secretary to be of much help to them.

While the private power companies are ferociously working to curtail any subsidy to you little fellows, the consumer-owned cooperatives, they are at the same time asking bigger subsidies for themselves. They are subsidized already, you know.

I will speak first of the atomic subsidy.

It is in the field of atomic power that the betrayal of the public power yardstick is most tragic. Here is the greatest power source known to man, the energy that lights the stars. By public effort and at public expense it was made available to the world.

The Federal investment in research and development for civilian nuclear power alone already exceeds two billion dollars. Surely here is a resource more truly belonging to the people even than falling water, for the water was always available, but atomic energy remained locked in the nucleus of matter until public effort showed us how to release and use it.

If any resource ought to be subject to a public preference clause, if not to exclusive public use, it is atomic energy.

There is a preference clause in the Atomic Energy Act. It is weak and worthless. It states that if the AEC produces electric energy, then public bodies and cooperatives shall be preference customers. But if the AEC produces steam, then the preference does not apply, even though the only use of the steam is to turn a generator. And if the AEC sells atomic fuel, as it has been authorized to do since 1964, it must do so under uniform, nondiscriminatory charges. After 1973 it may no longer lease nuclear fuel for power production, but must sell it at a price which provides reasonable compensation to the Government.

What could be fairer than this? It is like that law of France which prohibited rich and poor alike from begging in the streets or sleeping under bridges.

As a result of the present Federal atomic policy, nuclear power is becoming a private monopoly.

Last February the Atomic Energy Commission reported on all central station nuclear power reactors in the United States, including those in service, those under construction, and those contracted for. By the end of 1966, there were thirteen in operation, with a total capacity of 1,846 megawatts. The

only large one was at the AEC's Hanford Plant in Washington State, which has a capacity of 786 megawatts. The average capacity of the other twelve plants is only 88 megawatts. Five more stations are scheduled for completion this year. Their average capacity is 196 megawatts. Thirty-two stations have been contracted for completion after 1967. Their average capacity will be 625 megawatts. The average size of the nuclear generating units ordered last year—which is the latest figure in the AEC report—was 790 megawatts. Indeed the smallest plant in the list for future completion is 450 megawatts.

Of course, the economies which result from large generators is the reason for the increasing capacity of new atomic plants. The AEC estimates the cost of production from a 500 megawatt nuclear plant at 4.4 mills per kilowatt hour. TVA has already begun construction of two nuclear plants, each over 1100 megawatts, which will produce energy at a cost of only 2.37 mills per kilowatt hour.

4.4 mill nuclear power may or may not be competitive with coal, but 2.37 mill energy is competitive even with hydropower. But you have to be awfully big to afford a 1100 megawatt plant. TVA is paying \$122,700,000 for two of them—plus costs of the transmission plant, contingency allowance, and interest during construction, which run the bill up to \$247,000,000—plus \$232,000,000 for a twelve-year fuel supply. Significantly, however, even the investment in the plant itself, on a dollars-per-kilowatt basis, will be less than for a comparable coal plant—\$116 compared to \$117.

The prime component in the next 10 or 15 years will be nuclear energy. I understand that nuclear power was specified for 55 percent of the new generating capacity contracted for in the United States last year. But there are few non-Federal public power agencies or rural co-ops, that are big enough to play in the atomic league.

Of the 20,003 megawatts of total capacity of nuclear power plants under contract for completion after 1967, only TVA's 2,229 megawatts and the Omaha Public Power District 450 megawatts—the smallest plant on the list—will be publicly owned. We almost lost TVA during the '50's when we fought to keep it from being raided by Dixon-Yates and to enable it to build its own steam plants.

The Hanford plant, the only other large publicly owned nuclear power facility in the country, was built by the Atomic Energy Commission to make plutonium for bombs. The Commission considered producing electricity at Hanford itself, but the Congress would have preferred to waste the steam. Only after a bitter fight was this waste prevented, by legislation permitting a group of Washington State public power districts to recycle steam from the cooling water through their generator to produce 786 megawatts of useful power—but then only on condition that they offer 50 percent participation to the private companies. The private power interests today are very strong indeed.

Another example of their strangle-hold is shown in the recent deletion of funds for the proposed Dickey-Lincoln School Dam in Maine. Funds for this first Federal hydroelectric project in the northeast, the nation's highest cost power area, were amended out of this year's Public Works Appropriation bill in the House, with the approving votes of the majority of the New England delegation. It is most significant that the very threat of this project has led to at least five rate reductions from private power companies in Maine.

A more sinister deletion, however, took place in the Committee on Appropriations. The Committee stated on page 75 of its report:

"The Bonneville Power Administration has been conducting a nuclear plant site study in the Pacific Northwest. As the construction of such plants will not be the re-

sponsibility of the Federal Government, the Committee expects that hereafter the financing of such studies and planning shall be left entirely to private industry."

This sentence, buried in a 103-page report, not only purports to award nuclear power in the Northwest to the private companies, but would bar the Bonneville Power Administration even from conducting effective comprehensive regional planning.

The very success of the TVA in developing a once poor and backward region has made the private power industry vow never to permit it to happen again; and so far, they have kept their vow. There are no plans to repeat even the Hanford 50 percent public-50 percent private arrangement. Even half a loaf to the public is too much.

A potential new fuel for making electricity is geothermal steam—natural underground steam. Certainly steam under the public lands of the United States is a public resource, that ought to be developed for public benefit, either by the Government itself, or at least by public and cooperative bodies under a preference clause. The Department of the Interior proposed a leasing act to this Congress for geothermal steam. It contains no preference clause. Instead it provides for sale of steam leases to the highest bidder—again pricing the little fellows out of the market.

Almost sixty years ago, in vetoing a bill to give away a hydropower site on the James River in Missouri, President Theodore Roosevelt wrote as follows:

"The people of the country are threatened by a monopoly far more powerful, because it is in far closer touch with their domestic and industrial life, than anything known to our experience. . . .

"To give away, without conditions, this, one of the greatest of our resources, would be an act of folly. If we are guilty of it, our children will be forced to pay an annual return upon a capitalization based upon the highest prices which 'the traffic will bear'. They will find themselves face to face with powerful interests entrenched behind the doctrine of 'vested rights' and strengthened by every defense which money can buy and the ingenuity of able corporation lawyers can devise. Long before that time they may and very probably will have become a consolidated interest, controlled from the great financial centers, dictating the terms upon which the citizen can conduct his business or earn his livelihood, and not amenable to the wholesome check of local opinion.

"I esteem it my duty to use every endeavor to prevent this growing monopoly, the most threatening which has ever appeared, from being fastened upon the people of this nation".

We need another Roosevelt today.

Already electric power is the nation's largest industry. Its capital assets are 60 percent larger than those of the next largest industry—petroleum refining. Twelve percent of all capital invested in business in this country is under the control of the privately-owned electric power utilities. And they grasp for more at the public expense.

The State of New York has a fine power authority, which generates 20 percent of the electricity produced in that State, from the waters of the Niagara and St. Lawrence Rivers. These rivers are now almost fully developed. Logically, to maintain the yardstick, and to retain the public share of the market, the New York Power Authority, like TVA, should begin building nuclear plants.

This is not what the State Administration has proposed. Instead, it proposes to bring power costs down by providing free atomic fuel to the private companies.

Unless an enlightened and outraged public demands otherwise, this may be the ultimate fate of the yardstick—to be replaced by an undisguised subsidy to the private com-

panies—a subsidy which will simply transfer part of their excessive rates from our light bills to our tax bills.

The proportion of Federally-generated power to privately-generated power must be maintained at least at its current level. How can public power survive the establishment of the large regional power pooling combines that are coming to be the predominant pattern of the electric power industry, if public generation does not keep pace with industry expansion? Either we maintain the balance between the private and public sectors of the industry, or the electric industry will become ever more dominated and controlled by the large private monopolies within the next decade.

The second method of protecting the consumer from abuse by the monopolistic electric utilities is through government regulation of rates and services. There is vast room for improvement in this field, both by the State Commissions and by the Federal Power Commission. However, I believe that despite the prior inadequacies of such regulation, we should continue to work to improve and strengthen the regulatory role of both the Federal and State Commissions, and not abandon regulation as a tool for protecting the interests of the consumer.

Most of you are familiar with the efforts made during the last Congress by the private utilities to enact the Holland-Smathers bill which would exempt them from FPC jurisdiction. Most of you are also familiar with the efforts of some of the rural electric cooperatives to obtain similar legislation, although for different motives. I warned that it would be a great mistake for the cooperatives to sponsor this exemption legislation in advance of any ruling by the FPC that would be disadvantageous to the co-ops, and that blanket exemption of the utilities from FPC jurisdiction would destroy hopes for rate reduction for consumers through regulation of electric wholesale rates. The bill was on its way to passage when the great Northeast Blackout of November 9, 1965, occurred. The Blackout graphically demonstrated the interstate character of the electric industry and the need for more regulation, rather than less regulation, and effectively killed the Holland-Smathers bill in the last Congress.

But the private power utilities are not easily discouraged. The Holland-Smathers bill has reappeared in this Congress. It would exempt from Federal regulation, including Federal accounting and disclosure requirements, any electric company "whose facilities are all situated in a single State and are not used to transmit or receive electric energy by direct connection, from or to any other State, or by indirect connection, from or to any other State except for temporary or emergency purposes".

The Florida Power and Light Company, which is one of the principal supporters of the present Holland-Smathers bill, is the largest utility in the State of Florida, with assets of about a billion dollars. It is ninth in revenues, among the almost 3,600 electric systems in the nation. It claims that the "onerous" FPC accounting requirements will force it to raise its rates, and that it is already adequately regulated by the Florida Public Service Commission.

In 1964, Florida Power and Light Company's rate of return was 12.3 percent, the third highest rate of return on invested capital of any power company in the country. In 1965 the Chairman of the Florida regulatory commission testified before the Senate Commerce Committee that in his opinion the best utility regulation "is little or no regulation". In 1966, a newspaper reporter who asked the director of the finance department of the Florida Commission about Florida Power and Light's rate base was told: "Where it is, if it still exists, I don't know". The law of Florida does not provide for any

regulation of wholesale rates and service. Thus, if the Holland-Smathers bill should pass, there would be no one to require Florida Power and Light Company to sell electricity to a co-op, and perhaps ultimately, no more co-ops in Florida.

Florida Power and Light is not directly connected to any out-of-state utility. It is connected to Florida Power Corporation, which in turn is connected to the Georgia Power Company. The interchange contract between Florida Power and Light and the Florida Power Corporation is not to be found in either the FPC or the Florida Public Service Commission files. It apparently has never been put in writing. It remains more secret even than Florida Power and Light's rate base.

The new Holland-Smathers bill, although apparently motivated to fit the Florida Power and Light pattern, can also serve as the vehicle for exempting many other private electric utility companies from FPC jurisdiction, simply through the device of setting up a separate corporation to hold title to a substation, or other facility (even merely a 10-foot stretch of wire) at the state boundary, so that the utility is not connected "directly" to facilities in the next state.

The present Holland-Smathers bill also still contains the provision to confer statutory exemption from FPC regulation on co-ops. That provision is now, in any event, unnecessary because the Federal Power Commission recently ruled, in the *Dairyland* case, that it does not have jurisdiction over co-ops. It said they were "government instrumentalities".

I think that whatever may have been the short run gain for co-ops from that decision will be far outweighed by the overall impairment of protection for electric consumers generally, including cooperatives.

There are already examples of these bad consequences.

Recently the City of Paris, Kentucky, asked the FPC to require the Kentucky Utilities Company to wheel power to it which the City purchased from the East Kentucky co-op. "Sorry", the Commission ruled last month, "co-ops are government instrumentalities, and we cannot require a private utility to wheel government power". When the Colorado-Ute coal plant built with REA financing in Hayden, Colorado, was declared illegal by the Colorado Supreme Court, the co-ops sought to invoke the protection of the Federal Power Act. However, the FPC said, "Sorry, we have no jurisdiction over co-ops", and it rejected the co-ops' petition.

There will be many more instances, I fear, in which rural electric cooperatives will be unable to obtain the benefits of FPC protection because of the "governmental instrumentalities no jurisdiction" rule of the *Dairyland* case. This subject needs some more re-thinking by all of us.

Perhaps the remedy may come in the proposed Power Reliability Act which the FPC sent to Congress after the PJM Blackout of last June in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland and Delaware which affected 13 million people.

In my opinion, the FPC bill offers a sound approach to the problem of reliability and adequacy of power planning and power transmission. However, as I studied the FPC bill I found a number of oversights or defects which should be corrected. Therefore, on August 14, I introduced a revised bill (H.R. 12322) which would, in my judgment, remedy those deficiencies.

The purpose of this legislation is not merely to prevent more cascading power failures. It is also designed to assure, in accordance with the national policy adopted 32 years ago, that there will be an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States, with the maximum possible economy and with due regard to the proper utiliza-

tion and conservation of natural resources. This bill would also clarify the Congressional mandate to the Federal Power Commission to consider esthetic and historic values in carrying out its regulatory duties concerning electric power.

The FPC bill, and to a greater extent my bill, views the electric power industry as one nationwide public utility, consisting of all the local generating and transmission entities, including the public, private, and cooperative segments thereof. Both bills require organization of the industry into regional councils to plan, coordinate, and provide the most reliable, efficient, and economic service to all the people of the region, regardless of who provides retail distribution service, and to exchange and coordinate power with neighboring regions.

Strong interconnection between adequate generation is the key to power reliability in areas of heavy energy consumption. Every one of the 18 cascading power failures starting with the great Northeast Blackout of November 9, 1965, occurred because of inadequate interconnections. The Holland-Smathers bill in addition to its many other faults, would discourage interconnection, and hence decrease reliability. The Electric Power Reliability bill would help strengthen interconnections and thus increase the reliability of electric power systems.

Both the FPC bill and my bill seek to achieve these objectives by voluntary cooperation of the various managements within the regions. Both bills require that the regional councils be open to membership by all segments of the power industry so that all plans developed by the regional councils will be the product of all the power systems, including the public, private, and cooperative power networks within the same region.

My bill corrects an oversight in the FPC bill to provide for participation, on a voluntary basis, by State regulatory commissions as well as the utilities, in regional council work. Both bills empower the FPC to compel participation in council work by recalcitrant generating and transmission entities; however, my bill adds an explicit provision requiring such entities also to share reasonably in the council's expenses. Both bills provide that the FPC may review, and, if necessary, revise regional council plans; but both provide that the plans are to be developed in the first instance by the local utilities of the region.

The FPC bill provides that those who act pursuant to a regional plan shall be immune from suits for damages and injunctive relief under the antitrust laws by those who are hurt by such actions. I think such grant of immunity from suit under the antitrust laws would be a dangerous weakening of the protections against arbitrary monopoly actions. Furthermore, I believe the courts are a better forum than the FPC to resolve disputes under the antitrust laws. Hence, my bill does not authorize the FPC, by its approval of the plans of the regional councils, to confer antitrust immunity.

Both bills contemplate the establishment of mandatory reliability criteria by the FPC for bulk power supply facilities, which may be of nationwide or regional applicability. These criteria would be promulgated only after consultation with the regional councils, and may, in fact, be developed in the first instance by the councils. My bill differs in only two words from the FPC bill concerning reliability standards. I say the Commission "shall" promulgate regulations setting forth reliability criteria; and the FPC bill says it "may." Clearly, the criteria must be promulgated, and my bill explicitly so provides.

The FPC bill recognizes that the construction and operation of extra-high-voltage lines, those over 200,000 volts, will involve esthetic values. I want to provide increased protection to these values.

The FPC bill would authorize the FPC to appoint advisory coordination review boards, but does not explicitly encourage the appointment of persons interested in conservation and esthetics to those advisory boards. My bill will do so.

In addition, my bill expressly prohibits the grant of rights-of-way for extra-high-voltage power lines in national parks, national monuments, national battlefields, historic sites, and all other areas administered by the National Park Service, except three types of areas. The excepted areas are national parkways, which are narrow strips hundreds of miles long, and two varieties of recreation areas which frequently surround existing power dams and do not have preservation of the natural environment as their primary purpose.

My bill also goes beyond the FPC bill by authorizing the administering agency of Federal land to veto a proposed EHV power line over Federal lands, not only on the ground that it would endanger aesthetic or historic values but also if it would endanger identified species of flora or fauna. I have also added a provision to clarify that the Electric Power Reliability Act will not supersede the Wilderness Act in any way.

Both the FPC bill and my bill require review by the FPC before extra-high-voltage transmission lines may be built. One reason is to provide a forum for reviewing the aesthetic consequences of proposals such as Potomac Edison's plan to run an EHV line near Antietam battlefield in Maryland. The other reason is technological. The FPC will have an opportunity to determine whether the EHV line is adequate to do the job for which it is intended, whether it will increase the reliability of service at both its terminal, as it should, or increase the chances of cascading failures, as it should not.

My bill goes another step beyond the FPC bill, and makes extra-high-voltage lines true public utilities, giving to every electric entity the right to increase the capacity of such lines, by whomever owned, at its own expense and subject to FPC regulation and technological review, and to participate in joint use of such lines. This addition to the bill is important, both esthetically and economically, because it will reduce the need for unsightly and costly paralleling facilities. It recognizes the fact, which is far too frequently overlooked, that transmission lines are part of this Nation's transportation system.

I have revised greatly the FPC bill's provision for granting rights-of-way across Federal lands for EHV lines. Under my bill rights-of-way over Federal land may be granted for a limited term, not in excess of 50 years; or for an unlimited duration. However, if the right-of-way is granted for an unlimited duration, then the FPC will have continuing jurisdiction at intervals of not less than 10 years to add to or change the conditions of the right-of-way grants.

The FPC bill makes no provision for payment to the United States for use of its land. Mine does.

The FPC bill completely overlooks Indian rights in Indian reservations. The Indians, rather than the Government, are the true owners of the reservations, many of which were set up by solemn treaty guaranteeing that no one would ever be permitted to reside or cross over them without the Indian's consent. My bill requires Indian consent before any EHV right-of-way can be granted through an Indian reservation, and, when consent is given, it requires the utility to pay the Indians for the use of their lands.

My bill, as does the FPC bill, authorizes the FPC, on its own motion, to compel interconnections between power systems—again giving priority to efficient public service for the consumers of a region. My bill, however, goes further, requiring each entity, public or private, to wheel power for other entities to

the extent of excess capacity in its lines. For this service, it would, of course, be entitled to fair compensation.

I have added provisions to the FPC bill at several places to insure that the public receives notice of what is proposed and has access to information on file. Thus, when a statement of organization of a regional council, or a regional plan, is filed, my bill requires the FPC to give notice of the filing in the Federal Register, whereas the FPC bill requires such notice only in case of an EHV transmission line proposal. Furthermore, under my bill, all filings which are permitted or required to be made will be available for public inspection, including coordination contracts, such as for joint ownership or operation of generators and transmission lines.

I have also included a new section in my bill directing the Federal Power Commission to survey existing and planned extra-high-voltage testing laboratories in the United States and to report to Congress within 1 year whether any action is needed to provide more laboratories and to make them available to all persons desiring to test their EHV facilities. At the present time there are only two laboratories in this country, in contrast to 20 abroad, able to test extra-high-voltage equipment under operating conditions. Both American laboratories are maintained by individual manufacturers for their own use. I need not stress the hazard that inadequately tested equipment presents to reliable service.

I cannot predict when this bill will be enacted. A few more blackouts may hasten its enactment. But of this I am sure—that the national need for maximum reliability of electric service will inevitably demand the enactment of this bill, or similar legislation.

In the meantime, as consumers who want low cost power, you must work together to make sure that the economies of large-scale generation and transmission will be passed on to the consumer instead of into the salaries of company officials and the dividends of company stockholders. You must work to strengthen the governmental tools for protecting the consumer's interest. This includes both improved regulation of the monopolistic utilities, and the maintenance and strengthening of the yardstick of competition resulting from the availability of low cost public power. You must participate in all the benefits of pooling, and not permit the public and cooperative sectors of the electric industry to be smothered by private power domination of the benefits of large-scale generation and transmission.

The East River Electric Power Cooperative has been one of the great leaders in the continuing battle to protect the consumer. With the Basin Electric Power Cooperative, which shares your capable president Arthur Jones, East River has been in the forefront of the fight to develop the upper Missouri River Basin.

I applaud your pioneering efforts to utilize the great lignite resources of North Dakota for the maximum benefit of the people of this area. In your efforts to assure your future power supply, you have steadfastly endeavored to develop regional power coordination for maximum efficiency and economy. Your work to intertie the lignite fields of North Dakota with the power systems of Nebraska and Kansas will undoubtedly result in increased regional advantages that will greatly benefit your members, the region, and the nation too.

I share your disappointments over the way the Rural Electrification Administration handled the Minnesota loan, and the demise of the Supplemental Financing Bill in this Congress. I am confident, however, that you will maintain your alertness to the opportunities and the dangers that lie ahead for the consumer of electric power as the industry con-

tinues its massive expansion in the next decade.

I pledge to you that I shall continue to work with you in your efforts to provide consumers all the electricity they desire, at the lowest possible cost, and with the maximum possible reliability of service.

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I rise to commend the chairman and the members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, particularly the chairman and members of the Public Works Subcommittee, for the outstanding job they have done on what is a very tough bill.

There are so many meritorious and necessary projects throughout the Nation that deciding which ones should be included this year and which deferred is like trying to decide which of your own children should be helped first.

The committee shouldered a particularly heavy burden at this time when our Government is faced with rising expenditures, huge deficits, and calls for tax increases.

The bill before us represents America's annual installment on needed river, harbor, flood control, water supply, irrigation, power, and beach erosion projects. It represents economic investment so essential to America's future growth.

Every project authorized for construction has met the test of providing more than \$1 of benefits for every dollar of annual cost. In most cases, States or local interests must furnish cash or land or maintenance or make some other contribution to the cost.

Construction projects have been subjected to an intricate, time-consuming procedure including congressional review in authorizing legislation and in the appropriation review process.

These projects create jobs for Americans. They preserve, conserve, or develop our natural resources and so are vital to the economic development of our Nation. They are also vital to the saving of lives and property in America. Like so many essential functions, public works projects are not often glamorous. But they are tremendously important to the economic, and in many cases to the physical, well-being of the American people.

Every year, some Americans lose their lives, some have their homes ruined or destroyed, and some their businesses injured or wiped out by rampaging floodwaters. Year by year, ships get larger and maritime trade increases, requiring bigger, deeper harbors and rivers to accommodate them. Annually the demand for water supplies and power rises as our population grows. More Americans mean more food must be produced, and irrigation works such as included in this bill are needed to make land arable. With growing affluence and growing leisure, Americans are flocking to the Nation's shorelines, where beaches must be protected against erosion, lest valuable acreage be lost to sea.

It is highly regrettable that America has not made greater progress in harnessing its water resources, improving its harbors, controlling flood waters, and conserving its shorelines. And it is a shame that circumstances prevent pushing ahead faster this year.

I want to express special appreciation for the committee's action in including \$200,000 to build a harbor of refuge at

Honokahau, Hawaii, for the Kailua-Kona area. Many boatowners and operators earn their livelihood by hiring out to sport fishermen. Many others in the community also earn their livelihood by serving sport fishermen and their families who come to Kona, one of the finest deep-sea fishing areas in the world.

But skippers live in constant fear their boats, representing heavy investments, will be damaged or destroyed in the existing unprotected harbor. A few weeks ago, a sudden surge snapped the mooring line of one boat, and it was smashed beyond salvage on a nearby reef, a total loss estimated at \$20,000. Many times when storms hit Kona, captains and their crews have to take their boats to sea to ride out the storm or try to find refuge in the nearest harbor 40 miles away.

So the proposed Honokahau Harbor is urgently needed. It has a benefit-cost ratio of 2.3 to 1. The President did not request funds for Honokahau, nor did the House of Representatives include such funds in H.R. 11641. Nevertheless, I hope the Senate conferees will insist upon funds for this needed project.

I also want to express appreciation to the committee for including preconstruction planning funds for needed small-boat harbors at Heeia-Kea, Oahu, and Reeds Bay, on the Island of Hawaii. Both of these are needed to serve rapidly growing areas. Heeia-Kea, for which \$34,000 were recommended, has a benefit-cost ratio of 5.5 to 1. Reeds Bay, for which \$35,000 were recommended, has a benefit-cost ratio of 2.2 to 1. Thus, both are well justified.

Mr. President, before I conclude, I would like to refer to one project vital to Hawaii which was deferred beyond the 1968 fiscal year. I refer to the authorized project for erosion control at Waikiki Beach.

This project has the extraordinarily high benefit-cost ratio of 15.9 to 1, one of the highest ratios for any project of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The need for the project is based primarily on economics, not on personal pleasure or convenience of sunbathers and surfers as some people might wrongly assume. The industry involved is tourism, Hawaii's biggest source of private income next to agriculture. It is the fastest growing industry in the Islands and it has the greatest growth potential of any industry in the foreseeable future.

Waikiki is the physical heart of Hawaii's tourism. Of the 16,000 hotel rooms throughout the State, 11,000 are located in Waikiki. Economists estimate one hotel room generates about 1.5 jobs in directly associated employment. It generates even more jobs in indirectly associated employment.

Estimates show the Waikiki hotels generate about 15 percent of Hawaii's total civilian labor force of approximately 280,000. Counting dependents, more than 59,000 persons—almost 10 percent of our civilian resident population—are supported through tourism in Waikiki's existing hotel facilities.

This year, Hawaii may be host to nearly 1 million visitors, a record number. Most of them will stay at least part of their time at Waikiki Beach. By 1975, we may have 3 million visitors. Waikiki is

expanding its facilities to house and serve these rapidly growing numbers of tourists. New hotel construction is providing jobs for construction workers, not counted in the employment figures I have cited.

Unless Waikiki Beach retains its attractiveness to visitors, Hawaii's economy, with its heavy reliance on tourism, will suffer and jobs for thousands of workers in Hawaii will be in jeopardy.

The State of Hawaii strongly supports work on the Waikiki Beach erosion control project. Hundreds of thousands of dollars have been appropriated by the State legislature for work on the Kuhio beach segment of the project. The State is moving ahead on this segment.

In April this year, the Hawaii State Senate approved a resolution urging appropriation of preconstruction planning funds for the Waikiki Beach project. This involves an estimated \$82,000 to complete advance engineering.

The Hawaii Senate resolution refers to a new factor which has entered the picture since Congress authorized the Waikiki Beach erosion control project in 1965. Waikiki Beach has become very important as a recreation center for military personnel on rest and recuperation leave from Vietnam. An estimated 75,000 military personnel are expected to spend rest and recuperation leave in Hawaii each year.

In addition, 25,000 wives and other family members are expected to journey to Hawaii at their own expense to visit those on rest and recuperation. Almost all stay in or near Waikiki and use the beach facilities, primarily in the Fort DeRussy area.

The chairman of the Army Advisory Committee of Hawaii, Mr. Hung Wai Ching, in a letter dated July 24, wrote that Waikiki continues to be the most popular area for servicemen on rest and recuperation leave from Vietnam. He explained:

The limited space on the beach, which is packed so tightly with people that it is even difficult to walk about, denies these men the real potential for recreational purposes.

Congress has just recognized the need to improve facilities at Fort DeRussy by approving the military construction authorization bill with \$7,132,000 for the Army to build troop billets and support facilities there. The beach serving Fort DeRussy should also be improved.

With the influx of military personnel using the beach area and with sharply rising numbers of tourists in Waikiki, it is imperative that work proceed as fast as possible toward widening, improving, and protecting Waikiki Beach.

I can understand the committee's deferral of funds for Waikiki Beach as the President did not request the funds for the 1968 fiscal year.

I urge the President to include funds for Waikiki erosion control in his 1969 budget requests.

This is not a frivolous project, but a very necessary one. It will return at least \$15.90 in benefits for every dollar of cost. So it is good economics as well as good conservation.

In conclusion, again I want to express particular appreciation to the chairman of the Public Works Subcommittee [Mr.

ELLENDER] and to the ranking minority member of the Senate Appropriations Committee [Mr. Young] for their understanding and support of projects needed for Hawaii.

FOR RELIEF OF UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, an organization known as Midwest Farmers in a Hungry World will meet at Morning-side College, Sioux City, Iowa, on October 19, 1967.

I have received from the chairman of the Midwest Farmers in the Hungry World organization a letter in which I was asked certain questions. The questions, in substance, are: Will the United States expand, lessen, or maintain at its present level the food relief that it is sending to undeveloped countries in the world?

Mr. President, I shall read my answer to that letter:

I received your letter of September 25 and the questionnaire attached to it.

My own opinion is that within the reasonably foreseeable future, the Congress will not expand the shipment of food relief to the undeveloped countries of the world. Expressions have been made repeatedly in the Foreign Relations Committee while considering the Foreign Aid Bill that in face of the financial stringency resulting from unjustified spending practices and the Vietnam War, the practical emptiness of our surplus food bins, and because the recipient nations of our food relief have not made reasonable progress in increasing their own food production, the Congress will be reluctant to increase the moneys expended for the food relief program. It is my opinion that if a change is to be made it will be to give less rather than more for food relief.

India is especially pointed out as seemingly feeling that it can remain substantially indifferent to its failure to produce adequate food because of its conviction that the United States will continue its generous help. The argument is made that by the course we are following we are not in truth helping but hindering the solution of the problem.

Some day these recipient countries must make substantial progress in producing their own food and reducing their enormous population growth. So long as they keep getting food from us as a gift, an inducement exists for them to be neglectful and unmindful of the discipline that normally comes to human beings through the compelling force of need.

Necessity is a powerful teacher. There is no stronger doctrine than that which comes from necessity.

I continue to read from the letter:

The United States will want to help the hungry but in the genuine meaning of the term "help." If we in truth are not helping but merely postponing the arrival of the crucial time when these countries must by their self-help aid in the solving of the problem, the views will be to modify our program so as to compel these nations to become conscious of their own responsibility.

Mr. President, I believe that the nations of the world have reached the judgment that they need not give concern to solving their own problems because they are convinced that, regardless of what they do, the United States will help them.

The United States is sympathetic in

wanting to help hungry people around the world, but while we approach the problem of want in that light, it would be imprudent and inhumane to induce those countries to abandon any idea of helping themselves.

Past experience has demonstrated that no nation in the history of the world has been as desirous of helping the needy and those in want as the United States has demonstrated.

I repeat what I stated:

If we in truth are not helping but merely postponing the arrival of the crucial time when these countries must by their self-help aid in the solving of the problem, the views will be to modify our program so as to compel these nations to become conscious of their own responsibility.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that Mr. Fuqua, of Florida, had been appointed as an additional manager on the part of the House at the conference on the bill (H.R. 8718) to increase the annual Federal payment to the District of Columbia and to provide a method for computing the annual borrowing authority for the general fund of the District of Columbia.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 678) to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to pay a judgment in favor of the Upper and Lower Chehalis Tribes of Indians in Claims Commission docket numbered 237, and for other purposes.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 11456) making appropriations for the Department of Transportation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. BOLAND, Mr. McFALL, Mr. YATES, Mr. MAHON, Mr. MINSHALL, Mr. JONAS, and Mr. Bow were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12474) making appropriations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. EVINS of Tennessee, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. SHIPLEY, Mr. GAIMO, Mr. MARSH, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. MAHON, Mr. JONAS, Mr. MINSHALL, Mr.

WYMAN, Mr. TALCOTT, and Mr. Bow were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (S. 985) for the relief of Warren F. Coleman, Jr.

SLOW BUSINESS PACE ARGUES AGAINST TAX INCREASE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, a survey of the Nation's purchasing agents just conducted discloses some interesting intelligence on whether or not we should pass a tax increase now.

First, they express serious disappointment about the performance of the economy for the past 3 months, and generally agree that it fell below their expectations. Second, they do not see the economy picking up in the next 3 months or so. Third, the express optimism about the economic outlook for next year.

To me, Mr. President this suggests a strong expectation that the economy probably will not need to have a tax increase to stem a too exuberant growth in the coming year or so. I say this because the best basis for economic policy is the hard, verifiable facts of the economy at the moment as we can see them, weigh them, measure them. And these the purchasing agents find disappointing.

In other words the economy has not been too booming, it has been too sluggish. This we know. It is not predicted, guessed at, estimated. It is certain, established, history.

Second, the short-term outlook is by far the easiest to predict, and the Nation's purchasing agents are in a strategic position to predict it. Their prediction for the short term is for more of the same—more sluggishness, hardly the basis for an economy depressing tax increase.

But how about the long-term outlook? How about next year? After all that is precisely the period for which the tax increase is to be effective. The purchasing agents are optimistic about the economy's performance in 1968.

First, Mr. President, we should be aware of feebleness of long-term predictions. Here is where all men are fallible. Whether they are purchasing agents, trained economists, or U.S. Senators, we just do not know. The National Bureau of Economic Research recently made a study of economic forecasting and found that short-range forecasting was reasonably reliable, but that long-range forecasting was anything but.

But let us assume that the purchasing agents are right, and that 1968 will be a good economic year. Does this suggest that the economy needs a tax hike to slow it down?

After all, what is wrong with economic growth? Perhaps we will get the unemployment rate down below 3½ percent. What would be wrong with that?

Good economic conditions, a healthy increase in demand would have to go a long way from the present to begin to put real inflationary demand pressure on this economy of ours.

We have the available manpower—with factory workers—working close to the shortest hours in 6 years. We have ample factory facilities with our vast manufacturing facilities producing at less than 85 percent capacity far below the optimum rate at which costs are lowest and profits best.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article from yesterday's Washington Post headlined "Business Pace Disappointing" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PURCHASING AGENTS SURVEY: "BUSINESS PACE DISAPPOINTING"

A survey of the Nation's purchasing agents has revealed widespread disappointment with the general level of business during the third quarter.

The National Association of Purchasing Agents reported yesterday that 43 per cent of the purchasing executives surveyed said that third quarter business fell below their expectations, while only 12 per cent said business was better than they thought it would be.

For the future, the purchasers said they foresee no dramatic surges in business indicators that ordinarily reflect expansion of the economy, but they expressed "strong concern" about inflation of commodity prices.

The degree of disappointment with the third quarter results can best be appraised, the Association said, by comparing responses with those of recent years. Last year 21 per cent said the third quarter exceeded expectations and 17 per cent said it fell below them. In 1965, the figures were 26 per cent and 10 percent, and in 1964 they were 30 per cent and 6 per cent.

Although 35 per cent said they were "optimistic" about business for the next 12 months, compared with only 27 per cent a year ago, the purchasers gave few specifics to support their feeling.

Higher new orders and production were reported by 42 per cent for September, but this was regarded as normal for the season. Inventory liquidation remained unchanged, with 1 per cent fewer purchasers reporting lower stocks for their companies during September, as compared with August, and 15 per cent noting higher inventories.

Buyers of production materials reported that they had shortened their forward commitments, indicating, possible concern over labor negotiations. The level of orders for new capital equipment and plant construction was reported to be following the "drifting" trend that has prevailed since the mid-1966 peak and the Association said purchasers showed "concern about utilizing capacity now coming on stream."

The survey found that 62 per cent of the purchasers paid higher prices for commodities during September than during August. This was the second highest surge in the last 11 years, topped only by that at the inflationary peak of last year.

Just four months ago, the Association said, only 15 per cent reported a month-to-month increase in commodity prices.

SENATE'S FAILURE TO RATIFY HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS MAKES U.S. RATIFICATION OF U.N. CHARTER AN EMPTY GESTURE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the stinging indictment Lord Byron delivered upon Wellington has contemporary rele-

vance to the Senate's inaction on the human rights conventions:

Never had mortal man such opportunity, except Napoleon, or abused it more.

This Senate has balked time and again on one of the most crucial questions of this century—the inherent rights and dignity of man.

The Senate, almost as if to expiate this body's guilt over our predecessor's failure to vitalize the League of Nations, overwhelmingly ratified the United Nations Charter in 1945. By ratifying the U.N. Charter, the Senate pledged the United States to uphold "the dignity and worth of the human person."

But since that pledge was made, the Senate has continuously reneged, reneged on our pledge to the people of the United States, and reneged on our promise to all mankind. We have failed to ratify a single human rights convention, signed by U.S. Ambassadors and supported by U.S. Presidents.

The Senate's failure to support these legal instruments whose aims are identical with our own national goals has been the cause of both national shame and international disillusionment.

All Americans have these rights and we are grateful for them. There is nothing alien or un-American about guaranteeing the right to live, the right to be free from forced labor or slavery, or the right of women to participate freely in political life.

The Senate has embarrassed the United States. The Senate has hurt the credibility of our Nation. This body's reluctance to ratify conventions establishing minimal standards of human dignity puts the United States in the comparable position of a Silas Marner sermon on "Personal Generosity" or Marie Antoinette lecturing on "The Evils of Opulence."

We have said to the young nations—60 in the past 25 years—"you ratify, you participate, you observe. As for me, I am content to give lip service."

Let the Senate restore the international credibility of the United States. Let the Senate fulfill the pledge made by an earlier Senate to the United Nations by ratifying the Conventions on Forced Labor, Freedom of Association, Genocide, Political Rights of Women, and Slavery.

L. B. J. DESERVES CREDIT FOR SUSPENDING PUBLIC WORKS SPENDING

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, President Johnson deserves solid credit for putting a freeze on new spending commitments for public works projects.

For months, leading Members of Congress have pleaded with the administration to reduce spending. The President is now doing exactly that. And he is making the reductions precisely where he should be making them, without penalizing public welfare programs or the national security. Criticism of the President's action by Members of Congress is grossly inconsistent.

News that the Pentagon is deferring contract awards on some \$350 million in military construction projects and an un-

specified amount in civil construction followed by Budget Director Schultze's statement that the freeze has been made effective throughout the Government, were, indeed, encouraging developments.

This spending freeze imposed by the administration should not be designed to put pressure on Congress to approve the President's tax surcharge proposal. It should indicate a more sensible approach to our current economic problems. The spending suspension can be maintained as long as the administration is concerned with the threat of inflation and high interest rates in lieu of a tax increase.

Cutting back on public works and other low priority expenditures makes much more economic sense than raising taxes. I have stressed the opinion many times that the tax increase would have a repressive effect on the economy without putting an effective lid on inflation.

Elimination of low priority expenditures is far less risky to our economic growth in the event that pressures from excess demand do not materialize.

The speed with which the President acted demonstrates how promptly the administration can act on spending reductions. It can act just as quickly to restore spending when the economic conditions warrant it. Speed is the attribute of the spending-cut route that makes it far superior to the tax-increase route.

The tax surcharge was proposed by the President 1 year ago. It was proposed in January. Congress still has not acted on it, and chances of its taking action at all this year appear extremely dim. Furthermore, when and if a tax surcharge is imposed, it will have a 2-year life. There would be little chance of rescinding it sooner if economic conditions should warrant it. A spending freeze can be rescinded instantly.

What a contrast with the speed with which the President can suspend and restore spending.

PUBLIC WORKS AND ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11641) making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Atlantic-Pacific Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Water Resources Council, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

WHY PROXMIRE WILL VOTE AGAINST THE PUBLIC WORKS BILL

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I want to say, as the Senate begins consideration of the public works appropriation bill, it is a bill which I consider a travesty of rational economic management and economy in Government.

With the prospect of a huge Federal

deficit—possibly of the magnitude of \$29 billion—and a proposal by the President for a tax increase, it is high time that the Congress faced up to its responsibilities in budgetary control. I am well aware that many of these projects are politically important to Members of Congress, but, more important, this year should be the achievement of sufficient budgetary cuts to avoid a tax increase. And no area invites cuts as much as public works.

The fact is that, even if the Federal Government were not pressed for funds, many of these programs should be postponed, if not eliminated. I have been calling the attention of the Senate each day to the unanimous testimony received by the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Economy in Government to the effect that the Government's present evaluation of public works projects has led to gross overinvestment in this area.

In testimony which I found to be quite startling, three economic experts told the subcommittee that virtually the entire economics profession agree—an unusual situation in itself—that the administration is grossly misallocating resources by underpricing capital. This unfortunate situation has developed because the Government computes the cost of most public works at much too low a rate of interest. At the present time, the rate used is about $3\frac{1}{8}$ percent—the rate today is about $3\frac{1}{4}$ percent—calculated on the basis of the average coupon rate on outstanding long-term Government bonds. All of the economists told the subcommittee that this method made no sense in economic terms, since the rate used was recording past history.

The economists all agreed that a better economic allocation of resources would be achieved if the Government used the private "opportunity cost" of capital in making investment decisions. On this basis they judged that the rate applied should be at least 10 percent and perhaps 15 percent. In other words, these economic experts told the subcommittee that the Federal Government was wasting resources by taking funds from the private sector which would be expected to yield a much higher return.

If we applied the private "opportunity cost" of capital—a 10- to 15-percent rate—to the investments proposed in this bill, most of it would not survive this market test. This contention has been substantiated by figures I have just received from the Deputy Under Secretary for Programs at the Department of the Interior. At my request, his staff calculated the benefit-cost ratios at an "opportunity cost" rate of 10 percent for reclamation projects on which construction was initiated in fiscal year 1966 or 1967.

I have a table showing the resulting benefit-cost ratios and the ratios at $3\frac{1}{8}$ percent, and I also have a table showing similar calculations for a number of Corps of Engineers projects, which I ask unanimous consent to be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

| INTERIOR | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|--|--|
| Project | Benefit-cost ratios (100-year period of analysis) | | | |
| | $3\frac{1}{8}$ per- cent | 10 per- cent | | |
| Bonneville unit, Utah..... | 1.8 | 0.6 | | |
| Bostwick Park, Colo..... | 2.2 | .7 | | |
| Grand Coulee 3d powerplant, Washington..... | 3.2 | .9 | | |
| Garrison Diversion unit, North Dakota-South Dakota..... | 2.2 | .7 | | |

| CORPS OF ENGINEERS | | | | |
|--|---|-----------------|------|-----------------|
| [Dollar amounts in millions] | | | | |
| Project | Benefit-cost ratios (100-year period of analysis) | | | |
| | $3\frac{1}{8}$ per- cent | 10 per- cent | Cost | 10 per- cent |
| Arkansas River and tributaries, Arkansas and Oklahoma..... | 1.5 | \$585.0 | 0.66 | |
| Ouachita and Black Rivers, Ark. and La..... | 1.4 | 90.6 | .56 | |
| Marysville Reservoir, Calif..... | 1.5 | 143.0 | .48 | |
| Cross Florida Barge Canal, Fla..... | 1.1 | 145.3 | .36 | |
| Kaskaskia River (navigation), Illinois..... | 1.2 | 68.0 | .48 | |
| Missouri River levee system, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska..... | 1.16 | 101.7 | .42 | |
| Kaysinger Bluff Reservoir, Mo..... | 1.2 | 196.0 | .37 | |
| Stockton Reservoir, Mo..... | 1.3 | 66.1 | .37 | |
| R. D. Bailey (Justice) Lake, W. Va..... | 1.1 | 76.6 | .31 | |

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this table shows how a number of multimillion dollar projects which are now being funded would bear a ratio of costs exceeding benefits by enormous amounts. In some cases costs are two, or even three, times higher than benefits, when the rate of return typical in the private economy is applied.

What this table means is that these hundreds of millions of dollars have been wasted. If the Government had not taken money by taxes from the private economy to spend on these projects, the growth of the economy, the incomes of millions of Americans, would be higher, and higher by hundreds of millions. Applied to all public works projects of the Federal Government, the cost to the American taxpayer in literally wasted spending is in the billions and it is embodied in the bill before us today, which is why I will vote against it.

Let me cite examples of a few cost benefit studies to illustrate my point:

One of the most recent and thorough studies of rates of return to education—"An Economic Analysis of Earnings and School," by Dr. Giora Hanock—showed that the returns from the education of white males are "considerably higher than rates of interest in the market and somewhat higher than average rates of return generally estimated for nonhuman capital." For example, the marginal rate for high school was about 16 percent in the North and 19 percent in the South. In the case of college training—to graduation—the returns were 12 and 11 percent, respectively. Although the estimates of rates of return to nonwhites were lower and less reliable, they were still substantial.

In the poverty area, a recent study made by the Office of Economic Opportunity—using most realistic assumptions—indicates that benefit-cost ratios from Job Corps training are greater than 1. And here I want to underscore the point that the OEO study used much more realistic discount rates—7 and 5

percent—than $3\frac{1}{8}$ percent applied to public works projects.

In fact, the study makes some highly interesting comparisons between benefit-cost ratios for the Job Corps and for several water resource projects which the Army Corps of Engineers has recently advanced. Benefit-cost ratios were computed using the same interest rate, $3\frac{1}{8}$ percent, which is used for public works projects. The benefit-cost ratio for the Job Corps was 1.9, compared to ratios of 1.5 for the "Upper Missouri-Yankton Navy project," and 1.3 for both the "Lake Erie-Ohio River project" and the "Red River below Denison Project." When some allowance for indirect benefits of the Job Corps training was made, the benefit-cost ratio was raised to 2.1.

A recent study published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Program Coordination concerning the adult basic education program stated:

It is estimated that each \$1 million expended on the current program will yield total quantifiable benefits of \$8.8 million. Although a benefit-cost ratio of 8.8 to 1 for the program may seem rather large, it should be noted that this amount to an average lifetime benefit per person of less than \$3,000.

In this study, it is highly significant that the rate used to discount future benefits was 8 percent—more than twice the $3\frac{1}{8}$ percent used in the case of public works.

An early benefit-cost analysis of manpower training programs by Dr. Michael Borus indicated that the ratio from the standpoint of the individual was "somewhere between 3.2—the ratio at a 15-percent discount—and 6.2—the ratio at a 5-percent discount." A more recent study, undertaken by Dr. Garth Mangum, revealed that 68 percent of the completers had been employed in the post-training period and that their median hourly earnings were significantly higher after training than before—\$1.74 after compared to \$1.44 before.

A further factor in comparing the relative costs and benefits of investments in human resources and public works is the problem of measuring indirect benefits. In public works projects, virtually all of the benefits are quantifiable, and, accordingly, the cost-benefit calculus gives quite an accurate picture of their worth. On the other hand, many of the benefits from human resource programs are indirect and nonquantifiable, although nonetheless real and beneficial to society. For example, the Job Corps may yield benefits to society as a whole, through subsequent reductions in public assistance payments and other welfare payments or in the costs of law enforcement, delinquency, or crime. If these indirect benefits were measured, investment in human resources would appear even more worthwhile relative to public works.

In economic terms, it would hardly make sense to pass this bill and then cut funds out of the poverty areas, as some have proposed. Instead of talking about whether we can afford guns and butter, the latter apparently referring to our meager poverty expenditures, it is time

to ask whether we can afford guns and public works.

I think this bill is a real test of whether the Congress can effectively control expenditures. Our subcommittee hearings on the planning, programing, budgeting system—which I have referred to previously—received a substantial body of testimony amounting to an indictment of the present budgetary process. Prof. Otto Davis of Carnegie-Mellon University Graduate School of Industrial Administration, said that he and two other professors have developed model equations to predict the budget as requested by the President and as finally appropriated by the Congress. These equations were tested for the years 1948 to 1963 for almost all the nondefense agencies of the Federal Government. While there were exceptions, Professor Davis told the committee that, in general, the equations fit the data very well. In fact, the computer did a better job of predicting congressional action on appropriations than on Presidential budget requests.

The reason the computer could be so accurate is that it calculated projections on the basis of what Professor Davis called "creeping incrementalism." In other words, it assumed that budgets were determined by such attitudes as, "Just ask for a bit more than we got this year" and "Just give them a little less than they asked for." Professor Davis concluded that, between 1948 and 1963, there was insufficient consideration of goals, alternatives, and whether programs were meeting their objectives, and that the budget process could stand considerable improvement.

Fortunately, he has not quite given up hope and proposed that Congress be replaced by a computer as yet, although I think, on the basis of his testimony, it would be a fair conclusion to say that between 1948 and 1963 we might just as well have used the computer and disposed of action by Congress on appropriation bills.

The truth of his thesis is clearly demonstrated by the public works bill before us today. When we compare the President's requests with the amounts in the present bill, it is apparent that the Congress has abdicated effective budgetary control. The President proposed \$4,867,813,000 for the programs under consideration; the public works bill passed by the House calls for \$4,622,922,000 in new appropriations, and the Senate bill for \$4,776,064,000. And, if we go down the list of items, we find that each one is virtually unchanged. In other words, the Congress is not exercising independent judgment, but simply applying an attitude of "Give them a little less than they asked for."

With the country facing serious problems at home and abroad, and with a mounting deficit and the possibility of a tax increase confronting us, it is essential that the Congress do a better job in controlling the budget and ordering our national priorities. A first step would be a vote against this extravagant, wasteful bill. We need a reduction in expenditures right now. The reevaluation of projects before us, with a discount rate of 10 percent, would greatly postpone many expenditures.

I am aware that the requirement to use correct interest rates on next year's budget submissions is likely to produce changes in estimated costs and benefits on many programs. But now is the time to cut these programs down. Since the administration is hesitant to make any specific recommendations, we must act on our own, and our action should come from informed judgment based on a realistic knowledge of the economic consequences.

Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, whenever a project is considered by the Corps of Engineers, the secondary benefits which will accrue in the future are not considered; it is only the anticipated primary benefits that will result, from construction of the project that are considered by the corps in computing the benefit-to-cost ratio.

Take, for example, the channel work along the Ohio River. That project was justified on the basis of 13 million tons of traffic. When I came on the committee in 1948 the actual commerce was 42.8 million tons. Before the project was constructed, of course, the amount of tonnage was much less than the estimate of 13 million tons.

But traffic borne by the river has now increased to 103 million tons, or almost eight times the benefits contemplated when the project was authorized.

Mr. PROXMIRE. May I say to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana that the calculations I have here are based on the cost. I understand higher discount rates were not applied to the benefits. The Corps of Engineers informed us that in their judgment, if the benefits were also discounted at 10 percent, the ratio would be even worse, and the benefit-cost ratio would be even less.

As the Senator knows, when you extend the life of a project, whether it is over 50 years or over 100 years, if you attempt to figure out completely, accurately, and comprehensively the benefit-to-cost ratio, you should discount the benefits you anticipate receiving in 1970, 1980, or 1990 on some basis. If you discount on the basis of 10 percent, your benefit will be considerably less than if you discount on the basis, for example, of 3½ percent or 3¼ percent.

Mr. ELLENDER. I had not quite completed my statement on the Ohio River project.

In addition to the traffic having increased more than eight times the anticipated amount, as I pointed out a while ago, these projects, 14 in number, after their construction formed pools of water which attracted business to a total of \$25 billion. Suppose we had considered the employment resulting from that construction as a benefit; what would be the Senator's attitude? That actually happened.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I say to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, it is necessary and desirable that the Corps of Engineers do a competent job, and that Congress do the best job it can, in trying to anticipate all the benefits likely to result. It is my understanding that in most of these projects we do that. Sometimes, naturally, the benefits will be

underestimated, and sometimes the costs, as the Senator knows.

In the particular instance, the Senator has cited, it may also be that if the project had not been constructed, there might have been far more business for the railroads or other alternative, competing means of transportation. Any fair evaluation would have to take that into consideration also.

Mr. ELLENDER. At a greater cost.

Mr. PROXMIRE. It is possible.

Mr. ELLENDER. I also point out the example of the intercoastal waterway, which starts at Brownsville, Tex., and follows the coast all the way up to the New England States. When that project was authorized, and the benefit-to-cost ratio was figured, the amount of traffic was estimated at around 8 million tons. Today that traffic amounts to 78½ million tons. If the Engineers had been able to foresee those great benefits, certainly they could have included them, and shown a much better benefit-to-cost ratio.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is correct. Whenever we underestimate benefits, we will get an inaccurate estimate. We are always anxious to get as accurate an estimate as we can on the benefit side and the cost side—and certainly on the discount side.

When we consider the cost of capital, we must properly consider the alternatives. If private industry can make an investment and get a return of 10 percent on its investment, the Federal Government should not take that money from the private economy in taxes and invest it at 3¼ percent. To do so slows the economy, penalizes economic growth, diminishes the income of all Americans.

Mr. ELLENDER. I shall cite another instance to indicate that the Corps of Engineers does not take into consideration secondary benefits. It must justify a project on primary benefits if the project is to be constructed.

For example, the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Baton Rouge was deepened to 40 feet, and the cost was very small. Because it was possible in the past to harness the Missouri, the Ohio, and the tributaries of those rivers, the Arkansas and Red, it was possible to provide a constant flow of fresh water down the river. What has happened? As a result of the constant flow of fresh water, hundreds of millions of dollars of industry are now located along that waterway. Those benefits to the locality and the country as a whole were never considered in the cost-benefit ratio presented by the Corps of Engineers when the project was first submitted to the Congress.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I would not disagree at all with the Senator. Private industry has exactly the same kind of problem. It does not invest unless it can expect a 10-percent return. Sometimes the return will be 30 or 40 percent.

The same is true in the public sector. The Government does not invest unless it can get a 3- or 3½-percent return. Sometimes it gets a better return. But in all cases, we should apply the same rate for public projects as for private projects. Economists agree that if we did so, we would have a much better utilization

tion of our available resources. In a time of great depression, when millions of persons are out of work, we can sensibly make such an investment so that idle resources can be put to work.

But certainly at a time when the economy is operating reasonably close to capacity, and we are considering a tax hike to reduce activity in the private sector, to take money out of the private sector, where it is earning 10 percent, and to put it into the public sector, where it will earn 3 percent, is a bad allocation of public resources and is wasteful.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am not an expert, but I do not see how that could be accomplished in public works. I go back to the proposition that if it were possible to look into the future and know all the benefits that would accrue from a project under consideration, such as I have shown in the cases I have mentioned, the benefit-to-cost ratios would be much higher. I do not know of any case in which the benefits would not be greater than the estimates made by the Corps of Engineers. If we were to take into consideration future growth and secondary benefits, I feel certain that the return would be in keeping with what the Senator from Wisconsin is now talking about.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I hope the Senator is right. I also call his attention again to the fact that private industry could do the same thing, undoubtedly it could show much greater returns than it anticipated in many instances.

All I am arguing for is that we use the same rules and the same market rate for public and private investments spending. Why not be fair? If we were to do that, we would have a far better allocation of resources. We would save billions. We could hold down taxes.

I again point out that the overwhelming sentiment in the economic profession is virtually unanimous that this is the case. And we should follow the same rules for both public and private investment, the same discount rate.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf of myself and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE], and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 4, line 14, in lieu of "\$1,010,823,000" insert "\$992,307,000".

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all time on the pending amendment be limited to 30 minutes, the time to be equally divided between the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] and the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, a yea-and-nay vote will be asked for on this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. How much time does the Senator yield himself?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment is to strike from the bill those 41 new construction starts which were approved by the House and Senate but which were not a part of the budget recommendations.

Originally the budget estimate included nine new starts, involving future commitments of \$139,756,000.

The House included five of those projects, involving \$16,799,000, but eliminated the other four except for the planning money.

The House then included 16 new projects which were not in the budget, the ultimate cost of the 16 to be \$86,028,000.

The Senate included all the money requested by the budget for the four starts, which totaled \$122,957,000. In addition to including those budget items the Senate added 25 new projects which had not been recommended by the budget.

The ultimate cost of the 25 new projects will be \$303,603,000. Thus we have the situation where the budget recommended nine projects with a long-range cost of \$139,750,000. They are not affected by the pending amendment. In addition, the House added 16 new projects and the Senate added 25 which, when completed, the ultimate cost will be \$389,631,000.

The pending amendment would eliminate this \$390 million from the bill.

Summarizing, the bill as reported to the Senate provides for a total of 50 new construction starts. That includes nine budget items and the 41 nonbudgeted items and involves a future commitment of \$525,327,000.

Mr. President, there is no reason why we should not strike from the bill the 41 new, nonbudgeted projects. None of these were recommended by the budget.

As I have pointed out before, during World War II, the President and Congress, working together, postponed or held in abeyance until completion of the war all new construction starts and projects unless they were first certified as being absolutely essential for the national defense. During the Korean war one of the first steps which President Truman took was to issue an Executive order freezing all new construction projects so that they would be held in abeyance until the war was over.

I supported that action.

Unfortunately, neither the present ad-

ministration nor the Congress has recognized that there really is a war going on at the present time. Congress is being told that we can afford both guns and butter—life as usual on the home front—with a major war on our hands.

The Senate, while urging the President to reduce expenditures, includes 41 new projects above the budget.

I think the very least we can do at this time is to ask all Americans to cooperate in our efforts to cut back on spending, even if it involves one of their favorite projects. I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, the amendment if adopted would involve the reduction of \$389,631,000 in future commitments. Once we start these projects we have no choice but to proceed.

I hope that this amendment will be adopted.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

VISIT TO THE SENATE BY R. C. COTTON, A SENATOR FROM NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, on a matter of personal privilege, that I may be recognized for one minute, with the time to be charged to neither side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, it is my unique pleasure to introduce a namesake who happens to be in town today, Mr. R. C. Cotton, a Senator from New South Wales, in the Parliament of Australia.

I take great pleasure in presenting him to the Senate, even though he does not claim any relationship to me.

In order not to disturb debate, I shall retire with him to the cloakroom and would appreciate it if any Senators who would like to meet him will join us there. [Applause, Senators rising.]

RECESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess for 2 minutes, for the purpose of meeting Mr. Cotton, with the time not to be charged to either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.

The motion was agreed to; and 3:28 p.m., the Senate took a recess.

At 3:30 p.m., the Senate reassembled, when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. MONDALE in the chair).

PUBLIC WORKS AND ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11641) making appro-

priations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, Intrastate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Water Resources Council, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

I express the hope that the Senate will not vote for the amendment proposed by the Senator from Delaware. As I pointed out earlier in the afternoon, ever since I have been on this committee as its chairman, we have invariably added new construction starts as well as new planning starts. In my humble judgment, if that had not been done, this great program of resource development, of which most of us are proud, would probably not have occurred. There would have been peaks and valleys in the program with the result that there would be a loss of efficiency and the country would have been deprived of many of the economic benefits that accrue to the region and the Nation as a result of the development of these resources.

Mr. President, I pointed out earlier that when a public works bill comes before the Congress, some areas of the country are better taken care of than others. Why that is, I do not know. As chairman of the subcommittee, what I have endeavored to do is to try to take care of the needs as closely as possible, with the moneys at hand, and to have a balance in the projects spread over the whole country.

As I stated earlier, I think 14 to 16 modern locks and dams on the Ohio River have, in the course of the last 15 years, been completed or placed under construction. Those were all authorized, but in most cases there were no budget estimates.

As a result of that construction program, we now have increased tonnage on that great river by over 2½ times what it was in 1948, when I became a member of this subcommittee.

In addition, we have done a great deal of work in preventing floods throughout the Nation by providing the necessary funds for reservoir projects in, for example, Nebraska, Kansas, and other States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield myself 3 additional minutes.

The amount of the saving to the people as a result of preventing flood damage has been great.

My good friend should realize one thing. Every time we postpone construction of any worthy project the costs for labor and materials, and items of that kind, increases from 3 to 4 percent a year. It simply means that if a project which would have cost \$50 million is postponed, there will be an additional cost in the year ahead of about \$2,000,000.

If it is postponed for 2 or 3 or 4 years, the increased cost can be measured by multiplying that increased cost by the number of years it is postponed.

I have much information that I could produce to indicate the great savings that have been accomplished by the engineers in the construction of these projects.

As the Senator from Delaware stated, the House did add 16 new projects, and the Senate 25. That is about in line with what we have done in the past. If we take the cost of all those projects into consideration as well as the nine new starts recommended in the budget we find that the future commitment on all of these projects will be about equal to 6 months work at the present rate of appropriations. If we take out of the pipeline this \$500 million worth of work, it will mean that, if it is continued for the next few years, this great program to develop the water resources of this country will come to a halt. I do not think anyone wants to do that.

I hope the amendment is not agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK].

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I shall support this amendment. My reasoning is as follows. I have been critical of the priorities of the Congress, and, indeed, of the President. In view of the pending conflict in Vietnam, the fact that we have an impending deficit which may run as high as \$30 billion, and the fact that, in my opinion, we are not doing anything adequate to deal with the critical problems of our cities, it is my view that, in order to cut back on the deficit, we ought to make primarily large economies in the military program. I am well aware that Congress is not in the mood to do that, although I shall continue to urge that it do so. One of the next areas where I would think we could economize without serious damage to our country is by stopping new starts, by the Corps of Engineers.

I realize that this is an area where it will be difficult, indeed, to get enough votes to get the amendments adopted, but with a war going on—and it is a war—it would seem to me one of the least defensible new ventures is to appropriate for new starts for the Corps of Engineers. It is true that since new starts are being provided for in the States of many Senators, it will be most difficult to support the pending amendment. There is a small one in my State. But if we are ever going to face up to the fiscal deficit, I think the place where we could make a cut in an area which is most expendable is in the public works bill, which is traditionally known as the pork barrel.

I stood up on the floor of the Senate and urged substantial new expenditures for the poverty program, and I have no apologies to make for that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. That is where, in my

opinion, our money should be put in an endeavor to solve the problem of poverty and crime in the cities. To me that should have a higher priority than any public works projects. When a public works project is started, it costs money to stop it; but when one has not even started, I can see little, if any, excuse to start projects which the administration has not requested.

For that reason I shall support the Williams amendment.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.

The Senator from Louisiana points out that what the Senate committee has done in increasing these appropriations is in line with what the Congress has been doing in the past. That is correct. But I call attention to the fact that today we are at war. We are confronted with one of the largest deficits we have had in the history of this country. We are confronted with a sizable tax increase plus a serious threat of inflation.

There is only one way to check this alarming trend and that is to slow down spending.

The Senator from Louisiana points out that at the rate of the present inflation if we postpone these projects until next year they may cost more money. I recognize that. But why will they cost more money? Because we are in an inflationary spiral which is being fed by the deficit spending of this administration. If the Government is going to keep increasing its own spending to get ahead of inflation then we are never going to check these deficits. I think the Government of the United States has more responsibility than the average citizen. It should set an example and hold back on those expenditures which can be curtailed without disrupting the security of this country.

I am not arguing the merits or demerits of any one of these individual projects; perhaps if we were in normal times they would be meritorious. I am sure the committee did a good job of evaluating them. That is why I am not arguing the merits of the individual projects, but I am arguing that now is not the time to authorize 41 new projects at a cost of \$390 million. Should we not postpone these expenditures until we have ended the war or at least brought our budgetary condition under control?

The suggestion is made that such action might disrupt the work of the Corps of Engineers. I respect the job that the Corps of Engineers has done in the past and is doing today. It does a remarkable job, but this does not disrupt its program. I call attention to the fact that even with the adoption of this amendment we would still be leaving \$1.4 billion available for Corps of Engineers' expenditures. There would be left \$992 million under this item, another \$190 million would be left in the bill for operation and maintenance—all of this under Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction. There would be \$91 million left for flood control, \$18.9 million would be provided for general expenses of Corps of Engineers, and in addition there would be \$162 million for a revolving fund under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers. These funds are to take care of situations involving, for example, the Philadelphia, Baltimore,

New York, or San Francisco channel, or harbor facilities, where they sometimes have to act quickly. This amendment does not reduce this revolving fund or the other mentioned items. I recognize that it is impossible to anticipate what the need will be in such situations.

Adequate money is provided for all normal operations. The amendment does not touch, at all, the money needed to keep open sea lanes for commerce. All the amendment does is to hold in abeyance all these new projects, even though they may be highly meritorious in normal times. It would hold up the expenditure of \$389,000,000 until either we have the budget more nearly in balance or the war is over.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, with all due respect to my distinguished friend from Delaware, I think he is not correct in his statement that we would be doing the right thing if we simply go along with the budget.

The one project added in my State, at my request, after the bill came to the Senate, illustrates my point. It is the deepening of the channel at Jacksonville Harbor from 34 to 38 feet. The appropriation recommended by the committee provided for \$500,000 to begin construction on a project that has a recognized benefit to cost ratio of 1.9.

The fact of the matter is that the city and the port authority are putting up millions of dollars in the construction of new facilities for the enlarged port. They have already let the contract for a big bridge across the old channel of the St. Johns River to make accessible some of the newly developed area. The Navy, Mr. President, has a large oil depot along the upper channel, and large-draft tankers cannot now get to it when fully loaded. They will be able to do so after the channel is deepened.

Mr. President, the fact of the matter is that the President can refuse to go ahead with any new start if he wishes to do so. I am quite content with his having that right; and I believe that he will be well able, knowing as he does the condition of our country, to decide which projects are needed most by the Nation, and to release the funds to go ahead promptly with those projects. I believed that the Jacksonville Harbor project was such a project, and that is why I asked that construction funds be included in the bill.

Mr. President, I do not have a great deal more to say, except to pay my compliments to the Senator from Louisiana, who certainly goes through these matters with a fine-toothed comb. I do not believe he has recommended to the committee and to the Senate the inclusion of a single new start, except from the point of view that he thinks it is important for the country for it to move ahead at this time.

I am willing to have the President pass on these projects, and to determine which of the new projects he thinks are of sufficient importance to the Nation that they should be started at this time.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I just wish to state that I support the committee in its proposals. The distinguished Senator from Louisiana has been more than generous and kind to us in Kansas; and I know how thoroughly he studied every project before he brought out this bill. I agree fully with the statement just made by the distinguished Senator from Florida in support of the action of the committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator, and certainly concur in his statement.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, as I read this report, the State I have the honor to represent in part does not have any projects that are without budget approval. Nevertheless, I will support the committee, because I understand the burden they have taken on over the years, and I believe they have handled it very well. I further believe that the committee has a continuing knowledge concerning the development of our resources that extends from one administration to the next. The bill before us is \$91,749,000 below the budget in the total amount appropriated.

At the same time, I am not unmindful of the deficit we face, and that we are in a serious war. I believe a decision may become necessary that all public works, budgeted and unbudgeted, be suspended unless they are of an emergency nature and directly connected with the war effort. If it does, I am sure the State I represent in part will accept that verdict without complaint. We do want to give due priority to the war effort, stop inflation, and put our financial house in order. Therefore, whatever program is adopted across the board, either to reduce expenditures or to raise revenues, we shall accept.

In the meantime, however, I shall support the committee, even though, as I read the report, I have no particular project involved in this amendment.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. President, I am in a similar position to that of the Senator from Nebraska in that there are a few unbudgeted items in the bill and the committee report pertaining to my State.

However, I feel, as the Senator from Florida pointed out, that some of these unbudgeted items may be even more important than the budgeted items. I certainly feel, as a Member of Congress, that I have the prerogative to decide whether or not the President's budgeted items are of equal force and necessity with others that may not have been included in the budget.

The committee saw fit to place some

items in the report which were not in the President's budget. I believe they did so with good reason. I, too, am deeply concerned about the fact that the amount of the bill represents an increase over and above the current level of spending. To me, the only way to handle that is to hope that the President will see fit either to reduce the spending for some items by slowing them down, or possibly just not to begin some projects. I think such action must be taken on a prudent basis.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Louisiana has expired.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 6 minutes.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from Delaware.

I would hope that, instead of knocking out and not starting some of these projects, other projects which are underway might be slowed down somewhat.

I can think of one or two projects in my State which I believe could be slowed down certainly to meet the necessity for reducing spending. I think the State of Iowa would join with all of the other States in bearing its fair share of these expenditure reductions.

I hope that this can be done at an administration level.

I thank the committee for using its good judgment in including some of these projects which I regard as equal to if not more important than the budget items.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield myself the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, the argument has been made that these particular projects have great merit. I do not question that for a moment. I am sure that we could think of a lot of other projects which would be equally meritorious; but what about the money to pay for them?

I have made no effort to deal with the merits of projects in any particular State. The amendment states very clearly that the 41 new projects which were not recommended by the President in the budget would be eliminated.

The question has been asked, "Will Congress go ahead and pass these new projects and then expect the President at his discretion to decide which is meritorious and which is not?"

I point out that the decision of the President has already been made. The administration has recommended that construction work start on but nine new projects. It has recommended that construction work on none of these 41 projects be started.

Here we have a situation in which Congress is overriding the recommendations of the administration and adding 41 new projects at a cost of \$390 million. They were not recommended and have not been approved by the budget.

If the Senate rejects the amendment

it will be approving expenditures of an extra \$389,631,000 at a time when Senators are all expressing concern over the size of the deficit and at a time when we are all expressing concern for the taxpayer, who is confronted with a 10-percent tax increase.

Where do we start? We should decide whether Congress should cut the appropriation or pass the buck to the President. Everyone agrees that the Senate is the place to cut the appropriations. Will the Senate continue to vote for and approve these multimillion-dollar projects and then go home and boast to our constituents of what we have done for them? Then later pass a resolution which tells the President, "You cut expenditures; we just did not have the courage."

Congress has a responsibility. I hope that we will accept that responsibility and agree to the amendment.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having expired, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, a rollcall vote being imminent, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Delaware. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If he were present, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw my vote.

The assistant legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WILLIAMS], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], and the Sen-

ator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG] are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], and the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WILLIAMS] would each vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. BROOKE], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. GRIFFIN], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] are necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. BROOKE] would each vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] is paired with the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT]. If present and voting, the Senator from Illinois would vote "yea," and the Senator from Utah would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 12, nays 61, as follows:

[No. 289 Leg.]

YEAS—12

| | | |
|--------|---------|----------------|
| Baker | Hansen | Proxmire |
| Boggs | Pastore | Thurmond |
| Clark | Percy | Tower |
| Cotton | Prouty | Williams, Del. |

NAYS—61

| | | |
|--------------|---------------|----------------|
| Allott | Harris | Mondale |
| Anderson | Hart | Monroney |
| Bayh | Hartke | Montoya |
| Bible | Hatfield | Morse |
| Brewster | Hayden | Moss |
| Burdick | Hickenlooper | Mundt |
| Byrd, Va. | Hill | Murphy |
| Byrd, W. Va. | Holland | Muskie |
| Cannon | Hruska | Nelson |
| Carlson | Inouye | Pearson |
| Case | Jackson | Pell |
| Church | Jordan, N.C. | Scott |
| Cooper | Jordan, Idaho | Smith |
| Curtis | Kuchel | Spong |
| Dominick | Long, La. | Stennis |
| Ellender | Magnuson | Symington |
| Ervin | Mansfield | Tydings |
| Fannin | McGee | Yarborough |
| Fong | McGovern | Young, N. Dak. |
| Fulbright | McIntyre | |
| Gruening | Miller | |

NOT VOTING—17

| | | |
|----------|----------------|----------------|
| Aiken | Hollings | Morton |
| Bartlett | Javits | Randolph |
| Bennett | Kennedy, Mass. | Ribicoff |
| Brooke | Kennedy, N.Y. | Russell |
| Dirksen | Lausche | Smathers |
| Dodd | Long, Mo. | Sparkman |
| Eastland | McCarthy | Talmadge |
| Gore | McClellan | Williams, N.J. |
| Griffin | Metcalfe | Young, Ohio |

So the amendment of Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware was rejected.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I had one other amendment which I was planning to offer. The other amendment dealt with nine new projects which were budgeted items; however, recognizing the failure to eliminate the 41 nonbudgeted items, I see no reason to

press this second amendment with respect to budgeted items.

There is one question, however, that I wish to ask the chairman of the committee. I had an amendment prepared which dealt with this question, but in talking with the chairman of the committee I understand that this problem may already have been taken care of.

On page 17 there is an allotment of \$750,000 for an Ohio project. I wanted to make sure as to whether the approval of this \$750,000 in any way endorses continuation of either planning or construction on the so-called Kirwan ditch, officially known as the Lake Erie-Ohio River Canal in Ohio.

If it does I want to offer an amendment to eliminate any part of the money that could be allocated for that project. It is my understanding that the overwhelming recommendation has been that the project was not feasible.

The question I wish to ask is: Is there any money in this bill for that project?

Mr. ELLENDER. There is not.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. There is not.

Mr. ELLENDER. If the Senator will read the report, it states:

The purpose of the appropriation is to provide funds for a reanalysis of the Grand River Reservoir by the Corps to develop a comprehensive plan for water management for the Mahoning-Grand River Basins.

That is all it is.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Then the answer is that this \$750,000 is in no way related to it and is not a part of the \$968 million canal project; the approval of that \$750,000 item does not provide even one dime of money for the continuation of that project, either planning or otherwise.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. With that assurance I shall not offer the amendment. I have also discussed this matter with other members of the committee, and they are all in agreement that there is not a dime in this bill for that project; there is no need then for the amendment.

(At this point, Mr. CANNON assumed the chair.)

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, it is then my understanding that there are not only no funds in this bill for the Lake Erie-Ohio River Canal, but also, as far as this measure is concerned that canal is a dead issue.

Mr. ELLENDER. I would not say it is a "dead issue." We did not provide any money for it. If the Senator will read the first paragraph of the language on page 23 he will note, and I stated this on the floor of the Senate last year, that unless local interests contribute their share the project will not come into being; and since the Governor of Pennsylvania notified the corps that the State would not provide any money, the House of Representatives proceeded to strike from the bill all money related to the construction or planning of the Lake Erie-Ohio River Canal. If later on the Governor of Pennsylvania were to notify the corps

that the State would provide the local cooperation, why of course the situation would change.

For all intents and purposes since the local cooperation will not be provided, the canal will not be constructed.

Mr. BREWSTER. I thank the Senator for his very clear answer.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. With that understanding I withdraw the amendment.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, there will be no more rollcall votes today. When the Senate adjourns at the close of business today it will adjourn to meet tomorrow at 12 o'clock noon, at which time, following the morning business, the bill making appropriations for public works will still be under consideration. The bill will not go to third reading until tomorrow.

CONTROL OF POLLUTANTS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES IN CALIFORNIA

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, there is widespread concern in California over the future of our State's program to control the emission of pollutants from motor vehicles. Because of California's pioneering efforts in this field and due to the unusual topographical and meteorological conditions that exist in our largest city, Los Angeles, it has become necessary to impose strict regulations on motor vehicles to control pollutants. The Senate recognized California's special needs in its version of the Air Quality Act of 1967. The House Commerce Committee, unfortunately, saw fit to delete from its version of the bill an amendment that would allow California to set more advanced standards on emissions from motor vehicles. The action of the House committee has brought expressions of concern from most of the major newspapers and radio-television stations in California. In the belief that the arguments raised in these editorials deserve a wider audience, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a series of editorials published in the Los Angeles Times, the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, the Santa Rosa Press Democrat, the San Rafael Independent Journal, and a KNXT editorial.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 8, 1967]

SMOG: THE WORSENING CRISIS

"Los Angeles residents have the choice of driving the kinds of autos they now own

with current fuels—or breathing. But they won't have the choice for long."

"Already some 10,000 persons are moving from the Los Angeles Basin annually because of air pollution," declared Dr. Joseph F. Boyle, president of the Los Angeles County Medical Assn.

His grim warning, given at a Los Angeles hearing of the Assembly Transportation and Commerce Committee, was by far the strongest statement the medical association has made on the threat of air pollution.

"A critical and worsening health crisis exists in Los Angeles County despite all efforts for its control," Dr. Boyle told the legislators. "The pending crisis is imminent and demands that every appropriate action, however drastic be taken immediately. No further delay can be tolerated with safety."

His pessimism was echoed by the local and state county's air pollution control officer, Louis J. Fuller and by Eric Grant, executive officer of the State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board.

Both officials warned that California's present auto emission standards are inadequate and must be strengthened to cope with the continuing increase of motor vehicles.

The "adverse" level of oxidant, or ozone, has been exceeded virtually every day since 1956 in the county, Fuller said.

In terms of the definition by the State Board of Public Health, the Los Angeles Basin is continually under a "substantial threat from air pollution."

Fuller also offered new substantiation for his charge that the smog control devices installed on California cars since 1966 do not meet even the present standards requirements.

He quoted from a report made last March by the State Department of Public Health, which stated: "Projection of surveillance data shows that as vehicle mileage accumulates, the average emissions from vehicles with exhaust control systems will not meet the current standards of 275 parts per million (ppm) hydrocarbons and 1.5 per cent monoxide."

But even this much progress in combatting smog would not have been achieved had not California and particularly Los Angeles County, pioneered in the setting—and enforcing—of standards of air purity.

It seems incredible, therefore, that an effort is being made in Congress to deny California the right to take the stronger action needed to meet its pending crisis in air pollution.

Although the Senate unanimously excluded California from the federal preemption of auto emission standards, the House Commerce Committee decided no exemption should be made.

Any change in the federal standards—which are the same as California's presently inadequate requirements—could only be made by the secretary of health, education and welfare if the House committee has its way.

"Unless the special section is restored," said Grant, "it will be an outright violation of the concept of states' rights and an apparent recognition by Congress that the interest of Detroit auto makers prevails over the interests of California's 20 million people."

If the smog crisis is to be averted in urban California, the allowable amount of hydrocarbons from autos must be reduced to at least 180 ppm, as presently scheduled. Every additional car makes the problem worse, and the number of vehicles is expected to double by 1980.

A spokesman for the automobile industry told the Assembly committee that it is a "difficult technical job" to meet California current standards. No doubt it is, but as Dr. Boyle warned, no further delay can be tolerated with safety.

The health and welfare of the Los Angeles

Basin dare not be imperiled by any weakening of the fight for clean air. Emission control devices must be made to meet present standards, and more stringent standards must be adopted as soon as feasible without federal interference.

Despite attempts at control, Los Angeles County suffered three first-stage smog alerts in succession at the end of August, during which the ozone level was the highest in 10 years.

How many persons will have to leave the Los Angeles Basin to find breathing room?

County smog chief Fuller offers little encouragement.

"I have previously stated that the possibility of a major catastrophe from air pollution in this basin was quite remote," he concluded. "I must now say that on the basis of present data, my opinion has changed. There is no margin for error."

[From the Los Angeles Evening and Sunday Herald Examiner, Oct. 2, 1967]

THE SMOG CAUSE

It is the plain duty of the California congressional delegation—Republicans and Democrats alike—to undo the harm done by the House Commerce Committee in approving a national clean air bill.

The committee eliminated from the Senate-passed version a provision which would have permitted California to strengthen its auto emission standards beyond those set for all the other states.

The reason behind the original California exemption is that California, with one of the nation's worst smog problems, already has adopted a stringent antipollution law of its own.

The exemption was removed, however, when the House committee accepted an amendment (from Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich.) which would impose national standardization unless the secretary of health, education and welfare authorizes tougher measures.

Warren M. Dorn, chairman of the Board of Supervisors' Air Pollution Control Committee, sees it this way:

"This means that Los Angeles County . . . can have no stricter requirements for control than some wind-swept prairie town unless the secretary of health, education and welfare approves."

In other words, the House committee action has put the fate of Los Angeles smog control in the hands of one man. We believe that it should be fixed in law and that the California delegation should rally to restore the original exemption.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Aug. 1, 1967]

POLLUTION: SENATE CLEARS THE AIR

"No one has the right to use the atmosphere as a garbage dump," declared the U.S. Senate, as it unanimously approved new and stronger air pollution control legislation.

The Senate bill gives the Department of Health, Education and Welfare additional authority to set clean air standards and to implement them if local and state officials fail to act. A total of \$700 million was also authorized for research and demonstrations programs over the next three years.

Although the Administration sought the establishment of national emission standards for certain pollutants, the Senate decided to let the states set their own requirements—within a 15-month period, after which the federal government would move in.

The bill, however, went beyond the Administration's request by giving HEW the power to seek a court injunction against any source of pollution which creates an "imminent and substantial" danger to public health.

California won a highly important exemption that will permit it to impose auto emis-

sion standards that are more stringent than the national requirements. Approved at the request of Sen. George Murphy (R-Calif.), the exemption recognizes the pioneering efforts in auto smog control by California and our intention to require tougher standards in 1970.

This year every new car produced in Detroit will have exhaust control devices that meet the standards heretofore only required for autos sold in California.

The House should act without delay on the new legislation and should resist any attempts to weaken an essential program for cleaner air throughout the nation.

[From the Santa Rosa Press Democrat,
Aug. 6, 1967]

AIR POLLUTION

That was a good job Sen. George Murphy did in persuading the Senators to include a specific exemption of California from standards to be set by the Office of Health Education and Welfare controlling air pollution by motor vehicles.

It is unusual legislation that exempts one state from something that applies to all others. But in this case there was a good reason.

"I couldn't sit by and allow lower standards to replace those deemed necessary by our state officials," Sen. Murphy explained.

Essentially, the clean air bill passed by the Senate authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to divide the country into air quality control regions and give states in each region 15 months to accept the federal standards before the Department takes over.

Because of both experience and sheer necessity, the California standards on pollution of air by motor vehicles are both strict and effective.

Federal standards, when and if adopted, may be equally good. But if they are not, the California standards will not be weakened as a result. Sen. Murphy has seen to that.

[From the San Rafael (Calif.) Independent Journal, July 29, 1967]

MARIN PLAYED BIG ROLE IN AUTO SMOG CONTROL

The Air Quality Act of 1967, now before Congress, represents a nationwide war against air pollution, with cooperation among federal, state, and local agencies.

The bill would authorize the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to divide the country into control regions, establish criteria for controlling pollutants, give the states up to 15 months to accept the air quality standards, and authorize the Secretary of HEW to implement standards if states failed to do so.

At the insistence of Sen. George Murphy, California would retain the right to enact its own control on motor vehicle pollution because acute car smog problems in the state require stricter controls.

California has led the nation in efforts to combat air pollution. It entered the auto smog control picture in 1960 with establishment of its Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board.

And within California, Marin County played no small role in the long and often controversial process of equipping automobiles with anti-smog devices.

Back in 1964 when the first crankcase devices were ordered for used cars, two Marin County residents spearheaded a determined opposition to the devices.

Lester E. Jennings Jr. and Lars Williamson, mechanics by avocation, charged that crankcase devices installed on used cars would be difficult to maintain in top condition, and would be harmful to the car engine.

Their contention was that the little guy,

those who owned older model cars, should not be saddled with the extra cost of crankcase devices and the risk of a damaged motor.

They insisted that the responsibility should rest, not on the little car owner, but on the car manufacturers in Detroit.

Jennings and Williamson made many a trip into Sacramento to attend committee hearings and hammer away with their message.

Bearing the brunt of their attack was another former Marinite, Donald A. Jensen, who had been Marin County administrator before taking over as executive officer of the State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board.

Jensen and the car pollution control board faced increasing resistance from among used car owners. A law that finally went through the Legislature was considerably less stringent than that which had been proposed originally.

Because of persistent complaints on the high cost of installation and maintenance, a reform measure enacted in 1965 gave further relief to used car owners. Requirement of crankcase devices on 1955 and later models was made to apply only in 10 smog counties and only when car ownership was transferred.

The bulk of the attention thereafter focused on new models, with manufacturers required to install crankcase devices on cars after 1963, and exhaust devices on cars sold in California after 1966.

Jennings and Williamson and other opponents of crankcase devices for used vehicles did not succeed in halting the devices altogether. But they did succeed in getting relief for the older car owners and in focussing attention on the responsibility of the car manufacturer.

Jensen, who took quite a buffeting as executive officer of the state car pollution control board, maintained his composure and humor throughout the exhausting committee hearings.

Jensen has since moved on into the private auto manufacturing business, joining Ford Motor Co. as executive engineer in vehicle emissions and regulations.

In his new job Jensen is concerned primarily with improved crankcase devices and combustion system to reduce pollution from automobile emissions.

Thus, Marinites and former Marinites have been in the forefront on the fight to control auto smog, as California groped its way forward as pioneer in the field of air pollution control.

We take pride in the fact that the sound and fury created in Marin led to practical and meaningful legislation in Sacramento and is resulting in legislation on the federal level.

THE FEDERAL SMOG LAW

(By Karth Hintz, broadcast September 29 and 30, 1967, station KNXT)

Southern California faces the threat of a serious delay in the fight against smog.

A Federal air pollution control bill now before Congress may strip California of its authority to establish strict controls for automobiles.

As you know, California has pioneered in smog control legislation. Progress at the national level lagged far behind. But Congress is now considering ways to bring the national smog law up to standards already in effect in California.

That's all to the good, but California is moving beyond that point. The State has a target date of 1970 for controls that would double the effectiveness of the present automobile devices.

That schedule could be brought to a halt under the national smog bill as amended this week. The House Commerce Committee removed the Murphy Amendment, introduced by Senator Murphy, which would per-

mit California—California alone—to impose stricter rules than would be contained in the national law.

As the proposed law reads now, if the State of California wanted to impose standards tougher than the Federal law, we would have to ask permission of the Health, Education and Welfare Department.

Such a rule could involve prolonged hearings by the Federal bureau. California's smog control schedule would be tied up in red tape that stretched all the way back to Washington.

Southern California needs the Murphy Amendment. We've led the way in smog control for 20 years, and we can continue to set the pace if Washington does not apply the brakes.

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAM WAR

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Negotiation Now is meeting in Washington to organize its friends and rally followers behind a negotiated end to the Vietnam war.

This group has already done an outstanding job of educating the American people to the fact that there are alternatives to our present course in Vietnam. I extend to them my good wishes for a successful meeting.

That the war must be brought to a negotiated settlement seems to me to be the only reasonable course the American people can expect from their Government. Some recent news stories have purported to represent the administration as believing that North Vietnam will have made a great psychological gain and that negotiations more favorable to it will flow from a GOP victory. Therefore, this rationale runs, a defeat of the Johnson administration will be viewed as a victory for Ho Chi Minh and the American people must not allow that to come to pass.

The trouble with this theory is that it assumes the 1968 election is the one North Vietnamese consider the vital one. In my opinion, that is very doubtful. A much more practical and logical course for North Vietnam to be following would be to look to the 1972 election as being the key one.

Ho Chi Minh must appreciate that it would be unusual for the American people to turn out of office a President who seeks reelection. But anyone who can read the Constitution knows that this administration must leave office in 1972, and that it will be succeeded by a new President and a new administration.

Unless this administration finds a way to change its military policy in Vietnam, and seek a negotiated settlement, I see nothing else it can offer the American people except 5 more years of growing war and growing casualty lists; for if North Vietnam has sustained a war effort under the heavy air attack and overwhelming firepower the United States has showered upon it for 2 years, it is hard to see why it cannot sustain such a war for another 5 years—especially when the probabilities are increasing that it will get more and more aid from its allies, China and Russia.

I suggest to the President that 1968 is not the year of decision for North Vietnam, but 1972. I see no reason why North Vietnam, or the Vietcong should

surrender to a reelected Johnson administration, when it knows that by 1972, a change in American Government has to take place.

That is why I warn the American people against the notion that if they just hold out through November of 1968, peace can come on our terms. I warn them that unless they insist on prompt negotiations, and upon deescalation of the military scope of the war, it more than likely will proceed on its present course of steady enlargement for some 5 more years at the very least.

That is why I think the work of Negotiation Now is so important. It is helping to bring an understanding to the average American that a war of attrition can be just as costly to us as to the enemy, and that time is not necessarily on our side. In fact, the longer the war has continued, the more it is costing us in both manpower and money, plus the growing erosion of American leadership in other parts of the world.

GREECE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the press tells us that the Greek junta has released from house arrest an elderly leader of Greek political affairs, George Papandreou. It has also undertaken to consult with his son, Andreas Papandreou, on economic problems facing Greece, even though Andreas Papandreou is in jail awaiting trial on charges of treason.

Richard Eder, reporting from Athens for the New York Times, describes these actions as conciliatory moves the junta has made to the Center Union party.

From experience, one has to conclude that whatever else motivates these "conciliatory moves," at least one motivation is the desire of the U.S. Embassy to be able to depict the junta as deserving of a resumption of full U.S. military aid. All the way from Saigon to Athens, our diplomatic policy is concerned far more with appearances than with substance, for behind appearances the real interests of American military power can be advanced in any way we see fit.

I very much regret that the administration seems to have decided to resume our military support of this group of militarists, just as soon as a facade of reasonableness is constructed in front of their iron-fisted rule. Let no one in this country, or in Greece, be fooled about the why we send this aid to Greece. It has nothing to do with democracy; nothing to do with freedom of the Greek people; nothing to do with advancing the cause of personal freedom through constitutional limitations on government action. We do not stand for those things any more in Greece, just as we do not stand for them in many parts of the world.

The only object of our aid program in Greece is to keep a strong pro-American military government in power that will accede to whatever requests the Pentagon makes of it, especially with respect to NATO.

As one who supported the program of aid to Greece and Turkey when it was announced by President Truman in 1948,

I can only say that those of us who believed that program would lead Greece, Turkey, and the United States to peaceful progress have now found that we only got on a merry-go-round that comes back to the same place every year.

Greece has retrogressed politically; what economic progress she made with our billions of aid is being dissipated by the actions of the military dictatorship under the junta. If anything, Greece is now more threatened by economic and political upheaval than it was before our aid program started.

The country that only a few years ago was called a showcase for U.S. aid is now a showcase for the futility of U.S. aid, insofar as its contribution to political and economic growth is concerned.

Here the American taxpayers are supporting through a misguided administration, dominated by the military power of the Pentagon, the use of tax dollars to support a dictatorship in Greece; yet we have an administration that considers a \$70 billion defense budget—the largest in the history of the Republic—to be untouchable.

It is out of this budget that \$7½ billion saving should come, and thus avoid getting us into the very serious political issues that will develop, if the administration continues to insist upon yoking the American taxpayers with a 10-percent surtax charge.

But I do not doubt that the aid will be resumed in full. There will be another 20 years of heavy U.S. taxpayer contributions to Greece. But they will not have my support, for they will do no more for the well-being of the Greek people than have the last 20 years and \$3.5 billion worth of U.S. money which we have poured into Greece.

Here is a place where great savings can be made on behalf of the taxpayers. We have before us a public works bill at the present time on the floor of the Senate.

Let me respectfully point out to the administration that the expenditure of money for the benefit of our domestic economy is sorely needed by the American people in order to keep strong the greatest defense weapon we have; namely, the economic security of the Republic.

RECOGNITION OF SENATOR SMATHERS OF FLORIDA AT THE CLOSE OF MORNING BUSINESS TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the close of morning business on tomorrow, the distinguished junior Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] be recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PUBLIC WORKS AND ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 11641) making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of De-

fense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Atlantic-Pacific Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Water Resources Council, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I am concerned, as I stated in connection with the amendment offered by the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] a short while ago, about the failure to make any significant cuts in the public works and Atomic Energy Commission appropriation bill now pending before the Senate.

It is well known that I have been of the view that the fiscal crisis in this country is very serious indeed. It seems likely, unless the House Ways and Means Committee changes its mind, that we will not have a tax bill. We may be confronted with a deficit so huge that it will be necessary to sell some \$30 billion worth of U.S. Government bonds in the next calendar year.

Such an action on the money market is sure to cause very tight money, extremely high interest rates, and would slow down the normal growth of the economy.

It is likely also to have an inflationary effect, because of the immense cash flow which will be thrown into the economy as a result of the enormous deficit.

Last week I argued strenuously for substantial additional authorization for the poverty program; and I am very proud that I made that argument, because, as I said during the course of that debate, the problem with us is to put first things first. Where is our sense of national priorities?

We are confronted with very serious problems. The war in Vietnam, which is costing us \$2.5 billion a month and is costing hundreds—indeed, thousands—of American lives and American casualties of the flower of our youth. Yet there seems no end to it. That war will cost, in the current fiscal year, practically the same amount as the anticipated deficit if there is no tax increase—namely, \$30 billion.

It has been one of my duties as a Member of the Senate to follow very closely both the poverty program and the education program; I serve as chairman on one and as a member of the other subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare charged with the processing of legislation in the poverty and educational area. To me these matters should have the highest possible priority. Therefore, I have supported,

and will continue to support, all the authorization we are able to press through a reluctant Congress to see that every boy and girl in America gets the best possible education, and that something effective is done to improve the economic, social, and, indeed, educational status of the one-fifth of the Nation, almost 30 million Americans, who are ill-fed, ill-housed, and ill-educated.

One may well ask the question, how can one advocate increased appropriations in these social areas in the face of the deficit which confronts us? My answer is that the cuts have to be made in the less important matters, in programs of lower priority, in addition to cuts in the fat of the military appropriations requests.

With respect to the military, I have made as good a record as I could. When the appropriations bill was before the Senate, I tried to make a cut of something in excess of \$3.5 billion. I had only six votes in support of my amendment.

This morning I made a strong plea to the President not to spend the \$5 billion which it is anticipated will be spent in construction of an utterly inadequate anti-ballistic-missile system at a great cost to our taxpayers.

Now, in a far less dramatic setting, we are confronted by the public works and atomic energy appropriation bill. I was happy to support the Senator from Delaware in his effort to cut back the appropriations for public works by eliminating all the new starts for the Corps of Engineers. I shall not repeat the argument I made in that regard only a short time ago.

We come now to the Atomic Energy Commission. There the total of appropriations recommended for both operating expenses and construction is in the neighborhood of \$2.5 billion. In view of the strains placed upon our economy as a result of the costs of the war, I believe we must seek out and discover places to cut this item. I would be prepared to support cuts in the military research and development areas of the Atomic Energy Commission. I believe such cuts can be made with no prejudice to our national security.

In addition, they would signal to the Russians our desire for a downturn in the arms race, with mutual reductions in weaponry. But I have no illusions on that score. I am perfectly confident that my colleagues in the Senate would not support me in that regard.

So I return to the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy. I find that, under the heading of "Reactor Development," we appropriated last year a total of \$467,720,000. This is a huge sum for activities which, while desirable, are less essential to the well-being of our country than aid to our beleaguered cities and other programs which I could name. Moreover, they are expenditures which can have no possible impact on our military program.

Therefore, I would be prepared to support an amendment which would cut back the \$509,058,000 which the Senate committee has recommended in this area of peaceful reactor development to the

figure of \$467,720,000, which was appropriated last year.

It is my understanding that the Senator from Delaware will propose such an amendment tomorrow. I intend to support it.

I would be prepared to support an even greater cut in this field, but to me it would seem unrealistic to hope that such a cut could be successfully pressed through the Senate.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I have listened with interest to what the senior Senator from Pennsylvania has said. He has touched on a subject which should be the concern of every Member of this body—and of every American. We are being asked to increase the tax burden of the country by 10 percent. We are told that this is necessary to sustain our fighting forces in Vietnam. But if we are to ask the American people to make this sacrifice, we must be ready to stand before them with the firm and sincere reassurance that every penny we spend is in the national interest.

But economy cannot be the only measure of our decision. The distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania has raised the issue of the health and welfare of the American people. To build the civilian reactor plants for the production of electrical energy, as the AEC would have us do, is playing nuclear roulette with the future of this country.

I am moved to recall the words of W. A. Boyle, the president of the United Mine Workers union in his recent Labor Day address. He spoke of the 6,000 uranium miners condemned to a slow death by cancer, of the transport through our cities of deadly atomic waste, of the burial of this waste where it can pollute and has polluted the soil of this Nation with radioactive poisons. The Atomic Energy Commission, in its testimony before committees of this Congress, has admitted that it has not yet solved the problems of handling the deadly by-products of nuclear power.

Mr. President, if we give serious thought to what the president of one of this country's oldest and greatest unions has said; if we study what the AEC itself has unwittingly disclosed; if we listen to what the scientists tell us about the primitive state of our understanding of the nuclear arts—then we must, in all conscience subscribe to what the senior Senator from Pennsylvania has said.

There will be plenty of time for this body to sanction the wholesale proliferation in this country of nuclear power—but only when the Atomic Energy Commission and the scientific community know precisely what they are about. Meanwhile, there are ample means, through the use of other energy-producing materials such as coal, to supply this country with all the electric power that it needs—and at a cost far lower than what the AEC can offer.

I would be the last man in this great body to deprive the Atomic Energy Commission of a single penny that would be devoted for research and development in

instruments to guarantee this Nation's security. But I would be remiss in my duty if I did not stand behind the statement by the Senator from Pennsylvania. I submit that the interests of this country and of its people require us to question, and even limit, the civilian expenditures of the Atomic Energy Commission until such time as we know with absolute certainty that we are not taking a foolish and willful gamble.

I will join the Senator from Pennsylvania in supporting the amendment which it is anticipated will be offered by the Senator from Delaware on tomorrow.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Yes, I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I congratulate the Senator from West Virginia on the statement he has just made. Pennsylvania, like West Virginia, is a State where coal mining has been the backbone of our economy. It has fallen upon perilous times, but is now staging somewhat of a comeback. I hope very much that the coal industry and the unionized miners who work in that industry in my State, in both hard coal and soft coal, will be able to look forward to more prosperous days ahead.

If there is a real threat that the atomic energy program is, in fact, as the Senator from West Virginia suggests, creating a serious danger to the health and well-being, and perhaps the lives, of millions of Americans, it certainly is time to stop, look, and listen. It seems to be essential that we assure ourselves, before we move forward with the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy by building a large number of atomic reactors, that we are not, by so doing, endangering the lives of untold thousands of our fellow citizens.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, before moving to adjourn, I ask the distinguished Presiding Officer, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is H.R. 11641, an act making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Is it correct that the bill will be open for further amendment on tomorrow?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The bill will be open for further amendment tomorrow.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Presiding Officer.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to

come before the Senate today, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 41 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Tuesday, October 10, 1967, at 12 noon.

NOMINATION

Executive nomination received by the Senate October 9, 1967:

U.S. ATTORNEY

Asher E. Schroeder, of Iowa, to be U.S. attorney for the northern district of Iowa for the term of 4 years, vice Donald E. O'Brien, resigned.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

Report From Washington

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM L. SPRINGER

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, October 9, 1967

Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following report which I have made to my constituents this day:

Most Congress-watchers agree that President Johnson has failed to present a convincing argument for raising taxes. His so far unsuccessful effort to win a 10 percent surtax on top of your normal federal income tax is rooted in another failure: The Administration's failure to control spending.

As living costs climb steadily, the President continues to bombard Congress with new ideas for spending money. This is why so many members of his party have joined Republicans in refusing to consider a massive tax rise in the face of mounting evidence of wasteful extravagance on domestic programs.

Congress is showing its concern over inflation in many ways. Just this week the House of Representatives rejected an appropriation bill for the U.S. Departments of Labor and of Health, Education and Welfare because, although the \$13.3 billion total was some \$148.1 million less than President Johnson's budget requests, it represented a \$259.5 million increase over last year's appropriation for the same departments. In short, the trimming job did not go deep enough for 226 of us who voted for more economy against 173 House members who backed the bill that came out of a House-Senate conference committee.

Housewives see the visible results of the federal government's deficit spending every time they buy food for the family table. Dads see it everytime they consider the purchase of a new car, a television set or a needed appliance. Yet few consider that the higher prices they are forced to pay for goods of all kinds actually amount to an invisible tax that robs everyone but is particularly hard on people living on fixed incomes.

President Johnson scored inflation in his economic report of 1966 as "the most unjust and capricious form of taxation" but that year economists calculated the inflationary rise to be \$25 billion. The Labor Department's cost of living index has risen almost every month since then. Almost every issue of your daily newspaper carries company announcements of price increases for consumer products.

Increases in advertised prices are only part of the inflation story. Every person's living costs also are affected by prices set by competitive bidding or through negotiation between buyer and seller. A recent survey showed substantial rises in these unlisted prices, affecting a variety of items from pencils to electric generators. For example:

A Southern contractor is bidding 10 percent more than last year on a plant construction project in the \$5-15 million range.

A Midwest contractor reported his bids are averaging 10 percent more than last year on jobs to be completed in 1967 and 20 percent more on jobs to be finished in 1968.

The Chicago Board of Education reported sharp increases in prices not only for pencils but also for all supplies purchased through competitive bidding.

Airplane jet engine repair jobs are costing 8 percent more than a year ago.

Many companies selling under long-term contracts are demanding "escalator" clauses that will permit them to raise prices if their costs go up while they are filling the contract.

These are some of the reasons that Congress is calling a halt to inflationary federal spending programs and why even members of the President's own party, including Congressman Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, are reluctant to approve his tax proposal.

They know that the hand that signed the tax boost request is also the hand that controls the spending spigot.

Partnership in Health

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JEFFERY COHELAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, October 9, 1967

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize anew my satisfaction in the partnership for health legislation passed by the House. It marks a milestone in Federal-State-local relationships.

Our interest in the health of all the people has been evident for many years in the legislation passed to support growing State and local programs addressed to many health problems. But we were beginning to be uneasy that this Federal support might be imposing upon States and local areas a selection of programs that might not be the most effective in terms of their special needs.

In passing the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966, Public Law 89-749, we felt we were taking a step toward correcting the situation. This year, when the President recommended extension of this legislation for a true partnership for health, we gave it our careful attention. I believe, with the President, that the legislation passed last week, while not ideal in every detail, will be a long way toward strengthening State and

local programs of planning to meet State and local health needs. It permits flexibility in the use of Federal funds so that they can most effectively promote the health of the people.

I believe that the President's recommendation and careful examination of the issues involved by the Members of this House have resulted in legislation which deserves our full confidence and support.

Majority of TV Audience Opposes Stricter Firearms Law

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, October 9, 1967

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, it was gratifying to me to learn that a high percentage of residents of the National Capital area registered opposition to the enactment by the Congress of a stricter firearms law in a recent audience poll by WMAL-TV, channel 7. This is truly significant, because the people in the Washington environs have been exposed to an almost continuous barrage of newspaper stories and cartoons and radio and TV programs that have focused attention on the misuse of firearms in the commission of crime. Concerned efforts have been made by some segments of the public and of the news media to show that firearms are the cause of crime, and I would like my colleagues to know that this poll shows that intelligent people appreciate that criminals are not deterred from committing violent acts by the mere violation of another law. We have had the Federal Firearms Act and the National Firearms Act on the books for 30 years, but what good are laws if they are not rigidly enforced?

At approximately 8 p.m., Tuesday, September 26, I received a telephone call from a friend who informed me of a poll being taken by WMAL-TV, channel 7. The polling apparently had started with the news broadcast at 7 p.m. and continued until 10 p.m.

At the close of each scheduled program between these hours, the question: "Should Congress enact a strict gun control law?" was projected for approximately 1 minute. Two telephone numbers—one for a "yes" vote, and one for a "no"—were provided for each political